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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 14th January, 2026
%
Pronounced on: 9th February, 2026
+
W.P.(C) 18556/2025
M/S BHAGWAN CORPORATION
(THROUGH PROPRIETOR: SMT. ANJU GOSWAMI)
R/O: A 202, LEGEND CHSL,
LOKHANDWALA, ANDHERI WEST,
MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA- 400053
(M): +91 9899152565
Through:
.....PETITIONER
Mr. Pradeep Jain, Mr. Sambhav
Jain and Mr. Pranav Raj Singh,
Advs.
versus
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
ICD PATPARGANJ
R/O GALI NO. 2, GHAZIPUR VILLAGE,
GHAZIPUR, DELHI, 110096
(M): 011- 21211110
.....RESPONDENT NO. 1
Signed By:GAURAV
SHARMA
18:35:18
W.P.(C) 18556/2025
ADDITIONAL COMMISIONER OF
CUSTOMS
R/O GALI NO. 2, GHAZIPUR VILLAGE,
GHAZIPUR, DELHI, 110096
.....RESPONDENT NO. 2
(M): 011- 21211880
Through:
Mr. Gibran Naushad, Senior
Standing Counsel with Mr. Harsh
Singhal and Mr. Suraj Shekhar
Singh, Advs.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
JUDGMENT
AJAY DIGPAUL, J.
1.
The instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been
filed on behalf of the petitioner seeking the following reliefs:
“A) Issue a Writ of Certiorari, or any other appropriate
writ, order, or direction, quashing and setting aside the
Order-in-Original
No.
17/ADC/Bhagwan
Corporation/ICD-PPG/2021-22 dated 24.09.2021 passed
by the Respondent No. 2, to the extent it directs absolute
confiscation of the imported goods without affording the
Petitioner the statutory option of redemption fine under
Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962;
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B) Quash and set aside the consequential Order-in-Appeal
dated 17.01.2024 passed by the Commissioner of Customs
(Appeals), whereby the Petitioner‟s appeal was dismissed
solely on limitation, without consideration on merits;
C) Direct the Respondent Authorities to grant the
Petitioner the statutory option of redemption of the
confiscated goods on payment of appropriate redemption
fine in lieu of absolute confiscation under Section 125 of the
Customs Act, 1962, as per law;
D) Quash and set aside the penalty of ₹30,00,000/- imposed
under Section 112(a)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962, being
arbitrary, excessive, and imposed without any finding of
intent, suppression, or mens rea;
E) Direct the Respondent Authorities to permit the
Petitioner to physically inspect the seized goods either in
person or through an authorized representative, under
proper supervision, so as to verify the condition and quality
of the goods and to facilitate fair adjudication;
F) Direct the Respondent Authorities to issue a Detention,
Demurrage, and Warehousing Charges Waiver Certificate
in respect of the Petitioner‟s imported goods, which have
been wrongfully detained/seized pursuant to the impugned
proceedings, as the goods have been unjustifiably withheld
solely on the basis of a single and disputed laboratory
report, without affording any opportunity of re-testing,
cross-examination, or verification in accordance with law;
and consequently, the Petitioner cannot be burdened with
detention, demurrage, or warehousing charges accrued due
to the unlawful and arbitrary actions of the Respondents.;
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G) Pass such other and further orders or directions as this
Hon’ble Court may deem just, fit, and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.”
Factual Matrix
2.
The petitioner, M/s Bhagwan Corporation, a proprietorship
concern through its proprietor Smt. Anju Goswami, is engaged in the
business of import and trading of betel nuts, primarily boiled betel nuts,
sourced mainly from Indonesia. The firm holds Importer Exporter Code
(“IEC” hereinafter) No. ARNPG8663M and has been regularly
undertaking such imports through declared and lawful channels.
3.
In the ordinary course of its business, the petitioner imported two
consignments of boiled betel nuts from Indonesia and filed Bill of Entry
No. 9396149 dated 31.10.2020 and Bill of Entry No. 9829340 dated
04.12.2020 at ICD Patparganj, New Delhi. The goods were declared as
Boiled Betel Nuts and classified by the petitioner under Customs Tariff
Heading (“CTH” hereinafter) 2106 90 30. The total assessable value of
the two consignments was declared as ₹1,13,17,725/-, comprising
₹45,10,687.50/- for the first consignment and ₹68,07,037.50/- for the
second.
4.
