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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
Tax Revision Case No.51 of 2010
CNR No.HBHC010541022010
Tax Revision Case No.64 of 2010
CNR.No.HBHC010260202010
and
Tax Revision Case No.65 of 2010
CNR.No.HBHC010261162010
Date of Order: 05.11.2026
Reserved on: 17.09.2026
Pronounced on: 05.11.2026
Uploaded on:
05.11.2026
Tax Revision Case No.51 of 2010
Between:
M/s. ITC Bhadrachalam Paper Boards Ltd.
…Petitioner
AND
State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by the State Representative
before Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal,
Nampally, Hyderabad.
…Respondent
COMMON ORDER: (per The Hon’ble The Acting Chief Justice P.Sam Koshy)
Heard Dr. M.V.K. Moorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of Mr. M.V.J.K. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner;
and Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, learned Special Government Pleader for
State Tax appearing for the respondent.
2.
These are three Tax Revision Cases filed by the petitioner /
assessee under Section 22(1) read with Rule 10 of the Andhra Pradesh
Goods and Service Tax Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘APGST
Rules’) under the Andhra Pradesh Goods and Service Tax Act, 1957
(hereinafter referred to as ‘APGST Act’) challenging the orders
passed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh,
Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as the ‘STAT’).
3.
The assessment year involved in each of the case for ready
reference is reproduced below:
Sl.No.
01.
02.
03.
4.
Tax Revision Case
51 of 2010
64 of 2010
65 of 2010
Assessment Year
1998-99
2000-01
2000-01
Since the point of contention is same in all these cases, they are
taken up for hearing and are decided by this Common Order. For
convenience, Tax Revision Case No.51 of 2010 is taken up as the lead
case.
5.
Tax Revision Case No.51 of 2010 is filed by the petitioner
challenging the order dated 03.08.2009, in T.A.No.407/03, passed by
the STAT. Vide the impugned order, the petitioner stood excluded
from availing the benefit of deferment of sales tax on the base
turnover of sales from paper, paper boards and scrap manufactured by
the petitioner.
6.
The facts of the case are that the petitioner is a company
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 which was subsequently
amalgamated with M/s. ITC Limited, Kolkata. The divisional head
quarters of the Paperboards and Speciality Papers Division of M/s.
ITC Limited was located at Secunderabad. Industrial incentive was
granted to the petitioner vide the Final Eligibility Certificate dated
07.10.2002, issued by the Department of Industries in terms of the
Industrial Policy, namely the Target 2000 Scheme, as declared in
G.O.Ms.No.108, Industries and Commerce (IP) Department, dated
20.05.1996. As per the said Final Eligibility Certificate, the petitioner
was entitled to sales tax deferment to the tune of Rs.615,82,00,480/-,
which could be availed over a period of 14 years commencing from
01.04.1998 and ending on 31.03.2012, in respect of the turnover over
and above the base turnover of Rs.260,28,43,150/-. In other words,
the total tax deferment was subject to a monetary limit of
Rs.615,82,00,480/- to be availed within the said 14 years.
The
deferment could therefore be availed only if the turnover during a
particular year exceeded the base turnover of Rs.260,28,43,150/- and
up to the base turnover the petitioner was required to pay sales tax as
usual.
7.
The expression “base turnover” was not defined in the Sales
Tax Act. It was, however, defined in Paragraph No.7 of the Industrial
Policy document in G.O.Ms.No.108, according to which base
turnover meant the best turnover amongst the 3 years preceding the
year of expansion. The petitioner’s manufacturing unit went into
expansion for an additional production capacity of 1,20,000 tonnes
per annum, as against the original capacity of 62,500 tonnes per
annum. The base turnover in the case of the petitioner, as was evident
from the eligibility certificate was fixed at Rs.260,28,43,150/-, being
the highest turnover of the preceding 3 years namely 1995-96, 199697 and 1997-98. It is pertinent to note that while calculating the base
turnover of Rs.260,28,43,150/-, the authorities had included all the
turnovers, including the turnover relating to paper, paperboards and
scrap.
However, while issuing the revised Final Eligibility
Certificate, the tax turnover was limited to paper and paperboards, to
the exclusion of tax deferment in respect of the sale of scrap.
8.
