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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SRI P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
WRIT PETITION No.27212 of 2026
(CNR No.HBHC010558422026)
DATE OF ORDER: 30.10.2026
Reserved on: 16.09.2026
Pronounced on:
30.10.2026
Uploaded on:
31.10.2026
Between:
M/s. Arka Business Solutions.
…Petitioner
AND
Principal Commissioner of Customs,
GST Bhavan, L.B. Stadium Road,
Basheer Bagh, Hyderabad – 500 004 and 2 others.
…Respondents
ORDER: (per Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice P.Sam Koshy)
Heard Mr. S. Ravi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of
Mr.
Karthik
Ramana
Puttamreddy,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner; and Mr. Dominic Fernandes, learned Senior Standing
Counsel for CBIC, appearing for the respondents.
2.
The instant Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India has been filed by the petitioner challenging the Order-in-Original
No.HYD-CUS-031-ADC-26-27, dated 15.7.2026, passed by respondent
No.2, and to set aside the same along with consequential directions of
the respondent No.2 confiscating the said goods, as being arbitrary,
illegal and without jurisdiction.
3.
Vide the impugned order, respondent No.2 misinterpreted the
threshold of goods imported by the petitioner and confiscated the
same for being prohibited goods.
4.
The facts of the case are that the petitioner was engaged in the
business of importing and selling used Multi-Function Devices (for
short ‘MFDs’). In the ordinary course of its business, 73 units of used
Digital MFDs were purchased by the petitioner from its supplier in
U.S.A. under an Invoice and Packing List, both dated 21.04.2026
(collectively filed as Ex.P-2), and were imported into India.
Upon
arrival of the goods at ICD Thimmapur, Bill of Entry No.9677159,
dated 04.06.2026, was filed by the petitioner. The consignment was
examined by the Customs authorities on 19.06.2026 in the presence
of the petitioner’s authorised representative and Customs Broker, and
the examination confirmed that the imported goods corresponded
substantially with the declaration made in the Bill of Entry.
A
Chartered Engineer, appointed at the instance of the Customs
Department, physically inspected the machines and certified that they
were fully functional second-hand capital goods possessing a residual
life of more than 6 years and that the goods could not be treated as
hazardous waste or electronic waste. The Chartered Engineer further
certified that each of the imported machines weighed substantially
more than 80 kilograms, thereby satisfying Clause 8(d) of CRO, 2021,
relating to the exemption for Highly Specialised Equipment (for short
‘HSE’).
5.
Notwithstanding the above factual position emerging from the
very documents relied upon by the Department, a show cause notice
dated 25.06.2026 was issued stating that the petitioner was required
to obtain DGFT Authorisation under Para 2.31 of the Foreign Trade
Policy, 2023 and also alleging the absence of BIS registration.
The
show cause notice further proposed confiscation of the imported goods
under Sections 111(d) and 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962 (for
short the ‘Act’), together with enhancement of the assessable value on
the basis of the Chartered Engineer’s valuation report.
6.
Prior to the issuance of said show cause notice, the petitioner,
being aggrieved by the continued detention of the imported goods
without issuance of any seizure memo or any communication
indicating the reasons for such detention, approached this Court by
filing Writ Petition No.19962 of 2026. By order dated 03.07.2026, this
Court directed the petitioner to submit its reply to the show cause
notice dated 25.06.2026, which had been issued subsequent to the
filing of the said Writ Petition, and the adjudicating authority was
directed to decide the matter strictly in accordance with law, taking
into consideration the judicial precedents already rendered by this
Court in similar matters concerning the import of second-hand MFDs.
7.
In compliance with the said order, a reply dated 06.07.2026
was filed by the petitioner to the show cause notice, wherein it was
pointed out, inter alia:
a) That the imported MFDs constituted Highly Specialised Equipment
exempted under Clause 8 of CRO, 2021.
b) That once CRO, 2021 itself ceased to apply, Entry 1(b) of Para 2.31
of the Foreign Trade Policy became inapplicable.
c) That the imported goods consequently fell under Entry 1(d),
relating
to
second-hand
capital
goods
which
were
freely
importable.
d) That the binding judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.2014 of
2024 squarely governed the controversy.
e) That the Office Memorandum issued by Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology (for short, ‘MeitY’) dated 22.04.2024 could
not override either the statutory notification or the Foreign Trade
Policy.
f) That the imported goods had been fully and truthfully declared,
and therefore no case under Section 111(m) or Section 112 of the
Customs Act was made out.
