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signed by
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI
Date:
2026.08.25
10:29:09
+0530
CGHC010413662022
2026:CGHC:37804-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 2000 of 2022
Loknath Bandhe S/o Dayaram Bandhe Aged About 21 Years R/o
Village - Dotopar, Police Station - City Kotwali, Balodabazar, District
Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh
--- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, BalodabazarBhatapara, District - Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent
CRA No. 1825 of 2022
Jai Kishan Bandhe S/o Dayaram Bandhe Aged About 25 Years R/o
Dotopara,
Police
Station
City
Kotwali,
Balodabazar,
District
:
Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh
--- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station City Kotwali, Balodabazar,
District Balodabazar, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant in CRA
No.2000/2022
: Mr. Adil Minhaj, Advocate
For Appellant in CRA
No.1825/2022
: Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, Advocate
For Respondent/State
: Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Advocate General
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
24.08.2026
1.
Since both these criminal appeals arise out of the same judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.11.2022 passed by
the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar,
District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, in Sessions Trial No.10/2021,
they have been heard together and are being decided by this
common judgment.
2.
Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022 has been preferred by
appellant-Loknath Bandhe, whereas Criminal Appeal No.1825 of
2022 has been preferred by appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe. By the
impugned judgment, the learned trial Court convicted both the
appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to undergo
imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, with default
stipulation. The appellants were also convicted under the other
offences charged against them.
3.
According to the prosecution, on 16.07.2020 at about 8:00 p.m., a
quarrel took place at Azad Chowk, Dotopara, between the
deceased and the accused persons, during which abusive and
threatening language was exchanged. It was alleged that
thereafter Loknath brought a wooden plank (chaukki) and
assaulted Jayasurya, while Jai Kishan and other persons also
participated in the assault. On intervention by persons from the
locality, the assailants fled. Jayasurya was initially taken to
Balodabazar Hospital and was thereafter referred to Raipur, but
he succumbed to his injuries while being taken for further
treatment.
4.
On the basis of the information lodged by Kunti Bai, Crime
No.454/2020 was registered for offences under Sections 294,
324, 506 and 34 IPC, and Section 302 IPC was subsequently
added after the death of Jayasurya. During investigation, inquest
and post-mortem proceedings were conducted, the spot map was
prepared, the accused were arrested and their memorandum
statements were recorded, blood-stained soil and plain soil were
seized, and the clothes of the deceased and accused, along with
the wooden plank, were seized and sent for examination. The FIR
was proved by PW-15 Head Constable Bhim Kumar as Ex.P-3,
while the investigating officer PW-14 Vijay Choudhary proved the
spot map, memorandum, seizure and arrest proceedings,
including Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-6 to Ex.P-14, as well as the
subsequent medical and forensic correspondence.
5.
The prosecution principally relied upon the ocular evidence of
PW-3 Parasram, who stated that Loknath assaulted Jayasurya
several times with a wooden plank, causing him to fall and
sustain injuries. The prosecution also relied upon PW-4 Kunti Bai,
PW-5 Tokeshwar and PW-9 Lakshmi Bai, who deposed regarding
the disclosure made by Jayasurya concerning the assault, as well
as PW-1 Ghodghoti Jangde and PW-2 Vijay Kumar Tandon, who
supported the prosecution regarding the quarrel preceding the
assault. PW-6 Tularam Jangde deposed regarding the condition
of the deceased and his subsequent referral to Raipur. The
medical evidence consisted principally of the testimony of PW-12
Dr. M. Nirala, who conducted the post-mortem and proved Ex.P15, and PW-13 Dr. Shashi Kumar Jaiswal, who medically
examined Jayasurya and proved Ex.P-16.
6.
The post-mortem examination disclosed multiple ante-mortem
injuries, including lacerated and punctured wounds and fractures
of the sixth and seventh ribs. PW-12 opined that the injuries were
caused by hard, sharp and blunt objects and that death had
occurred due to excessive blood loss and shock resulting from
the injuries, thereby establishing the homicidal nature of death.
The prosecution further relied upon the seizure and examination
of the wooden plank and clothes, including the report marked
Ex.P-17 and the forensic report marked Ex.P-21. The accused, in
their statements under Section 313 CrPC, denied the allegations
and pleaded false implication, while the defence examined DW-1
Kartikram, whose evidence did not materially discredit the
prosecution case.
7.
Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence
available on record, the learned trial Court held that the
prosecution had succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt
and therefore, convicted the appellant for the offence punishable
under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and imposed the sentence as
recorded in the impugned judgment dated 03.11.2022.
8.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and
order of sentence, the appellants have preferred the present
criminal appeals before this Court, challenging the findings
recorded by the learned trial Court and seeking reversal of his
conviction and sentence.
9.
