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by RAMESH
KUMAR VATTI
Date: 2026.03.25
11:15:29 +0530
2026:CGHC:12492
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPL No. 189 of 2023
* - M/s Jayaswal Neco Industries Ltd. Through Its Managing Director, Having
Office At Siltara Raipur, Tahsil And District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner
Versus
* - Ravi Kumar Sahu S/o Late Bhulauram Sahu Aged About 28 Years R/o
Village Mandhar, P.O. Mandhar, Tehsil - Dharsiwa, District - Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent
And
WPL No. 10 of 2024
* - M/s Jayaswal Neco Industries Ltd. Through Its Managing Director, Having
Office At Siltara - Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
---Petitioner
Versus
* - Vishnu Verma S/o Itwari Ram Verma Aged About 39 Years R/o Village
Raita, P.O. Manohara, Tahsil-Dharsiwa, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent
For Petitioner/Management
:
Mr. Trivikram Nayak, Advocate
For Respondents/Workmen
:
Mr. Sudeep Johri, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
16/03/2026
1.
The petitioner has preferred these two petitions challenging the
order(s) and award(s) passed by the learned Labour Court (ID Act),
Raipur in Case No. 34/I.D. Act/2015 and Case No. 35/I.D. Act/2015
dated 01.11.2022, whereby the statement of claim filed by the
workmen have been allowed and the employer has been directed to
reinstate them in service within period of 45 days with 25% of back
wages.
2.
The facts, in brief, are that workman/respondent- Ravi Kumar Sahu
(WPL No. 189/2023) was working with the petitioner to the post of
Junior Assistant since 21.12.2009 and workman/respondent- Vishnu
Verma (WPL No. 10/2024) was working with the petitioner to the post
of Junior Assistant since 31.07.2007. Their services were confirmed by
the employer. The workmen were served with Articles of Charge on the
ground that they were involved in tampering milometer of vehicles of
the Company. The said Articles of Charge were issued on 01.12.2014.
Both the workmen filed their reply to Articles of Charge on 06.12.2014
and 05.12.2014 respectively. Subsequent to filing of replies to Articles
of Charge, both the workmen tendered their voluntarily resignations on
14.01.2015 and their resignations were accepted by the employer. The
workmen made complaint before the police authorities on 20.05.2015
which was registered under Section 155 of CrPC. It is also stated in
the statement of claim that the complaint was made to the Assistant
Labour Commissioner and consequently conciliation proceedings were
drawn and finally the workmen were advised to approach Competent
Court. Both the workmen examined themselves before the learned
Labour Court, exhibited documents, but the employer failed to
examine any witness and finally the impugned awards were passed.
3.
Mr. Trivikram Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the employer
would argue that the Articles of Charge were issued against the
workmen on 01.12.2014, where specific allegations were that they
tampered with milometer of the trucks engaged with the company for
transportation of the goods. He would contend that the workmen filed
their reply wherein they categorically stated that in future they would
never repeat such mistake. He would submit that on 14.01.2015 both
the workmen tendered their resignations and same were accepted by
the management on 14.01.2015. He would contend that the workmen
made complaint before the police authorities after 04 months on
20.05.2015 without explaining delay part. He would submit that the
workmen could not place on record complaints made to the Assistant
Labour
Commissioner
to
demonstrate
that
immediately
after
14.01.2015 complaints were made. He would submit that burden was
on the workmen to establish the fact that the resignations were
outcome of coercion, force or influence. He would submit that the
learned Labour Court has committed error of law while allowing the
statement of claim and directing their reinstatement with 25% of back
wages. He would pray to allow these petitions. Mr. Trivikram Nayak
has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the matters of Shriram Manohar Bande Vs. Uktranti Mandal and
Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 647 and Anil Rishi Vs. Gurbaksh
Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558. He has also placed reliance on the
judgment passed by this Court in WPS No. 1625 of 2012 dated
06.11.2025 parties being Mahendra Kumar Sahu Vs. South Eastern
Coal Fields Ltd. and Others
4.
Mr.
Sudeep
Johri,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
respondents/workmen would oppose the submissions made by Mr.