The Bill of Entry dated 31.10.2020 was initially marked to the
Faceless Assessment Group but was later marked for first check
examination on 02.12.2020. The Bill of Entry dated 04.12.2020 was
assessed by the Faceless Assessment Group on 07.12.2020. Samples
from both consignments were drawn by the customs authorities and sent
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SHARMA
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to the Central Revenues Control Laboratory (“CRCL” hereinafter), New
Delhi vide Test Memo Nos. 133 dated 24.12.2020 and 135 dated
29.12.2020 for determination of the nature and composition of the goods.
Pending receipt of test results, the goods were warehoused under Section
49 of the Customs Act, 1962.
5.
On 30.12.2020, a confidential analysis report bearing F. No.
IV(1)/3/2015/RMD was received from the Additional Director General,
Risk Management Centre for Customs (RMCC), Mumbai, indicating that
certain importers were allegedly misclassifying areca nuts to circumvent
the Minimum Import Price (“MIP” hereinafter) conditions applicable to
areca nuts.
6.
CRCL issued its Test Report No. CRCL/21/972(1) dated
22.01.2021 in respect of Bill of Entry No. 9396149 and Test Report No.
CRCL/21/973(1) dated 25.01.2021 in respect of Bill of Entry No.
9829340. The said reports record that the samples were in the form of
brown coloured WHOLE ARECA NUTS with defective and broken
pieces, did not contain additives such as catechu, lime, or tobacco, and
did not meet the moisture content requirement for ARECA NUTS as per
IS:16962:2018. The reports further stated that the samples were “other
than betel nut product known as „supari‟” as mentioned in
Supplementary Note 2 of Chapter 21 of the Customs Tariff.
7.
Upon receipt of the CRCL reports, the petitioner made repeated
written representations seeking re-testing or re-analysis of the samples.
On 12.02.2021, the petitioner submitted a detailed clarification in
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response to departmental correspondence dated 09.02.2021, enclosing a
certificate from the Ministry of Health, Republic of Indonesia certifying
the goods as boiled betel nuts, a Phytosanitary Certificate dated
28.09.2020, an Advance Ruling dated 31.03.2017 in M/s Oliya Steel Pvt.
Ltd., and a copy of the judgment of the Madras High Court in M/s Esha
Exim v. ADG, DRI [2018 (1) TMI 1027]. The petitioner specifically
requested retesting by CRCL to conclusively determine classification.
8.
The petitioner reiterated its request for re-testing and correction of
the laboratory report by letter dated 22.02.2021 addressed to the
Chemical Examiner, CRCL, New Delhi. Further reminders were sent by
email to the Commissioner of Customs, ICD Patparganj on 01.03.2021
and 06.03.2021, requesting deferment of adjudication proceedings until
retesting was completed. A further communication was addressed to
CRCL on 04.05.2021. No re-testing was permitted.
9.
Thereafter, the Department issued a Show Cause Notice dated
19.05.2021, bearing C. No. VIII(B)40/ICD Patli/Bhagwan/WH/87
/2020/3063, proposing reclassification of the imported goods under CTH
0802 80 10 as areca nuts, confiscation of the goods under Sections
111(d) and 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962, and imposition of penalty
under Section 112(a)(i). The petitioner submitted an interim reply to the
Show Cause Notice by email dated 04.08.2021. Pursuant thereto, the
Additional Commissioner of Customs, ICD Patparganj, passed Order-inOriginal No. 17/ADC/Bhagwan Corporation/ICD-PPG/2021-22 dated
24.09.2021. By this order, the Adjudicating Authority rejected the
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SHARMA
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W.P.(C) 18556/2025
petitioner‟s declared classification under CTH 2106 90 30 and
reclassified the goods under CTH 0802 80 10. The two consignments,
valued at ₹45,10,687.50/- and ₹68,07,037.50/-, were ordered to be
absolutely confiscated under Sections 111(d) and 111(m) of the Customs
Act, 1962, without granting any option of redemption under Section 125.
A penalty of ₹30,00,000/- was imposed on the petitioner under Section
112(a)(i) of the Act.
10.
Aggrieved by the Order-in-Original, the petitioner preferred an
appeal before the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) on 10.11.2022.
The appeal was filed with a delay of 156 days, beyond the condonable
period. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal solely on the
ground of limitation, without examining the merits of the case, vide
Order-in-Appeal
No.
CC(A)
CUS/D-II/PPG/157/2023-24
dated
17.01.2024.
11.
