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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.34448 of 2025
(In the matters of petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
M/s. Aryan Ispat & Power Private
Limited, Sambalpur
-versusGeneral Manager, O/o. The District
Industries Centre, Rourkela & Anr.
….
Petitioner(s)
….
Opposite Party(s)
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Petitioner (s)
:
Mr. Biyotkesh Mohanty, Adv.
-versus-
For Opp. Party(s)
:
Mr. Pabitra Kumar Nayak, Adv.
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
DATES OF HEARING:- 08.12.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:- 09.01.2026
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. The present Writ Petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 4.11.2025 passed by
the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Commercial Court, Rourkela, in Arbitration
Petition No. 10 of 2024. By the impugned order, the Commercial Court
revisited and recalled the earlier order dated 21.4.2025, whereby the
petitioner’s application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging the award of the Micro & Small
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
Enterprises Facilitation Council, Rourkela, had been admitted and
further directed the deposit of 75% of the award amount.
I.
FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
(i)
The petitioner, M/s. Aryan Ispat & Power Private Limited, is
engaged in industrial operations and was involved in commercial
dealings with Opposite Party No. 2, who claims to have supplied
iron ore to the petitioner over a period spanning 2019 to 2021.
(ii)
According to Opposite Party No. 2, disputes arose in relation to
unpaid
dues
allegedly
arising
out
of
these
transactions.
On 29.10.2021, Opposite Party No. 2 invoked the jurisdiction of
the Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC),
Rourkela, by filing a claim for recovery of an aggregate amount
of Rs.3,94,35,891/-,
comprising Rs.3,19,67,533/-
towards
principal and Rs.74,68,358/- towards interest.
(iii)
This claim was registered as MSEFC Case No. 87 of 2021 and was
taken up by the Council on various dates.
(iv)
While the reference before the MSEFC was pending, Opposite
Party No. 2 initiated parallel proceedings on the same underlying
claim before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), New
Delhi. On 24.2.2022, Opposite Party No. 2, through its proprietor,
filed an application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016, which was registered as I.B. No. 193 (ND) / 2022, alleging
default by the petitioner in payment of operational debt. The
insolvency application came up for consideration on 6.1.2023, on
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
which date the proceedings were disposed of in view of the
submission that the petitioner had paid the claimed amount.
Consequent thereto, the application was withdrawn by Opposite
Party No. 2.
(v)
After disposal of the insolvency proceedings, the reference before
the MSEFC continued. During the pendency of the MSEFC
proceedings, it emerged from the record that the proprietor of
Opposite Party No. 2 was also a member of the MSEFC, Rourkela,
during a substantial part of the period when the reference was
being heard. The proceedings before the Council continued over
multiple sittings. It is reflected in the order sheet that the said
proprietor formally recused himself from participation in the
Council only on 28.6.2023, shortly before the culmination of the
proceedings and passing of the award.
(vi)
Subsequently, the MSEFC passed an award dated 28.6.2024 against
the petitioner in MSEFC Case No. 87 of 2021. Aggrieved by the
said award, the petitioner invoked the statutory remedy
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by
filing an application before the competent District Court seeking
setting aside of the award.
(vii) The application was admitted by the District Judge by order
dated 21.4.2025, and thereafter the matter was transferred to the
Court of the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Commercial Court, Rourkela,
for adjudication in accordance with law.
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
(viii) After the admission of the Section 34 application, Opposite Party
No. 2 filed an application dated 18.9.2025 seeking recall of the
order of admission dated 21.4.2025 for giving direction to the
petitioner to make deposit of 75% of the awarded amount as per
the provisions of Section 19 of the MSMED Act.
(ix)
Upon consideration of the said application, the Senior Civil Judgecum-Commercial
Court
passed
an
order
dated 4.11.2025 in Arbitration Petition No. 10 of 2024, whereby the
Court revisited the issue of admission of the Section 34 application
and held that the appeal could be heard after the present Petitioner
deposited 75% of the award amount in compliance with Section 19
of the MSMED Act. Accordingly, one month time was given to the
Petitioner to deposit the same.