Mr. Adil Minhaj, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in
Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022, submits that the learned trial
Court has erred in appreciating the evidence available on record
in its proper perspective and has recorded the finding of
conviction
without
there
being
cogent,
reliable
and
unimpeachable evidence establishing the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that the prosecution
witnesses do not present a consistent and trustworthy account of
the occurrence and that there are material contradictions,
omissions and discrepancies in their respective statements.
Learned counsel further submits that the evidence of PW-3
Parasram, which has been treated as the principal ocular
evidence, does not inspire confidence to sustain the conviction,
particularly in view of the inconsistencies emerging from his
deposition and the statements of other witnesses. It is therefore
submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the
necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 302 read with
Section 34 IPC. It is further submitted that the medical and
seizure evidence, by itself, does not establish the involvement of
the appellant in the commission of the offence. The recovery of
the wooden plank and other articles has also not been proved in
a manner sufficient to connect the appellant with the fatal assault.
Learned counsel submits that the benefit of every reasonable
doubt must necessarily go to the appellant and, therefore, the
conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court
deserve to be set aside. In the alternative, it is submitted that,
even if the entire prosecution case is accepted, the ingredients
necessary for sustaining a conviction for murder are not
established and the case deserves appropriate alteration of
conviction. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal be allowed in
full and the appellant be acquitted, or, in the alternative, such
relief as may be permissible in law be granted. Reliance has been
placed upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ganesh Bhavan Patel and another v. State of
Maharashtra, (1978) 4 SCC 371, Anbazhagan v. State
Represented by the Inspector of Police, (2024) 20 SCC 500
and Tarun Sharma v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
2094 to buttress his submissions.
10.
Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022, submits that the
learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the material
contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the prosecution
evidence and has proceeded to convict the appellant primarily on
the basis of interested and related witnesses, whose testimony
does not receive sufficient corroboration from the other evidence
available on record. It is contended that the evidence concerning
the actual assault is not free from doubt and that the prosecution
has not been able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the
specific role attributed to the appellant in causing the fatal injuries
to deceased Jayasurya. Learned counsel further submits that the
circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, including the
seizure and medical evidence, do not conclusively connect the
appellant with the commission of the alleged offence. He further
submits that the appellant has been enlarged on bail by this Court
vide order dated 26.04.2023 and has remained on bail pursuant
thereto. It is contended that, considering the doubtful nature of
the prosecution evidence, the material discrepancies in the
testimonies of the witnesses and the absence of reliable evidence
establishing the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, he is
entitled to the benefit of doubt. Learned counsel therefore prays
that the present appeal be allowed, the impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellant
be acquitted of the charges levelled against him by extending to
him the benefit of doubt.
11.
Per contra, Mr. Sumit Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General
appearing for the State, opposes the submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the appellants and submits that the learned
trial Court, after considering the entire oral and documentary
evidence available on record, has recorded a well-reasoned
finding of conviction which does not warrant any interference by
this Court. It is contended that the evidence of PW-3 Parasram is
a direct account of the assault and is duly supported by the
evidence of other prosecution witnesses, the medical evidence
and the surrounding circumstances. Learned State counsel
submits that the minor discrepancies or variations pointed out by
the defence do not go to the root of the prosecution case and are
insufficient to discard otherwise reliable testimony. It is further
submitted that the homicidal death of Jayasurya stands
conclusively established by the evidence of PW-12 Dr. M. Nirala
and PW-13 Dr. Shashi Kumar Jaiswal, while the seizure of the
weapon and other articles, coupled with the investigation
conducted by PW-14 Vijay Choudhary and the FIR proved by
PW-15
Bhim
Kumar,
lends
further
corroboration
to
the
prosecution case. Learned State counsel submits that the
appellants acted in furtherance of their common intention and that
the prosecution has successfully established their participation in
the fatal assault beyond reasonable doubt. It is therefore prayed
that both the criminal appeals be dismissed and the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 03.11.2022 passed by the
learned trial Court be affirmed.
12.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused
the impugned judgment and carefully examined the entire
material available on record, including the oral testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, the documentary evidence, the medical
evidence and the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution.
13.
This Court shall first deal with Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022
preferred by appellant-Loknath Bandhe and thereafter Criminal
Appeal No.1825 of 2022 preferred by appellant-Jai Kishan
Bandhe.
Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022
14.
The principal question which arises for consideration in Criminal
Appeal No.2000 of 2022 is as to whether the prosecution has
been able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellantLoknath Bandhe was the person who inflicted the fatal injuries
upon deceased Jayasurya and, if so, whether the offence proved
against him would amount to murder punishable under Section
302 of the Indian Penal Code or would fall within any of the
exceptions to Section 300 IPC so as to attract Section 304 Part-I
IPC.
15.