Trivikram Nayak. Mr. Johri would submit that management failed to
examine any witness to substantiate the fact that the resignations
were tendered by the workmen voluntarily. He would submit that the
workmen had only remedy to make a complaint before the police
authorities or before the Assistant Labour Commissioner and those
remedies were very well availed by them. He would contend that there
was no reason or occasion for the workmen to tender their
resignations as they were appointed in lieu of land acquisition. He
would submit that Articles of Charge were issued against the workmen
and thereafter replies were filed. He would contend that the workmen
have specifically stated in the statement of claim that they were
confined by Security Officer for a day and they were compelled and
forced to tender their resignations. He would submit that the workmen
have proved their case and therefore, the learned Labour Court
allowed the statement of claim and passed award(s) of reinstatement
with 25% of back wages. He would submit that burden was on the
management to establish that there was no coercion or force upon the
workmen to tender their resignations and the management utterly
failed to prove this fact. It is also argued that these writ petitions under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not maintainable. He would
contend that the petitioner should have preferred these writ petitions
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as the order(s) under
challenge have been passed by the learned Labour Court. He would
contend that the High Court while exercising power under Article 226
of the Constitution should not re-appreciate evidence. He would
submit that these writ petitions deserve to dismissed. Mr. Johri has
placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of M/s Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Krishna Kant Pandey, 2015 AIR SCW 634.
5.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records
of the learned Labour Court.
6.
The learned Labour Court recorded a finding that the workmen herein
were pressurized to tender their resignations. The workmen who were
working with the petitioner were served with Articles of Charge on
01.12.2014. They tendered their resignations on 14.01.2015. Exhibited
documents would show that the workmen made complaint to the
police authorities on 20.05.2015 after 04 months. A conciliation
proceeding
was
also
initiated
before
the
Assistant
Labour
Commissioner, but the workmen failed to demonstrate that they were
pressurized to tender their resignations, and therefore, they were
advised to approach Competent Court. The resignations submitted by
the workmen were accepted on 14.01.2015 itself and the learned
Labour Court has recorded a finding that 01 month prior notice or
salary of 01 month was not paid to the workmen. The finding recorded
by the learned Labour Court appears to be erroneous as it was not a
case of retrenchment, rather resignations were tendered by the
workmen, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, there was no need to
serve with 01 month prior notice or to make payment of 01 month
salary. The provisions of Sections 25 F, G and H of the ID Act would
attract when a workman has been removed from service without
holding enquiry or without issuance of show cause notice or in utter
violation of provisions of Section 25 F of ID Act.
7.
Shriram Manohar Bande (supra) was a matter where attempts were
made by the workman to undo the voluntary decision to resign only
post acceptance of his resignation letter. It was observed that
resignation was voluntary tendered, and no stand of marital disputes
and personal difficulties was not stated in the resignation letter. The
relevant paragraph no. 20 is reproduced herein below:-
“20. It is to be noted that appellant was
undergoing certain marital disputes and has
admitted to this effect that owing to his difficulties
in performing his duties, he tendered his
resignation on 10.10.2017. Before the Tribunal,
appellant tried to take a stand that he was
pressurized into tendering his resignation,
however, the Tribunal specifically observed that
the appellant never took this stand in his
resignation letter, and this plea was raised for the
first time before the Education Officer vide letter
dated 13.12.2017. Appellant did not take this plea
in any of the earlier communications, and
accordingly, Tribunal observed that resignation
was voluntary, and the submissions of
pressurization were vague. Appellant also stated
that he had filed a leave application on
10.10.2017, the same date as his resignation
letter, seeking leave from 01.11.2017 to
30.11.2017. However, the Tribunal had brushed
aside said contention of the appellant on the
ground that he never submitted any proof to show
his bona fides of having communicated the leave
application, and Tribunal held that Appellant had
acted upon his resignation till his subsequent
communication. These observations of the
Tribunal would go to show the conduct of the
appellant, and the attempts made by the appellant
to undo the voluntary decision to resign only post
acceptance of his resignation letter. Appellant
himself has admitted that he sought withdrawal of
his resignation letter on 03.11.2017 only upon
realizing his mistake. Tribunal and the High Court
have confirmed the fact that resignation was
voluntary tendered by the appellant. The appellant
has also strenuously submitted that the
acceptance of the resignation was not
communicated to him, and he submitted his letter
seeking withdrawal of resignation before the
communication of acceptance of the resignation.