8.
Disregarding the above submissions and the binding judgments
cited before him, respondent No.2 passed the impugned Order-in-
Original
dated
15.07.2026,
holding
that,
notwithstanding
the
exemption available under Clause 8 of CRO, 2021, the petitioner was
nevertheless required to obtain DGFT authorisation.
Proceeding on
the said premise, all the imported goods were confiscated under
Section 111(d) of the Act, and the declared value was enhanced on
the basis of the Chartered Engineer’s report.
9.
In the impugned order, the petitioner’s consignment of 73 units
of second-hand MFDs was bifurcated by respondent No.2 into two
categories.
In respect of 36 units, the goods were held to be
“prohibited” under the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023, read with the
Electronics and Information Technology Goods (Requirement for
Compulsory Registration) Order, 2021, and were confiscated under
Section 111(d) of the Act, redemption being permitted only for the
limited purpose of re-export on payment of a redemption fine of
Rs.1,33,257/- under Section 125(1) of the Act. It was further directed
that in the event if the petitioner failed to exercise the option of reexport within the period prescribed under Section 125(3) of the Act,
the Customs Authorities were to deform the imported goods beyond
use and dispose of the same as scrap, after intimating the MeitY.
10.
The decision of respondent No.2 in this regard was based on the
premise that the threshold limit of import of 100 units had to be
applied across all ports of India and across all importers, an aspect
that was never disclosed to the petitioner in the show cause notice,
and which, according to the petitioner, was in any event an
unsustainable interpretation. In respect of the remaining 37 units, the
goods were confiscated under Section 111(d) of the Act, being treated
as “restricted” under the Foreign Trade Policy, but redemption for
home consumption was permitted on payment of a redemption fine of
Rs.3,95,021/-, being 25% of the re-determined assessable value
under Section 125(1) of the Act.
11.
The aforesaid bifurcation of the petitioner’s single consignment
of 73 units was made solely on the basis that 36 units pertained to
models which had allegedly crossed the threshold of 100 units per
model during the calendar year 2025 on an all-India basis through
imports made by various importers, whereas the remaining 37 units
related to models which had not crossed such threshold. Proceeding
on this premise, the former 36 units were treated by respondent No.2
as ineligible for exemption available under Clause 8 of CRO, 2021, and
consequently as “prohibited goods”, while a different treatment was
extended to the remaining 37 units.
12.
The impugned order was stated to proceed on the basis of the
Office Memorandum dated 22.04.2024 issued by the MeitY, while
overlooking the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.2014 of
2024, wherein it was held that, once the imported MFDs satisfied the
conditions prescribed under Clause 8 of CRO, 2021, the compulsory
registration requirement itself ceased to operate and the import
consequently could not be treated as “restricted” under Entry 1(b) of
Para 2.31 of the Foreign Trade Policy.
13.
It is the case of the petitioner that the impugned order was ex
facie contrary to the binding judgments of this Court, and was based
on an interpretation of the Foreign Trade Policy and CRO, 2021 that
had already been rejected by this Court in identical cases.
The
challenge was stated to raise a pure question of law and was not
merely directed against findings of fact, and that the adjudicating
authority having proceeded on an erroneous understanding of the
applicable legal provisions.
It was further contended that the
continued confiscation of the goods was resulting in recurring
demurrage and detention charges, causing serious and irreparable
financial prejudice, and that, in these exceptional circumstances the
availability of an appellate remedy did not bar the exercise of the writ
jurisdiction of this Court.
14.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the alternative remedy of appeal
under Section 128 of the Act, the petitioner approached this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by way of the present
Writ Petition, seeking a Writ of Mandamus against the impugned
orders.
