Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Reserved on:
Pronounced on:
Uploaded on: .
11.08.2026
21.08.2026
21 .08.2026
Whether the operative part or full
Judgment is pronounced: Full
WP(C) No. 2355/2026(O&M)
c/w
WP(C) No. 2426/2026(O&M)
M/s Dinesh Kumar Sharma
Constructions Pvt. Ltd. th. Harsh
Kumar Sharma
…..Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. D. C. Raina, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Anuj Dewan Raina, Adv.
Mr. Mohd. Junaid, Adv.
Q
vs
.…. Respondent(s)
U. T. of J&K and others
Through: Mr. Ravinder Gupta, AAG with
Ms. Pallavi Sharma, Adv.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
WP(C) No. 2355/2026:
1.
Respondent No. 3 had issued an e-NIT No. CEJ/PMGSY/792 of 2025-26
dated 30.07.2025 for the construction and maintenance of road from L135(Link Road) Dhyangarh to Dharan PMGSY Road KM 4th RD 900 to Namal
Package No. JK20-4210, PMGSY-IV, Batch-I of 2025-26, BlockThakrakote District Reasi (Using Waste Plastic) Length-21.300 Kms.
2.
The petitioner, being fully eligible and qualified, submitted its technical as
well as financial bid within the stipulated time and was declared responsive
in the Technical Evaluation Report dated 17.11.2025. One of the bidders,
namely, Vikesh Kumar, was declared non-responsive on the ground that he
had failed to upload the Income Tax Return (ITR) for the financial year
2023-2024, a necessary requirement as per the Clauses 4.2(III), 4.4(a)(III)
and 12.2(b) (III) (b) of the Standard Bidding Document (SBD). He assailed
the Technical Evaluation Report dated 17.11.2025 before this Court by way
of a writ petition bearing WP(C) No. 3258/2025 and vide order dated
19.11.2025, interim relief was granted in his favour. Due to the interim
order, respondent No. 3 issued updated revised summary of the technical
evaluation bearing No. CEJ/PMGSY/20590 dated 10.12.2025 in respect of
aforesaid work and declared the said bidder as L-1. Thereafter, the
aforesaid bidder filed a CM bearing No. 309/2026 for withdrawal of the
prayer part No. (a)(iii) in the writ petition bearing No. WP(C) No.
3258/2025 and vide order dated 31.01.2026 passed by the Court, the said
Vikesh Kumar was allowed to withdraw the said prayer. Following the
withdrawal of the prayer, interim order dated 19.11.2025 was also modified
vide order dated 31.01.2026. Thereafter, on 29.05.2026, the aforesaid writ
petition preferred by Vikesh Kumar was withdrawn.
3.
It is stated that the said Vikesh Kumar had sought the indulgence of this
Court regarding 11 number of works and had requested the Court for
opening of financial bid despite having been technically declared as nonresponsive, in order to stall the entire tendering process for the reason that
he himself was aware that he won’t be able to secure final allotment on
account of having violated the specific terms and conditions of the tender
notice. The writ petition was filed by him solely with a view to cause harm
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
to the official respondents as well as the petitioner herein and subsequently
withdrew the writ petition after the declaration of his financial bid. The
petitioner has given the details of the writ petitions filed by said Vikesh
Kumar in paragraph 11 of the petition.
4.
Subsequently, the respondent-authorities issued communication dated
16.03.2026, thereby categorically clarifying that there existed no legal
impediment in finalizing the tender process in accordance with law. The
said communication specifically recorded that upon the disqualification of
the earlier bidder, the L-2 bidder i.e. petitioner herein had become L-1 and
having qualified both the technical as well as the financial bid, was entitled
to consideration for allotment of the work.
5.
After the withdrawal of the writ petition preferred by Vikesh Kumar, the
respondent-authorities proceeded to finalize and allot various other works
in favour of the different contractors. However, despite there being no legal
impediment for the respondents, they deliberately failed to finalize the
tender process in favour of the petitioner and rather decided to cancel
original tendering process and proceeded to issue fresh e-NIT dated
20.07.2026 for the same work.
6.
The petitioner, through the medium of present petition, has assailed e-NIT
dated 20.07.2026 issued by respondent No. 3, so far as it re-tenders the
work, which was the subject matter of the e-NIT dated 30.07.2025, wherein
after the disqualification of one Vikesh Kumar, the petitioner had become
L-I. The petitioner has also sought the quashing of corrigendum dated
16.07.2026 issued by respondent No.3, whereby the earlier e-NIT dated
30.07.2025 has been cancelled and further directions to the respondents to
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
bring the earlier e-NIT to its logical conclusion by awarding contract by
giving effect to communication dated 16.03.2026.
