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signed by
KABORAMBA Digitally
KABORAMBAM
SANDEEP
SINGH
M SANDEEP
Date: 2025.12.02
SINGH
20:12:02 +05'30'
Sl. No. 7
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
W.P. (Crl.) No. 24 of 2025
Longjam Boy Singh @ Khaba
Petitioner
Vs.
District Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur; & Ors.
Respondents
BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH
(ORDER)
(Order of the Court was made by M. Sundar, CJ)
02.12.2025
[1]
Captioned ‘Writ Petition’ (‘WP' for the sake of brevity) has been
presented in this Court seeking issue of writ of habeas corpus qua ‘a preventive
detention order dated 21.07.2025 bearing Reference No. Crl/NSA/No. 8 of 2025’
(‘impugned preventive detention order’ for the sake of convenience) made by R1 (District Magistrate, Imphal West) who shall hereinafter be referred to as
‘detaining authority’ (to be noted, ‘R-1’ is a short form reference to ‘1st
respondent’ and similar short form references will be made in this order qua other
respondents also).
[2]
Short facts, shorn off elaboration, i.e., factual matrix in a nutshell
containing facts that are imperative for appreciating instant order are that, there
was an alleged occurrence (person missing/murder) on 11.06.2025; that, a dead
body was found on 13.06.2025; that this led to registration of an FIR being ‘FIR
No. 38(6)2025 WGI-PS dated 14.06.2025 on the file of Wangoi Police Station in
Imphal West District’ (‘said FIR’ for the sake of convenience and clarity), to be
noted, ‘FIR’ is an abbreviation which denotes ‘First Information Report’; that the
said FIR is qua Sections 140(3)/127(3)/142/3(5)/109/61(2)BNS (Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023); that based on the said FIR, writ petitioner before us (herein after
‘detenu’ for convenience) was arrested on 22.06.2025; that detenu moved a bail
application on 30.06.2025 but the same was withdrawn as not pressed on
22.07.2025; that in the interregnum, i.e., on 21.07.2025, the impugned
preventive detention order came to be made by detaining authority; that the
impugned preventive detention order was followed by grounds of detention dated
23.07.2025 bearing Reference No. Crl/NSA/No. 8 of 2025 made by detaining
authority; that the approval of the impugned preventive detention order by the
State was vide proceedings dated 31.07.2025; that confirmation was vide order
dated 22.08.2025 bearing Reference No. H-1401/16/2025-HD-HD; that on
04.10.2025, the detenu filed a default bail application obviously on the ground
that final report has not been filed by the investigation/prosecution within the
prescribed time; that this default bail application was allowed by concerned Court
in and by an order dated 08.10.2025 in Crl. Misc. (B) Case No. 34 of 2025; that
it is to be noted that the Court concerned is the Court of Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Imphal West at Lamphelpat; that the default bail order of concerned Court
has attained finality as State has not chosen to assail the same; that in the
interregnum, captioned WP was filed in this Court on 25.08.2025 with a prayer
for issue of writ of habeas corpus (as alluded to supra), notice was issued and
respondents have entered appearance; that the captioned WP was taken up for
hearing on multiple listings after affidavits-in-opposition were filed by R-2 (State
of Manipur, represented by Chief Secretary), R-3 (Superintendent of Manipur
Central Jail, Sajiwa) and R-4(Union of India represented by Secretary, Home
Affairs); that R-1, i.e., detaining authority has not chosen to file affidavit-inopposition; that the captioned WP was heard out with the consent of all learned
counsel on both sides today.
[3]
In the hearing today, Mr. Ch. Ngongo, learned senior counsel
instructed by Ms. S. Gangarani, learned counsel on record for writ petitioner (to
be noted, detenu himself is writ petitioner before this Court), Mr. Sh. Yangya,
learned senior counsel and prosecutor instructed by Mr. Phungyo Zingkhai,
learned Dy. Government Advocate and Mr. W. Darakeshwar, learned Sr. Panel
Counsel for Central Government (PCCG) are before this Court. As already alluded
to supra, main WP was taken up and heard out with the consent of all these
learned counsel.
