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IN THE H]GH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
FRIDAY,THE NINTH DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
ANI)
SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO
JUSTICE
THE HONOURABLE SRI
WEALTH TAX APPEAL N os. 3. 4. 5. 6&7 0F2006
3 of 2006
W.T
Appeal Under Section 27 A ot the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 against the
order of the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal Hyderabad, Bench 'A' in
W.T.A.No. 13lHydl2002 dated 31 -08-2005 for the Assessment Year 1994-95
Between:
BirlaNu Limited, ( Formerty known as Hyderabad lndustries Limited ) Office No' 1 &
2 , L7 Floor, SLN Terminus, Near Botanical Garden Gachibowli, Hyderabad -500032'
rep. by its Senior Manager - Legal, Mr. Vasanth Bharani
( Appellant Name is amended vide C.O. dt. 13-11-2025 in l.A.No. 1 ot 2025 )
...APPELLANT
AND
The Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Central Circle -'l (4), Hyderabad.
...RESPONDENT
: 1 OF 2013
AMP. NO:2
F 2013
Petition under section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
expedite the date of hearing of the Appeal
l.A. NO: 1OF 20O6{WTAM P- NO: 3 OF 20061
Petition under Section 15l CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
suspend the order dated 3'l-8-05 passed by the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal,
Hyderabad 'A' Bench in WTA.No.13/Hydl2O02 for the Assessment Year 1994-95
and direct the respondent not press for the payment of disputed wealth tax
demand in a sum of Rs. 8,33,397/- pending disposal of appeal
Counsel for the Appellant: SRl. S. RAVI
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms. B. SAPNA REDDY (SENIOR SC INCOME
TAx)
WEALTH TAX A P
NO: 4 OF 2006
Appeal Under Section 27 A ot the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 against the
order of the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal Hyderabad, Bench 'A' in
W.T.A.No. 141 Hydl2002 dated 31-08-2005 for the Assessment Year 1995-95
Between:
BirlaNu Limitecr, ( Formerly known as Hyderabad lndustries Limited )Office No. 1 &
2 ,L7 Floor, S[.N Terminus, Near Botanical Garden Gachibowli, Hyderabad -500032,
rep. by its Senicr Manager - Legal, Mr. Vasanth Bharani
( Appellant Nane is amended vide C.O. dl. 13-11-2025 in l.A.No. 1 of 2025 )
...APPELLANT
AND
The Assistant Commissioner of Wealth tax, Hyderabad The Assistant
Commissisoner of Wealth Tax, Central Circle - 1[4], Hyderabad.
...RESPONDENT
l.A. NO: 1 OF 20'13
AMP. NO: 3 OF 20131
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
expedite the dale of hearing of the appeal
l.A. NO: 2 OF 200 6{WT AMP. NO: 22OF 2006r
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
suspend the orcrer dated 31-8-05 passed by the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal,
Hyderabad 'A' Elench in WTA.No.14l\ydl21l2 for the Assesment year 1995-96
and direct the respondent not to press for the payment of disputed wealth tax
demand in a sunr of Rs. 8,66,282l- pending disposal of appeal
Counsel for the Appellant: SRl. S. RAVI
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms. B. SAPNA REDDY (SENIOR SC INCOME
TAx)
WEALTH T AX APPEAL NO: 5 OF 2006
Appeal Under Section 27 A ol the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 against the
order of the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal Hyderabad, Bench 'A' in
W.T.A.No. 171Hydl2OO2 dated 31-08-2005 for the Assessment Year 1998'99
Between:
BirlaNu Limited, ( Formerly known as Hyderabad lndustries Limited ) Office No. 1 &
2 ,L7 Floor, SLN Terminus, Near Botanical Garden Gachibowli, Hyderabad -500032,
rep. by its Senior Manager - Legal, [Ir. Vasanth Bharani
( Appellant Name is amended vide C.O. dt. 13-1 1-2025 in l.A.No.'l of 2025 )
...APPELLANT
AND
The Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax,, The Assistant Commissioner of Wealth
Tax, Central Circle-1 [4] Hyderabad.
...RESPONDENTS
l.A. NO: 2 OF 2 oo6lWTAMP. NO: 23 OF 2006 )
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
suspend the order dated 31.8.2005 passed by the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal,
Hyderabad 'A'Bench in W.T.A.No.17lHydl2OO2 for the Assessment Year 1998-99
and direct respondent not to press for the payment of disputed Wealth Tax
demand in a sum of Rs.9,84,970.
l.A. NO: 1 OF 2O1 3IWTAMP. NO: 4 OF 2013 I
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
expedite the date of hearing of the Appeal
Counsel for the Appellant: SRl. S. RAVI
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms. B. SAPNA REDDY (SENIOR SC INCOME TAX)
WEALTH TAX APPEAL NO: 6 OF 2006
Appeal Under Section 27 A ol the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 against the
order of the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal Hyderabad, Bench 'A' in
W.T.A.No. 161 Hydl2002 dated 31-08-2005 for the Assessment Year 1 997-98
Between:
BirlaNu Limitec, ( Formerly known as Hyderabad lndustries Limited )Office No. 1 &
2,L7 Floor, S[.N Terminus, Near Botanical Garden Gachibowli, Hyderabad -500032,
rep. by its Senicr Manager - Legal, Mr. Vasanth Bharani
( Appellant Narie is amended vide C.O. dt. 13-11-2025 in l.A.No. 1 of 2025 )
...APPELLANT
AND
The Assistant C:ommissioner of Wealth Tax, Central Circle-1(4), Hyderabad.
...RESPONDENT
l.A. NO: 2 OF 2006(WTAMP . NO: 24 OF 2006)
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
suspend the orler dated 31.08.05 passed by the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal,
Hyderabad 'A' l3ench in WTA No.16/Hyd/2002 for the Assessment Year 1997-98
and direct Resrrondent not press for the payment of disputed wealth Tax Demand
in a sum of Rs.-15,06,84O/-pending disposal of appeal
Counsel for ther Appellant: SRl. S. RAVI
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms. B. SAPNA REDDY (SENIOR SC INCOME
TAX)
WEALTH TAX APPEAL NO: 7 OF 2006
Appeal Llnder Section 27 A of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 against the
order of the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal Hyderabad, Bench 'A' in
W.T.A.No. 151 Hydl2002 dated 3't-08-2005 for the Assessment Year '1997-98
Between
BirlaNu Limited, I Formerly known as Hyderabad lndustries Limited ) Office No. '1 &
2 , L7 Floor, SLN Terminus, Near Botanical Garden Gachibowli, Hyderabad -500032,
rep. by its Senior Manager - Legal, Mr. Vasanth Bharani
( Appellant Name' is amended vide C.O. dl. 13-11-2025 in l.A.No. 1 ot 2O25 )
...APPELLANT
AND
The Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax,, Central Circle-1(4), Hyderabad.