15.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted
that respondent No.2 has erred in reckoning imports made by the
unrelated importers during the calendar year 2025 for determining the
Petitioner's
Information
eligibility
under
Technology
‘Clause
Goods
8’
of
the
(Requirement
Electronics
of
and
Compulsory
Registration) Order, 2021 (‘CRO, 2021’). The expression “imported in
less than 100 units per model per year” cannot be construed as
prescribing an industry-wide or all-India cap in the absence of express
language to that effect.
The impugned interpretation is therefore
arbitrary, contrary to the plain language of Clause 8 and liable to be
rejected.
16.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner further
submitted that the petitioner has interpreted the expression “imported
in less than 100 units per model per year” in Clause 8 of the CRO,
2021 to apply on a per importer basis which is evident and
reasonable. The petitioner has also interpreted the restriction to apply
on a pan-India basis irrespective of the port of entry. Accordingly, the
petitioner has always conducted its importation within the limit
prescribed.
Further, when it is analyzed based on each model
depending on the manufacturer and the make, the number of MFDs
imported by the petitioner would be well within the limit.
17.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended
that the entire reasoning adopted by respondent No.2 proceeds on the
assumption that ‘notwithstanding the exemption granted under Clause
8 of the CRO, 2021, the petitioner was nevertheless required to obtain
a DGFT Authorization under Entry I(b) of Para 2.31 of the Foreign
Trade Policy, 2023.
The said finding is directly contrary to the
judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court in Writ Petition No.2014 of
2024 and the subsequent batch of writ petitions, wherein this Hon’ble
Court has categorically interpreted the scheme of the CRO, 2021 and
the Foreign Trade Policy.
18.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner also
contended that the respondent No.2 has imported additional eligibility
requirements into the statutory notification by relying upon an
executive clarification and that it is a settled law that ‘executive
instructions or office memorandum cannot override, amend or restrict
the scope of delegated legislation’. The impugned finding, is therefore
contrary to clause 8 of the CRO, 2021, arbitrary and without
jurisdiction.
19.
On the other hand, the learned Senior Standing Counsel for
CBIC submitted that the present Writ Petition is not maintainable and
is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has an
efficacious and specific statutory remedy of appeal under Section 128
of the Act against the impugned Order-in-Original dated 15.07.2026.
The impugned order itself specifically informs the petitioner that an
appeal lies before the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 128 of
the Act within sixty days and sets out the applicable statutory predeposit requirement.
20.
Learned Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC further submitted
that the petitioner has expressly admitted in the Writ Petition that an
alternative remedy under Section 128 of the Act is available, but seeks
to bypass the same by describing the impugned order as arbitrary,
without jurisdiction, contrary to binding precedents and violative of
natural justice.
Such labels cannot, by themselves, displace the
statutory appellate remedy. The substance of the challenge has to be
examined.
21.
Learned Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC further submitted
that
the
adjudicating
authority
considered
the
MeitY
Office
Memorandum dated 22.04.2024. It is denied that reliance upon the
said Office Memorandum was the sole or independent source of the
statutory liability. The adjudicating authority considered the CRO, the
FTP, the DGFT Notification No.13/2024-25, dated 20.05.2024, the
General Notes to the Import Policy, the Customs Act and the relevant
judicial precedents.
The petitioner’s challenge to the interpretation
adopted is a matter for the statutory appellate forum and the
allegation that the adjudicating authority erred in reckoning all-India
imports is clearly denied. The impugned order expressly records that
Para 8 of the CRO is model-specific and that the FTP operates
nationally.
The adjudicating authority therefore examined all-India
import data for the relevant models.
The petitioner’s contrary
interpretation is a substantive legal contention and cannot be used to
establish lack of jurisdiction.
22.
According to the learned Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC the
ground concerning 100 unit threshold and the treatment of 36 units as
prohibited goods is incorrect. The adjudicating authority examined the
statutory text, the model-wise all-India data and the relevant policy
framework before arriving at its conclusion.