It is case of the petitioner that once the base turnover
comprising all sales had been fixed by the competent authority in
terms of Paragraph No.7 of G.O.Ms.No.108, the Commercial Taxes
Department in general, and the assessing authority in particular, being
the authority entrusted with extending the benefit of the incentive,
could not have disallowed tax deferment on the turnover pertaining to
scrap. Since the base turnover included paper, paperboards and scrap,
tax deferment ought to have been equally available on the turnover
pertaining to paper, paperboards and scrap, and there was thus an
inconsistency in the stand of the Department. The petitioner had not
objected to the fixation of the base turnover as including the turnover
relating to scrap in the firm hope that the Department would allow tax
deferment on the turnover relating to scrap as well. Assessments
were, however, completed under the APGST Act and the CST Act for
the assessment years 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, whereby
the petitioner was denied the incentive of deferment on scrap sales,
although the base turnover included the turnover relating to scrap.
The assessing authority was thus stated to have adopted the principle
of approbation and reprobation in respect of the very same issue.
9.
Having regard to the injustice so occasioned, and at the
instance of the petitioner and on the report of the Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes, the base turnover was revised by the competent
authority, after seeking the approval of the State Level Committee,
from Rs.260,28,43,150/- to Rs.236,61,08,031/-, and a revised Final
Eligibility Certificate dated 16.01.2004 was accordingly issued
incorporating the base turnover of Rs.236,61,08,031/- in place of the
original base turnover of Rs.260,28,43,150/-. While the base turnover
was so revised, the turnover relating to scrap was excluded and the
revised base turnover included the turnover relating to paper and
paperboards only. Since the original certificate remained in force till
16.01.2004, the petitioner acted upon the same by calculating its
turnover as including the turnover relating to scrap and claimed
deferment on it.
10.
The appeals filed by the petitioner against the assessment
orders before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner and the STAT
ended without success, in spite of the petitioner having furnished
cogent evidence and binding judicial precedents in substantiation of
its claim. Aggrieved by the orders of the STAT, the present Tax
Revision Case was preferred.
11.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted
that the STAT failed to appreciate the fact that initially the base
Turnover was fixed by taking into account turnover pertaining to
paper, paperboards and scrap etc., whereas while granting tax
deferment, the turnover was restricted to turnovers in respect of paper
and Paperboards only thereby excluding the turnovers relating to
scrap.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that even the
petitioner did not seek amendment of Final Eligibility Certificate on
the fond hope that the sales tax department would allow tax deferment
on the sale of scrap also. It is only at a later stage that the petitioner
realized the intention of the Department and took steps for
amendment of final eligibility certificate.
12.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that
allowing tax deferment on the turnover relating to scrap does not
result in amendment of Final Eligibility Certificate as was held by the
STAT, inasmuch as the scrap arises out of the main activity of
manufacture of paper and paper board and the same is integrally
connected to manufacturing activity. Therefore, turnover arising out
of scrap as such is not an independent activity to be excluded from the
main activity. Precisely on the same assumption, initially the base
turnover was determined by taking into account the turnover relating
to scrap. Since the Department refused to allow tax deferment on
turnover relating to scrap, the petitioner was compelled to seek for
amendment of Final Eligibility Certificate.
13.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further contended
that the Department is estopped from changing its stand after grant of
final eligibility certificate because the certificate was issued to the
petitioner only after the approval and clearance given by the sales tax
department.
Learned Senior Counsel relied on the principle of
‘promissory estoppel’ inasmuch as the petitioner proceeded on the
assumption that if base turnover includes the turnover relating to
scrap, the additional turnover on which deferment is being granted
would also include the turnover relating to scrap.
14.
On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader for
State Tax relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Checkmate Services (P) Ltd. vs. CIT1 wherein it was held
that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly and that there can be no
room for equitable considerations.
15.
Learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax also relied
on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Rajasthan SEB vs. CIT2 wherein it was held that while interpreting a
tax legislature the consequences and hardship are not looked into but
(2023) 6 SCC 451
(2021) 14 SCC 557
the purpose and object by which taxing statutes have been enacted
cannot be lost sight.
16.
Learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax further
relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
AMD Industries Ltd. vs. CIT3 wherein it was held that in a case of
“expansion or modernisation” the exemption shall be available only if
there is an additional production as a result of such modernisation or
expansion.
17.
Having heard both the sides at length and on perusal of records,
the question of law which falls for consideration is “whether in the
facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner was entitled to avail
deferment of sales tax in respect of the turnover relating to scrap
when the original Final Eligibility Certificate fixed the base turnover
by including the turnover relating to paper, paperboards and scrap, but
the incentive of deferment was confined by the Revised Final
Eligibility Certificate to the turnover relating to paper and
paperboards alone?”
18.
The controversy is narrow, though of considerable fiscal
consequence.
(2023) 4 SCC 231
The petitioner was granted an industrial incentive
under the Target 2000 Scheme, as contained in G.O.Ms.No.108,
Industries and Commerce (IP) Department, dated 20.05.1996. The
incentive was in the nature of deferment of sales tax subject to a
monetary ceiling and a defined period. The eligibility certificate fixed
the base turnover at Rs.260,28,43,150/-, being the highest turnover
among the 3 preceding years, namely 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98.