...RESPONDENT
l.A. NO: 2OF 20OG(WTAMP. NO:25 oF 20061
Petition under Section 't 51 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in
the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
suspend the order dated 31.8.2005 passed by the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal
Hyderabad 'A' Bench in WTA No.15/Hyd/2002 for the assessment year 1996-97
and direct respondent not to press for the payment of disputed wealth tax demand
in a sum of Rs.15,06,840/-.
Counsel for the Appellant: SRl. S. RAVI
Counset for the Respondent: Ms. B. SAPNA REDDY (SENIOR SG INCOME
TAX)
The Court made the following COMMON JUDGMENT:
IN THE} HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO
WTA.Nos.3,4,5.6&7of 20,o,6
pt. 09 .0]-.20.26
Between
M/s Birlal'lu Limited
(Formerly known as M/s. Hyderabad Industries Limited)
Arld
"" APPellant
The Assistrlnt Commissioner of Wealth Tax
...Respondent
COMMON JUDGMENT: per the Hon'ble Sri Justice Sudd.ata Cho,torpathi Rao)
1. The instant appeals are filecl by the appellant-assessee
challenginSl the common order, dt.31.08.2005, passeci by the
lncome Ta:< Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench "A", Hyderabad
(for short 'the learned ITATJ in wrA Nos. 13 ro LT /HyD /2ooo,
relating to the assessment years 1994-gs to 199g-99. As the
assessee is one and the same in all the matters and the issues
arose therein were iCentical though pertaining to different
assessment years, the learned ITAT heard the appeals together
and disposed of by a common order.
2.
Though separate appeals are filed before this court, as
the
and the
sarne question of law and facts arise in these appeals
orders impugned being a common order, all these appeals
were
analogously hearcl and decided by this common order.
The brief facts of the case:
3.
The appellant/assessee namely M/s Hyderabad Industries
Limited is a company doing business in manufacturing of
sheets, and is registered on the rolls of the Additional
AC
clT(Assts)
sR-2, Hyderabad. It had purchased an extent of 53,944 sq'
meters of land in Road No.13, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad,
way-back
in the year 1962 under a registered sale deed and out of the said
total land, the constr:'ucted alea was 11,913 sq. mtrs., and the
remaining was vacant land admeasuring 42,013 sq. mtrs'
contended by the appellant/assessee that an extent of
It is
42,013 sq'
mtrs has been given to Asbestos centre(recreation centre), a
society registered under the A.P. (Telangana Area) Public
societies
Registration Act, 1315 Fasli under a registered Irrevocable
Power
of Attorney on 28.10. lg75 for the use of welfare activities of the
employees.
/
4.
Further, the object of the society was to provide a common
place for the welfare of the employees and their family members. It
is stated by the assessee that in view of the registered irrevocable
power of attorney, the Iand was under active possession and
enjoyment of the Asbestos Centre and thus, it ceased to be belong
to it there a-fter.
5.
It is the case of the appellant/assessee that the Assessment
Officer del.ermined that the value of the said land was exigible to
wealth tax u/s.2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1968 and referred the
matter to the Valuation Cell to determine the value of the propert5r
as on the said date. The Assessing Authority pursuant to the
report of ttre Valuation Oflicer, added the value of the said land as
per the valuati on report to the wealth of the assessee and passed
the impugn.ed assessment order, dt.28.O3.2001.
6.
Aggrir:ved thereupon, the appellant/assessee filed an appeat
before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (hereinafter
referred to as "CIT(Al"l, inter alia contending that the property
which was transferred to Asbestos Centre uide a registered
Irrevocable Power of Attorney, dt.28.10.1975, it did not belong to
the assessie and, therefore, could not be treated as an asset
within the meaning of Section 2(eal of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957.
Further it is contended that as the said property was transferred
under registered Irrevocable Power ofAttorney, dt.28.10. 1975 and
dt.26.O7.L975, the Asbestos Centre is to be recognized as the
holder of the property for the purposes of Urban Land Ceiling
proceedings. Further, it is contended that by virtue of Irrevocable
Power of Attorney, the property could not vest back with the
assessee, and in view of the transfer to a Asbestos Centre for
recreational and welfare purpose of the employees, it ought to
have been treated as a productive asset under the provision of
Section 2(ea) ofthe Act.
7.
After due enquiry and hearing, the learned CIT(A) allowed
the appeals of the assessee uicie order, dt. 15.O2.2OO2, holding that
the dispttted property had been determined as excess larrd uncler
the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulationl Act, L976 (for short 'ULC
Act') and, as it is vested with the Government, and does not belong
to the assessee, the value of the said land is not exigible to rvealth
tax. Further, the CIT(A) held that the value of the vacant land
payable to the assessee as monetary compensation by the State
Governrnent should only be taken for assessing the value of the
said vacax t land and further held that the excess vacant land falls
under the exceptions of urban land for the purposes of wealth tax
assessment and in view of the exceptions contained in
Explanation I(b) to Section 2(ea) of the Act, it is not exigible to tax.
8.
Assailing the said orders of CIT(A), the respondent/Revenue
filed appeeils before the learned ITAT for the assessment years
1994-95 to 1998-99, and the learned ITAT after due enquiry and
hearing, allowed the appeals of the Revenue and the said orders of
the learned ITAT are impugned by the appellant/assessee in the
instant appeals.
9. The instant appeals a-re admitted by this Court on
1O.O7.2006 on the following substantial questions of law:
'1. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case,
the Income Tox Appellate Tribunal utas correct in lau
in ignoring the fact that by an lrreuocable Power of
AttorneA, the Appellant had transfened all its rights
in respect of the propertg Asbestos Centre, and the
trar,.sferee was enjoging the propertg aduerse to the
interests of the Appellant, and in concluding that the
Asbesfos Centre "belonged" to the Appellant?