The Department do not
concede that an error, even if ultimately found by the appellate
authority, constitutes a jurisdictional defect.
23.
Learned Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC also contended that
the
ground
concerning
the
MeitY
Office
Memorandum
dated
22.04.2024, is denied and that the said Office Memorandum was
considered as relevant material in the context of the HSE exemption
and the quantitative threshold.
The petitioner’s assertion that the
Office Memorandum alone creates the import restriction is not a
correct characterization of the impugned order.
24.
Learned Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC further contended
that the rejection of declared value was not based merely upon the
difference between the invoice value and the Chartered Engineer's
estimate. The adjudicating authority recorded the specific reasons for
doubting the declared value and thereafter followed the sequential
valuation mechanism before adopting Rule 9.
25.
Lastly, the learned Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC argued
that the ground concerning differential redemption fine is also denied.
The two categories of goods were found to stand on different legal
footing, i.e. 36 units were treated as prohibited / non-compliant with
the CRO / FTP framework and were offered redemption only for reexport, whereas 37 units were treated as restricted and were
permitted redemption for home consumption.
The distinction in the
redemption consequences flowed from the adjudicating authority’s
findings regarding the legal status of the two categories.
26.
Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on
perusal of records, the question that falls for our consideration is
“whether the quantitative limit of less than 100 units per model per
year found in Paragraph 8 of the Electronics and Information
Technology Goods (Requirements for Compulsory Registration) Order
2021 as amended by S.O. 1246(E) dated 10.03.2026 with effect from
15.06.2026 can be applied to a consignment covered by a Bill of Entry
presented on 04.06.2026 and whether respondent No.2 was justified
on that footing in treating part of the consignment as prohibited goods
and the rest as restricted goods and in confiscating all of it under
Section 111(d) of the Act?”
27.
The Department placed its principal reliance on the efficacious
remedy of appeal under Section 128 of the Act.
The order itself
informs the petitioner of the forum and the period of sixty days and
the pre-deposit. Learned Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC urges that
labels such as arbitrary or without jurisdiction cannot displace a
statutory remedy and that the substance of the challenge must be
examined. We accept that proposition and have therefore examined
the substance. The rule of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion
and not a bar to jurisdiction.
It yields where the challenge raises a
pure question of law where the impugned order is contrary to a
binding decision of this Court or where the delay inherent in the
statutory route would defeat the relief.
28.
All three features are present here.
The controversy turns on
the temporal operation of a notification and requires no appreciation of
disputed facts.
The impugned order proceeds contrary to the
judgment of this Court in Writ Petition Nos.2014 and 843 of 2024.
The goods have remained at the port since June 2026 and attract
recurring demurrage and detention.
This Court had also directed in
Writ Petition No.19962 of 2026 that the adjudicating authority shall
decide the matter in the light of the precedents of this Court on
‘second-hand MFDs’. Relegating the petitioner to the appellate forum
would
defeat
that
direction and
prolong
the
detention.
The
preliminary objection is therefore rejected.
29.
The
Electronics
and
Information
Technology
Goods
(Requirements for Compulsory Registration) Order, 2021 was issued
under the Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 2016.
It requires
registration of notified goods and Paragraph 8 as inserted on
01.07.2021,
exempts
Highly
Specialized
Equipment
from
its
application. The Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 operates in a connected
manner.
Entry 1(b) of Para 2.31 makes the import of second-hand
goods subject to compliance with the Order of 2021, while Entry 1(d)
leaves second-hand capital goods freely importable. This Court held in
Writ Petition No.2014 of 2024 and batch that when the imported MFDs
satisfy the conditions of Paragraph 8, the compulsory registration
requirement ceases to operate. The import then cannot be treated as
restricted under Entry 1(b) and falls under Entry 1(d). The petitioner
pleaded this in its reply of 06.07.2026. We see no reason to depart
from that holding.