7.
The contention raised by the petitioner in the present writ petition is that the
action of the respondents in cancelling the earlier e-NIT dated 30.07.2025
and issuance of impugned fresh e-NIT dated 20.07.2026 is clearly arbitrary
coupled with legal malice, bias and mala fide because a non-responsive
bidder, in fact, is a non-participant and his bid opened on the basis of the
court directions cannot be even referred much less considered for the
purpose of comparison of rates.
8.
It is further contended that in normal circumstances, a tender can be
cancelled by the authorities for cogent reasons and even the L-1 bidder has
no right to insist upon the execution of the work but once the respondents in
the same tendering process for the same set of reasons have allowed the
other construction works to continue, then in that eventuality, cancelling the
tendering process, is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is also
urged that the respondents have acted in complete disregard of the
communication dated 16.03.2026 issued by the Public Works (R&B)
Department, wherein it was categorically clarified that there was no legal
impediment in finalizing the tender process and allotting the work to the
bidder, who had become L-I after the disqualification of the earlier bidder.
9.
The respondents have filed the response, stating therein that the tendering
process remained protracted on account of successive rounds of litigation
initiated by one Vikesh Kumar, resulting in expiry and repeated extension
of bid validity. After withdrawal of the said litigation, the revised technical
evaluation, the bid rankings and the price differential in bid amounts, were
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
placed before and examined in detail by the Contract Committee
constituted under the Chairmanship of the Engineer-in-Chief (Secretary
Technical), Public Works (R&B) Department. The Committee specifically
noticed a difference of ₹6,05,12,020/- between the competing bids for the
work in question, having significant financial implications for the State
exchequer, and as such, unanimously resolved to cancel the tender process
and invite fresh tenders in the interest of transparency, fairness and wider
competition. Respondents have denied the non-application of mind,
arbitrariness, bias or mala fide, while arriving at the above decision. It is
further stated that the impugned corrigendum-IV dated 16.07.2026 and the
fresh e-NIT of 2026-27 dated 20.07.2026 were issued strictly in pursuance
of, and consistent with, the said bona fide decision of the competent
Contract Committee, and not with any intention to cause prejudice to the
petitioner. It is also stated by the respondents that the communication dated
16.03.2026 merely enabled the respondents to proceed with the tender
process and to consider the petitioner having emerged as L-I upon
disqualification of the earlier L-1 bidder. Such consideration, however, was
subject to the decision of the competent authority/Contract Committee,
which was competent to take an appropriate decision regarding finalization
or cancellation of the tender process in accordance with the applicable
rules, conditions of the tender and the larger public interest. The said
communication was issued only in the context of legal impediment arising
from the pending litigation. It is further stated that the finalization of certain
other works, falling within the delegated financial powers of the concerned
authorities proceeded with or allotted, does not take away the competence
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
of the Contract Committee to independently examine the present tender in
light of its peculiar circumstances, including the prolonged litigation, bid
validity, financial implications and other relevant considerations and it does
not furnish a valid reason to the petitioner under Article 14 of the
Constitution to assert that he has been discriminated.
10.
Mr. D. C. Raina, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has
vehemently argued that once the petitioner was declared as L-I bidder after
the disqualification of Vikesh Kumar, the respondents ought to have
awarded the contract to the petitioner, but for the reasons best known to
them, the respondents took into consideration the financial bid of Vikesh
Kumar and cancelled the tender on the ground that there was substantial
difference of amount between the bids of the petitioner and Vikesh Kumar,
the course not permissible under law, because once the bidder (Vikesh
Kumar) was declared non-responsive, then the rates quoted by him became
inconsequential. Mr. Raina has placed reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in West Bengal Electricity Board v Patel
Engineering Company Ltd, (2001) 2 SCC 451, Shanti Construction Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of Odisha and others, 2025 AIR SC 5516 and the judgment
of Madhya Pradesh High Court passed in WP No. 8404 of 2020, titled,
Rachna Construction Company v State of MP and others.
11.