2. Wfuitler on the facts and circumstances of the case,
haut.ng regard to the fact that the substantial part of
the l.and uas determined to be in excess of the timits
under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act,
1.975, tlle Income Tax Appellate Tibunal was conect
in uplwlding the ualuation of the land on the foottng
that it is the free'hold propertg of the Appellant?
3. Whether on the facts and ciranmstances of the case,
the Income Tax Appetlate Tibunal was correct in law
in holdtng that the entire land was buildable,
although admittedlg as at the ualuation date, the
land was declared to be surplus under the Urban
Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 7976 and there utas
no possibilitg of the Appellant obtoining anA such
permission?
4. Whetlwr on the facts and circumstances of the case,
the Income Tax Appeltate Trtbunal was correct in law
in holding that th.e propertg was not put to productiue
use although indisputablg, the propertg was being
enjoyed bA a welfare trust established solely for the
beneftt of the employees of the Appellant?"
10. The core issue which falls for consideration before this Court
in all these appeals is, whether the vacant land at Road No.13,
Banjara Hills, Hyderabad is exigible to wealth tax in the hands of
the appetlant/assessee and whether the vacant land falls under
the purview of levying wealth tax by the authorities under Section
2(eal of the Act.
11. We have heard Sri S.Ravi, learned Senior Counsel appqaring
for appellant/assessee, and Ms. B.Sapna Reddy, learned Senior
Standing Counsel for respondent-Revenue.
Contenti.ons of the appellant/ assessee:
12. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the
appellant/assessee contended that as the entire disputed vacant
land wasl handed over to Asbestos Centre, Hyderabad uide
registerecl Irrevocable Power of Attorney, dt.28.10.1975, with the
object of utilizing the same for the welfare activities of the
employee,s and their family members, and partly as a guest house
to the visiting officials. Thus, the vacant land neither belong to it
nor the p:ssession of the land is with the appellant/assessee and
the Asbes.tos Centre is in possession for more than 12 years and
therefore the assessee-company cannot claim title or possession
under Se'ltions 64 & 65 of the Limitation Act, and also it falls
outside th.e purview of the definition of "asset' under Section 2(ea)
of the Act and thus, is not exigible to wealth tax.
13. It is further contended that Section 3, Section 2(rn) and
Section 2(ea) make it clear that assets belonging to a company are
assessabk: to wealth tax subject to certain exceptions. As per
Section 2(,zal of the Act, admittedly the vacant land as well as the
land occupied by the buildings, which is not used by the company
for specific purposes mentioned therein, do not fall in any of
clauses 1 to 5 of Section 2(ea)(i), and also falls under exception to
Section 2(ea)(v) read with Explanation I(b) which defines "urban
land" and is not exigible to wealth tax.
14. Further, it is contended that the Assessing Officer
determined that out of the total land held by the assessee, the
constructed area is 11,931 sq.mtrs only and the vacant land is
42,013 sq. mtrs, and as the disputed vacant laud does not belong
to the assessee/company, referriug to the Valuation Cell for
determination of the value and thereby passing the impugned
assessment order taking the market value as on 31.03.L994, are
not sustainable under law
15. Learned Senior Corrnsel further contended that the first
appellate authority i.e., the CIT(A) has rightly allorved the arppeal
holding that the disputed property had been de':ermined as excess
land under the ULC Act and as there is prohibition of granting
permission for construction as it is .rested with the Government
extinguishing the title of the assessee, and only the monetar5r
compensation to be paid by the Government is exigible to tax, is
proper and that the impugned orders of the learned ITAT irr
reversing the orders of the CIT(A) are perverse and unsustainable.
16. l,earned Senior Counsel also emphasizes the words
"belonging to" used in the Wealth Tax Act as against "owner' used
in the Inc:ome Tax Act and submitted that the vacant land already
vested with the Asbestos Centre by virtue of the irrevocable Power
of Attornry executed on 28.10.1975, and also as it is declared as
excess ceiling land under ULC Act and as the ULC Act prohibits
transfer and construction, mere non-filing rejection of application
for construction is irrelevant, and therefore the excess vacant land
under ULC Act cannot come within the ambit of urban vacant
land, and as such contended that it would fall under Explanation
I(b) to Section 2(eal of the Act, and thus, the findings of the
learned ITAT were perverse and liable to be set aside.
. Iearned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the judgment
of the HorL'ble Supreme Court in the Case of Late Nautab Sir Mir
Osman Att Khan us Commissioner Of Wealth Tax,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the similar issue
and obsenred as under:
n29. Salmond's coneption of "ownership" h.as been noted.
The neaning of the expression "belonging to" has also been
noteai.. We haue disanssed the cases where the distinction
betueen "belonging to" and "ounership" has been considered.
t 1986 SCC(Supp.l 700
The following facts emerge lwre: (1) the assessee hc.s parted
tDith tle possession uhich is one of tte essential,s of
ounership. g fhe assessee was disentitled to reauer
possession from thc. uendee and assessee alone until the
doanment of title is executed was entitled to sue for
possession against otlers i.e. other than tle uendee in
possession in this case. Th.e title in rem uested in the
assessee. (3) TLE uendee taizs in rightful possession against
tle uendor. ft) fhe bgal title, houeuer, belonged to tte
uendor. @ fhe assessee had not tte totalitg of tle rights that
constihtte title but a tlere Lusk of it and a uery important
element of the lrusk.