Before examining the individual depositions, it is appropriate to
notice that the homicidal nature of death of Jayasurya stands
firmly established from the medical evidence. The post-mortem
examination was conducted by PW-12 Dr. M. Nirala. The external
examination disclosed several injuries on the body of the
deceased. The post-mortem report, marked as Ex.P-15, records,
inter alia, lacerated wounds and punctured wounds over different
parts of the body and fracture of the sixth and seventh ribs. The
internal examination also revealed corresponding injuries to the
chest and other internal organs. The doctor opined that injuries
Nos.2 to 6 were caused by a hard, sharp and pointed object,
whereas injury No.7 was caused by a hard and blunt object. The
duration of the injuries was within 24 hours and, in the opinion of
PW-12, death occurred on account of excessive blood loss and
shock resulting from the injuries. He further opined that the death
was homicidal in nature. The testimony of PW-12 remained
substantially unshaken in cross-examination.
16.
The medical evidence is further corroborated by PW-13 Dr.
Shashi Kumar Jaiswal, who examined Jayasurya shortly after the
occurrence. His examination disclosed multiple injuries, including
injuries over the forehead, left side of the chest, left thigh, left
hand and left elbow. He opined that the injuries could have been
caused by hard, sharp and pointed objects and that the injuries
were of recent duration. Ex.P-16 is the medical examination
report proved by him. The witness also stated that, having regard
to the condition of the injured, he was referred to a higher medical
centre. Thus, there is no serious controversy regarding the fact
that Jayasurya died an unnatural and homicidal death as a result
of injuries sustained during the occurrence. The medical evidence
establishes the nature and seriousness of the injuries, whereas
the real question is whether those injuries can safely be attributed
to appellant-Loknath and, further, what was the requisite intention
accompanying his act.
17.
Coming to the ocular evidence, PW-3 Parasram is the most
material witness so far as the actual assault is concerned. He
stated that on 16.07.2020 at about 8:15 p.m., he had come to
Azad Chowk, Dotopara, after taking food and went to the house
of his paternal aunt Lakshmi Bai. At that time, he noticed an
altercation between Jayasurya and appellant-Jai Kishan. He and
Ghodghoti attempted to intervene and pacify them. According to
him, when Jayasurya and the accused persons were proceeding
towards their respective houses, a further altercation took place
on the road. At that stage, Loknath, Dayaram, Chhotu, Shashi,
Hemant and others assaulted Jayasurya. PW-3 specifically
attributed the use of the wooden plank (chaukki) to appellantLoknath and stated that Loknath assaulted Jayasurya with the
said plank several times, as a result of which Jayasurya fell down
at the place of occurrence. He further stated that after the assault,
the deceased was lying there and subsequently died.
18.
The importance of PW-3's testimony lies in the fact that he is not
merely a witness to a circumstance occurring after the incident;
he claims to have been present at the place of occurrence and to
have actually seen the assault. His presence at the spot is also
supported by his own version regarding the earlier quarrel and
the intervention made by him and Ghodghoti. Significantly, even
in cross-examination, although certain omissions and variations
were brought out, his presence at the occurrence could not be
wholly dislodged. The trial Court also treated him as the principal
direct witness of the assault.
19.
At the same time, the evidence of PW-3 has to be scrutinised with
some care. His deposition does not attribute every injury found on
the deceased to Loknath. He has specifically attributed the
assault with the chaukki to Loknath, whereas the remaining
accused have been described collectively. The distinction
assumes significance while determining the individual liability of
each accused. The Court cannot mechanically convert a general
allegation of participation by several persons into an individual
finding
of
circumstances
common
establish
intention
unless
such
common
the
surrounding
intention
beyond
reasonable doubt.
20.
The evidence of PW-1 Ghodghoti Jangde and PW-2 Vijay Kumar
Tandon provides corroboration regarding the quarrel which
preceded the assault. PW-1 stated that there was an altercation
between Jayasurya and the accused persons and that he
attempted to pacify the parties. PW-2 also stated that he had
witnessed the earlier altercation and that the parties were abusing
each other. These witnesses therefore support the prosecution
regarding the genesis of the occurrence, though neither of them
furnishes the same degree of direct evidence concerning the fatal
assault as PW-3.
21.
The testimony of PW-4 Kunti Bai is also relevant. She stated that
she came to know that Jayasurya had been taken to hospital and,
upon reaching the hospital, enquired from him as to what had
happened. According to her, Jayasurya told her that he had gone
to Azad Chowk where a dispute arose with Jai Kishan and that,
thereafter, Dayaram and others assaulted him. She attributed the
assault to several persons, including Loknath and Jai Kishan. Her
evidence, therefore, is in the nature of a statement made by the
injured shortly before his death and is relevant to the extent
permissible in law.
22.