Per Contra, Mr. Ravinder Gupta, learned AAG appearing for the
respondents has vehemently argued that the respondents had a valid cause
for cancelling the tender, wherein the petitioner had participated and
emerged as L-1 after Vikesh Kumar was declared as non-responsive
because there was substantial difference of more than six crores between
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
the bids submitted by the petitioner and Vikesh Kumar. Taking into
consideration the huge financial difference in the financial bids submitted
by the petitioner and Vikesh Kumar, the Contract Committee resolved to
cancel the earlier tender and retender the work issued vide e-NIT dated
30.07.2026. He has further submitted that communication dated 16.03.2026
was only to the extent of clarifying and providing that the tender process
can be finalized, provided there is no legal impediment, but whether to allot
the contract or not, was the sole discretion of the Contract Committee and
communication dated 16.03.2026 does not confer any indefeasible right
upon the petitioner to seek allotment of work pursuant to the earlier e-NIT,
which was cancelled through the medium of corrigendum dated 16.07.2026
issued by the Chief Engineer, PMGSY(JKRRDA), Jammu. He has further
argued that in terms of Clauses 27 and 28 of the Standard Bidding
Document, the employer has reserved the right to accept or reject any bid,
and to cancel bidding process and reject all bids, at any time prior to the
award of contract, without thereby incurring any liability to the affected
bidder or bidders or any obligation to inform the affected bidder or bidders
of the grounds for the employer’s action, as such, the petitioner had no
vested right for allotment of work and once the respondents have genuine
cause to cancel e-NIT wherein the petitioner had participated, the decision
of the Committee does not call for any interference. He has relied upon
judgments of the Supreme Court in IndoreVikas Praadhikaran (IDA)
and another vs. Shri Humud Jain Samaj Trust and another, decided on
25.11.2024, SLP(C) No. 9940 of 2022, M/s N. G. Projects Ltd. v M/s
Vinod Kumar Jain and others, 2022 INSC 319, Tata Cellular v Union
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
of India, 1994(6) SCC 651, M/s Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v State of
Karnataka and others, 2012 INSC 338 and judgment of the Jammu Wing
of this Court passed in WP(C) No. 357/2023, titled M/s SPBL Energy Pvt.
Ltd. v/s Jammu Power Development Corporation Ltd. and Another.
12.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, including the
Standard Bidding Document.
13.
Before this Court considers the grounds raised by the petitioner, it would be
appropriate to take note of the judicial precedents governing the scope of
judicial review in tender/contract matters.
14.
In “Haryana Urban Development Authority Vs. Orchid Infrastructure
Developers P. Ltd”, AIR 2017 SUPREME COURT 882, Hon’ble the
Apex Court has held that “It is a settled law that the highest bidder has no
vested right to have the auction concluded in his favour. The Government
or its authority could validly retain power to accept or reject the highest
bid in the interest of public revenue. We are of the considered opinion that
there was no right acquired and no vested right accrued in favour of the
plaintiff merely because his bid amount was highest and had deposited 10%
of the bid amount”. It was further observed as under:
25. Thus, it is apparent that the report and recommendations of
the Auction Committee consisting of 5 members, was not to
accept the bids of big commercial sites as the prices fetched
were on lower side which was examined by the Government at
the Headquarters level. Considering the auction trends and
also taking into consideration the higher prices fetched at
Panipat, Panchkula and Faridabad, it was decided to reject the
seven bids. Thus, there was due application of mind.
26. In our opinion when it is apparent from the communication that
the reports were considered and what was contained in the report
was very much pleaded in the written statement, mere nonproduction of report was not of any significance in the instant case.
We are satisfied that the rejection of the bid by the
Administrator was absolutely proper and justified and was
beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The Administrator had the
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
right to reject the bids and he had rejected it on sufficient
ground, duly considering the materials on record as is apparent
from the communication dated 21.9.2004. In the interest of the
public, revenue of the State and in the interest of HUDA the
huge property was saved from being plundered.
(emphasis added)
15.
In “Jagdish Mandal Vs. State of Orissa”, AIR Online 2006 SC 645, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“19. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent
arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides.
Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made
'lawfully' and not to check whether choice or decision is 'sound'.
When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to
tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be
borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating
tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial
functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance.
If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in
public interest, courts will not, in exercise of Page 0102 power of
judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in
assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of
judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect
private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide
contractual disputes.
The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek
damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with
imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make
mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation
or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by
exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such
interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for
years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and
may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before
interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of
judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions :
i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the
authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone.
OR
Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary
and irrational that the court can say : 'the decision is such
that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in
accordance with relevant law could have reached.
ii) Whether public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there should be no
interference under Article 226. Cases involving black-listing
or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor
or distribution of state largesse (allotment of sites/shops,
grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a
different footing as they may require a higher degree of
fairness in action.”