Hence, he contended that the termination was
invalid.”
8.
In the matter of Anil Rishi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme has dealt
with the provisions of Sections 101, 102 and 106 of the Evidence Act.
It is held that ordinarily, the burden of proof rests on party which
substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. The relevant
paragraphs no. 9 and 10 are reproduced herein below:-
“9.
In terms of the said provision, the burden of
proving the fact rests on the party who
substantially asserts the affirmative issues and
not the party who denies it. The said rule may not
be universal in its application and there may be
an exception thereto. The learned trial court and
the High Court proceeded on the basis that the
defendant was in a dominating position and there
had been a fiduciary relationship between the
parties. The appellant in his written statement
denied and disputed the said averments made in
the plaint.
10. Pleadings is not evidence, far less proof.
Issues are raised on the basis of the pleadings.
The defendant-appellant having not admitted or
acknowledged the fiduciary relationship between
the parties, indisputably, the relationship between
the parties itself would be an issue. The suit will
fail if both the parties do not adduce any
evidence, in view of Section 102 of the Evidence
Act. Thus, ordinarily, the burden of proof would
be on the party who asserts the affirmative of the
issue and it rests, after evidence is gone into,
upon the party against whom, at the time the
question arises, judgment would be given, if no
further evidence were to be adduced by either
side.”
9.
In the present case, the workmen filed statement of claim and sought
relief of reinstatement with full back wages, inter alia, on the ground
that resignations tendered by them were outcome of coercion or force,
thus, the primary burden was on the workmen to establish this fact,
which they failed to discharge.
10. Mr. Sudeep Johri, Advocate has taken a ground that the writ petitions
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not maintainable
as the petitioner has challenged orders passed by the learned Labour
Court and therefore, writ petitions should have been filed under Article
227 of the Constitution of India. He has placed reliance on the
judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Krishna Kant Pandey (supra) wherein it is held that the High Court
could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227
convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not
conferred a right of appeal. It is also held that the power of
superintendence conferred by Article 227 is exercised most sparingly
and only in appropriate cases. The relevant paragraph no. 13 is
reproduced herein below:“13. While discussing the power of the High
Court under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution interfering with the facts recorded by
the courts or the tribunal, this Court in the case of
Chandavarkar S.R. Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram,
(supra) held as under:“17. In case of finding of facts, the court
should not interfere in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution. Reference may be made to the
observations of this Court in Bathutmal
Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where
this Court observed that the High Court could
not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction
under Article 227 convert itself into a court of
appeal when the legislature has not conferred
a right of appeal. The High Court [pic] was not
competent to correct errors of facts by
examining the evidence and reappreciating.
Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the
learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p.
1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864,
para 7) “The special civil application preferred
by the appellant was admittedly an application
under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material
only to consider the scope and ambit of the
jurisdiction of the High Court under that article.
Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an
application under Article 227 to disturb the
findings of fact reached by the District Court ?
It is well settled by the decision of this Court in
Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the … power
of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is,
as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain
Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised
most sparingly and only in appropriate cases
in order to keep the subordinate courts within
the bounds of their authority and not for
correcting mere errors.
This statement of law was quoted with
approval in the subsequent decision of this
Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of
Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha,
J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the
court in that case:
It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial
interference under Article 227 of the
Constitution with orders of judicial or quasijudicial nature, are not greater than the power
under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under
Article 226 the power of interference may
extend to quashing an impugned order on the
ground of a mistake apparent on the face of
the record. But under Article 227 of the
Constitution, the power of interference is
limited to seeing that the tribunal functions
within the limits of its authority.”
11. In the matter of Krishna Kant Pandey (supra), it is also held that “the
powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution
with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, they are not greater than
the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the
power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on
the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under
Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to
seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.”
12. The workmen failed to substantiate that the learned Labour Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in the decision making process, therefore, writ
petitions filed by petitioner are held maintainable.