PW-9 Lakshmi Bai similarly stated that after learning about the
incident she went to the hospital along with her son and met
Jayasurya. On being asked as to who had assaulted him,
according
to
her,
Jayasurya
named
Loknath,
Dayaram,
Dayaram's son, Jai Kishan, Hemant, Chhotu and others and
stated that he had been assaulted with a chaukki. She also
noticed injuries on his body. Her testimony regarding the
statement made by the deceased substantially corroborates the
occurrence and, in particular, lends support to the presence and
involvement of Loknath.
23.
PW-5 Tokeshwar also deposed regarding the statement made by
Jayasurya after the occurrence. According to him, Jayasurya
stated that Dayaram had initially assaulted him and thereafter
Loknath came there; when his hands were caught, other persons,
including Loknath and Jai Kishan, assaulted him with the chaukki.
The testimony of PW-5, therefore, broadly corroborates the
prosecution case regarding the occurrence and the presence of
Loknath, although the precise role attributed to the different
persons is not identical in every account.
24.
PW-6 Tularam Jangde is material for another reason. He stated
that two or three days prior to the occurrence the health of
Jayasurya had deteriorated, and on the date of occurrence he
was at his house. He came to know that Jayasurya had been
assaulted and taken to hospital. He thereafter made enquiries
and learnt that Loknath and others had assaulted him with a
chaukki. His evidence is essentially corroborative regarding the
immediate aftermath and the information received concerning the
assault.
25.
PW-2 Vijay Kumar Tandon also stated that at the relevant time
Jayasurya was abusing persons present there, whereupon Jai
Kishan came out of his house and objected to the abuses. An
altercation followed, but after the intervention of Ghodghoti and
others, the parties initially separated. The witness further stated
that he thereafter went towards the pond and, on the next
morning, learnt that Jayasurya had been assaulted with a chaukki
and had died. This evidence is important because it demonstrates
that the occurrence had its genesis in a sudden verbal altercation
and that the assault was not preceded by any proved preparation
or pre-arranged plan.
26.
PW-1 also stated that after the parties were initially pacified, they
proceeded towards their respective houses and the later assault
occurred on the road. His cross-examination contains certain
admissions regarding the fact that the initial quarrel had subsided
and that the subsequent altercation took place when the parties
were returning home. The evidence thus suggests that the fatal
occurrence developed out of a quarrel at the spot rather than
pursuant to any established prior design.
27.
The prosecution evidence regarding the investigation is supplied
principally by PW-14 Vijay Choudhary, the investigating officer.
He proved the proceedings relating to the registration and
investigation of the offence, the spot map, arrest of the accused
persons, memoranda and seizures. The FIR was proved by PW15 Bhim Kumar as Ex.P-3. PW-14 stated that the memoranda of
Jai Kishan and Loknath were recorded as Ex.P-7 and Ex.P-8
respectively. Pursuant to the memorandum of Loknath, his
clothes and the chaukki were seized and seizure proceedings
were recorded as Ex.P-10. The investigating agency also
prepared the spot map Ex.P-4 and seized soil samples and other
articles.
28.
It is, however, necessary to appreciate the evidentiary value of
the recovery with due caution. The mere recovery of an article
pursuant to a memorandum does not, by itself, establish the
entire prosecution case. Its significance depends upon whether
the article is satisfactorily connected with the occurrence and
whether the other evidence establishes the role of the accused. In
the present case, the recovery of the chaukki lends some
corroborative value to the ocular version of PW-3 that a wooden
plank was used in the assault. Nevertheless, the conviction
cannot rest upon the recovery alone.
29.
PW-10 Deepak, a police constable, proved the seizure of the
clothes of the deceased and other articles under Ex.P-14. The
seized chaukki and clothes were thereafter sent for examination.
PW-14 proved the correspondence sent for chemical examination
and the report received from the State Forensic Science
Laboratory, Raipur, marked as Ex.P-21.
30.
The evidence of the forensic and seizure witnesses thus
constitutes
corroborative
evidence.
However,
the
decisive
evidence against Loknath remains the direct ocular testimony of
PW-3, supported by the surrounding evidence and the statements
attributed to the deceased by PW-4, PW-5 and PW-9. The fact
that the deceased had sustained multiple injuries and that he
subsequently succumbed to those injuries is conclusively
established by PW-12 and PW-13 and Ex.P-15 and Ex.P-16.
31.
The defence has argued that the witnesses are related or
interested witnesses and that their evidence ought not to be acted
upon. There is no quarrel with the proposition that the evidence of
a related witness requires careful scrutiny. At the same time,
relationship by itself is not a ground for discarding otherwise
reliable evidence. The trial Court also considered this aspect and
relied upon the settled principle that the testimony of a related
witness cannot be rejected merely on the ground of relationship.