That base turnover admittedly included the turnover relating to paper,
paperboards and scrap. The petitioner, however, claimed deferment
not only on the turnover exceeding the base turnover, but also on the
turnover relating to scrap.
19.
The petitioner’s argument proceeds on the premise that because
scrap was included in the computation of the base turnover, it must
necessarily form part of the turnover eligible for deferment. We are
unable to accept this submission. The base turnover and the eligible
turnover for deferment perform distinct statutory and policy
functions. The base turnover is the threshold against which additional
turnover is measured for the purpose of extending the incentive. It
does not, by itself, determine the commodities or transactions on
which deferment may be claimed.
The latter question must be
answered by reference to the eligibility certificate, the industrial
policy, and the conditions subject to which the incentive was granted.
20.
The Final Eligibility Certificate dated 07.10.2002 granted
deferment up to Rs.615,82,00,480/- over a period of 14 years
commencing from 01.04.1998 and ending on 31.03.2012, in respect
of turnover over and above the base turnover. The certificate did not
create an unqualified entitlement to deferment on every item of sale
undertaken by the petitioner.
The incentive was conditional,
quantified, and period-bound.
Where an industrial incentive is
granted upon stated conditions, the beneficiary must establish
compliance with those conditions; the Court cannot expand the
benefit by implication, equity, or assumed intention.
21.
The subsequent conduct of the Department reinforces this
conclusion. The base turnover was revised from Rs.260,28,43,150/to Rs.236,61,08,031/- by the Revised Final Eligibility Certificate
dated 16.01.2004.
The revision was made after excluding the
turnover relating to scrap. Thus, the competent authority clarified that
the eligible turnover for deferment was confined to paper and
paperboards. The petitioner’s contention that the Department was
bound, on the principle of promissory estoppel, to allow deferment on
scrap merely because scrap had earlier been included in the base
turnover, conflates the calculation of the threshold with the grant of
the concession.
22.
Promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the State to
grant a fiscal benefit beyond the terms of the policy or the eligibility
certificate.
The doctrine may prevent the State from acting
inconsistently with a clear promise upon which a party has acted to its
detriment, but it cannot be used to create an exemption, concession, or
deferment which was never granted in clear and unambiguous terms.
A taxing concession must rest upon authority of law and must be
traced to the applicable policy instrument. It cannot be inferred from
an ambiguity, an administrative omission, or a unilateral expectation
of the assessee.
23.
The petitioner’s reliance on the circumstance that it did not
seek amendment of the Final Eligibility Certificate until later is also
of no assistance. The petitioner claims to have acted on the original
certificate in the hope that scrap turnover would be included in the
deferment benefit. Such an expectation, however reasonable it may
have appeared to the petitioner, cannot alter the scope of the
incentive. The Revised Final Eligibility Certificate dated 16.01.2004
made the Department’s position explicit by excluding scrap from the
eligible turnover. Thereafter, the petitioner could not claim deferment
on scrap turnover for periods governed by assessments already
completed.
24.
The settled principles governing exemption and incentive
provisions support this view. In Checkmate Services (P) Ltd. vs.
CIT4 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where a deduction or
exemption is available upon compliance with conditions, those
conditions must be strictly complied with; taxing statutes admit of no
equitable considerations.
The relevant paragraphs are reproduced
below for ready reference:
“55. One of the rules of interpretation of a tax statute is
that if a deduction or exemption is available on compliance with
certain conditions, the conditions are to be strictly complied with.
[ See e.g., Eagle Flask Industries Ltd. v. CCE, (2004) 7 SCC 377]
This rule is in line with the general principle that taxing statutes
are to be construed strictly, and that there is no room for
equitable considerations.”
56. That deductions are to be granted only when the conditions which
govern them are strictly complied with. This has been laid down in
State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements [State of Jharkhand v. Ambay
Cements, (2005) 1 SCC 368] as follows : (SCC p. 378, paras 23-26)
“23. … In our view, the provisions of exemption clause should
be strictly construed and if the condition under which the
(2023) 6 SCC 451
exemption was granted stood changed on account of any
subsequent event the exemption would not operate.
24. In our view, an exception or an exempting provision in a
taxing statute should be construed strictly and it is not open to
the court to ignore the conditions prescribed in the industrial
policy and the exemption notifications.
25. In our view, the failure to comply with the requirements
renders the writ petition filed by the respondent liable to be
dismissed. While mandatory rule must be strictly observed,
substantial compliance might suffice in the case of a directory
rule.
