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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 259 of 2022
Date of Decision: 07.03.2023
Vs.
M/S East Jaintia Coke
State of Meghalaya & Anr.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner
:
Ms. B. Dikshit, Adv. with
Mr. M. Lyngdoh, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. A. Kumar, AG with
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, GA
Ms. S. Laloo, GA (For R 1)
Dr. A. Todi, Adv. (For R 2).
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The petitioner being aggrieved with the notification dated
23.12.2020, issued by the respondent No. 2, State Pollution Control Board
under Section 17(1)(n) under the Water (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1974 and Section 17(1)(h) of the Air (Prevention and
Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, whereby norms/criteria have been
prescribed for siting of Coke plants of various capacities, which it is
alleged is without jurisdiction and ultra vires the Air and Water Pollution
Acts, is before this Court by way of the instant writ petition.
2.
This Court on the challenge to the maintainability that had
been made by the respondents by order dated 26.10.2022, had held this
writ petition to be maintainable as the National Green Tribunal does not
possess the power of judicial review, apart from the fact that nothing in the
NGT Act, ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court
3.
I have heard learned counsels for the parties.
4.
Ms. B. Dikshit, with Mr. M. Lyngdoh, learned counsels for the
petitioner, has submitted that the petitioner has approached this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution, as the impugned notification is
patently without jurisdiction, and has been passed with total disregard to
the statutory provisions of the Air and Water Pollution Acts. The attention
of this Court, has been drawn to Section 17(1)(n) of the Water Pollution
Act, which the learned counsel submits, specifically stipulates that one of
the functions of the State Pollution Control Board, with regard to siting, is
to advise the State Government with respect to the location of any industry,
the carrying on of which is likely to pollute a stream or a well. It is
contended that, a plain reading of the said provision, thus indicate that, the
impugned notification issued by the State Pollution Control Board which
is patently not advisory, but a prescription of norms is clearly ultra vires
the statute, and without any jurisdiction.
5.
The learned counsel submits that the point in issue therefore is
limited only to the legality of the impugned notification and that the
provisions as contained in Section 17 (1) (n) of the Water (Prevention and
Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Section 17 (1) (h) of the Air
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 being specific and clear,
the impugned notification not being advisory but prescribing siting norms
is clearly in violation of the Water and Air Acts. Reliance has been placed
on the judgments of J.K. Industries Limited & Anr. vs. Union of India &
Ors. (2007) 13 SCC 673 and St. Johns Teachers Training Institute vs.
Regional Director, National Council for Teacher Education & Anr.
(2003) 3 SCC 321, to substantiate the arguments that an authority upon
whom a specific power is conferred, is to act within the limits of such
powers as prescribed in the Act.
6.
Mr. A. Kumar, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. A.H.
Kharwanlang, learned counsel for the respondent submits that even though
the impugned notification has been issued under Section 17(1)(n) and
17(1)(h) of the Water and Air Pollution Acts respectively, the same is well
within the powers of the State Pollution Control Board, as stipulated by the
Act, by the application of Sections 21 and 25 thereof, which has cloaked
the Boards with ample power to prohibit and restrict the setting up of any
activity, that may cause pollution. The learned Advocate General has
contended that Section 21 (5) (v) of the Air (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1981 also empowers the State Pollution Control Board to
specify such conditions necessary to prevent air pollution, as also the
granting of the Consent to Establish and Consent to Operate, and submits
that the source of power in issuing the impugned notification flows from
these provisions.
7.