32.
In the present case, PW-3 is not shown to have any compelling
reason to falsely implicate Loknath in a grave offence. More
importantly, his specific attribution of the chaukki assault to
Loknath finds support from the statements attributed to Jayasurya
by PW-4, PW-5 and PW-9. There are undoubtedly variations in
the precise sequence of assault and in the names of the persons
who participated. However, such variations are natural when a
sudden street altercation involving several persons is described
by different witnesses. What remains consistent is that Loknath
was present at the occurrence and that he used a wooden plank
in assaulting Jayasurya.
33.
The defence has also placed emphasis upon the fact that the
medical evidence refers to injuries caused by hard, sharp and
pointed objects in addition to a blunt object. This circumstance
does create some uncertainty as to the precise instrumentality of
every injury found on the deceased. But it does not, in the facts of
the present case, discredit the direct evidence that Loknath used
a wooden chaukki during the assault. Medical evidence is
ordinarily corroborative and cannot be used to discard credible
ocular testimony unless there is a fundamental and irreconcilable
inconsistency between the two. Here, the evidence of PW-12
establishes that at least one injury was attributable to a hard and
blunt object, which is consistent with the prosecution allegation of
an assault by a wooden plank.
34.
The next and more important question is the nature of the offence
attributable to Loknath. The prosecution case itself discloses that
the occurrence originated in a quarrel. There is no evidence of
any prior conspiracy, preparation or premeditated plan on the part
of Loknath to kill Jayasurya. The witnesses speak of abuses and
a sudden altercation. Even PW-3's account indicates that the
parties initially intervened and attempted to pacify the dispute and
that the subsequent assault occurred in the course of the ensuing
altercation.
35.
The fact that Loknath brought a chaukki from his house and
assaulted Jayasurya is certainly a serious circumstance. The use
of a wooden plank, particularly against the body of another
person, is an act which is likely to cause serious bodily injury.
Thus, this Court is unable to accept the submission that Loknath
had no knowledge whatsoever of the consequences of his act. At
the same time, the material on record does not establish beyond
reasonable
doubt
that
the
assault
was
actuated
premeditated intention to cause the death of Jayasurya.
by
a
36.
Section 300 IPC itself recognises circumstances in which
culpable homicide would not amount to murder. Exception 4
applies where death is caused without premeditation, in a sudden
fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and without
the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised
that the question is not merely whether a quarrel took place, but
whether the occurrence as a whole satisfies the requirements of
the exception.
37.
In K. Ravi Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 14 SCC 588,
the Supreme Court explained that the essential requirements of
Exception 4 are a sudden fight, absence of premeditation, the act
having been committed in the heat of passion, and absence of
undue advantage or cruel or unusual conduct. The Court also
reiterated that the cause of the quarrel and who offered the first
provocation are not decisive factors and that the number of
injuries is not by itself determinative.
38.
Likewise, in Muthu v. State, Criminal Appeal No.204 of 2024,
decided on 10.07.2024, the Supreme Court examined the plea of
conversion from Section 302 IPC in the context of a sudden fight
and absence of established intention to kill. The Court reiterated
that the question whether the case falls within an exception to
Section 300 depends upon the facts and circumstances
established on record.
39.
In the present case, however, having regard to the weapon used,
the manner of assault spoken to by PW-3, the multiple injuries
found on the deceased, including injuries on the chest region, and
the circumstances in which the assault was committed, this Court
is of the considered view that Loknath can safely be attributed the
intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause
death. At the same time, the evidence does not establish the
requisite intention to cause death so as to bring the case within
the main clause of Section 300 IPC.
40.
The distinction between Section 304 Part-I and Part-II is therefore
material. Part-I applies where the act is done with the intention of
causing death or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, whereas Part-II applies where there is knowledge that the
act is likely to cause death but no such intention. On the facts
established here, the deliberate use of the wooden plank against
the deceased and the repeated blows attributed to Loknath
demonstrate more than mere knowledge. His conduct reflects an
intention to cause bodily injury of a nature likely to cause death.
Consequently, the appropriate conviction is under Section 304
Part-I IPC.
41.
This conclusion is also consistent with the approach adopted by
the Supreme Court in cases where a sudden quarrel culminates
in a fatal assault but the evidence does not establish
premeditated intention to kill. An occurrence arising from a
sudden quarrel and heat of passion may attract Exception 4 and
yet, depending upon the nature of the injury and the mental
element proved, the appropriate offence may be Section 304
Part-I rather than Part-II.
42.
