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[2026:RJ-JP:2374-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
1. D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4842/2025
M/s Anamika Conductors Private Limited, Having Office At B-70,
Upasana House, 2Nd Floor, Rajendra Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur302015, Through Its Director Sharad Bakliwal
----Appellant
Versus
Se (Mm) Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Vidyut Bhawan,
Pancsheel Nagar, Makrawali Road, Ajmer 305001, Rajasthan
----Respondent
2. D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4843/2025
M/s Anamika Conductors Private Limited, Having Office At B-70,
Upasana House, 2Nd Floor, Rajendra Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur
302015, Through Its Director Sharad Bakliwal
----Appellant
Versus
Se (Mm) Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Vidyut Bhawan,
Pancsheel Nagar, Makrawali Road, Ajmer 305001, Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Amol Vyas
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SANGEETA SHARMA
Judgment
20/01/2026
Reportable
(Oral)
1.
Heard.
2.
In both the appeals, the challenge is to the judgment passed
by the learned Commercial Court-II, Jaipur Metro-II, whereby the
objections
raised under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act of 1996’), were rejected
by the learned Commercial Court on the ground that the same had
been raised beyond period of limitation, as provided for filing
objections in terms of Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996.
[2026:RJ-JP:2374-DB]
3.
(2 of 7)
[CMA-4842/2025]
Brief facts which have come up before us are that the
appellant had initially raised a dispute and in terms of Section 18
of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act,
2006 (for short ‘MSMED Act’) preferred an application before the
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Facilitation Council, Jaipur
(for short ‘Council’) claiming compound interest. The Council vide
its order dated 10.05.2022, noticed that in terms of the contract,
there was a provision of raising a dispute before the Settlement
Committee of the Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited in terms of
the conditions of tender. It is further observed that the claim had
been directly put up before the Council. Thereafter, it proceeded to
examine the claim on merits and reached to the conclusion that
there had been no violation of Section 15 of the MSMED Act by the
respondent-purchaser and, therefore, the claim of three times
compound interest on the ground of delay of one month was not
acceptable. Having reached to that conclusion, the Council closed
the case unanimously. It however, further proceeded to observe
that the supplier could further raise its claim relating to interest
before the Settlement Committee, which would examine the case
separately and pass an order taking into consideration the interest
payable and lay down the same accordingly. It appears that after
the dispute had been closed by the Council, the appellant
approached the Settlement Committee, which passed an order on
05.08.2022 allowing simple interest at the prevailing bank rate to
the appellant with direction that the same be paid within a further
period beyond 45 days in all the cases referred to it.
4.
After the said order has been passed by the Settlement
Committee, the appellant raised objections relating to the order
(3 of 7)
[2026:RJ-JP:2374-DB]
[CMA-4842/2025]
passed by the Council dated 10.05.2022 under Section 34 of the
Act of 1996 before the learned Commercial Court. Learned
Commercial Court, however, found the said claim of objections
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 to be beyond the period of
limitation, as provided under Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 and
rejected the same. Aggrieved thereto, the present appeals have
been filed.
5.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that period during
which the proceedings remained pending i.e. between 10.05.2022
and the order passed by the Council dated 05.08.2022, should be
treated as dies non and should not be counted for the purpose of
counting limitation, as provided under Section 34(3) of the Act of
1996 and, therefore, the objections raised under Section 34 of the
Act of 1996, would be treated to be within limitation and on that
count, he assails the order passed by the learned Commercial
Court to be unjustified and illegal.
6.
Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the judgments
passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of M/s Sonali
Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Chairman, Maharashtra
State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC
1467 and Geo Miller and Company Private Limited Vs.
Chairman,
Rajasthan
Vidyut
Utpadan
Nigam
Limited,
(2020) 14 SCC 643.
7.
We have carefully considered the submissions.
8.
It would be apposite to quote Section 34(3) of the Act of
1996, which reads as under:
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award(1) …………..
(2) …………..
(4 of 7)
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[CMA-4842/2025]
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the party
making that application had received the arbitral award or, if
a request had been made under section 33, from the date
on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral
tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
within the said period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.”
9.
From the perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is apparent
that the objection under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 can be
raised within a period of three months and for any sufficient
reasons, which may be put up before the Court, one month further
time may be granted to condone the delay, as has now been
settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by the High
Court.