[4]
Notwithstanding myriad grounds in the captioned WP, learned
senior counsel, Mr. Ch. Ngongo, predicated his campaign against impugned
preventive detention order on two points and they are as follows:
(i)
the
live
and
proximate
link
between
the
alleged
occurrence/arrest and the detention order has snapped;
(ii)
the detaining authority in the impugned preventive detention
order has not recorded the factual position that detenu was in
custody and was lodged in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa, while
making the impugned preventive detention order dated
21.07.2025 and the grounds of detention.
[5]
We now proceed to deal with the aforesaid two points in the order
in which the same has been set out supra. To be noted, as we take up the points
one after the other, we shall be setting out the point, discussion on the same
and also set out our dispositive reasoning.
[6]
As regards first point, as would be evident from the factual matrix
in a nutshell set out supra, the alleged occurrence was on 11.06.2025, arrest of
detenu was on 22.06.2025 and the impugned preventive detention order was
made on 21.07.2025 by R-1. Learned counsel for writ petitioner pressed into
service Anand Prakash vs. State of U.P. and others reported in AIR 1990
SC 516. Anand Prakash case, on facts, is also one which arose under ‘National
Security Act, 1980 (Act No. 65 of 1980’) [hereinafter ‘NSA’ for the sake of
convenience and clarity]. Anand Prakash was a case of alleged theft of wires,
the alleged occurrence was on 14.02.1989, FIR was registered on the next day,
i.e. on 15.02.1989, there was a raid on 03.03.1989 and some 20 kilograms of
melted wires was recovered, thereafter arrest was made on 02.05.1989 and the
preventive detention order itself was made on 03.05.1989. In this context,
Hon’ble Supreme Court, holding that this delay has not been satisfactorily
explained concluded that preventive detention order in that case stood vitiated.
In the case on hand, the live and proximate link snapping point was not raised
in the original writ petition but it was subsequently raised in the hearing as also
by way of MC[W.P. (Crl.)] No. 5 of 2025. As would be evident from our earlier
proceedings dated 13.10.2025, learned State counsel requested for time to file a
separate affidavit-in-opposition qua this additional ground but subsequently on
10.11.2025, learned State counsel submitted that he would make this point on
the basis of averments in the affidavit-in-opposition of R-2 (State of Manipur,
represented by Chief Secretary) without filing a separate affidavit-in-opposition
qua additional ground For convenience, we deem it appropriate to extract and
reproduce our 13.10.2025 and 10.11.2025 proceedings, we do so and the same
are as follows:
‘13.10.2025
Mr. Ch. Ngongo, learned senior counsel for petitioner and Mr.
Y. Ashang, learned Public Prosecutor for State are before this Court.
Read in conjunction with and in continuation of previous
listing.
As regards the additional grounds raised i.e., the proximate
link between arrest and grounds having snapped, as this was not
raised in the writ petition and as it was raised by way of additional
grounds, State counsel requests for a short accommodation to file
affidavit-in-opposition on this point alone.
Request acceded to.
List on 27.10.2025.’
‘10.11.2025
[1]
Read this in conjunction with and in continuation of earlier
proceedings made in the previous listing on 13.10.2025
[2]
Mr. Ch. Ngongo, learned Senior Advocate instructed by
Ms. Reena Chongtham, learned counsel on record for petitioner; Mr. Sh.
Yangya, learned Sr. Advocate instructed by Mr. Phungyo Zingkhai,
learned State counsel for respondent Nos. 1-3; and Mr. W. Darakeshwar,
learned Sr. Panel Counsel for Central Government (Sr. PCCG) for
respondent No. 4; are before this Court.
[3]
Petitioner’s counsel is ready to advance arguments.