The petitioner‟s grievance, in the present petition, is confined to
the direction of “absolute confiscation” of the imported goods and the
“denial of the statutory option of redemption under Section 125 of the
Customs Act, 1962”. The petitioner does not dispute the classification as
determined in the Order-in-Original. Having been left without an
efficacious alternative remedy due to dismissal of the statutory appeal on
limitation, the petitioner filed the present Writ Petition seeking directions
of setting aside of the impugned order to the extent they direct absolute
confiscation without offering redemption.
Signed By:GAURAV
SHARMA
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W.P.(C) 18556/2025
Submissions on behalf of the petitioner
12.
Mr. Pradeep Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner submits that it is a bona fide importer, engaged in the lawful
business of import and trading of betel nuts, primarily boiled betel nuts,
sourced from Indonesia. The petitioner submits that it holds a valid IEC
and has consistently imported such goods through declared channels,
supported by valid commercial invoices, phytosanitary certificates, and
health certificates issued by the competent authorities of the Republic of
Indonesia.
13.
The imports were not concealed or misdeclared and were
accompanied by all requisite documents. During routine examination,
samples were drawn and sent to the CRCL. Pending test results, the
goods were permitted to be warehoused under Section 49 of the Customs
Act, 1962, demonstrating that the Department itself did not treat the
goods as prohibited at the relevant time. The CRCL reports did not
conclusively determine that the goods were raw areca nuts, nor did they
rule out that the goods were boiled or processed betel nuts as declared by
the Petitioner.
14.
Upon receipt of the CRCL reports, the petitioner promptly and
repeatedly sought re-testing or re-analysis to conclusively establish the
correct nature and classification of the goods. Detailed representations
were made on 12.02.2021, 22.02.2021, 01.03.2021, 06.03.2021, and
04.05.2021. Along with these representations, the Petitioner placed on
record a certificate from the Ministry of Health, Republic of Indonesia, a
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Phytosanitary Certificate dated 28.09.2020, an Advance Ruling dated
31.03.2017 in the case of M/s Oliya Steel Pvt. Ltd., and the judgment of
the Madras High Court in M/s Esha Exim (Supra). Despite these
materials, no re-testing was allowed and no reasoned response was
provided.
15.
The petitioner submits that the denial of re-testing and refusal to
permit physical inspection of the goods, despite repeated written
requests, amounts to a clear violation of Section 122A of the Customs
Act, 1962 and the principles of natural justice. The adjudication
proceeded solely on the basis of an inconclusive laboratory report,
depriving the petitioner of a fair opportunity to rebut the Department‟s
proposed reclassification.
16.
It is submitted that while the adjudicating authority reclassified the
goods under CTH 0802 80 10, the petitioner does not challenge the
classification for the purposes of the present writ petition. The grievance
is confined to the direction of absolute confiscation of the goods valued
at ₹45,10,687.50/- and ₹68,07,037.50/-, without granting the statutory
option of redemption under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962, and
the imposition of penalty of ₹30,00,000/- under Section 112(a)(i). It is
submitted that Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 mandates that
where confiscated goods are not prohibited, the Adjudicating Authority
ordinarily give an option to pay redemption fine in lieu of confiscation.
The impugned Order-in-Original does not record any finding that the
goods were prohibited goods under any statute, notification, or policy.
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W.P.(C) 18556/2025
On the contrary, the record shows that the goods were imported through
declared channels, warehoused under Section 49, and accompanied by
valid certificates.
17.
The petitioner submits that absolute confiscation is an extreme
measure reserved for prohibited or hazardous goods. In the present case,
neither the Show Cause Notice nor the Order-in-Original records any
finding of prohibition, fraud, suppression, or mens rea. Despite this, the
adjudicating authority ordered absolute confiscation without recording
reasons for denying the statutory option of redemption, rendering the
order arbitrary and contrary to law.
18.
The petitioner further submits that the penalty of ₹30,00,000/-
under Section 112(a)(i) has been imposed without any finding of wilful
misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade duty. The imports
were openly declared, supported by documents, and subjected to
examination and testing by the Department itself.
19.
The petitioner submits that it preferred a statutory appeal before
the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) on 10.11.2022. The appeal was
filed with a delay of 156 days. The Appellate Authority dismissed the
appeal solely on the ground of limitation, without examining the merits
of the case, vide Order-in-Appeal dated 17.01.2024. As a result, the
petitioner has been left without any efficacious alternative remedy.