The relevant paragraph of the said notification
reads as under:
“MINISTRY
OF
ELECTRONICS
AND
INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGYORDER
New Delhi, the 10th March, 2026
S.O. 1246(E).— In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section
(1) and (2) of section 16 read with subsection (3) of section 25 of
the Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 2016 (11 of 2016), and the
Central Government beingof the opinion that it is necessary and
expedient in the public interest so to do, hereby makes the
followingamendments
to
the
“Electronics
and
Information
Technology Goods (Requirements for Compulsory Registration)
Order, 2021”, notified vide S.O. 1248(E) published in the Gazette
of India on 18th March, 2021 and amended fromtime to time.
2. In the said Order, Paragraph 8 inserted vide notification No S.O.
No 2844 (E) dated 1st July, 2021 shall beread asExemption for
Highly Specialized Equipment (HSE): HSE as per the criteria given
below shall stand exempted fromapplication of this Order based on
specific
exemption
issued
by
Ministry
of
Electronics
and
Information Technologyunder Para 2 of Gazette notification S.O.
No 1248(E) dated the 18th March, 2021, as amended by S.O.
1929 (E) dated26th April 2023, provided they are manufactured/
imported in less than 100 units per model per year:
a. Equipment Powered by three phase power supply or
b. Equipment Powered by single phase power supply
with current rating exceeding 16 Ampere or
c. Equipment with dimensions exceeding 1.5 m x 0.8 m
or
d. Equipment with weight exceeding 80 Kg
3. The aforesaid amendment shall come into effect from 15th
June, 2026.”
30.
Paragraph
of
the
notification
is
amendment takes effect from 15.06.2026.
unambiguous.
The
The notification uses no
language of retrospective operation and nothing in it supports that
reading. A subordinate legislative instrument that fixes its own date
of commencement operates from that date.
A presumption against
retrospectivity attaches to the every legislative measure and it applies
with greater force to delegated legislation.
A power to legislate
retrospectively must be conferred expressly by the parent statute and
must be exercised in clear terms.
Neither condition is met.
The
quantitative limit of 100 units per model per year is a new fetter on an
exemption. It cannot be applied to a transaction that was complete
before 15.06.2026.
The Department had not argued that the
notification has retrospective effect.
They rely instead on the Office
Memorandum of 22.04.2024 and on all-India import data for calendar
year 2025.
31.
The
petitioner
presented
Bill
of
Entry
No.9677159
on
04.06.2026. That date falls eleven days before the amendment came
into effect. Under Section 15 of the Act, the relevant date for the rate
of duty and the tariff valuation of imported goods entered for home
consumption is the date on which the Bill of Entry is presented. The
same date must furnish the reference point for testing whether the
goods satisfied the conditions of an exemption or the requirements of
an import policy.
Hence, the position as it stood on 04.06.2026
governs. On that date, Paragraph 8 contained no numerical ceiling as
the revised text had not come into force.
The later events do not
change the position. The examination on 19.06.2026, the show cause
notice of 25.06.2026, and the order of 15.07.2026, all relate to goods
which had already entered for home consumption.
A later date of
adjudication cannot bring an earlier import within a notification that
did not govern it when the goods arrived.
To hold otherwise would
make an importer’s rights depend on the speed of the Department’s
own proceedings.
32.
Respondent No.2 treated 36 units as prohibited goods because
the models allegedly crossed 100 units in calendar year 2025 on an
all-India basis across all importers. Our finding is that the numerical
limit did not apply to this import disposes of that ground at its root.
There are other infirmities.
The text relied on speaks of units
manufactured or imported per model per year. It does not say that
the limit is an industry-wide cap shared by unrelated importers. The
petitioner has read it as a per importer limit and states that its own
imports of each model were well within it. A restrictive reading that
deprives an importer of an exemption on account of imports made by
strangers is not warranted by the text and could not be adopted
without clear words.
The Department relied on a statement in the
impugned order that Paragraph 8 is ‘model specific’ and that the
Foreign Trade Policy operates nationally. That statement explains why
model-wise national data were examined. It does not explain why the
cap of one importer should be exhausted by the imports of another.
33.
The Chartered Engineer appointed at the instance of the
Department certified that each machine weighed substantially more
than 80 Kg and met the weight criterion of Paragraph 8(d). He also
certified that the machines were functional second-hand capital goods
with a residual life of over six years and were not hazardous or
electronic waste.