Dr. A. Todi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, (State
Pollution Control Board) has placed reliance on the affidavit filed on its
behalf, and submits that on the question of the vires of the impugned
notification, the respondent will initiate a review of the same in accordance
with the interpretation of Section 17, but in view of the pendency of the
matter before this Court, the matter has not been taken forward. Learned
counsel however, has voiced strong exceptions to the conduct of the
petitioner and has submitted that the petitioner had applied for Consent to
Establish (CTE) on 30.05.2021, under Section 25 and 26 of the Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and under Section 21 of
the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 but without
obtaining the said permission, it was found on inspection, had constructed
the Unit which was a clear violation of the provisions of Section 21 of the
Air Act and Section 25 of the Water Act. He further submits that closure
notice was then issued to the petitioner under Section 33A of the Water
Act and 31A of the Air Act, and after re-inspection, an order of refusal of
Consent to Establish, was issued vide letter dated 06.01.2022 and lastly,
on these infractions the respondent No. 2, imposed Environmental
compensation upon the petitioner, in exercise of powers under Section 33A
of the Water Act and Section 31A of the Air Act. Learned counsel in
support of his submissions, has taken this Court to the Annexures detailing
the action taken and orders passed by the respondent No. 2.
8.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, in reply firstly to the
submissions of the Advocate General, has contended that general
provisions cannot override the specific provisions as provided in the Act,
and that further Section 25 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act, 1981 and Section 21 of the Water (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1974 deals only with the part of application for consent and
does not in any manner vest power upon the respondent No. 2, general or
otherwise, to issue the impugned notification. On another limb, the learned
counsel reiterates her submissions that the instant writ petition will be
confined only on the point of law, that is the legality of the impugned
notification, and that the other prayer set out in the writ petition, to declare
the Refusal of Consent as non-est and void, will not be pressed.
9.
Having heard learned counsels for the parties, as observed
earlier, the only point in contention is on a point of law, which is whether
the impugned notification is ultra vires, the Air and Water Pollution Acts.
To answer the question as to whether the State Pollution Control Board has
acted without jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notification dated
23.12.2020, the relevant provisions of the Water and Air Pollution Control
Acts, as given in Section 17(1)(n) and 17(1)(h) respectively need to be
examined, and for the sake of convenience are reproduced hereinbelow:Section 17 (1) (n) of the Water (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1974 is as follows:17. Functions of State Board – (1) Subject to the provisions
of this Act, the functions of the State Board shall be –
(a)……
(b)……
(c)……
(d) …..
(e) ……
(f) ……
(g) …..
(h) ……
(i)……
(j) ….
(k)….
(l)…..
(m)….
(n) to advise the State Government with respect to the
location of any industry the carrying on of which is likely to
pollute a stream or well;
Section 17 (1) (h) of the Air (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1981 is as under:17. Functions of State Boards.—(1) Subject to the provisions
of this Act, and without prejudice to the performance of its
functions, if any, under the Water (Prevention and Control
of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974), the functions of a State
Board shall be—
(a) …………
(b)…………..
(c)………….
(d) ………….
(e) …………
(f) …………
(g) ……………
(h) to advise the State Government with respect to the
suitability of any premises or location for carrying on any
industry which is likely to cause air pollution;”
A plain reading of the afore quoted provisions, reflects that
the respondent No. 2, is to act in an advisory capacity to the State
Government with respect to the suitability of any premises or location for
setting up and carrying on any industry, which may be likely to pollute air
or water. The impugned notification it is noted, has been issued by the
respondent No. 2 prescribing norms/criteria for siting of Coke Plants,
ostensibly in exercise of functions vested under clause 17 (1)(n) of the
Water Act and 17 (1) (h) of the Air Act. In discerning as to whether, read
with the other provisions the said notification can be sustained as
advocated by the State respondents, a perusal of Section 25 of the Water
Act as also Section 21 of the Air Act, however, shows that these provisions
deal with the factum of application for Consent before the State Pollution
Control Board and to the conditions that may be imposed, when setting up
such industrial units.