20.
In these circumstances, the petitioner submits that the impugned
orders, to the extent they direct absolute confiscation without offering
redemption under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962, are illegal,
Signed By:GAURAV
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W.P.(C) 18556/2025
disproportionate, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The
petitioner, therefore, seeks interference by this Court, limited to granting
the statutory option of redemption and consequential reliefs as prayed for
in the writ petition.
Submissions on behalf of the respondents
21.
Per Contra, Mr. Gibran Naushad, learned SSC for the Department
vehemently opposed the present petition submitting to the effect that the
during the relevant period, departmental intelligence and Risk
Management Centre (RMCC) inputs highlighted a pattern of
misclassification of areca nuts as processed goods to circumvent the
Minimum Import Price (MIP) of ₹251/kg. A Modus Operandi Circular
and directives issued by Commissioner of Customs, Ludhiana required
stricter scrutiny of such imports.
22.
The petitioner had sought to import the prohibited goods by
misclassifying them under Chapter 21 instead of Chapter 8. Under Note
3 to Chapter 8, areca nuts, whether whole or subjected to processes such
as boiling for preservation, continue to fall under CTH 0802 80 10. The
imported goods, being, whole boiled betel nuts, did not qualify as a
“preparation” under Supplementary Note 2 to Chapter 21, and were
therefore correctly reclassified as areca nuts.
23.
Once correctly classified under CTH 0802 80 10 (areca nuts),
DGFT Notification no. 20/2015-20 dated 25.07.2018 read with Section 3
of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 read with
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Section 11 of the Act is applicable thereby prohibiting Areca Nuts
imports under Chapter 8, having CIF value less than ₹251/kg. It
submitted that the declared CIF value by the petitioner, which was USD
1.125/kg (₹83.50-84.04/kg), fell below the mentioned threshold,
rendering the goods prohibited for import.
24.
It is also submitted that there has been no procedural inconsistency
in the present case inasmuch as the petitioner was granted an opportunity
of personal hearing and the same was duly attended by the authorized
representative of the petitioner as well as the written submissions were
also considered as is depicted in the Order-in-Original.
25.
Further, it is clear from the bare reading of the Order-in-Original
that the petitioner‟s conduct crystallizes an unlawful attempt, to import
goods by cleverly flouting rules of prohibition qua the goods in question,
by furnishing incorrect description of their goods as „Boiled Betel Nuts‟
and deliberately misclassifying. Moreover, to justify the said
misclassification vide their written submission dated 04.08.2021, the
petitioner falsely placed reliance on a ruling which was no longer legally
valid as the same was overruled and much before 04.08.2021.
26.
As regards the petitioner‟s plea for redemption, it is submitted that
the option of redemption under Section 125 is not an absolute right,
particularly where the goods are held to be prohibited or restricted under
the applicable law. Section 125(1) of the Customs Act uses the
expression “may”, vesting discretion in the adjudicating authority. In the
present case, considering the nature of violation and statutory prohibition
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flowing from the applicable notifications and MIP condition, absolute
confiscation was lawfully ordered.
27.
It is further submitted that the petitioner‟s statutory appeal under
Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962 was filed with a delay of 156 days,
beyond the condonable period. The Commissioner (Appeals) was
therefore justified in dismissing the appeal on limitation, and the
petitioner cannot reopen findings of the Order-in-Original under writ
jurisdiction at this stage. The respondents thus submit that the writ
petition, confined as it is to the issue of redemption while accepting the
classification is not maintainable, and the penalty and confiscation
ordered in accordance with law do not warrant interference. The present
petition is merely tactics on the part of the petitioner to circumvent the
issue of limitation. Therefore, it is prayed that the petition may be
dismissed.
Analysis and findings
28.
Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the
material available in record.
29.
The present writ petition has been instituted assailing the Order-in-
Original dated 24.09.2021, passed by the Additional Commissioner of
Customs, ICD Patparganj, and the consequential Order-in-Appeal dated
17.01.2024, passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), only to
the limited extent that the adjudicating authority ordered absolute
confiscation of the imported goods without grant of redemption under
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Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962, along with consequential reliefs
of waiver of warehouse charges and demurrage, retesting, and setting
aside of penalty.
30.
At the outset, it is pertinent to state that it is an admitted position
on record that the petitioner has not challenged the classification of the
goods as determined in the Order-in-Original, nor has any perversity in
the findings on merits been pleaded.
31.