26. Whenever the statute prescribes that a particular Act is to
be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure
to comply with the said requirement leads to severe
consequences, such requirement would be mandatory. It is the
cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that
a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the
manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled
rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character,
it must be strictly construed and followed. Since the
requirement, in the instant case, of obtaining prior permission
is mandatory, therefore, non-compliance with the same must
result in cancelling the concession made in favour of the
grantee, the respondent herein.”
This was also reaffirmed in a number of judgments, such as CIT v.
Ace Multi Axes Systems Ltd. [CIT v. Ace Multi Axes Systems Ltd.,
(2018) 2 SCC 158]
57. The Constitution Bench, in Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kumar &
Co. [Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co., (2018) 9 SCC 1]
endorsed as following : (SCC pp. 19 & 23-24, paras 24 & 34)
“24. In construing penal statutes and taxation statutes, the
Court has to apply strict rule of interpretation. The penal
statute which tends to deprive a person of right to life and
liberty has to be given strict interpretation or else many
innocents might become victims of discretionary decisionmaking. Insofar as taxation statutes are concerned, Article
265 of the Constitution [“265. Taxes not to be imposed save
by authority of law.—No tax shall be levied or collected
except by authority of law.”] prohibits the State from
extracting tax from the citizens without authority of law. It is
axiomatic that taxation statute has to be interpreted strictly
because the State cannot at their whims and fancies burden
the citizens without authority of law. In other words, when
the
competent
legislature
mandates
taxing
certain
persons/certain objects in certain circumstances, it cannot be
expanded/interpreted to include those, which were not
intended by the legislature.
***
34. The passages extracted above, were quoted with approval
by this Court in at least two decisions being CIT v. Kasturi &
Sons Ltd. [CIT v. Kasturi & Sons Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 346]
and State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. [State of W.B.
v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201] (hereinafter
referred to as Kesoram Industries case, for brevity). In the
later decision, a Bench of five Judges, after citing the above
passage from Justice G.P. Singh's treatise, summed up the
following principles applicable to the interpretation of a
taxing statute:
‘(i) In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable
considerations are entirely out of place. A taxing
statute cannot be interpreted on any presumption or
assumption. A taxing statute has to be interpreted
in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot
imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot
import provisions in the statute so as to supply any
deficiency;
(ii) Before taxing any person, it must be shown that he
falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear
words used in the section; and
(iii) If the words are ambiguous and open to two
interpretations, the benefit of interpretation is given to
the subject and there is nothing unjust in a taxpayer
escaping if the letter of the law fails to catch him on
account of the legislature's failure to express itself
clearly.’”
25.
The same principle applies with greater force to an incentive
such as sales-tax deferment. Deferment is not a general exemption
from tax; it is a fiscal concession permitting postponement of
payment subject to the terms of the scheme. The beneficiary cannot
claim the concession by relying on the breadth of the base-turnover
calculation while ignoring the express limitation placed upon the
eligible turnover. The assessing authority was therefore justified in
confining deferment to paper and paperboards and excluding scrap.
26.
The petitioner’s further submission that scrap is integrally
connected with the manufacture of paper and paperboards, and
therefore cannot be treated as an independent activity, does not
advance its case. Even assuming that scrap arises incidentally from
the principal manufacturing activity, the question is not whether scrap
is commercially or industrially connected with paper manufacture.
The question is whether the incentive certificate extended deferment
to scrap turnover. The answer is in the negative. A product may be
incidental to the main manufacturing activity and yet remain outside
the scope of a fiscal incentive if the eligibility certificate does not
expressly include it.
27.
Nor are we persuaded that the assessing authority adopted
inconsistent standards. The inclusion of scrap in the base turnover
was relevant only for determining the threshold turnover.
Its
exclusion from the deferment benefit was relevant to the quantum and
scope of the concession.
The two determinations are not
contradictory; they address different aspects of the incentive scheme.
Thus there is no question of approbation and reprobation.
28.
In the case of Rajasthan SEB vs. CIT5 the Hon’ble Supreme
Court reiterated that hardship or consequences cannot dilute the clear
language of a taxing provision, although the object and purpose of the
legislation must be kept in view. In paragraph No.25 of the said
judgment, it was held as under:
“25. It is true that while interpreting a tax legislature the
consequences and hardship are not looked into but the purpose and
(2021) 14 SCC 557
object by which taxing statutes have been enacted cannot be lost sight.