13. The Full Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur in the
matter of Shailendra Kumar vs. Divisional Forest Officer and
another passed in Writ Appeal No. 286/2017 dated 06.07.2017 while
dealing with the similar issue held that a writ of certiorari is
maintainable against any authority or body of persons constituted by
law or having legal authority to adjudicate upon questions affecting the
rights of a subject and enjoined with a duty to act judicially or quasijudicially is amenable to the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court.
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh has placed reliance on the
judgment passed in the matter of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander
Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 wherein it is held that writ of certiorari can be
issued for correcting error of jurisdiction; an error in decision or
determination itself; where court has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of its jurisdiction. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh further
held that an order of the Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal is
amenable to the writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The relevant paragraphs no. 15, 16, 17 and 18 are reproduced herein
below:“15. A writ of certiorari is maintainable against
any authority or body of persons constituted by
law or having legal authority to adjudicate upon
questions affecting the rights of a subject and
enjoined with a duty to act judicially or quasijudicially is amenable to the certiorari jurisdiction
of the High Court. The writ of certiorari as
delineated in Surya Dev Rai’s case (supra) can
be said to be exercised in the following instances:(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction;
(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the
Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise
of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it
decides without giving an opportunity to the
parties to be heard, or violates the principles of
natural justice;
(3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in
exercise of a supervisory and not appellate
jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that
the court will not review findings of fact
reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if
they be erroneous.
(4) An error in the decision or determination
itself may also be amenable to a writ of
certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on
the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is
based on clear ignorance or disregard of the
provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent
error which can be corrected by certiorari but
not a mere wrong decision.
(5) The certiorari may be and is generally
granted when a court has acted (i) without
jurisdiction, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction.
The want of jurisdiction may arise from the
nature of the subject-matter of the proceedings
or from the absence of some preliminary
proceedings or the court itself may not have
been legally constituted or suffering from
certain disability by reason of extraneous
circumstances.
(6) Certiorari may also issue if the court or
tribunal though competent has acted in
flagrant disregard of the rules or procedure or
in violation of the principles of natural justice
where no particular procedure is prescribed.
(7) An error in the decision or determination
itself may also be amenable to a writ of
certiorari subject to the following factors being
available if the error is manifest and apparent
on the face of the proceedings such as when it
is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the
provisions of law but a mere wrong decision is
not amenable to a writ of certiorari.
16. Therefore, we find that an order of the
Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal is amenable
to the writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In exercise of writ of certiorari, the
High Court demolishes the order which it
considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably
erroneous but does not substitute its own views
for those of the inferior tribunal. The Constitutional
Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reported as T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR
1954 SC 440, held as under:“7……….. The second essential feature of a
writ of certiorari is that the control which is
exercised through it over judicial or quasijudicial tribunals or bodies is not in an
appellate but supervisory capacity. In granting
a writ of certiorari the superior court does not
exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It
does not review or reweigh the evidence upon
which the determination of the inferior tribunal
purports to be based. It demolishes the order
which it consider to be without jurisdiction or
palpably erroneous but does not substitute its
own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The
offending order or proceeding so to say is put
out of the way as one which should not be
used to the detriment of any person [Vide Per
Lord Cairns in Walshall’s Overseers v. London
and North Western Railway Co., (1879) 4 AC
30, 39.]”
17. But issuance of the directions after setting
aside an order passed in exercise of powers
conferred under Article 226, is only under Article
227 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Court
exercises composite jurisdiction which will make
intra Court appeal maintainable. Thus the order
passed by the Division Bench in Superintendent,
Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia Regional
Agricultural Research Station, Ujjain’s Case
(Supra) does not lay down correct principal of law
and is thus overruled.
18. We may clarify that the orders passed by the
Judicial Courts, subordinate to a High Court even
in criminal matters when challenged in
proceedings before the High Courts are only
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thus
no intra court appeal would be maintainable
against an order passed by the Learned Single
Judge in proceedings arising out of an order
passed by the Judicial Courts, may be civil or
criminal proceedings.”
14. Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
and High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, I have no hesitation to hold that the learned Labour Court
committed error of law while allowing the statement of claim filed by
the workmen and accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed and the
order(s) / award(s) passed by the learned Labour Court are hereby set
aside. No order(s) as to cost(s).
Sd/(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
vatti
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