The factual chronology is also not in dispute. The petitioner filed
two Bills of Entry, declaring the goods as “Boiled Betel Nuts” under
CTH 2106 90 30. Samples were drawn and sent to the CRCL. Based on
the CRCL reports, the Modus Operandi Circular, the report of ADG
(RMCC), Mumbai, and DGFT Notification No. 20/2015-20 dated
25.07.2018, a Show Cause Notice dated 19.05.2021 was issued
proposing reclassification under CTH 0802 80 10, confiscation under
Sections 111(d) and 111(m), and penalty under Section 112(a)(i) of the
Customs Act, 1962.
32.
The Order-in-Original dated 24.09.2021 reclassified the goods as
Areca Nuts under CTH 0802 80 10, held the goods to be prohibited in
view of the Minimum Import Price (MIP) condition of ₹251 per kg,
ordered absolute confiscation, and imposed a penalty of ₹30,00,000/-.
33.
The Order-in-Original records detailed reasons in paragraphs 42 to
49 for denying redemption, including deliberate misdeclaration on the
petitioner‟s instance, import of prohibited goods, and an attempt to
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circumvent the MIP/CIF condition. For reference, paragraph nos. 42 to
49 of the Order-in-Original are as follows:
“42. In view of the above statutory provisions read with
Section 3(2) of the FTDR Act, 1992, the power to
modify/amend, from prohibited to restricted and from
restricted to free or otherwise regulating in all cases of
import/export, is vested only with the Central Government
and not with any quasi-judicial authority. Further in terms
of Section 3(3) of the FTDR Act, 1992 when read with
Section 11 and Section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962 the
goods under reference imported at declared value of Rs.
83.50 and Rs. 84.04 per kg CIF is much below the MIP fixed
i.e. @Rs.251 per kg, therefore, becomes prohibited for
import. It is further seen that the said DGFT notification
does not provide relief to the importer by way of allowing
the quasai-judicial authority to enhance the declared from
Rs. 83.50 and Rs. 84.04 per kg CIF value to Rs. 251 per Kg
and allow import on exercising the power of redemption u/s
125 of the Customs Act, 1962. As this would tantamount to
amending the EXIM policy for which the authority is not
vested with me.
43. It is important to note that Section 11 ( 1) of the
Customs Act, 1962 makes it unambiguously clear that If the
Central Government …………….. by notification in the
Central Gazette, prohibit either absolutely or subject to
such conditions (to be fulfilled before or after clearance) as
may be specified in the notification. I find that DGFT
Notification No. 20/2015-20 dated 25.07.2018 is a
notification issued in terms of Section 11(1) of the Customs
Act, 1962 read with Section 3(2) and Section 6(3) of the
FTDR Act 1992. Due to infringement of its condition the
imported goods becomes prohibited in absolute terms on
policy angle. Since absolute prohibition comes into
operation in the instant case, due to lower declared CIF
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import value, the statutes does not provide option to allow
the goods for export on redemption as requested by the
importer.
44. I further find that any imported goods when declared
as Prohibited by the DGFT is in accordance with the Import
Policy (FTP). Therefore, any release thereto of such
prohibited goods after imposition of redemption fine as
under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 would be in
contravention to the Import Policy for which Central
Government is the competent authority and such power is
not vested with me. Accordingly, their request for re-export
cannot be considered for want of authority in law.
45. It is also seen that goods are correctly classifiable
under CTH 080208010, as discussed above. Hence, the
provisions of DGFT Notification No. 20/2015-20 dated
25.07.2018 becomes squarely applicable in the instant case.
The declared CIF value of Rs. 83.5/ Kgs and 84.04/Kgs
under BE No. 9396149 dated 31.10.2020 and 9829340
dated 04.12.2020 respectively are less than the statutory
value of Rs. 251/- per kg, therefore, in terms of Section 3(2)
of Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992
read with Section 11 of the Customs Act 1962, the imported
goods covered under BE No. 9396149 dated 31.10.2020 and
9829340 dated 04.12.2020 becomes prohibited for import.
Therefore, once the imported goods have become prohibited
goods the same shall be dealt as per law for the time being
in force.
46. I thus find that the importer rather than placing
reliance on the statutes governing classification as provided
in the Customs Act, 1962, they preferred to rely on Advance
Authority Rulings and supplier's documents. I see this as a
well thought out plan and deliberate attempt on the part of
the importer to hoodwink the Department by mis-declaring
the description and seeking inappropriate classification
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under CTH 2106 to circumvent the scope of levy of duty
based on minimum import price fixed by the government for
the import of Areca Nut read with DGFT Notification No.