(x)
Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition on
various ground challenging the order dated 4.11.2025 primarily on
the ground that the Section 34 application having been already
admitted, the Ld. District Judge ought not to have imposed a fresh
onerous condition of mandatory deposit.
(xi)
Now that the broad facts leading up to the instant Petition have
been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to fully summarise the
contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been
urged to seeking the exercise of this Court’s plenary powers of
review.
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II.
PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS:
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
(i)
The petitioner contends that the entire proceedings before the
Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Rourkela,
culminating in the impugned award, are fundamentally vitiated
and unsustainable in law. At the forefront of the petitioners’
challenge is the allegation of institutional bias. It is contended that
Opposite Party No. 2, whose claim was adjudicated by the MSEFC,
was himself a member of the same Council during a substantial
portion of the proceedings. The petitioners submit that this placed
Opposite Party No. 2 in a position where he was effectively part of
the adjudicatory body deciding his own dispute. Although
Opposite Party No. 2 recused himself from the Council
on 28.3.2024, the petitioners argue that such recusal occurred only
at the final stage, i.e. one date prior to the date on which the award
was pronounced and does not cure the prejudice caused by his
continuous participation in the proceedings. The petitioners assert
that the principle that no person shall be a judge in his own
cause stands violated, and that such violation renders the award a
nullity.
(ii)
In addition to the allegation of bias, the petitioners challenge
the very jurisdiction of the MSEFC to entertain the reference. It is
contended that Opposite Party No. 2 does not fall within the
statutory definition of a “supplier” under the Micro, Small and
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. The petitioners assert
that Opposite Party No. 2 is, in substance, a trader who procures
iron ore from mine owners and resells it to buyers, including the
petitioner, and does not itself manufacture or produce goods. In
this regard, reliance is placed on the Office Memorandum dated
1.9.2021 issued by the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises, which clarifies that traders are not entitled to claim
benefits under the MSMED Act for delayed payments.
(iii)
Another significant contention raised by the petitioners relates to
the parallel proceedings before the NCLT. It is submitted that
Opposite Party No. 2 had earlier pursued insolvency proceedings
on the same cause of action, which were disposed of
on 6.1.2023 upon payment by the petitioner. Despite such
settlement, Opposite Party No. 2 continued with the MSEFC
proceedings, which, according to the petitioners, amounts to an
abuse of process. The petitioners argue that the continuation of the
reference after settlement before the NCLT further taints the
proceedings and calls into question the bona fides of Opposite
Party No. 2.
(iv)
The petitioners also assail the procedural impropriety committed
by the Ld. Commercial Court. It is contended that once the Section
34 application was admitted by the Ld. District Judge by order
dated 21.4.2025, the subordinate Ld. Commercial Court lacked
authority to reopen or revisit the issue of admission. The filing of a
recall application by Opposite Party No. 2 on 18.9.2025, nearly five
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
months after the admission order, is characterised as a deliberate
attempt to circumvent limitation and delay adjudication. The
petitioners submit that the impugned order dated 4.11.2025,
whereby the Ld. Commercial Court entertained such a recall and
reconsidered admission, violates settled principles of judicial
discipline and hierarchy.
III.
OPPOSITE PARTYS’ SUBMISSIONS:
4. Per contra, Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the
following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i)
The Opposite Parties oppose the writ petition in its entirety and
contend that it is not maintainable either in law or on facts. At the
threshold, they submit that the petitioner is seeking to invoke the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court to circumvent a
complete and efficacious statutory mechanism provided under the
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006,
read with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. According to
the respondents, the impugned award passed by the Facilitation
Council is amenable to challenge only under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, subject to the conditions
prescribed
therein,
and
the
present
writ
petition
is
an
impermissible attempt to bypass that statutory framework.