30. The position is that though all statutes including tle
statute in question should be equitably interpreted, tlere is no
plae of equitg as such in taxation laws. Tte concept of realitg
in implementing frscal proui.sion i.s releuant and the legislature
in this case has not significantly used the expressbn oowner"
but used the expression 'belonging to". Tte propeftg in
question legallg, howeuer, cannot be said to bebng to tte
uendee. The uendee is in nghtful possession only against the
uendor. Speaking for mgself, I haue deliberated long on tte
question uhether in interpreting tle expression 'belongirry to'
in the Act, ue slrculd not import tlrc maxim that "equitg loolcs
upon a thing as done uhich ought to Lnue been done" and
though tlrc conuegane had not been executed in fauour of tle
uendee, and tle legal title uested with the uendor, the
propertg should be treated as belonging to tle uendee and not
fo the assessee. I lwd occasion fo discuss thorougtilg this
aspect of the matter with my leamed Brotler and in uiew of
tle position tlnt legal title still uests uith the assessee, tte
authoities we haue noted are preponderantlg in fauour of tle
uieut thnt tle propertA should be treated a,s belonging to the
assessee. In such ciranmstances, I shall not permit mg doubts
to preuail upon me to take the uiew that tle propertV belongs
to the uendee and not to the ossessee. I am anscious that it
u.till work some amount of injustie tn such a situation
because the assessees utould be mode liable to bear the tax
burden in such sihtations uithout houing the enjoyment of tlrc
propertg in qtestion. But times perhaps are yet nat ripe to
transmute equitg on this aspect in tlre interpretation of laut
much as I utould haue personallg liked to do that. As
Benjamin Cardozo ha.s said: "Tle judge, euen when lw be
free, is not wlnllg free". A judge cnnnot innouate at pleasure."
18. l.earned Senior Counsel further submits that the Hon,ble
Supreme Court held that though the assessee had only a husk of
title, as against the world still he remained the legal owner, but if
a person has use and enjoymcnt of the property, he would
ordinarily be liable. Learned Senior Counsel therefore submits
that in the instant case it is the Asbestos Centre who is the user
and therefore the user should be held liable, not the assessee. By
taking a <:ue from the sa:d judgment, counsel submits that the
Asbestos Centre alone is in actual enjoyment and possession,
therefore the propert5r cannot be tr.eated as belonging to the
assessee, as they have parted with the land way back in the year
1975.
19. Learrred Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on the
judgment crf the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Commissioner o!
Wealth Tqx a. DCM Ltd2, wherein it was held that Section 3 of
the Wealth Tax Act is the charging section and that Section 2(e)
defines "asriets" to mean property of every description, movable or
immovable, subject to the statutory exclusions. The Honble
Supreme Court further held that under Section2(eal,,,urban land"
does not include land on which construction is not permissible
, 2005 SCC Online Del. 124
L2
under any law in force, land occupied by a building duly approved
by the competent authorit5r, or land held for industrial purposes
for two years from the date of acquisition. Relying on this, learned
Senior Counsel contends that the ULC .Act prohibits both
construction and transfer in respect of excess land, and therefore
the disputed land falls squarely within the exception and is not
exigible to wealth tax.
20. Learned Senior Counsel also places reliance on Gouri
Prasad fuenka And Fo;mltg (Hufl a. Commissioner Of WealthTax3, wherein the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held
that once land vests in the State Government under the Land
Ceiling Act, exemption under Section 20 of that Act cannot arise,
ancl further held that a person holding vacant land in excess of
the ceiling limit cannot dispose of srrch land and it cannot be sold
in an open market. [t was noted that excess vacant land. does not
automatically vest in the State burt continues to be held only until
a notification under Section 1O(3) of the Land Ceiling Act is
issued. Learned Senior Counsel therefore contends that since the
instant land has been declared as excess under the provisions of
3 1991 SCC Online Cal. 348
ULC Act, it cannot be put to productive use or transferred, and
hence ca:rnot be treated as an asset amenable to wealth tax.
2L. Learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance on the
judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in Commissloner
of Wealth Tax, Tamll Nadu-II, Madras a. K.S.Ranganatha
Mudallar and. other#., wherein it was held that the proper
valuation of excess land is tJre compensation payable by the State
Governmt:nt under Schedule III to the Act, and not the open
market velue, in view of the statutory restrictions and prohibitions
under the Ceiling Act.
22. karned Senior Counsel also relied on the judgment of the
Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Amrit Lal Jlndal
cnd Soru;. a. Wealth Tax Officefi, wherein it was held that if
construction on land is not permissible in law, the land cannot be
considerecl "urban land" and is therefore excluded from the
expression "assets". On this basis, it is contended that the
disputed land, is non-buildable under the ULC Act, as such is not
exigible to wealth tax. Thus, contended that the orders of the
learned ITr\T are legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
I (1984) 1l;0 ITR 619 (Mad)
s 2OO9 SCrl Online P & H 8595
t4
23. Further reliance was placed on the judgment of the Bombay
High Court at Goa in Prabho;kar Keshaa Kunde t),
Commissloner of Income Tax and others6, wherein it was held
that where part of a property is buildable and part non-buildable,
the non-buildable portion must be segregated, as Section 2(ea)
exclud.es non-buildable land from computation of net wealth'
Learned senior counsel submits that since the disputed vacant
land is rendered. non-buildable by reason of the ULC Act, it would
fall outside the ambit of "urban land" and thus beyond the scope
of wealth tax.
24. Learned Senior Counsel has also drawn support from the
decision of the Honble High court of commissioner of wealth
Tax a. M/s HP Small Industries & Export cotTtorationT,
wherein it rvas held that though the language of wealth tax and
income tax are may be different, inasmUch as the words 'rsed in
the wealth Tax are 'belonging to'-ancl in the lncome Ta< the rvords
userl are 'owner', there can be nc dispu.te that 'belonging to has to
be given a much wider annotation than owner and in the instant
case, the disputed land cannot be sa.id to be 'loelonged to'.
6 2oll (1) Born. CR 216
7 201 1 SCC OnLine HP 160
25' Learned senior counsel further
the Ftonble supreme court
in commtss ioner of rncome Tax,
Bombag and, Others a. pod.q.r
three-'Judge Bench decision,
Nq'wab sir Mir osman Ati
wherein the judgment in
supreme court herd that
Section 4 and that the
in the right of the Expranation
the appeilant-assessee and
ey executed on 28.10. lgTS,
hence cannot be brought
26' Lea.ned senior counsel thus
where regetl ownership had
226 I tR 625 (SC)
under
in the
rand cannot be said to "belong
the Wealth Tax Act.
cemenfs case (supra), the
any
by virtue of
and enjoyment have vested
Asbestos centre, the disputed
to
on the strength of this judiciar
the lrrevocable power of Attorn
8 (.r 997)
the expression
senior counsel submits that,
which possession, control
noticed
expression "transfer,, includes
agreemt:nt or arrangement.