The period cannot be extended beyond 120 days in no
circumstances and even if sufficient cause is shown to the Court,
still the Commercial Court cannot extend the period of limitation.
In this regard, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chintels India Limited Vs.
Bhayana Builders Private Limited, (2021) 4 SCC 602,
wherein it was held as under:
“11. A reading of Section 34(1) would make it clear that an
application made to set aside an award has to be in
accordance with both sub-sections (2) and (3). This would
mean that such application would not only have to be within
the limitation period prescribed by sub-section (3), but
would then have to set out grounds under sub-sections (2)
and/or (2-A) for setting aside such award. What follows from
this is that the application itself must be within time, and if
not within a period of three months, must be accompanied
with an application for condonation of delay, provided it is
within a further period of 30 days, this Court having made it
clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not
apply and that any delay beyond 120 days cannot be
condoned.”
10.
However, the contention of learned counsel is different. It is
his
submission
that
the
period
spent
from
10.05.2022
to
[2026:RJ-JP:2374-DB]
(5 of 7)
[CMA-4842/2025]
05.08.2022, is not to be counted for the purpose of counting of
three months+one month.
11.
We are afraid that we cannot agree with the submission, as
we find that the Council had unequivocally and with a unanimous
decision, closed the cases relating to the dispute raised before it.
So far as the observations regarding allowing the supplier to avail
the remedy before the Settlement Committee are concerned, they
are independent of the arbitration award passed by the Council.
The settlement proceedings flow from the conditions of contract
and the Settlement Committee, which passed the order on
05.08.2022, was independent of the award passed by the Council.
The Council’s award dated 10.05.2022 could have been objected
to by raising objections under Section 34 within the period as
prescribed, hereinabove. It was not required or bound in any
manner to be also counting as to what is the decision by the
Settlement Committee.
12.
Learned counsel’s reliance on the two judgments, as stated
hereinabove, is also misconceived.
13.
In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Geo Miller and Company Private Limited (supra), the
Court was examining the amicable settlement, which may have
arrived between the parties for the purpose of computing the
period of limitation for reference to arbitration. The reference to
arbitration is independent of the objections which have been
raised under Sections 34 and 34(3) of the Act of 1996 and is
nowhere influenced by the period, as laid down for reference to
arbitration. Thus, the said judgment would have no application
[2026:RJ-JP:2374-DB]
(6 of 7)
[CMA-4842/2025]
and would not help the appellant. The relevant paragraph No.28 of
the said judgment reads as under:
“28. Having perused through the relevant precedents, we
agree that on a certain set of facts and circumstances, the
period during which the parties were bona fide negotiating
towards an amicable settlement may be excluded for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation for reference
to arbitration under the 1996 Act. However, in such cases
the entire negotiation history between the parties must be
specifically pleaded and placed on the record. The Court
upon careful consideration of such history must find out
what was the ‘breaking point’ at which any reasonable party
would have abandoned efforts at arriving at a settlement
and contemplated referral of the dispute for arbitration. This
‘breaking point’ would then be treated as the date on which
the cause of action arises, for the purpose of limitation. The
threshold for determining when such a point arises will be
lower in the case of commercial disputes, where the party’s
primary interest is in securing the payment due to them,
than in family disputes where it may be said that the parties
have a greater stake in settling the dispute amicably, and
therefore delaying formal adjudication of the claim.”
14.
In M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the
issue was completely different. It would be, therefore, apposite to
quote paragraph No.24, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court was
examining the issue before it, which reads as under:
“24. In light of the above statutory provisions, we will decide
the first issue of whether the Limitation Act applies to
conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED
Act, and even if not, whether time-barred claims can be
referred to conciliation.”
15.
Thus, the issue which the Hon’ble Supreme Court was
examining was whether claims which are time barred can be
raised under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act. Presently, it is not a
case of raising of claims under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act,
which the appellant raised within time and were decided by the
Council within time. The issue is with regard to raising of
objections before the learned Commercial Court under Section 34
of the Act of 1996, which has been examined by us hereinabove
and we notice and agree with the view taken by the learned
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(7 of 7)
[CMA-4842/2025]
Commercial Court that the objections were not raised within the
limitation period and the same cannot be extended in any manner
beyond the period, as prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act of
1996.
16.
Accordingly, the appeals fail and the same are dismissed.
(SANGEETA SHARMA),J
SANJAY KUMAWAT/RAJAT/17
(SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),ACTING CJ
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