It is also relevant that the Supreme Court has in appropriate
cases modified a conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 and
imposed a sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment where
the
factual
circumstances
demonstrated
absence
of
premeditation but established culpability under the lesser
provision. In the present case, the deceased had been subjected
to a sudden assault arising from a quarrel. There is no evidence
of prior preparation to kill him. The accused persons did not carry
any deadly weapon with them as part of a pre-arranged plan. The
wooden plank was brought during the quarrel. The incident
occurred in the course of an altercation and the assailants
thereafter fled when persons from the locality intervened. These
circumstances materially distinguish the case from a calculated or
premeditated murder. The conduct of Loknath, nevertheless,
cannot be completely exonerated merely because the occurrence
arose from a quarrel. He voluntarily participated in the assault
and, according to the direct testimony of PW-3, repeatedly used
the wooden plank against Jayasurya. The medical evidence
demonstrates that the assault resulted in serious bodily injuries,
including rib fractures and internal injuries, ultimately causing
death. Therefore, the case squarely falls within culpable homicide
not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part-I
IPC.
43.
So far as the conviction under Section 201 IPC is concerned, the
material available on record does not disclose a separate and
satisfactory foundation for sustaining the conviction of Loknath
under Section 201 IPC independent of the main occurrence. The
prosecution has relied substantially upon the seizure and
subsequent forensic examination of the articles. There is,
however, no clear evidence establishing that Loknath caused
disappearance of evidence or gave false information with the
requisite knowledge or intention contemplated by Section 201
IPC. Accordingly, the conviction under Section 201 IPC also
cannot be sustained merely as a consequence of the conviction
for the substantive offence.
44.
The conviction of appellant-Loknath Bandhe under Section 302
IPC is, therefore, liable to be altered to one under Section 304
Part-I IPC. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, the
nature of weapon used, the manner of assault, the sudden
genesis of the occurrence, absence of proved premeditation, the
age of the appellant at the relevant time and the period already
undergone, this Court considers that a sentence of ten years'
rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice.
45.
It is stated before this Court that appellant-Loknath Bandhe has
remained in custody since 17.07.2022. He is directed to serve out
the sentence as modified above.
46.
Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022 deserves to be
partly allowed. The conviction of appellant-Loknath Bandhe
under Section 302 IPC is altered to conviction under Section 304
Part-I IPC and he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for ten years. The conviction and sentence under Section 201
IPC are set aside. The fine, if any, imposed under the altered
conviction shall stand modified accordingly.
Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022
47.
We shall now consider Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022
preferred by appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe. The evidence against
Jai
Kishan
requires
separate
consideration
because
the
prosecution evidence which directly attributes the use of the
chaukki to Loknath does not attribute the same specific act to Jai
Kishan.
48.
The prosecution case regarding Jai Kishan primarily rests upon
the allegation that he was present during the quarrel and
participated in the subsequent assault along with several other
persons. The trial Court inferred common intention from the
collective conduct of the accused persons. However, in an appeal
against conviction, the Court is required to examine whether such
inference is firmly founded upon proved circumstances and
whether the evidence establishes the participation of the
particular accused beyond reasonable doubt.
49.
PW-3 Parasram is the most important witness for the actual
occurrence. His evidence specifically attributes the assault with
the chaukki to Loknath. So far as Jai Kishan is concerned, PW-3
states that an initial quarrel had taken place between Jai Kishan
and Jayasurya. He further stated that thereafter several persons
joined the altercation. However, the specific fatal assault with the
chaukki is attributed to Loknath. Thus, while PW-3 establishes Jai
Kishan's presence during the earlier quarrel, his evidence does
not furnish the same degree of certainty regarding Jai Kishan's
participation in the fatal injuries.
50.
This distinction becomes more significant when the evidence of
PW-4 Kunti Bai is examined. According to PW-4, when she met
Jayasurya at the hospital, he disclosed that the dispute had
initially taken place with Jai Kishan but that thereafter Dayaram
and several other persons had assaulted him. Although Jai
Kishan is included in the list of persons named by the deceased,
the statement does not consistently specify what particular act
was committed by Jai Kishan or which injury was caused by him.
51.
PW-5 Tokeshwar also gives a somewhat different account.
According to him, Dayaram initially assaulted Jayasurya,
thereafter Loknath came, and subsequently other persons
participated in the assault. The precise role attributed to Jai
Kishan is not consistent with the specific role attributed to
Loknath by PW-3. PW-9 Lakshmi Bai states that Jayasurya
named Loknath, Dayaram, Dayaram's son, Jai Kishan and others
as persons who had assaulted him. Again, there is no specific
attribution of any particular weapon or injury to Jai Kishan. The
statement is therefore omnibus in nature so far as Jai Kishan's
individual role is concerned.
52.