Late
the judgment in pod,qr cement,s
"belonging to" must be construed
pronourrcement, rearned
Cement put. Ltd. & Other#,
a
Khan(supra) was expressly
and distinguished by following
case(sr-rpra),. The Honble
relied on the judgment of
to,
to tax under
submits that in pod.ar
Honbre supreme court held
that even
not yet passed, the property
does not
"belonged to" the assessee, since it was not in its domain and
control, as the assessee constructed shops on the land with the
permission of the State and derived income there from. Drawing
support from this reasoning, learned Senior Counsel contends
that in the present case, the appellant/assessee had no
possession by virtue of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney executed
in 1975, as they have completely parted with possession, control
and enjoyment of the disputed land in favour of the Asbestos
Centre, which has since been using it for welfare activities of the
employees. It is therefore contended that the disputed land cannot
be said to "belong to" the appellant/assessee and, consequently,
cannot be brought within the ambit of wealth tax, and thus, the
orders of the learned ITAT are contrary to the provisions of tJ:e
Wealth Tax Act, inasmuch as the disputed land clear'ly falls within
Exception(b) to Section 2(eal, and is not exigible to tax, and
therefore the appeals deserve to be allorved by setting aside the
orders of the learned ITAT.
of
27. Per contra, Ms. B. Sapna Reddy, learned Senior Standing
Counsel, reiterating the strbmissions advancect in the impugned
t7
order, c()ntends that notwithstanding the execution of the
Irrevocable Power of Attorney in 19'75, the land continued to vest
in and "t,elong to" the appellant/assessee. It is contended that
power of attorney, irrespective of its nomenclature, does not
convey tiile or any proprietary interest or possession in tlee
property .md at the most it would constitute the Asbestos Centre
as an agent of the appellant/assessee. It is further submitted that
the mere cteclaration of land as excess under the ULC Act does not
by itself entitle the assessee to claim exemption under the Wealth
Tax Act.
28. l,earned Senior Standing Counsel further submits that the
terms of the power of attorney make it evident that the assesseecompany <:ontinued to remain the owner of the property, as the
liability to pay taxes and other statutory dues remained with the
appellant/:rssessee being the owner and possessor of the disputed
land, and that the Asbestos Centre was only permitted to utilize
the land pursuant to a Board Resolution by way of an Irrevocable
Power of Attorney executed on 28.10.197 5. It is emphasized that
such permissive use does not divest the assessee of ownership
and possession, in law. Learned Senior Standing Counsel further
contends that, unlike Section 22 of tl:le Income Tax Act which
taxes the 'owner", the Wealth Tax Act imposes tax on assets
"belonging to" a person, the disputed vacant land continued to
belong to the assessee. The relevant portion of the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Late Nawab Slr Mlr
Osman Ali Khan's case(supra) relied upon is extracted
hereunder:
"24. Before concluding thb aspect of tle matter, ttere is
certain a.spect which hns to be bome in mind. Relianec utas
plaed as ue hnue mentioned lereinbefore on tle decision of
the Gujarat High Court in the case of CWT u. H.H, Maharaja
F.P. Gaekwad [(1983) 144 ITR 3O4 (Guj)] . It uas antended
that if the Gujarat High Court's uieut utas correct, then tte
assessee's contention on thi.s aspect in the instant appeal
cannot be acepted. On behalf of the assessee it was
submitted tlnt the deasion of tle Gujarat High Court in CWT
u. Kum. Manna G. Sarabhai ft1972) 86 ITR 153 (Guj)l not
hauing been taken into ansideration bg tle Gujarat High
Court in tle later decbion, ttte Gujarat High Court judgment
on which reuenue relied was not coftect. It is not neessary in
the uieut we haue taken on the other aspect of the matter,
namelg, tle use of tle expresston "belonging to" to disqtss
this point any further. It was furtler submitted before us tlnt
from the said decision of tlrc Gujarat High Court in CWT u.
H.H. Malnraja F.P. Gaekuad ft1983) 144 ITR 30a puj)l , a
special leaue petition utas flled bg tlrc assessee, uthich utas
dismissed bg thi.s Court on January 17, 1983. (See in this
connection 144 ITR Statute p. 23.) It is, houeuer, well settbd
that dismissal of special leaue petition in limine does not
clothe the decrsion under appeal in special leaue petition uith
tlrc authoritg of the decision of this Court. See in this
unnection the obseruations in Daryao u. State of U.P. IAIR
1961 SC 14571 It mag be mentioned o.s tDo.s ightlg observed
bg a Full Bench of tle Allahabad High Court in Sahu Gouind
Prasad u. CIr [fi983) 144 ITR 851, 863 (AlI)] special leaue is a
discretionary juri.sdiction and the dismissal of a special leaue
i9
peti;:ion cannot be constn:ed as alfirmation bg this Court of
ttte ,lecision from u;hich special leaue uas sought for."
29. l,ear:ned Senior Standing Counsel also submits that in
Poddar riements' case(supra), the distinction between oowner,,
and "belonging to" was expressly considered, and it is asserted
that in ttre instant case the rights in the disputed vacant land
remained vested in the assessee, as the Asbestos Centre had no
authority to alienate or transfer the laud, and in other words, the
power of attorney did not amount to an irrevocable transfer of
title, and that the property does not cease to be an asset of the
assessee rnerely because proceedings under the ULC Act were
initiated.
30. It is further contended by the learned Senior Standing
Counsel that there has been no finality to the ULC proceedings, as
the appella.te authority has only remanded the matter to the
Urban Larrd Authority for fresh consideration, and the stage
contemplated under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act i.e., publication
of a notification specifying particulars of the excess land, has not
been reached and, until and unless, such a notification is issued,
the vacant land cannot vest with the Government. Learned Senior
Standing C)ounsel therefore submits that the land cannot be
treated aS excess land vested in the Government, nor Can wealth
tax can be restricted to notional compensation to be granted by
the Government. It is also pointed out that the assessee itself
preferred an appeal under Section 33, and by order,
dt.O4.O2.2OO4, it
resulted in remanding the matter to the
competent authority for fresh consideration. Thus, it is contended
that this is not the case of voluntary handing over of possession of
the disputed land to the Government, nor the proceedings before
the competent authority under IJL,C Act have attained linality.