[4]
Though on 13.10.2025, time was sought by State counsel
for getting instructions, today, Mr. Sh. Yangya, learned Sr. Advocate
instructed by Mr. Phungyo Zingkhai, learned State Counsel, submits that
he will make submissions by referring to affidavit-in-opposition of
respondent No. 2 (State of Manipur represented by Chief Secretary)
however, affidavit-in-opposition of respondent No. 2 is not before the
Court. Learned counsel on record for petitioner confirms that a copy of
affidavit-in-opposition of respondent No. 2 has been served on her.
[5]
Registry to put up the affidavit-in-opposition of respondent
No. 2 in the next listing. In the interregnum, State counsel for respondent
Nos. 1-3 shall file in the Registry one more copy of the affidavit-inopposition of respondent No. 2.
[6]
[7]
List on 13.11.2025.
Learned prosecutor today adverted to paragraph 2 of affidavit-in-
opposition of R-2 which reads as follows:
‘2. That, with reference to Grounds No. (i) of the Misc. Application, it is
specifically denied the contentions of the petitioner's that the incident of
the FIR lodged on 14-06-2025 and the order of the detention dated 2107-2025 has no live proximate link for the simple reason that a written
complaint was lodged on 11-06-2025 at 07:00 p.m. by 1(one) Chesam
Nasir Khan, S/o (L) Mv. Abdul Ajid of Paobitek Mayai Leikai about the
missing of Chesam Abdul Kadir (deceased) who is said to be the nephew
of the complainant. The same was registered under G.D. No. 18/WGIPS/2025 dated 11-06-2025 and police launched hunt and search at every
possible places. During the course of inquiry, it came to light that one
unknown youth was found at the courtyard of one Heikrujam Ibechaobi
Devi, W/o (L) H. Sarat Singh of Yumnam Huidrom Makha Leikai at about
01:30 a.m. of 11-06-2025. It is also corrected from the source of
information that the said unknown person suspected to be the missing
person was confined wrongfully by the public and later on handed over
to (1) Longjam Boy @ Khaba Singh (the present detenue), (2) Yumnam
Pandeyraj Singh, S/o Y. Ranjit Singh of Yumnam Huidrom Mayai Leikai
and some other persons who are members of Arambai Tengol Unit 27(B)
QRT. Hence, the connected FIR was registered on the basis of the findings
report submitted by the enquiry officer and the case was investigated
into. During the course of investigation, some of the accomplice of the
present detenue were arrested by the investigating authority. During the
course of investigation, it was unearthed that the said unknown person
was severely tortured by the present detenue and his accomplice at the
community hall of Community Hall of Yumnam Huidrom Makha Leikai and
also in the camp of the aforesaid Arambai Tengol Office. As a result, the
said unknown person succumbed to the injuries caused by the said
torture. Thereafter, a vehicle i.e. Fortuner vehicle bearing MN-01X 4633
of the present detenue and another vehicle Bolero pick-up bearing No.
MN-01AA 3784 were used for disposal of the dead body of the said
unknown person. After the commission of the said incident, the present
detenue went to Chandel area by his Fortuner vehicle and hide himself at
Liwa Sarei which is the parental home of his wife and thereafter he sold
out the said vehicle to an unknown person from Chakpikarong and also
destroyed his mobile phone at Chandel in order to evade arrest by the
security force. Later on, the dead body of the said unknown person was
found buried and recovered on the bank of the Nambul River on the
discloser of the accused person and the same was found to be the missing
person namely, Chesam Abdul Kadir (deceased). Hence, there is very
much proximately between the date of incident and the date of detention.’
[8]
This Court carefully considered the afore-referred paragraph 2 and
it is seen that paragraph 2 does not explain much less satisfactorily explain that
live and proximate link between the alleged occurrence on 11.06.2025 and the
impugned preventive detention order dated 21.07.2025 had not been snapped
as it is more in the nature of a calendrical sequence of investigation and other
events as they unfurled. In this regard, this Court finds that live and proximate
link point has been dealt with by Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered
on 30.09.2022 in Sushanta Kumar Bainik Vs. State of Tripura and others
reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1333 (equivalent citations – Supreme Court
it was a case of live and proximate link snapping qua proposal by the sponsoring
authority which was on 28.06.2021 and the making of the impugned preventive
detention order on 12.11.2021 and Bainik case arose under the Prevention of
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (Act No.