20/2015-20 dated 25.07.2018. This DGFT notification is in
public domain from July, 2018. And the import has been
made almost two and half years later. From the discussions
above it becomes abundantly clear that unless they
inappropriately classified the goods under CTH 2106, they
probably would not get their unlawful benefit. This shows
that they mis-declared the import goods as boiled betel nuts
instead Areca Nuts/ Betel Nuts to suit their intended misclassification under CTH 2106, so that they go out of the
purview of levy of duty @ MIP @ Rs. 251 per kg in terms of
the DGFT said notification. By this way they attempted to
unduly avail huge financial benefit to which they are
certainly not entitled.
47. Ongoing through the entire facts and records of the
case. I am of the considered opinion that Boiled Betel Nut
(Supari), imported under cover of the BE No. 9396149
dated 31.10.2020 and 9829340 dated 04.12.2020 are
correctly re-classifiable under CTH 08028010 as Areca
Nuts instead of CTH 21069030.
48. Hence, the impugned goods totally weighing 54 MTS
and 81 MTS which were imported at total an assessable
value of Rs.4510687.50/- and Rs. 6807037.50/- respectively
have thus become clearly prohibited in view of DGFT
Notification No. 20/2015-20 dated 25.07.2018 as the
declared value is C&F @ Rs. 83.50 and Rs.84.04 per kg as
against Minimum Import Price(MIP) @ Rs.251/kg. The said
goods cannot be considered for release for the reasons
discussed above and prohibition in force. The importer has
since deliberately mis-declared and mis-classified the goods
with an intent to evade customs duty and have attempted to
import prohibited goods unlawfully is also liable to penal
action for their acts of omission and commission.
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49. I thus find that for their acts of omission and
commission a penalty, therefore, is imposable under section
112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962, as they have clearly tried
to unlawfully import goods by cleverly passing a prohibition
in place, on furnishing inappropriate description of their
goods as "Boiled Betel Nuts" and tried to deliberately
misclassify them under CTH 21069030 as betel nut
preparation which has now been re-classified as Areca
nut/betel nut under CTH 08028010. To justify their
classification vide their written submission dated
04.08.2021 they falsely placed reliance on a ruling which
was no longer legally valid as the same was overruled and
much before 04.08.2021 when they filed their submission
and appeal for a personal hearing, the issue of classification
of the impugned goods have unquestionably attained finality
in the backdrop of Hon'ble Apex Court rulings discussed
supra in the case of M/ s Ayush Buisness Overseas. In view
of the above Discussion & Findings, I proceed to Order as
Follows:
ORDER
1. I reject the claimed classification of the impugned
goods i.e. Boiled Betel Nuts Supari declared under CTH
21069030 imported vide Bill of Entry 9396149 dated
31.10.2020 and 9829340 dated 04.12.2020, at a declared
assessable value Rs.4510687.50/- and Rs. 6807037.50/respectively at ICD Patli and order for re-classifying the
same under CTH 08028010 as Areca Nuts/Betel Nuts.
2. The imported goods of assessable value Rs.
4510687.50/- and Rs. 6807037.50/- with CIF value of Rs.
83.50 and Rs. 84.04 per kg are absolutely confiscated for
having been imported in violation of the provisions of
Section 46 of Customs Act, 1962 and DGFT Notification
NO. 20/2015-20 dated 25.07.2018 read with Section 3(2)
of Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act,
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1992 and Section 11 and Section 111(d) & (m) of the
Customs Act, 1962.
3. I impose a penalty of Rs. 30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty
Lacs Only) under Section 112(a) (i) of the Customs Act,
1962 on the importer M/s Bhagwan Corporation for their
acts of omission and commission for rendering the goods
liable for confiscation under Section 111 of the Customs
Act, 1962.”
34.
The Adjudicating Authority (in paragraph no. 49 of the Order-in-
Original which is reproduced hereinabove) also noted that the petitioner
relied upon an advance ruling which had already been overruled prior to
the personal hearing on 04.08.2021, thereby recording adverse findings
on its conduct.
35.
The record reveals that against the Order-in-Original dated
24.09.2021, the statute provided a complete and efficacious appellate
remedy under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner
admittedly availed the said remedy by filing an appeal before the
Commissioner (Appeals). However, the appeal was presented with a
delay of 156 days, beyond the period prescribed under the statute as well
as beyond the outer limit within which delay could be condoned.