31. Learned Senior Standing Counsel also controverts the
contention of the learnecl Senior Counsel for the
appellant/assessee that the Asbestos Centre has perfected adverse
possession by virtue of Sections 64 and 65 of the Lirnitatic,n Act,
1908, a.s they exti.nguished t-heir right. It is further contended that
under Sections 10 and 14 of the ULC Act, restrictions on transfer
of excess land would only be effective after issuance of the
notification under Section 1O(3) of the ULC Act, and as the
proceedings have not yet reached that Stage, such contentions are
misconceived and untenable.
/
32. It is finally submitted by the learned Senior Standing
counsel that no grounds have been made out for interference witrr
the well-reasoned findings of the learned ITAT, and that the
authorit:.es/judgments relied upon by the appellant/assessee have
no application and are distinguishable, on facts in the present
case, and thus asserts that the appeals are devoid of
merit and
prays its dismissal.
33. we have given earnest consideration to the submissions
made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for
appellant/assessee and Iearned Senior Standing counsel
appearing for respondent/Revenue, perused the material
on
record arLd also the judgments relied upon by both the rearned
counsel.
OB SERVATIONS AND FINDINGS:
34.
The submissions of learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the
appellantl assessee are of two-fold:
1)
Since the disputed vacant land stood transferred in
favour of Asbestos Centre on2g.lO.l9Z5 by virtue of
a
registered lrreuocable pouter of Attorneg. the appellant/
assessee divested itself of all rights, titte, ana interest
in the property, as a result, the-land
lo vest in
the appellant/assessee from that date,
"..".Jand
thus,
question of appellant/assessee exigible to wealth
tax
does not arise as no liability could be fastened upon
the appellant/assessee in respect of the said disputed
vacant land, as the disputed vacant land no more
belongs to the appellant/assessee; and
2l
As the subject land has been declared as excess uacant
land under Section 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1956, and that, by reason of such
declaration, construction upon the said land is
statutorily prohibited, and therefore, the disputed land
squarely falls within the exception contemplated under
Explanation I(b) to Section 2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act,
which excludes from the definition of "urban land" any
land on which the construction of a building is not
permissible under any law, and thus, the disputed
vacant land is not eigible to wea-lth tax basing upon
the valuation report.
35. Before going into the merits of the case, we deem it
appropriate to extract Explanation I(b) to Section 2(eal of the Act,
which are the exceptions, and it reads as under:
" Explanation I:
(a)
(b)
'jeuellery' includes xxxxxx
*urban land" means land situate-
xxxxxxx
but does not include land classifted as agiatltural
land in the records of tlrc Gouernment and used for
agianltural purposes or land on uhich construdion of
a building is not permissible under ang laut for the
time being in force in tLe area in uthich such land is
situated or tte land occupied by ang buildittg which
lws been mnstructed with tlw approual of tle
oppropiate authoritg or anV unused land held bg ttte
assessee for industial purposes for a period of tr.rto
gears from tle date of its aquisition bg him or anA
land heLd bg the assessee as stock-in-trade for a
period of ten gears from the date of its acquisition."
36. Insofar as the first contention of the learned Senior Counsel
for the a1:pellant/assessee that the land had already been handed
over to lr.sbestos Centre under a registered lrreuocable pouter of
Artorneg, dt.2a.L0.l975, and thereby ceased to belong to the
appellant/assessee, a thorough exarnination of the record makes
it abundrmtly clear that the said document merely appointed
Asbestos Centre as an agent of the appellant/assessee. The
authority conferred under the instrument was only in the nature
of an agency and did not convey any transfer of title, interest,
ownership or possession in the immovable property. It is settled
principle c'f law that an agent, even under an irrevocable power of
mandate, Coes not acquire ownership rights or possessory rights
and at all r-imes, the principal remains the owner and possessor of
the propert5r. In such view of the matter, we are of the considered
opinion tttat the disputed land continued to vest in the
appellant/assessee, and the expression "belonging to,, employed in
the Wealth Tax Act squarely applies to the facts of the present
case. Consr:quently, the submission of the learned counsel for the
appellant that the appellant/assessee had ceased to be the owner
and no mc,re belonged to the appellant/assessee by virtue of
alleged Irre'ocable Power of Attorney in favour of Asbestos centre,
is not tenabre and hence, rejected.
deal with the property does not,
ownership or transfer possession
'
More so, permission to use
in [aw, extinguish or divest the
of the appeuant/assessee.
In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme
Industries (p) Ld..Tr.Dir us sta te
court in suraj Lamp &
of Haryana & Anp reinforced
the principle by holding that a power
execution, create or transfer any
of attorney does not, by its
right in immovabre property. In
the present case as wer, the ownership,
interest in the disputed land
right to retain the property, except
title, and proprietary
continued to vest in the
appellant/assessee and the Asbestos
centre had no independent
being an agent of the principar
and at the best can convey the property
to the prospective buyer
under the instructions of the principal.
considered vielv, the land continued
appellant/assessee within the
Accordingry, in our
to ..belong to,, the
meaning of the wealth Tax Act,
the first contention, therefore, does
and
not merit to be acceptecr and
accordingly rejected.
38. coming to the second rimb of the argument
hauing been d.ecrared. as exces s
e
QOt2) I SCC 6s6
or
that the tand.
und.er the prouisions of the [Jrban
Land (Cetiling and Regalation) Act, 1956, no construction could. be
mad.e thereon and. thus the disputed uacant land. falts utithin the
exceptior,. carued out in Explanation I(b) to Section 2(ea) of tle
Wealth T'ax Act, for better under.standing, we deem it appropriate
to extrac': the relevant provisions of ULC Act, 1955.
"Sectlon 9. After tlre disposal of the objections, if ang,
re*:iued under sub-section (4) of section 8, the competent
autlnitA shall make tle necessary alteration s in the d.rafi
statement in arcordance uith tfe orders passed on tie
obje'ctions aforesaid and" shall determine tle iacant land held
by the person concemed in exess of tlrc ceiling timit and.
cau.se a copg of the draft statement as so altered to be serued
in the manner referred to in sub-section (3) of section g on the
per:;on concerned and uh.ere such uacant land i.s, held under a
lease, or a mortgage, or a hire-purchase agreement, or an
ineuocable pouer of aftomeA, also on tlrc owner of such
uacont land..