46 of 1988). However, in Bainik case, Hon’ble Supreme Court after making a
survey of various case laws touching upon delay/live and proximate link snapping
recognized the principle that live and proximate link snapping would vitiate a
impugned preventive detention order. After making a survey of SK.
Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal reported in (1975) 3 SCC 395,
Suresh Mahato v. the District Magistrate, Burdwan reported in (1975) 3
SCC 544,
Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in
(1979) 1 SCC 465 and Shafiq Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Meerut
reported in (1989) 4 SCC 556, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paragraph
21 and 22 as follows:
‘21. It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this
Court, that the underlying principle is that if there is unreasonable delay
between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu
and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the
order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a
considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and
consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the "live
and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose
of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the
delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
22. In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the detaining
authority after the receipt of the proposal from the sponsoring authority
was indifferent in passing the order of detention with greater
promptitude. The "live and proximate link" between the grounds of
detention and the purpose of detention stood snapped in arresting the
detenu. More importantly the delay has not been explained in any manner
& though this point of delay was specifically raised & argued before the
High Court as evident from Para 14 of the impugned judgment yet the
High Court has not recorded any finding on the same
[9]
This Court finds that the ratios/principles laid down in Anand
Prakash and Bainik are instructive and we respectfully follow the same. If
Anand Prakash and Bainik are applied to facts of instant case, in the light of
paragraph 2 of the affidavit-in-opposition of R-2, we find that the delay between
the alleged occurrence on 11.06.2025 or for that matter, the delay between the
date of arrest on 22.06.2025 and making of the impugned preventive detention
order on 21.07.2025 has not been explained, much less satisfactory explained.
In this view of the matter, this Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion
that the impugned preventive detention order is vitiated and becomes liable to
be dislodged in the habeas corpus legal drill at hand.
[10]
In a habeas corpus legal drill, if writ petitioner succeeds on one
point, that will suffice but nonetheless, we deem it appropriate to examine the
second point also. As would be evident from the narrative thus far, second point
turns on subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The detaining authority
in the impugned preventive detention order as well as the grounds of detention
has not recorded the then obtaining factual position that the detenu had already
been arrested on 22.06.2025, lodged in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa and was in
detention on 21.07.2025 when the impugned preventive detention order was
made. The detaining authority has also not recorded subjective satisfaction that
there is imminent possibility of the detenu being enlarged on bail. In this regard,
learned senior counsel, Mr.Ch. Ngongo appearing on behalf of Ms. S. Gangarani,
learned counsel for writ petitioner, relied on Union of India vs. Paul
Manickam and another reported in (2003) 8 SCC 342. Learned senior
counsel while pressing into service Paul Manickam which arose under erstwhile
COFEPOSA adverted to paragraph 14 thereat and submitted that it is necessary
for the detaining authority to record that there is imminent possibility of detenu
being enlarged on bail in cases preventive detention orders are made qua detenu
who is already in custody. In response to this argument, Mr. Sh. Yangya, learned
senior counsel and prosecutor instructed by Mr. Phungyo Zingkhai, learned Dy.
Government Advocate appearing for R-1 to R-3 placed reliance on/pressed into
service Union of India and another Vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad reported in
(2019) 20 SCC 609. To be noted, Dimple Happy Dhakad arose under
COFEPOSA. After referring to Paul Manickam, besides Senthamilselve v
State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2006) 5 SCC 676 as well as Kamarunnissa
vs. Union of India and another reported in (1991) 1 SCC 128 Hon’ble
Supreme Court vide paragraphs 38 and 39 of Dimple Happy Dhakad held that
detenu’s likelihood of being released on bail is based on the material before the
detaining authority and this subjective satisfaction is normally not interfered with.