The Department, therefore, had before it its own
expert evidence that the goods qualified as Highly Specialized
Equipment. We note that the weight criterion in the notification now
relied upon is the same as in ‘clause (d)’ quoted above and that the
Department has disputed neither the weight nor the functionality.
34.
The petitioner states without contradiction that the show cause
notice did not mention the all-India reckoning of the 100 unit
threshold.
The importer was told that DGFT authorisation and BIS
registration were absent. It was not told that its eligibility would be
tested on the imports of others across all ports. A finding that rests
on a basis not put to the ‘noticee’ offends the principle that a person
must know the case he is to meet. The adjudicating authority could
not travel beyond the notice. This defect is independent of the main
ground and would vitiate the findings on the 36 units even if the
numerical ceiling had applied.
35.
The 37 units were treated as restricted goods and confiscated
under Section 111(d) on the footing that DGFT authorisation was
needed despite the exemption in Paragraph 8. That finding is contrary
to the holding in Writ Petition No.2014 of 2024 which we have
followed. The goods being compliant with Paragraph 8 on the date of
import compulsory registration did not apply and Entry 1(b) of Para
2.31 was not attracted. The goods were freely importable under Entry
1(d).
The definition of prohibited goods in Section 2(33) excludes
goods in respect of which the conditions for import have been
complied with. We find no basis on this record for confiscation under
Section 111(d).
The Customs examination found the goods to
correspond substantially with the declaration and no case has been
made out under Section 111(m). Nor is there a foundation for penalty
under Section 112. The Department also defend the enhancement of
the declared value as having followed the sequential valuation scheme
before Rule 9 was adopted. Since the confiscation and the redemption
fines cannot survive we need not examine valuation in any detail and
leave the petitioner and the Department to their remedies on that
aspect.
36.
The goods have remained under respondents’ port custody for a
considerable amount of period and a workable course for their release
was indicated by this court in the case of Arka Business Solutions
vs. Supt. of Cus.1. We consider it appropriate to adopt the conditions
stated in paragraph 26 of that decision.
Those conditions read as
under:
“26. Thus, for all the aforesaid reasons, it is ordered that let the
respondent-authorities pass an order on the application filed by
the petitioners for provisional release of the goods subject to the
conditions that:
(a) The petitioner shall pay/deposit the enhanced duty amount. On
receipt of such enhanced duty amount paid by the petitioners, the
goods in question shall be released within a period of four (04)
weeks thereafter.
(b) For payment of such duty, quantification shall be made by the
customs forthwith within one (01) week from the date of receipt of
a copy of this order. On receipt of such quantification, the payment
shall be immediately made by the petitioners and on receipt of the
payment in entirety, the goods shall be released as indicated
above at the outer limit of four (04) weeks.
(c) It is made clear that this order will not stand in the way for
Customs Department to go ahead with the further proceedings
including the adjudication in the manner known to law.
(d) It is further made clear that so far as the condition of the
petitioner that demurrage charges till date, for the goods be
considered for waiver, in this regard, if any application is filed by
(2026) 166 GSTR 286
the petitioners seeking such a waiver of demurrage charges, the
same shall be considered and decided by the respondents
objectively.”
37.
In light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the amended
Paragraph 8 had no application to the import in question and that the
impugned order cannot be sustained. The Order-in-Original No.HYDCUS-031-ADC-26-27 dated 15.07.2026 passed by respondent No.2 is
set aside insofar as it holds the goods to be prohibited or restricted
confiscates them under Section 111(d) of the Act and imposes
redemption fines and penalty if any.
The respondents shall release
the goods covered by Bill of Entry No.9677159, dated 04.06.2026,
subject to the petitioner fulfilling the conditions prescribed in Arka
Business Solutions (supra).
38.
The instant writ petition therefore stands allowed. The question
of law framed is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
39.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand
closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
________________
P. SAM KOSHY, ACJ
_________________________
NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J
Date: 30.10.2026
GSD
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