Extracts of Sections 25 of the Water (Prevention and Control
of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Section 21 of Air (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1981 which are relevant are reproduced hereinunder:Section 25 in the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,
“25. Restrictions on new outlets and new discharges.—
[(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, no person shall,
without the previous consent of the State Board,—
(a) establish or take any steps to establish any industry,
operation or process, or any treatment and disposal system
or any extension or addition thereto, which is likely to
discharge sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or
sewer or on land (such discharge being hereafter in this
section referred to as discharge of sewage); or
(b) bring into use any new or altered outlet for the discharge
of sewage; or
(c) begin to make any new discharge of sewage:
Provided that a person in the process of taking any
steps to establish any industry, operation or process
immediately before the commencement of the Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Amendment Act,
1988, for which no consent was necessary prior to such
commencement, may continue to do so for a period of three
months from such commencement or, if he has made an
application for such consent, within the said period of three
months, till the disposal of such application.
(3) The State Board may make such inquiry as it may deem
fit in respect of the application for consent referred to in subsection (1) and in making any such inquiry shall follow such
procedure as may be prescribed. 2[(4) The State Board
may—
(a) grant its consent referred to in sub-section (1), subject to
such conditions as it may impose, being—
(i) in cases referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section
(1) of section 25, conditions as to the point of discharge of
sewage or as to the use of that outlet or any other outlet for
discharge of sewage;
(ii) in the case of a new discharge, conditions as to the nature
and composition, temperature, volume or rate of discharge
of the effluent from the land or premises from which the
discharge or new discharge is to be made; and
(iii) that the consent will be valid only for such period as may
be specified in the order,
and any such conditions imposed shall be binding on any
person establishing or taking any steps to establish any
industry, operation or process, or treatment and disposal
system of extension or addition thereto, or using the new or
altered outlet, or discharging the effluent from the land or
premises aforesaid; or
(b) refuse such consent for reasons to be recorded in
writing.”
Section of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,
“21. Restrictions on use of certain industrial plants.— 15 [
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, no person shall,
without the previous consent of the State Board, establish or
operate any industrial plant in an air pollution control area:
(5) Every person to whom consent has been granted by the
State Board under sub-section (4), shall comply with the
following conditions, namely:—
(vi) the conditions referred to in clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) shall
be complied with within such period as the State Board may
specify in this behalf:
Provided that in the case of a person operating any industrial
plant 19 [***] in an air pollution control area immediately
before the date of declaration of such area as an air pollution
control area, the period so specified shall not be less than six
months: Provided further that—
(a) after the installation of any control equipment in
accordance with the specifications under clause (i), or
(b) after the alteration or replacement of any control
equipment in accordance with the directions of the State
Board under clause (ii), or
(c) after the erection or re-erection of any chimney under
clause (iv), no control equipment or chimney shall be altered
or replaced or, as the case may be, erected or re-erected
except with the previous approval of the State Board.”
These provisions therefore, cannot be read to be general and
empowering provisions that will cloak the respondent No. 2, with powers
for issuance of norms and criteria under Section 17(1)(h) and 17 (1) (n) of
the Water and Air Acts, which would make the impugned notification
sustainable in law.
10.
On the other aspect that is, the disposal by the NGT of a
similar matter, wherein, the instant impugned notification, has met with its
approval, the learned counsel for the petitioner has apprised the Court, that
the said order has since been assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
and that interim orders are operating staying the impugned notification.
Orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said matter, dated
07.11.2022 and 14.12.2022, have been produced before this Court by the
learned counsel. It is noted that it is a fact, that the matter has been taken
on appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but however, apart from an
undertaking from the counsel for the Meghalaya State Pollution Control
Board, not to take further action against the appellant therein, there are no
orders specifically staying the operation of the impugned notification.
11.