This Court while considering the very same provision i.e. Section
143(1-A), its object and purpose and while upholding the provision
held that the burden of proving that the assessee has attempted to
evade tax is on the Revenue which may be discharged by the Revenue
by establishing facts and circumstances from which a reasonable
inference can be drawn that the assessee has, in fact, attempted to
evade tax lawfully payable by it. In the present case, not even a
whisper, that claim of 100% depreciation by the assessee, 25% of
which was disallowed was with intent to evade tax. We cannot
mechanically apply the provisions of Section 143(1-A) in the facts of
the present case and in view of the categorical pronouncement by this
Court in CIT v. Sati Oil Udyog Ltd. [CIT v. Sati Oil Udyog Ltd.,
(2015) 7 SCC 304] , where it is held that Section 143(1-A) can only
be invoked when the lesser amount stated in the return filed by the
assessee is a result of an attempt to evade tax lawfully payable by the
assessee. In view of the above, we hold that mechanical application of
Section 143(1-A) in the facts of the present case was uncalled for.”
29.
In the case of AMD Industries Ltd. vs. CIT6 it was held that
exemption provisions must be construed literally and that the claimant
must satisfy every condition of the exemption. The petitioner has not
shown that the eligibility certificate, the industrial policy, or any other
binding instrument conferred deferment on scrap turnover.
paragraph Nos.9 to 13 of the said judgment, it was held as under:
“9. In the case of “expansion or modernisation”, the
exemption shall be available, if there is an additional production as a
result of such modernisation or expansion. In the present case, we are
(2023) 4 SCC 231
In
concerned with the case of “diversification”. Therefore, the goods
manufactured after diversification must be different goods from the
goods manufactured before such diversification. As per the settled
position of law, in case of an exemption notification/exemption
provision, the same is required to be construed literally and the
person claiming the exemption must satisfy all the conditions of
exemption provision.
10. In the present case, the appellant was manufacturing/producing
“spun line crown cork” used for sealing the glass bottles. With the use
of modern technologies, now the appellant is manufacturing “double
lip dry blend crowns”, which is also used for sealing the glass bottles.
The earlier product being manufactured by the appellant was used for
sealing glass bottles and subsequently the additional product produced
with the use of modern technology is also being used for the same
purpose, namely, “sealing glass bottles”. Therefore, the same cannot
be said to be manufacturing of goods different from that being
manufactured before such diversification.
11. With the passage of time, due to advancement in technology, if
there is a replacement of the old machinery with the new machinery
for improvement in quality and quantity of a product, at the most, it
can be said to be expansion and/or modernisation, but it cannot be said
to be “diversification”, which is “manufacturing of goods different
from the goods manufactured before such diversification”. In a case of
“diversification”, the effect has to be that the quality and quantity of
the product should have been improved and/or increased but if the
ultimate use is the same, the product manufactured on use of modern
and/or advanced technology cannot be said to be manufacturing the
different goods for claiming the exemption from payment of trade tax.
12. The words used in Section 4-A are very clear and unambiguous.
As per the settled proposition of law and as observed hereinabove, the
statute and more particularly, the exemption provisions are to be read
as they are and to be construed literally and should be given a literal
meaning. Giving the literal meaning to the exemption provision,
namely, Section 4-A, it cannot be said that the appellant is entitled to
the exemption as claimed.
13. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and
as observed hereinabove, when the provisions of the Act
unequivocally provides that the “diversification” can be considered
only in a case where “goods of different nature” are produced, and
only then the exemption shall be available. The goods manufactured
on “diversification” must be a “different”, “distinct” and a “separate”
goods in nature. In the present case, the goods manufactured on use of
advance and/or modern technology, cannot be said to be a different
commercial activity at all. The High Court has not committed any
error in refusing to grant exemption to the appellant. We are in
complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.”
30.
A fiscal incentive is not a matter of grace to be enlarged by
judicial benevolence, nor is it an entitlement to be inferred from
the manner in which a threshold was computed. It is a statutory
or policy-based concession, defined by its terms, conditioned by
its limits, and available only to those who bring themselves
squarely within its scope.
The discipline of tax law lies in
respecting the boundary between what the State has granted and
what the taxpayer hopes to receive. The STAT, therefore, correctly
held that the petitioner was not entitled to deferment of sales tax on
the turnover relating to scrap.
The assessment orders and the
appellate orders do not suffer from any jurisdictional error, perversity,
or misreading of material evidence warranting interference.
31.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the question of law stands
answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
Accordingly, Tax Revision Case No.51 of 2010 stands dismissed.
32.
Consequently, Tax Revision Case Nos.64 and 65 of 2010 also
stand dismissed on similar lines.
33.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand
closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
____________________
P. SAM KOSHY, ACJ
_______________________________
NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J
Date: 05.11.2026
GSD
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