Sectlon 10 (1) As soon as mag be after the service of the
stat?ment under section 9 on tle person concemed, the
conyoetent autlaitg shall cause a notiftcation giuing tle
partianlars of the uacant land held by such person ii excess of
the eiling limit and stating that(i) such uacant land is to be aquired by the concemed.
State Gouemment ; and
(ii) the claims of all persons interested in such uacant
land mag be made bg them personallg or bg their
agents giuing partiatlars of tlLe nature of their interests
in such land,
to bct published for tle information of the general public in tle
Offrcial Gazette of tlle State concerned and ii such otter
manner as mag be prescribed.
(2) After consideing the claims of tle persons interested.
in dte uacant land, mad.e to the compitent authoritg in
pursuance of tLrc notification publi.shed under sub-section (1),
th.e competent authoitg shalt determine tle nature and ertent
of such claim.s and pass such orders as tt deems fit.
4t anu fime after tLe publication of tLe notiftcation
- (3)sub-section
under
(1) the competent authoitg mag, bg
notif;cation publisled in tle Olficial Gozette i7 tn"- St"i
con@rraed, declare that the excess uacant land referred to in
th.e notiftcation publislled under sub-section (1) shall, with
effect from such date as mag be specifted in tle declaration,
be deemed to haue been aquired by tlrc State Gouernment
and upon tle publication of such declaration, such land shall
be deemed to haue uested absolutely in the State Gouentment
free from all enanmbranes with effect from tle date so
specified.
(4) Durtng the peiod commencing on the date of
publication of tte notification under sub-section (1) and ending
with the date specified in the declaration made under subsection (3):
(i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage,
gift, lease or otherwise anA excess uacant land
(including any part thereofl specifted in th.e notifrcation
aforesaid and any such transfer made in contrauention
of this prouision shall be deemed to be null and uoid;
and
(ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered th.e use of
such excess uacant land.
(5) Where anA uacant land is uested tn the State
Gouernment under sub-section (3), the competent authoitg
maA, bg notice in writing, order anA person who may be in
possession of it to surrender or deliuer possession thereof to
the State Gouemment or to ang person dulg authorised bg the
State Gouernment in this behalf within thirtg days of the
seruie of the notire.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply utith an
order made under sub-section (5), the competent authoritg
may talcepossessfon of tLe uacant land or cause it to be giuen
to the conerned State Gouemment or to any person duly
authorised ba such State Gouernment in this behalf and mag
for that purpose use suchforce as may be necessary.
Explanation : In this section, in sub-section (1) of section
11 and in sections 14 and 23, "State Gouerrtment", in relation
to-
(a) any uacant land owned by tle Central Gouernment,
means tlrc Central Gouemment;
(b) ang uacant land ouned by ang State Gouernment
and situated in a Union territory or uithin tle local
limits of a cantonment declared as such under section 3
of tle Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924), means that
State Gouerttment."
39. Frorn a perusal of the record, it is clear that though the land
was declared as excess land, the proceedings did not reach
concludin.g stage, as the statutory requirements under Sections 9,
i0(1), 1O(3), and 1O(6) of the ULC Act had not been completed. No
notificaticn under Section 10(3) had been issued to vest the land
in the State Government, and no document is produced to show
that possession had been taken under Section 10(6). Till these
steps are fulfilled, vesting of the land in favour of the Government
does not arise and the land cannot be treated as one where
construction is prohibited under the provisions of the ULC Act.
Consequerrtly, the mere pendency of ULC proceedings cannot
bring the land within the exclusion under Explanation I(b], thus,
the second contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant/assessee is also untenable and hence, rejected.
40. Further as seen from the record, the appellant/assessee had
preferred en appeal under Section 33 of the ULC Act, and by order
dt.O4.O2.2t)O4, the matter was remanded to the competent
authority for fresh consideration as on that date and it is not the
case of th,: appellant/assessee that they themselves voluntarily
surrendered the excess land to the Government, so as to result in
its automatic vesting in the State, and more So, even as on the
date of filing of the appeal either before the learned ITAT or before
this Court, no proceeding/notification issued under Section 1O(3)
or 1O(6) of the Act is filed, and the said act stood repealed by the
Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and the
erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh adopted the Repeal Act with
effect from 27.O3.2OO8. In such circumsta.nces, the question of
the land vesting in favour of the Government and adopting the
value of any compensation that might eventually be sanctioned by
the Government for the purpose of computation or levy under the
Wealth Tax Act, are misconceived and untenable.
41. It is rightly contended by the learned Senior Standing
Counsel for the Revenue that the land is not falling under
Explanation I(b) of Section 2(ea) of the Act, in the light of the
judgment in Late Nqutqb Sir Mir Osman Ali Kho,n's case( supra),
wherein the distinction between 'belonging to' and 'ownership'has
been considered which determine whether the land belonged to
the assessee, i.e., (1) the assessee has parted with the possession
which is one of the essentials of ownership; (2) the assessee was
disentitled to recover possession from the vendee and until
documetrt of title is executed, assessee alone was entitled to sue
for possr:ssion against others i.e., if the land was in possession of
other them the vendee. The title in rem vested in the assessee; (3)
the vend,:e was in rightful possession against the vendor; (4) the
legal title, however, belonged to the vendor; and (5) the assessee
had not t"he totality of the rights that constitute title but a mere
husk of it and a very important element of the husk.
42. Fur':her, in the instant case on hand, the assessee had not
parted wrth possession and legal ownership, and the Asbestos
Centre \^,as in permissive possession as agent and actual
possessiort remained with the assessee, and such residual rights
are sufficient for the property to be treated as .,belonging to,, the
assessee lor wealth tax purposes and more so, the ownership
rights also vested with the appellant/assessee.
43. The rstatutory use of the expression "belonging to" in Section
2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act, instead of ,,owner", is deliberate and
significant. As such, in the present case, the legal title admittedly
continues with the appellant/assessee, as there has been no
transfer of title or interest to Asbestos Centre, and the disputed
vacant lanrl has not vested in State, thus the proceedings under
ULC Act have not attained finality. Therefore, the land, on law as
well as in factual matrix, continued to belong to the
appellant/assessee, and thus, the contentions of the learned
Senior Standing Counsel for the respondent/Revenue, appear to
be germane and valid.