(ii)
On the issue of alleged bias, the respondents deny that the
proceedings before the MSEFC were vitiated in any manner. It is
contended that the award was passed by the Council as a
collective adjudicatory body and not by any individual member
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
acting alone. The respondents emphasize that the proprietor of
Opposite Party No. 2 recused himself from the Council prior to the
passing of the award on 28.6.2024, and therefore did not
participate in the final decision-making process. According to the
respondents, once recusal was effected, no allegation of bias can
survive, and mere participation in earlier sittings does not
automatically vitiate the entire proceedings.
(iii)
With regard to jurisdiction, the respondents assert that the
Facilitation Council rightly entertained the reference under Section
18 of the MSMED Act. They submit that Opposite Party No. 2 was
entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Council as a micro or
small enterprise and that disputes relating to delayed payments
fall squarely within the legislative intent of the Act. The
respondents dispute the petitioner’s contention that Opposite
Party No. 2 is a mere trader and submit that such factual
determinations cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings and
ought to be examined, if at all, in arbitral challenge proceedings.
(iv)
On the issue of parallel proceedings before the NCLT, the
respondents submit that the insolvency proceedings were
withdrawn after settlement and that such withdrawal does not bar
continuation of proceedings under the MSMED Act. According to
the respondents, the remedies under the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code and the MSMED Act operate in different fields
and the mere invocation of one remedy does not extinguish the
right to pursue another, unless specifically barred by law.
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
(v)
The respondents further contend that the challenge to the order
dated 4.11.2025 is misconceived. It is submitted that courts possess
inherent powers to recall orders obtained without proper
consideration of jurisdictional objections. The respondents argue
that the Commercial Court acted within its authority in examining
whether the Section 34 application had been rightly entertained,
and that the petitioner cannot claim immunity from scrutiny
merely because an admission order was earlier passed.
IV.
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:
5. The
petitioner has
advanced several
grounds
challenging the
proceedings before the Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council
and the resultant award. However, in the present writ proceedings, it is
neither necessary nor appropriate to examine those issues on merits. The
limited question that arises for consideration is whether the Learned
Court, after having admitted the application under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, could thereafter revisit the issue
of admission by entertaining a recall application and passing the
impugned order.
6. Therefore, this court has identified the following issue that has to be
determined which has emerged contentiously during the course of the
hearing:
a. Whether the Learned Court was legally justified in recalling its
earlier order and directing the appellant to comply with the
mandatory requirement of depositing 75% of the awarded amount
under Section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
Development Act, 2006, and whether such recall and consequential
direction is sustainable in law?
A. WHETHER THE LEARNED COURT WAS LEGALLY JUSTIFIED
IN RECALLING ITS EARLIER ORDER AND DIRECTING THE
APPELLANT TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY
REQUIREMENT OF DEPOSITING 75% OF THE AWARDED
AMOUNT UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE MICRO, SMALL AND
MEDIUM ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT ACT, 2006, AND
WHETHER
SUCH
RECALL
AND
CONSEQUENTIAL
DIRECTION IS SUSTAINABLE IN LAW?
7. To answer this question, section 19 of the MSMED Act, which contains
the mandate of the 75% deposit, should be set out first.
“19. Application for setting aside decree, award or order.No application for setting aside any decree, award or
other order made either by the Council itself or by any
institution or centre providing alternate dispute
resolution services to which a reference is made by the
Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the
appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it
seventy-five per cent. of the amount in terms of the
decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in
the manner directed by such court.
Provided that pending disposal of the application to set
aside the decree, award or order, the court shall order that
such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to
the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the
circumstances of the case, subject to such conditions as it
deems necessary to impose.”
8. As would be clear from the mandate in section 19, a Court is statutorilyprecluded from entertaining any application for setting aside of an
award passed by the Council unless the buyer-applicant has deposited
75% of the amount in terms of the award. Apart from the decisions of
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
the Supreme Court, section 19 itself constitutes a bar to such an
application crossing the threshold unless the appellant - buyer complies
with the requirement of the 75% deposit.