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
16.
In “Air India Ltd Vs. Cochin International Airport Ltd. and others”,
AIR 2000 SUPREME COURT 801, it has been held as under:
“7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its
corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of
the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in R.
D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority, (1979) 3 SCC 498 :
(AIR 1979 SC 1628); Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v.
Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568 : (AIR 1981 SC 844); Asstt.
Collector, Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260 :
(AIR 1985 SC 330); Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC
651 : (1994 AIR SCW 3344 : AIR 1996 SC 11); Ramniklal N.
Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 134 : (1997 AIR
SCW 1281 : AIR 1997 SC 1236) and Raunaq International Ltd. v.
I.V.R. Construction Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 492 : (1999 AIR SCW 53 :
AIR 1999 SC 393). The award of contract, whether it is by a
private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a
commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision
considerations which are of paramount are commercial
considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a
decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is
not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before
finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need
not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to
grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions
permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though
it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its
corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to
adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by
them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that
decision is not amenable to judicial review, the Court can
examine the decision making process and interfere if it is found
vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The
State, is corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the
public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect
is found in the decision making process the Court must exercise
its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution
and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and
not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court
should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order
to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only
when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public
interest requires interference, the Court should intervene.”
(emphasis added)
17.
Thus, it is a settled proposition of law, fortified by an unbroken line of
judicial precedents, that the lowest bidder possesses no indefeasible or
vested right to the award of a contract. The tendering authority remains the
sole judge of its requirements and is fully empowered to reject the lowest
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
bid, provided such decision is grounded in cogent and justifiable reasons.
However, this administrative discretion is not absolute. The authority
cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, or with mala fide to extend an undue
favour to any preferred bidder. Ultimately, individual commercial interest
must yield to the paramount public interest.
18.
Now, this Court would examine the contentions raised by the petitioner in
the present petition in the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, as noticed hereinabove.
19.
First, it was contended that the financial bid of Vikesh Kumar could not
have been relied upon by the respondents for the purpose of cancelling the
tender through the medium of corrigendum dated 16.07.2026, as the said
contractor had deliberately submitted the commercially unviable bid, and
that is why, he initially disputed the action of the respondents declaring his
bid as non-responsive but subsequently withdrew the petition, causing loss
not only to the petitioner but also to the respondents. The case of Rachna
Construction Co. (supra), relied upon by the petitioner, provides that once
the bidder is declared as non-responsive, the rates quoted in the financial
bids become irrelevant. In that case, the petitioner had challenged the
declaration of its bid as non-responsive and he asserted that he had quoted
rates lesser than L-1 bidder, therefore, he was entitled to allotment of
contract, so that the differential amount could be used for other valuable
projects. So far as the present case is concerned, the employer in its
discretion, has examined the issue in detail and has arrived at the
conclusion that there was substantial difference of ₹6,05,12,020/, between
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
the bids submitted by the petitioner and Vikesh Kumar, therefore, decided
to cancel the earlier tender.
20.
A perusal of the minutes of the meeting dated 10.07.2026 held in the office
of Engineer-in-Chief reveals that the Committee comprising of Chief
Engineer, PMGSY(JKRRDA), Jammu as well as Chief Engineer,
PMGSY(JKRRDA), Kashmir, Financial Control, PMGSY(JKRRDA), J&K
and Superintending Engineer, PMGSY/Circle Reasi-Udhampur, deliberated
upon e-NIT dated 30.07.2025 and after detailed discussions, the Contract
Committee unanimously decided to scrap the earlier e-NIT and directed
fresh e-NIT be invited for the aforesaid work besides another, which is the
subject matter of clubbed writ petition. The Committee noted that there was
difference of amount more than six crores i.e. ₹6,05,12,020/ between the
bids submitted by Vikesh Kumar and the petitioner, taking into
consideration this huge difference, the aforesaid decision was arrived at.
Given the substantial disparity between the bids submitted by Vikesh
Kumar and the petitioner, the decision of the employer to cancel the tender
process is anchored in justifiable reasons, and the same cannot be faulted.