Be that as it may, the fact that the respondent No. 2 had no statutory
authority to issue the impugned notification, however, is established by the
discussions made hereinabove. In this context, the judgment placed by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, that is St. Johns Teacher Training
Institute vs. Regional Director, National Council for Teacher Education
& Anr. (supra) being relevant for this case, paragraphs 10 and 12 thereof,
on this point of law with regard to delegation of powers is quoted
hereinbelow: 10. A regulation is a rule or order prescribed by a superior
for the management of some business and implies a rule for
general course of action. Rules and regulations are all
comprised in delegated legislations. The power to make
subordinate legislation is derived from the enabling Act and
it is fundamental that the delegate on whom such a power is
conferred has to act within the limits of authority conferred
by the Act. Rules cannot be made to supplant the provisions
of the enabling Act but to supplement it. What is permitted is
the delegation of ancillary or subordinate legislative
functions, or, what is fictionally called, a power to fill up
details. The legislature may, after laying down the legislative
policy confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the
execution of the policy and leave it to the agency to work out
the details within the framework of policy. The need for
delegated legislation is that they are framed with care and
minuteness when the statutory authority making the rule,
after coming into force of the Act, is in a better position to
adapt the Act to special circumstances. Delegated legislation
permits utilisation of experience and consultation with
interests affected by the practical operation of statutes. Rules
and regulations made by reason of the specific power
conferred by the statutes to make rules and regulations
establish the pattern of conduct to be followed. Regulations
are in aid of enforcement of the provisions of the statute. The
process of legislation by departmental regulations saves time
and is intended to deal with local variations and the power to
legislate by statutory instrument in the form of rules and
regulations is conferred by Parliament. The main
justification for delegated legislation is that the legislature
being overburdened and the needs of the modern-day society
being complex, it cannot possibly foresee every administrative
difficulty that may arise after the statute has begun to operate.
Delegated legislation fills those needs. The regulations made
under power conferred by the statute are supporting
legislation and have the force and effect, if validly made, as
an Act passed by the competent legislature. (See Sukhdev
Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi.)
12. The question whether any particular legislation suffers
from excessive delegation has to be decided having regard to
the subject-matter, the scheme, the provisions of the statute
including its preamble and the facts and circumstances in the
background of which the statute is enacted. (See Registrar of
Coop. Societies v. K. Kunjabmu and State of Nagaland v.
Ratan Singh.) It is also well settled that in considering the
vires of subordinate legislation one should start with the
presumption that it is intra vires and if it is open to two
constructions, one of which would make it valid and the other
invalid, the courts must adopt that construction which makes
it valid and the legislation can also be read down to avoid its
being declared ultra vires.”
12.
Though the impugned notification in view of the stated position
of law is liable to be declared invalid, this Court however cannot lose sight
of the fact that the main subject matter and the larger picture, concerns the
preservation of the environment, for which the norms or criteria, had been
issued prescribing the conditions for location of polluting industries, such
as the instant Coke Plant. What has alarmed this Court, is the fact that as
submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, and evidenced
by the annexures on affidavit, the petitioner without obtaining even the
Consent to Establish, had proceeded with setting up the Coke Plant for
which thereafter, consent to Establish was refused under Section 27 (1) of
the Water Act and 21 (4) of the Air Act, by the respondent No. 2 who also
levied a penalty under Section 33A and 31A of the Water and Air Acts
respectively, upon the petitioner. In this backdrop therefore, though the
impugned notification is invalid, the same is only on a technical ground
which should not be taken to be a license to proposed Coke Plants to be
oblivious to the stipulations of the Water and Air Acts, as also the valid
concerns of environmental protection.
13.
In conclusion therefore, looking into the totality of the
circumstances, especially the public interest and policy involved, while
setting aside the impugned notification dated 23.12.2020, the statement that
the respondent No. 2 is in the process of review of the same, is taken into
consideration by this Court, and the Respondent No.2 is accorded 8(eight)
weeks’ time from the date of this order to complete the same. It is further
provided that during this period, there shall be a status quo on all operations
of the petitioner at its project site, who nonetheless also, is not in possession
of any valid permissions to re-start the project, as per the materials on
record.
14.
With the aforementioned directions, this writ petition is
allowed to the extent indicated above and is accordingly disposed of.
15.
There shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGE
Meghalaya
07.03.2023
“V. Lyndem-PS”
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