9. Section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006, contains a mandate on a “Buyer” to
deposit 75% of the amount of the decree or award or an order or such
other percentage as may be directed by a Court, for setting aside any
award made by the Facilitation Council. “Buyer” is defined in section
2(d) and the Facilitation Council under section 20 of the Act. There is no
scope for any ambiguity in construing the mandate since the words in
section 19 are peremptory in nature and pins a buyer down to the
mandate if the buyer chooses to apply for setting aside the award made
by the Council.
10.The only exception made in the section is for a supplier; there is no other
exit route under the section for a buyer to seek setting aside of an award
without the pre-deposit. The framing of the section also makes it clear
that the 75% deposit is a condition precedent for a buyer for seeking
setting aside of the award of the Council.
11. Section 24 of the MSMED Act seals the mandate of Section 19 by
declaring that sections 15-23 shall have overriding effect over any other
law for the time being in force.
12.Section 19 read with 24 thus leaves little doubt that a buyer cannot seek
setting aside of an award made by the Council unless the buyer first
deposits 75% of the awarded amount.
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
13.Section 19 of MSMED Act categorically uses the word ‘entertain’. The
word ‘entertain’ has been explained in Lakshmi Rattan Engg. Works
Ltd. v. CST1, which reads as under:—
“7. To begin with it must be noticed that the proviso
merely requires that the appeal shall not be entertained
unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the
payment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant
to be due. A question thus arises what is the meaning of
the word “entertained” in this context? Does it mean
that no appeal shall be received or filed or does it mean
that no appeal shall be admitted or heard and disposed of
unless satisfactory proof is available? The dictionary
meaning of the word “entertain” was brought to our
notice by the parties, and both sides agreed that it means
either “to deal with or admit to consideration”. We are
also of the same opinion. The question, therefore, is at
what stage can the appeal be said to be entertained for the
purpose of the application of the proviso? Is it
“entertained” when it is filed or is it “entertained” when
it is admitted and the date is fixed for hearing or is it
finally “entertained” when it is heard and disposed
of? Numerous cases exist in the law reports in which the
word “entertained” or similar cognate expressions have
been interpreted by the courts. Some of them from the
Allahabad High Court itself have been brought to our
notice and we shall deal with them in due course. For the
present we must say that if the legislature intended that
the word “file” or “receive” was to be used, there was no
difficulty in using those words. In some of the statutes
which were brought to our notice such expressions have
in fact been used. For example, under Order 41 Rule 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure it is stated that a
memorandum shall not be filed or presented unless it is
accompanied etc.; in Section 17 of the Small Causes
Courts Act, the expression is “at the time of presenting
(1968) 1 SCR 505
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
the application”. In section 6 of the Court Fees Act, the
words are “file” or “shall be received”. It would appear
from this that the legislature was not at a loss for words if
it had wanted to express itself in such forceful manner as
is now suggested by counsel for the State. It has used the
word “entertain” and it must be accepted that it has used
it advisedly. This word has come in for examination in
some of the cases of the Allahabad High Court and we
shall now refer to them.”
14.In view of the above, the filing and entertaining of a petition are two
different aspects. Hence, there is no bar in filing a petition under Section
34 of the Act, 1996 and the same can be filed without pre deposit
of 75% of the awarded amount. However, the said petition will not be
“entertained” without the deposit of 75 % of the awarded amount.
15.The mandate of Section 19 was reinforced by the Supreme Court
in Tirupati Steels v. Shubh Industrial Component2 which held Section 19
of the MSMED Act to be mandatory. The Supreme Court further relied
on its previous judgment in Gujarat State Disaster Management
Authority v. Aska Equipments3 to allow the pre-deposit to be made in
instalments in particular cases of hardship.
16.The above leads to the unerring conclusion that a buyer must first
deposit 75% of the awarded amount, as a one-time deposit or in
instalments, before inviting a Court to entertain an application for
setting aside of the award made by the Facilitation Council.