The medical evidence also does not assist the prosecution in
establishing the specific role of Jai Kishan. PW-12 Dr. M. Nirala
establishes the homicidal nature of death but does not identify the
person who caused the individual injuries. PW-13 Dr. Shashi
Kumar Jaiswal similarly proves the injuries suffered by Jayasurya
but does not connect any particular injury to Jai Kishan. The
recovery evidence is likewise insufficient to connect Jai Kishan
with the fatal assault. PW-14, the investigating officer, states that
memoranda of both accused were recorded as Ex.P-7 and Ex.P8, but the recovery of the chaukki relied upon by the prosecution
is connected with the memorandum of Loknath and the seizure
proceedings recorded as Ex.P-10. There is no corresponding
recovery of the weapon of assault from Jai Kishan which could
furnish independent corroboration of his participation in the fatal
assault. PW-7 Santosh Dohariya and PW-8 Bhavesh Kumar
Dhruv were examined regarding the memorandum and seizure
proceedings. Their evidence does not provide any direct account
of Jai Kishan causing injury to Jayasurya. Indeed, PW-7 stated
that he had not heard any statement of the accused persons
against them and did not support the prosecution regarding any
incriminating
disclosure.
PW-8
similarly
did
not
provide
substantive evidence connecting Jai Kishan with the fatal assault.
53.
The trial Court placed considerable reliance upon Section 34 IPC
and held that both accused shared a common intention. However,
common intention cannot be presumed merely because two
persons were present at the place of occurrence or because they
had earlier quarrelled with the deceased. Common intention may
certainly develop at the spot, and the prosecution is not required
to
prove
a
formal
prior
agreement;
circumstances
must
establish
a
nevertheless,
meeting
of
minds
the
and
participation in furtherance of the common intention beyond
reasonable doubt.
54.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Section 34 IPC
embodies the principle of constructive liability and that the
common intention may be inferred from the conduct and
circumstances of the case. At the same time, the inference must
arise from proved facts and cannot be based on conjecture. The
Court has also recognised that the absence of an overt act is not
by itself decisive where common intention is otherwise clearly
established. The present case, however, stands on a different
footing because the evidence itself is inconsistent regarding Jai
Kishan's precise participation and does not satisfactorily establish
that he shared the intention of Loknath to cause the fatal injuries.
55.
The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, in fact, shows that the first
phase of the occurrence was a quarrel between Jayasurya and
Jai Kishan. PW-2 stated that Jai Kishan came out of his house
after Jayasurya was abusing persons in the vicinity and objected
to the abuses. PW-1 similarly speaks about an initial altercation.
The parties were thereafter pacified. It was subsequently, on the
road, that the more serious assault occurred. This sequence
makes it unsafe to infer that Jai Kishan necessarily shared the
intention that later developed in the mind of Loknath when he
used the chaukki.
56.
The distinction between presence and participation assumes
importance in criminal jurisprudence. Mere presence at the
scene, previous quarrel with the deceased, or even participation
in an earlier verbal altercation cannot, without more, establish that
the accused shared the common intention to cause the fatal
injuries. The prosecution must prove the nexus between the
accused and the act constituting the offence.
57.
There are also material variations in the statements attributed to
the deceased. One account refers to Dayaram as the initial
assailant and thereafter to Loknath and others; another names
several persons collectively; another attributes the specific use of
the chaukki to the group. Such variations may not be fatal to the
prosecution case as a whole, particularly against Loknath whose
specific role is independently established by PW-3. But when the
Court is required to determine the individual guilt of Jai Kishan,
these inconsistencies assume significance because there is no
independent evidence identifying the precise act committed by
him.
58.
The principle that an accused is entitled to benefit of doubt does
not mean that every minor discrepancy must result in acquittal. At
the same time, where the evidence leaves a reasonable doubt
regarding the participation of a particular accused in the fatal act,
the doubt must operate in his favour. The prosecution is required
to establish the guilt of each accused independently and not
merely through the collective character of the occurrence.
59.
In this regard, the Supreme Court has cautioned that while an
appellate Court should not interfere with a finding of conviction
merely because another view is possible, where the evidence
suffers from material uncertainty regarding the individual role of
an accused, the criminal standard of proof must be maintained.
The prosecution cannot bridge such a gap by resorting to
assumptions regarding common intention.
60.
In the present case, the following circumstances create a
reasonable doubt regarding the participation of Jai Kishan in the
fatal assault:
(i) PW-3, the principal eyewitness, specifically attributes the
assault with the chaukki to Loknath and does not attribute
any specific fatal blow to Jai Kishan;
(ii) the statements attributed to Jayasurya by PW-4, PW-5
and PW-9 are not consistent regarding the sequence and
individual roles of the assailants;
(iii) there is no specific medical evidence connecting any
particular injury to Jai Kishan;
(iv) there is no weapon recovery from Jai Kishan connecting
him with the fatal assault;
(v) the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 establishes an earlier
quarrel between Jai Kishan and Jayasurya, but does not
establish that Jai Kishan thereafter shared the intention of
Loknath when the fatal assault occurred; and
(vi) the subsequent collective allegations against several
persons are omnibus in character and do not satisfactorily
establish the individual participation of Jai Kishan beyond
reasonable doubt.