However, the ratio laid down in Khudiram Das Vs. State of West Bengal
reported in (1975) 2 SCC 81 (to be noted, Dimple Happy Dhakad does not
refer to Khudiram Das) that subjective satisfaction though subjective is
justiciable and can be subjected to judicial scrutiny though to a limited extent
remained undisturbed. Be that as it may, this Khudiram Das principle was
affirmatively adverted to by Honb’ble Supreme Court in Ameena Begum vs.
State of Telangana and others reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587 which was
rendered after Dimple Happy Dhakad. (To be noted, while Dimple Happy
Dhakad was rendered on 18.07.2019, Ameena Begum was rendered on
04.09.2023). Ameena Begum is a case which arose owing to a detention under
Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, DrugOffenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed
Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration
Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest
Offenders,
Gaming
Offenders,
Sexual
Offenders,
Explosive
Substances
Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial
Offenders Act, 1986 (1 of 1986) {‘said A.P. Act’ for the sake of convenience}. In
Ameena Begum, Khudiram Das principle is affirmatively adverted to in
paragraph 16 and the same reads as follows:
‘16. In his counter-affidavit (at pp. 10 and 11) to the special leave
petition, the Commissioner referred to, and extracted a passage from
para 8 of the decision of this Court in Khudiram Das v. State of W.B.,
wherein a Bench of 4 (four) Hon'ble Judges of this Court was examining
a challenge to an order of detention passed under Section 3 of the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 ("MISA" hereafter) by a
District Magistrate. We consider it appropriate to notice not only para 8
of the decision rendered by Hon'ble P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship
then was) in its entirety but also para 9, reading as follows: (SCC pp. 9092, paras 8-9)
"8. Now it is clear on a plain reading of the language of subsections (1) and (2) of Section 3 that the exercise of the power
of detention is made dependant on the subjective satisfaction of
the detaining authority that with a view to preventing person
from acting in a prejudicial manner, as set out in sub-clauses (i),
(ii) and (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1), it is necessary to
detain such person. The words used in sub-sections (1) and (2)
of Section 3 are “if satisfied” and they clearly import subjective
satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority before an order
of detention can be made. And it is so provided for a valid reason
which becomes apparent if we consider the nature of the power
of detention and the conditions on which it can be exercised. The
power of detention is clearly a preventive measure. It does not
partake in any manner of the nature of punishment. It is taken
by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the community.
Since every preventive measure is based on the principle that a
person should be prevented from doing something which, if left
free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do, it
must necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent, on
suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof. Patanjali Sastri,
C.J. pointed out in State of Madras v. V.G. Row that preventive
detention is "largely precautionary and based on suspicion" and
to these observations may be added the following words uttered
by the learned Chief Justice in that case with reference to the
observations of Lord Finlay in R. v. Halliday, namely, that the
‘court was the least appropriate tribunal to investigate into
circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action
must be largely based'. This being the nature of the proceeding,
it is impossible to conceive how it can possibly be regarded as
capable of objective assessment. The matters which have to be
considered by the detaining authority are whether the person
concerned, having regard to his past conduct judged in the light
of the surrounding circumstances and other relevant material,
would be likely to act in a prejudicial manner as contemplated in
any of sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (1) of sub-section
(1) of Section 3, and if so, whether it is necessary to detain him
with a view to preventing him from so acting. These are not
matters susceptible of objective determination and they could
not be intended to be judged by objective standards. They are
essentially matters which have to be administratively determined
for the purpose of taking administrative action. Their
determination is, therefore, deliberately and advisedly left by the
legislature to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority which by reason of its special position, experience and
expertise would be best fitted to decide them. It must in the
circumstances be held that the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority as regards these matters constitutes the
foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and the
Court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency
of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining
authority is based. The Court cannot, on a review of the grounds,
substitute its own opinion for that of the authority, for what is
made a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of
detention is not an objective determination of the necessity of
detention for a specified purpose but the subjective opinion of
the detaining authority, and if a subjective opinion is formed by
the detaining authority as regards the necessity of detention for
a specified purpose, the condition of exercise of the power of
detention would be fulfilled. This would clearly show that the
power of detention is not a quasi-judicial power. ....