17.The correct sequence under the Act would therefore be:—
Award passed by the Facilitation Council under section 18(3) of
the MSMED Act.
(2022) 7 SCC 429
(2022) 1 SCC 61
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
↓
Application filed by the buyer for setting aside of the award under
section 19 of the MSMED Act.
↓
The buyer/applicant puts in 75% of the awarded amount under
section 19 of the MSMED Act.
↓
The application under section 34 of the 1996 Act becomes
entertainable by the Court.
18.As a matter of law, an order admitting a proceeding is not a judgment on
jurisdiction, nor does it operate as res judicata on questions of
maintainability unless such questions have been consciously examined
and decided. Admission orders are ordinarily passed at a preliminary
stage, often without a detailed adjudication on statutory bars or
jurisdictional preconditions. Consequently, such orders do not confer
any vested or indefeasible right upon a litigant to have the matter
adjudicated irrespective of statutory compliance.
19.Courts are recognised to possess inherent powers to recall or correct
orders that are shown to have been passed in ignorance of a mandatory
statutory requirement or a jurisdictional bar. This power flows not from
any express provision alone, but from the duty of the court to ensure
that it does not exercise jurisdiction where none exists, or continue
proceedings that are legally incompetent. An error touching jurisdiction
is treated as fundamentally different from an error on merits; it goes to
the authority of the court to entertain the proceeding at all.
20.In this context, the requirement under Section 19 of the MSMED Act has
been
consistently
characterised
as
a condition
precedent to
the
maintainability of a challenge to an award. Non-compliance does not
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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
constitute a mere procedural irregularity capable of waiver; it strikes at
the root of the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the challenge. An
admission order passed without noticing such a statutory mandate is
therefore vulnerable to correction.
21.The MSME Act is a beneficial legislation enacted to protect small
enterprises from payment delays by larger buyers. One of its central
features is the imposition of a stringent interest regime to discourage
defaults. The legislative intent behind Section 19 is to ensure that
challenges to awards are not taken lightly and that MSMEs are not
deprived of their dues during prolonged litigation. By mandating a predeposit of 75% of the total liability, the law ensures that MSMEs are not
subjected to financial strain while awaiting enforcement of arbitral
awards.
22.The structure of Section 19 also reflects a broader legislative choice to
treat MSME-related disputes as a distinct category. This differentiation is
grounded in the recognition that conventional dispute resolution
processes often fail to account for disparities in bargaining power and
financial resilience. By imposing a higher threshold for challenges, the
law recalibrates the procedural balance between suppliers and buyers.
The right to challenge an award under the Act is statutory in nature, and
the legislature is entitled to attach reasonable conditions to its exercise.
The pre-deposit requirement is one such condition, designed to ensure
that access to appellate remedies does not undermine the very
protections the statute seeks to provide. The measure is therefore best
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Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 15-Jan-2026 19:31:53
understood not as a restriction, but as a recalibration of procedural
fairness in light of economic realities.
V. CONCLUSION:
23.In the present case, the Ld. Court at the first instance failed to correctly
interpret the legal provisions and misapplied them, which led to a
decision that was not based on a true understanding of the relevant legal
framework. As a result, the admission of the application under Section
34 of the A&C Act was unsustainable. In such circumstances, the
impugned order has ensured that fairness is restored to the proceedings.
24.This Court therefore declines to interfere with the impugned order
directing deposit of 75% of the awarded amount. However, in the
interest of justice, the Petitioner is granted 3 months from the date of this
order to deposit the requisite amount in the manner specified by the Ld.
Court below. After deposit of the same, the appeal under Section 34 of
the A&C Act preferred by the Petitioner shall be heard. All contentions
on merits are left open. Nothing contained in the present order shall
influence the adjudication of the Section 34 application. The Parties shall
cooperate so as to enable early resolution of their dispute.
25. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is disposed of. No order as to costs.
26. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 9th Jan., 2026
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