44. Insofar as the finding of the learned ITAT that there was no
proceeding filed by the appellant/assessee showing rejection of
construction application for construction of a building on the
disputed land, though not well founded, is of limited relevance rn
the light of the aforesaid findings. Further, it is also not the case
of the assessee that the lan<l is used for industrial purposes, nor
does it fall within any statutory exceptions, including the two-year
limit showing the disputed land held as stock-in-trade.
45. Having gone into the rival contentions of both sides in the
foremost paras, we have appreciated the judgments placed by the
both the learned counsel and opine as follows:
46. So far as the judgment relied by the learned senior counsel
for appellant in the case of Commtssioner of Wealth Tosc, a. DCM
Limited\supra) the Honble High Court of Delhi dealt with
circumstances s,here construction was legally impermissible,
thereby excluding the land from the definition of "urban land." In
the presr:nt case, although the land was declared excess, the
proceedings had not attained finality. Hence, the said precedent is
factually distinguishable with the instant case. Likewise, the
decision of the Madras High Court in K.S.Ranganatha
Mudaliar's case(supra), relied upon by the assessee, only clarifies
that for wealth-tax purpose s, valuation must be based on
compensa'ion payable by the State and not on market value.
However, the facts in the instant case do not attract that principle,
as the ULt3 proceedings are not concluded and the land did not
vest with the Government, ar-rd thus, the said judgments are
distinguishable on facts.
47. Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta in
Prasa,d Goenlca's case(supra) categorically held that vacant land
does not vest in the State unless a notification under Section lO(3)
of the Act is issued and the owner will hold it subject to certain
conditions until a notification is issued under Section l0(3). Once
the land is vested with the State, no exemption under Section 20
can be sought. In that case, such a notification under Section
10(3) of the Act has been issued.. As such, the factual matrix is
materially different.
48. In the case cited on the fiLe of the Honble High Cotrrt of
Punjab and Haryana in Amrit l,al'Ji.ndq-l and Sons's case(supra)
it was held that the land on which construction is completely
prohibite,J or impermissible in lalv, su.ch land rvould not be treated
as "urban land" or an asset for rvealth ta< purposes. In the instant
case, as already stated supra, there is no complete prohibition, as
the urban land proceediu.gs are not yet completed and ttre
proceedings under sectio n 20 of the Act rvere not yet isstred, and
thus, apparently there is no prohibition in totality. As strch, said
ruling is distinguishable and is of no assistance to
appellant/assessee.
49. So also the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in
M/s HP Sma;ll Industries' case(surpra), only interpreted the
expression 'belonging to' to read with the explanation to Section
(41, and the expression 'transfer' was held to include any
agreement or arrangement. In the saict case, the land was allotted
by the state government to the assessee, rvhich thtrs held to be
falling under 'belonging to'the assessee' and b}r interpreting the
/
judgments of the Honble supreme court
in pod.ar cement put.
Ltd.'s c€rse and Late Ndutab sir Mir osman Ari
supra), t'ee Honble High Court held that as
the assets were under
the domrfn and control of the assessee, even
if tegal ownership
has not passed on to the assessee, the property
belonged to it. In the instant case, neither
Rhans case(
in question
there was any transfer
of properry or vacant rand in favour of Absenters
appellant,/assessee extinguished'its possession
center nor the
on the rand and as
such the land continues to vest with the appeilant/assessee.
50. Insolar as the judgment of the Division Bench of the
Honble
High court of Bombay at Goa in the case of prabhakar
Kesh..a
Kunde's cia.se(supra), the only principre herd
was that the price of
the property which was not buildable was required
segregated from the price of the property
which is buildable
because u.rder section 2(eal of the wealth
Tax Act, the non
buildable property was not riabre to be included
I
\
while computing
the wealth/assets under the wealth tax act
and that in the present
case, the land is vacant land as such, the
question of segregation
of buildable area is not appricabre in the present
I
to be
case.
51. Insofar as the judgment relied by the learned senior
Standing Counsel in Late Nautab Sir Mlr Osman Ali Khrln's
case( supra), in the said judgment it is categorically stated that in
of taxing laws, the interpretation should be strictly done and it is
also held that the words 'belonging to' used in the wealth tax
d.enotes domain or lawful control over the property, which is
sufficient to hold that it is exigible to wealth tax and the said case
is squarely applicable to the facts bf the present case.
52. In view of the above analysis and findings, we are of the
considered view that neither ownership nor any interest in the
property was transferred to the Asbestos Centre and the
appellant/assessee has neither parted with the ownership or
possession and the disputed vacant land still belong to it, and also
as no notification und.er Section 10(3) of the ULC Act was issued,
the proceedings under ULC Act have not attained finality and the
lanrl has not vested in the Government. Thus, the findings arrived
by the learned ITAT afe proper, legal, and justified and there is no
perversity in the said findings of the learned ITAT'
53. In vie,*' of the above finclings, we are of the considered vie',r"
that the appellant/assessee has not made out any grounds for
interfere:ece of this court with the well-considered orders of the
learned ITAT. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are
answerecl against the appellant/assessee and in favour of the
respondent/ Revenue. The appeals are therefore liable to be
rejected.
54. Acc,trdingly, all the appeals are dismissed. No order as to
costs.
As :r sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications pending, if
any, shall stand closed.
SD/. K.SRINIVASA RAO
JOINT REGISTRAR
//TRUE COPY//
SECTION OFFICER
To,
'1. The lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal Hyderabad, Bench ,A,
Hyderabad
2. One CC to SRl. S. RAVI, Advocate tOpUCI
3. One CC to SRI BOKARO SAPNA REDDY (SEN|OR SC TNCOME
\
TAX) Advocate [OPUCI
4. Two CD 3opies
kul/PSL
HIGH COURT
DATED:09101t2026
lHE S
(
,o
rJ
COMMON JUDGMENT
t-
WEALTH TAX APPEAL Nos 3,4,5,6&7 0F2006
DISMISSING 1-I{E ALL TI{E APPEALS
WITHOUT COSTS
b
(,
a
&
*
t r[8
*
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