9. But that does not mean that the subjective satisfaction
of the detaining authority is wholly immune from judicial
reviewability. The courts have by judicial decisions carved out an
area, limited though it be, within which the validity of the
subjective satisfaction can yet be subjected to judicial scrutiny.
The basic postulate on which the courts have proceeded is that
the subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the
exercise of the power conferred on the executive, the Court can
always examine whether the requisite satisfaction is arrived at
by the authority: if it is not, the condition precedent to the
exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of
the power would be bad. There are several grounds evolved by
judicial decisions for saying that no subjective satisfaction is
arrived at by the authority as required under the statute. The
simplest case is whether the authority has not applied its mind
at all; in such a case the authority could not possibly be satisfied
as regards the fact in respect of which it is required to be
satisfied. King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee is a case in point.
Then there may be a case where the power is exercised
dishonestly or for an improper purpose: such a case would also
negative the existence of satisfaction on the part of the authority.
The existence of "improper purpose", that is, a purpose not
contemplated by the statute, has been recognised as an
independent ground of control in several decided cases. The
satisfaction, moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority
itself, and therefore, if, in exercising the power, the authority has
acted under the dictation of another body as the Commissioner
of Police did in State of Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji and the
officer of the Ministry of Labour and National Service did in
Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of Labour & National Service
the exercise of the power would be bad and so also would the
exercise of the power be vitiated where the authority has
disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each
individual case by self-created rules of policy or in any other
manner. The satisfaction said to have been arrived at by the
authority would also be bad where it is based on the application
of a wrong test or the misconstruction of a statute. Where this
happens, the satisfaction of the authority would not be in respect
of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Then
again the satisfaction must be grounded 'on materials which are
of rationally probative value'. (Machindar Shivaji Mahar v. R.)
The grounds on which the satisfaction is based must be such as
a rational human being can consider connected with the fact in
respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached. They must be
relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and must not be
extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. If the
authority has taken into account, it may even be with the best of
intention, as a relevant factor something which it could not
properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise
the power or the manner or extent to which it should be
exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad. (S. Pratap
Singh v. State of Punjab) If there are to be found in the statute
expressly or by implication matters which the authority ought to
have regard to, then, in exercising the power, the authority must
have regard to those matters. The authority must call its
attention to the matters which it is bound to consider."
(emphasis supplied)
{To be noted, the portion of extracted Khudiram Das which is in italics is as in
Ameena Begum as reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587}.
[11]
We respectfully follow Khudiram Das principle. Be that as it may,
Dimple Happy Dhakad is clearly distinguishable on facts qua the factual matrix
of the case on hand. The reason is, in Dimple Happy Dhakad, the only point
is the detaining authority not recording imminent possibility of detenu being
enlarged on bail but in the instant case, it is not merely a case of detaining
authority not recording imminent possibility of detentu being enlarged on bail but
it is a case of the detaining authority not noticing obtaining factual position that
the detenu was in custody, i.e., he remained incarcerated on the date on which
the impugned preventive detention order was made. In this regard, learned
prosecutor drew our attention to a history sheet which according to him forms
part of the detection order and in the history sheet, it has been recorded by
Superintendent of Police, Imphal West, that the detenu was remanded to judicial
custody on 30.06.2025 and is lodged in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa. Though the
history sheet says that the detenu has been remanded and remains lodged in
the Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa, in the impugned preventive detention order, the
detaining authority after making it clear that powers under Section 3(2) of NSA
are being exercised has directed the detenu to be detained and lodged in Manipur
Central Jail, Sajiwa, unless the impugned preventive detention order is revoked
or modified earlier. If this subjective satisfaction is subjected to judicial review,
i.e., the same being justiciable to the limited extent as indicated in Khudiram
Das and reiterated in Ameena Begum, we have no hesitation in coming to the
conclusion that the impugned preventive detention order stands vitiated. To put
it differently, Dimple Happy Dhakad is distinguishable on facts and Khudiram
Das as reiterated in Ameena Begum if applied to test impugned preventive
detention order, the same come to aid of the writ petitioner in his campaign
against impugned preventive detention order as regards this point.