While a technically non-responsive bidder, whose financial bid happens to
be the lowest acquires no indefeasible or vested right to seek the award of
the contract, the tendering authority is fully justified in relying upon the
substantial price gap between the non-responsive bid and the responsive bid
as a cogent ground to scrap the tender altogether. This principle applies
with even greater force where the financial bid of the non-responsive bidder
was opened pursuant to judicial directions. Consequently, the decisions
relied upon by the petitioner are clearly distinguishable on facts and
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
inapplicable to the present case, particularly as the technically disqualified
bidder herein is not seeking the award of the contract. Therefore, this
contention is rejected.
21.
It was next contended by the petitioner that having been declared as L-1
bidder, after the withdrawal of the litigation, the petitioner ought to have
been awarded the contract, more particularly in the light of communication
dated 16.03.2026. In this context, it would be appropriate to take note of the
Clauses 27 and 28 of the Standard Bidding Document, the same are
extracted as under:
“27. Award Criteria
27.1 Subject to Clause 30 of ITB, the Employer will award the
Contract to the Bidder whose Bid has been determined:
(i)
to be substantially responsive to the bidding documents
and who has offered the lowest evaluated Bid price, provided that
such Bidder has been determined to be (a) eligible in accordance
with the provisions of Clause 3 of ITB, and (b) qualified in
accordance with the provisions of Clause 4 of ITB; and
(ii) to be within the available bid capacity adjusted to account for
his bid price which is evaluated the lowest in any of the packages
opened earlier than the one under consideration.
28 Employer’s Right to Accept any Bid and to Reject any or all
Bids
28.1 Notwithstanding Clause 27 above, the Employer reserves the
right to accept or reject any Bid, and to cancel the bidding process
and reject all bids, at any time prior to the award of Contract,
without thereby incurring any liability to the affected Bidder or
bidders or any obligation to inform the affected Bidder or bidders
of the grounds for the Employer’s action.”
22.
A perusal of Clause 27 of the Standard Bidding Document reveals that
while the Employer may award the contract to the bidder, whose bid is
found to be substantially responsive and who offers the lowest evaluated
bid price, Clause 28 thereof contains an explicit non-obstante clause. In
terms of Clause 28, notwithstanding anything contained in Clause 27, the
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
Employer reserves the absolute right to accept or reject any bid, or to cancel
the bidding process altogether at any time prior to the award of the contract,
without incurring any liability towards the affected bidder(s) or any
obligation to inform him/them of the grounds for such action.
23.
Consequently, the contention advanced by the petitioner that despite being
declared the L-1 bidder and in the light of communication dated
16.03.2026, the contract ought to have been awarded to it, is wholly
misconceived. Merely being designated as the lowest bidder confers no
indefeasible or vested right upon the petitioner to seek the award of the
contract, particularly when the Employer has advanced cogent and
justifiable reasons for cancelling the tender process.
24.
The other contention of the petitioner is that, in light of the communication
dated 16.03.2026, the petitioner is entitled to the award of the contract upon
being declared as L-1 bidder. The communication dated 16.03.2026 was
only clarificatory in nature that there was no legal impediment to finalizing
the tender process in favour of the L-1 bidder. Nonetheless, the decision as
to whether or not to award the contract to the petitioner continued to remain
within the domain of the competent authority, to be exercised in accordance
with law and the applicable tender conditions. This contention is also
without any force and the same is rejected.
25.
Lastly, it was contended that, under similar circumstances, contracts under
other tenders have been awarded to various bidders, including the
petitioner. However, it must be noted that with respect to the present tender,
the Contract Committee recorded cogent and justifiable reasons involving
substantial financial implications for the public exchequer. Conversely, the
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
petitioner has placed nothing on record to demonstrate that in those other
tenders where contracts were awarded, a similar price disparity existed
between the financial bids. Consequently, the petitioner cannot claim parity
with those cases. Otherwise also, it is submitted by the respondents that the
contracts were awarded by different authorities.
26.
For all what has been said, analyzed and discussed hereinabove, there is no
merit in this petition. As such, the same is dismissed.
WP(C) No. 2426/2026
27.
The present petition involves and raises the issues identical to that arising in
the writ petition bearing WP(C) No. 2355/2026. The only difference
between the two cases is that in the present case, the bid was reduced by the
petitioner. In view of the detailed reasoning recorded in the aforesaid writ
petition, which is equally applicable to the issues raised in the present
petition, the present petition is also dismissed.
(RAJNESH OSWAL)
JUDGE
Jammu
21.08.2026
Rakesh PS
Whether the order is speaking:
Whether the order is reportable:
KARAM CHAND
2026.08.20 22:09
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
WP(C) No. 2355/2026
Yes/No
Yes/No
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review