36.
The petitioner preferred the statutory appeal under Section 128 of
the Customs Act only on 10.11.2022, i.e., beyond the statutory period of
60 days, and also beyond the maximum condonable period of 30 days.
37.
The Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), by Order dated
17.01.2024, rejected the appeal on the ground of limitation, after
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recording that the Order-in-Original had been dispatched on 28.09.2021
by Speed Post, which was not returned undelivered, thereby attracting
the ‘deemed to be received’ principle mentioned under Section 153(3) of
the Customs Act, 1962. Consequently, the plea that the order was
communicated only on 05.11.2022 was rejected.
38.
The statutory scheme under Section 128 of the Customs Act is
explicit. An appeal must be filed within 60 days, extendable by a further
30 days on sufficient cause being shown. Beyond this absolute limit of
90 days, the appellate authority lacks jurisdiction to condone delay.
39.
The present writ petition was filed only in December 2025, nearly
four years after the Order-in-Original dated 24.09.2021 and two years
after the Order-in-Appeal dated 17.01.2024. The pleadings do not
disclose any cogent or continuous explanation for this prolonged delay.
Further, subsequent dismissal of the statutory appeal, on limitation, does
not furnish a fresh cause of action.
40.
The appellate authority, therefore, correctly declined to entertain
the appeal, and no infirmity is present in the said order to this aspect.
41.
Significantly, in the present writ petition, the petitioner has not laid
any challenge to the finding of the appellate authority on limitation. No
pleadings, grounds, or arguments advanced assail the correctness or
legality of the order rejecting the appeal as time-barred. The grounds
argued by the petitioner before the Commissioner (Appeals) qua
limitation were rejected being bereft of any merits. In the absence of any
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such challenge now, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) has
attained finality.
42.
It is well settled that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution is discretionary and equitable, and unexplained delay and
laches disentitle a litigant to relief. Further, it is trite law that a party who
allows a statutory order to attain finality cannot be permitted to indirectly
assail the same by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution. The writ court is not intended to function as a
substitute for a statutory appellate forum. The said principle was also
observed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Thansingh Nathmal v.
Supdt. of Taxes, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13, relevant paras of which are
as under:
“7. Against the order of the Commissioner an order for
reference could have been claimed if the appellants satisfied the
Commissioner or the High Court that a question of law arose out
of the order. But the procedure provided by the Act to invoke the
jurisdiction of the High Court was bypassed, the appellants
moved the High Court challenging the competence of the
Provincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale, and invoked
the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
226 and sought to reopen the decision of the Taxing Authorities
on question of fact. The jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the
exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the
territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the
Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary : it is
not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very
amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be
exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort that
jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief
which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by
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statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a
writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative
remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an
equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not
generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand
an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to
enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not
therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court
or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming
jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy
provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the
aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in
another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner
provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by
entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the
machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will
leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so
set up.”
43.
The doctrine of delay and laches in writ petitions has also been
discussed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Chennai Metropolitan
Water Supply v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 whereby it was
held that a person who is indolent and negligent in pursuing remedies
cannot invoke the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is as under:
“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly
brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear
in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable
jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the
rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to
the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without
adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or
pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize
whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not.
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Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most
circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the
litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects
inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who
has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the
greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to
sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and
causes injury to the lis.
17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years‟ delay
in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address
the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such
enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That
apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more
significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely
careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the
responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext
of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that
remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster
the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it
is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others‟
ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation
which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated
to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with
„Kumbhakarna‟ or for that matter „Rip Van Winkle‟. In our
considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence
and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown
the petition overboard at the very threshold.”
44.
In fiscal matters, courts have consistently emphasised certainty,
finality, and strict adherence to timelines.
45.
The petitioner‟s attempt to invoke Article 226 after having lost the
statutory remedy by its own inaction cannot be countenanced. The
Hon‟ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that writ jurisdiction cannot
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be used to bypass statutory remedies, especially where the litigant has
disabled itself by delay.
46.
On the scope of relief sought qua option of redemption, Section
125(1) of the Customs Act employs the expression “may”, thereby
conferring discretion upon the adjudicating authority to grant, or deny
redemption, particularly in cases involving prohibited goods. The statute
does not create an absolute or vested right to redemption.