[12]
Before concluding, this Court deems it appropriate to record
another aspect of the matter. In the case on hand, as would be evident from the
factual matrix narrative supra as well as the trajectory the matter has taken thus
far, it is clear that impugned preventive detention order is predicated on a lone
FIR, the law is well settled that a preventive detention order can be predicated
on lone FIR and there can be no quarrel over this proposition but in the instant
case, even in the lone FIR, the detenu has been allowed to get default bail on
08.10.2025 (in his default bail application dated 04.10.2025). This takes this
Court to celebrated Ram Manhohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar and another
reported in (1965) SCC OnLine SC 9. The oft quoted Ram Manhohar Lohia
is a case law in which Hon’ble Supreme Court explained law and order, public
order and security of State by resorting to an illustrative narrative of three
concentric circles. This in contained in paragraph 55 and 56 of Ram Manhohar
Lohia which read as follows:
‘55. It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court
(earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those
affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders
of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to imagine three
concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which
is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle
represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect
law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order
but not security of the State. By using the expression "maintenance of law
and order" the District Magistrate was widening his own field of action and
was adding a clause to the Defence of India Rules.
56. We do not know the material on which the District Magistrate acted. If
we could examine the reasons we may be able to say whether the action
can still be said to fall within the other topic public safety. That enquiry is
not open to us. If we looked into the matter from that angle we would be
acting outside our powers. The order on its face shows two reasons. There
is nothing to show that one purpose was considered to be more essential
than the other. We are not, therefore, certain that the District Magistrate
was influenced by one consideration and not both. The order of detention
is a warrant which authorises action. Affidavits hardly improve the order as
it is. If there is allegation of bad faith they can be seen to determine the
question of good faith. If mistaken identity is alleged we can satisfy
ourselves about the identity. But if action is taken to maintain law and order
instead of maintaining public order, there is room to think that the powers
were misconceived and if there is such a fundamental error then the action
remains vulnerable. It will not be possible to say that although maintenance
of law and order were specified, what was considered was the problem of
maintenance of public order. The error is an error of a fundamental
character and unlike quoting a wrong notification. It is thus apparent why
one error in the order of detention is admitted but not the other, and why
with elaborate arguments it is attempted to establish that "public order"
involves elements more numerous than "law and order" where, in fact, the
truth is the other way.’
[13]
In the case on hand, the respondents (State) even in the regular
law and order mechanism have allowed the detenu to get default bail (obviously
owing to investigation/prosecution not filing final report within prescribed time
frame) but is making an endeavor to sustain the preventive detention order (to
be noted, this is not the point on which we are dislodging the impugned
preventive detention order but this obtaining position is set out in instant order
only for the limited purpose of completion of facts as well as for comprehensively
capturing the trajectory this matter has taken thus far).
[14]
Ergo, sequitur is, captioned writ petition is allowed. Impugned
preventive detention order dated 21.07.2025 bearing Reference No. Crl/NSA/No.
8 of 2025, made by R-1 (District Magistrate, Imphal West District), approval of
the same by State Government on 31.07.2025 followed by confirmation order
dated 22.08.2025 bearing Reference No. H-1401/16/2025-HD-HD are set aside
and the detenu, Shri Longjam Boy Singh @ Khaba aged about 35 years, S/o L.
L. Ibohal Singh of Yumnam Huidrom Thiyam Leishangkhong, PS Wangoi, Imphal
West District, now lodged in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa, is directed to be set at
liberty forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case/cases. There
shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGE
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sandeep
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