61.
It is true that the deceased, as narrated by PW-4 and PW-9,
named Jai Kishan among the persons who assaulted him. But
such a statement, particularly when considered along with the
inconsistent accounts regarding the individual roles and in the
absence of independent corroboration, cannot safely be treated
as sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder with the aid of
Section 34 IPC. The Court is conscious that a dying declaration
can form the sole basis of conviction if found wholly reliable;
however, before acting upon an oral dying declaration, particularly
one transmitted through witnesses, the Court must be satisfied
regarding its consistency, voluntariness and reliability.
62.
Here, the oral statements attributed to Jayasurya are not uniform
regarding the sequence of assault or the particular role played by
each accused. They are broadly consistent about the fact of
assault, but that is insufficient to establish the individual
culpability of Jai Kishan for the fatal assault when the prosecution
seeks to impose constructive liability under Section 34 IPC. The
recovery evidence also does not cure this deficiency. As noted
above, the chaukki recovery is associated with Loknath. The
prosecution has not brought on record any equally strong
circumstance connecting Jai Kishan with the weapon or the fatal
injuries. The forensic material may corroborate the occurrence,
but it does not establish the individual participation of Jai Kishan
in the absence of a clear foundational fact.
63.
It is also significant that the prosecution case does not disclose
any prior preparation by Jai Kishan to cause the death of
Jayasurya. His initial confrontation with Jayasurya was a verbal
altercation arising at the spot. The parties were intervened upon
and separated. Thereafter the fatal assault occurred. In such
circumstances, the possibility that Jai Kishan was involved in the
initial quarrel but did not share the subsequent intention to cause
the fatal injuries cannot be ruled out. The benefit of doubt is
therefore not being extended to Jai Kishan on the basis of a
minor discrepancy or an isolated omission. Rather, the doubt
arises from the cumulative effect of the inconsistencies
concerning his individual role, absence of a specific attribution by
the principal eyewitness, absence of recovery connecting him
with the weapon, and lack of reliable independent evidence
demonstrating that he shared the common intention to cause the
fatal injuries.
64.
Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that the
prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe for the offence punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC or for the other
offences in respect of which conviction has been recorded on the
basis of the same evidence. The Supreme Court's recent
jurisprudence also emphasises that constructive liability under
Section 34 IPC cannot be applied in a mechanical manner and
that the foundational facts from which common intention is
inferred must themselves be proved. In cases where the evidence
leaves a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused shared the
common intention or participated in the act constituting the
substantive offence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of that
doubt.
65.
Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022 preferred by
appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe deserves to be allowed. The
conviction and sentence imposed upon him by the learned
Second
Additional
Sessions
Judge,
Balodabazar,
District
Balodabazar-Bhatapara, in Sessions Trial No.10/2021 vide
judgment dated 03.11.2022 are hereby set aside. The appellantJai Kishan Bandhe is acquitted of the charges levelled against
him by extending the benefit of doubt. The appellant-Jai Kishan
Bandhe is stated to be on bail, his bail bonds and sureties stand
discharged.
66.
In the result :(i) Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022 – Loknath Bandhe:
The appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of appellantLoknath Bandhe under Section 302 IPC is altered to one
under Section 304 Part-I IPC. He is sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years. The
conviction under Section 201 IPC is set aside. The
appellant is stated to be in custody since 17.07.2022, he is
directed to serve out the sentence as modified above.
67.
Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along
with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned
forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send
a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail
where the appellant-Loknath Bandhe is undergoing his jail
sentence to serve the same on the appellant-Loknath Bandhe
informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment
passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, if so advised, with assistance of High Court Legal
Services Committee or Supreme Court Legal Service Committee.
(ii) Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022 – Jai Kishan
Bandhe: The appeal is allowed. The conviction and
sentence recorded against appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe by
the learned trial Court vide judgment dated 03.11.2022 in
Sessions Trial No.10/2021 are set aside. He is acquitted of
the charges by extending to him the benefit of doubt.
68.
Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Now Section 481 of the Bhartiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe
is directed forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form
No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of
Rs.25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the
Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months
along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special
Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave,
the aforesaid appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe on receipt of notice
thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
69.
Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted
to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and
compliance.
70.
After passing of the judgment, Mr. N.K. Malviya, learned counsel
appearing for the Objector, appeared before the Court and
submitted that his appearance may kindly be taken on record and
his presence may be marked in the proceedings. Accordingly, the
appearance of Mr. N.K. Malviya, learned counsel for the Objector,
is hereby recorded and his presence is marked.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Anu
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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