47.
In the present case, the adjudicating authority has recorded
detailed reasons for treating the goods as prohibited on account of
MIP/CIF violation and deliberate misclassification, and for denying
redemption. No case of perversity, lack of jurisdiction, or violation of
natural justice is made out to warrant interference under Article 226.
48.
The ancillary reliefs sought, namely waiver of warehouse charges
and demurrage, retesting of goods, and setting aside or reduction of
penalty, are entirely consequential and intrinsically linked to the validity
of confiscation and penalty imposed under the Order-in-Original.
49.
Once the confiscation and penalty have attained finality, no
independent consideration of these issues arises. The Customs Act
provides specific appellate mechanisms for challenging penalty
quantification and confiscation, and writ jurisdiction cannot be converted
into a surrogate appellate forum to bypass the statutory provisions,
legislative intent and objective of prohibiting import of certain goods.
50.
The record further shows concurrent findings by the Customs
Preventive authorities, including directions dated 25.11.2020, the Modus
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Operandi Circular, and the report of ADG (RMCC), Mumbai, regarding
widespread misclassification of boiled betel nuts to evade MIP/CIF
conditions. The petitioner‟s conduct, as recorded in the Order-inOriginal, including reliance on overruled rulings and failure to seek
provisional release or interim custody, reinforces the conclusion that no
equitable relief is warranted at this belated stage.
51.
At this juncture, it is also relevant to note that the petition has
made submission to the effect that the department may inform them
about the status of the goods and whether they have been auctioned or
not. The petitioner‟s submission seeking information or directions
regarding the status of auction or disposal of goods does not merit
acceptance. Once the petitioner failed to challenge the Order-in-Original
within the statutory period, all consequential proceedings undertaken in
accordance with law cannot be interdicted in writ jurisdiction. The record
further does not disclose any positive or contemporaneous steps taken by
the petitioner, either prior to the passing of the Order-in-Original or
immediately thereafter, to seek appropriate relief regarding valuation of
the goods. No explanation is forthcoming as to what prevented the
petitioner from seeking such remedies at the relevant stage.
52.
Permitting the petitioner to agitate such issues at this belated stage
would defeat the object of finality attached to statutory adjudication and
appellate processes.
53.
The Customs Act, 1962 is a fiscal statute. This Court is of the view
that fiscal statutes must be construed strictly and the conditions
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prescribed therein must be scrupulously adhered to. Courts cannot, on
equitable considerations, dilute statutory mandates or timelines.
Conclusion
54.
The record, when examined holistically, clearly demonstrates that
the petitioner‟s conduct has been evasive, dilatory, and lacking in bona
fides. The Order-in-Original specifically records that the petitioner
sought to justify its declared classification by placing reliance on an
advance ruling which had already been overruled well before the
personal hearing, thereby reflecting a conscious attempt to mislead the
adjudicating authority and to rely on legally untenable material (para 46
and 49 of the Order-in-Original).
55.
The petitioner‟s responses to the departmental proceedings were
largely vague, without addressing the core issue of misclassification and
violation of the Minimum Impact Price (MIP) condition.
56.
Significantly, despite having knowledge of the adverse Order-in-
Original dated 24.09.2021, the petitioner did not take any prompt or
effective steps to challenge the same within the statutory framework and
approached the appellate authority only after an inordinate delay of 156
days, resulting in dismissal of the appeal on limitation, and thereafter
invoked writ jurisdiction belatedly.
57.
The absence of any timely effort to seek provisional release,
interim reliefs, or other appropriate relief from the competent authorities,
coupled with the belated assertion of rights before this Court, reinforces
the inference that the petitioner never intended, in a bona fide manner, to
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clear or seek lawful release of the goods. Instead, the overall conduct
points towards a calculated strategy to avoid the authorities and, after
allowing the proceedings to attain finality, to resurrect stale claims
through writ jurisdiction. This pattern of behaviour unmistakably
indicates that from the very inception, the petitioner‟s approach and
intention has been to evade statutory consequences rather than to pursue
remedies in accordance with law.
58.
For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view
that the writ petition does not disclose any ground warranting exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
59.
Accordingly, the present writ petition stands dismissed, along with
pending application(s), if any.
60.
No order as to costs.
61.
The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
AJAY DIGPAUL
(JUDGE)
NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE
(JUDGE)
FEBRUARY 09, 2026/gs/ryp
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