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CGHC010391102025
2026:CGHC:31397-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 2840 of 2025
1 - Lokesh Sagar S/o Shri Anil Sagar Aged About 29 Years R/o Village
Kandel, P.S. Arjuni, Dhamtari, District- Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh
2 - Vivek Manjhi S/o Narottam Lal Manjhi Aged About 25 Years R/o Patsendri
P.S. Saraipali, District - Mahasamund (C.G.) Currently R/o At Behind Mata
Garage Gandhi Nagar, Pandri P.S. Civil Line, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioners
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Civil
Lines, District -Raipur (C.G.)
... Respondent
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners
:
Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, Advocate
For Respondent/State
:
Mr. Soumya Rai, Deputy Govt. Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
23/07/2026
1.
VED
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Digitally signed
by VED
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Date: 2026.07.27
17:37:56 +0530
Heard Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, learned counsel for the petitioners
as well as Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Deputy Govt. Advocate for the
respondent/State.
2.
By way of the present petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the petitioners have called in
question the legality and validity of FIR bearing Crime No. 71/2025
registered at Police Station Civil Lines, District Raipur, for the offences
punishable under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the Cigarettes and Other
Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation
of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution)
Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred as ‘COTPA Act, 2003’), the
consequential charge-sheet (Challan No. 31/2025 for the offence
under Section 4A and 21A of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco
Products (Prohibition of Advertising and Regulation of Trade and
Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) (Chhattisgarh
Amendment) Act, 2021, Act No. 1 of 2023 w.e.f. 10.02.2023
(hereinafter referred as ‘COTPA Amendment Act, 2021’), the order
dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Raipur taking cognizance, and all consequential criminal proceedings
of Criminal Case No. 1986 of 2025 pending before the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Raipur.
3.
The present petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 has been filed by the petitioners with the following
prayer:
“(1) That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to quash and set-aside the impugned
FIR
dated
10.02.2025,
registered
against
petitioners bearing Crime No. 71 of 2025
(impugned FIR is part of impugned Final Report,
bearing Challan No. 31 of 2025, certified copy
filed as Annexure P/1), registered at Police
Station Civil Lines, District Raipur, for the
offences punishable under Sections 4A and 21A
of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products
(Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of
Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and
Distribution) Act, 2003.
(2) That this Hon’ble Court may further kindly be
pleased to quash and set-aside the impugned
Final Report, bearing Challan No. 31 of 2025
dated 24.02.2025 (Annexure P/1), filed against
the petitioners, before Learned CJM, Raipur,
arising out of the impugned FIR No. 71/2025, for
the offence punishable under Sections 4A and
21A of the Act, 2003.
(3) That this Hon’ble Court may further kindly be
pleased to quash and set-aside the impugned
order dated 25.02.2025 (order date wrongly
mentioned as 25.01.2025 in the impugned order)
vide which the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Raipur, has taken cognizance of the offences
punishable under Section 4A and 21A of the Act,
2003, against the petitioners, and also directed
for the registration of case before Court. This
Hon’ble Court may further kindly be pleased to
quash/set aside the sequential proceedings
(order sheets), if any, passed in the Criminal
Case No. 1986 of 2025.
(4) This Hon’ble Court be further pleased to pass
such other orders as it may deem fit under the
facts and circumstances of the case, in favour of
the petitioners against the respondent.”
4.
The facts, in brief, are that on the basis of a secret information received
by Police Station Civil Lines, Raipur, a raid was conducted on
09.02.2025 at the Blinkit Dark Store situated near Katora Talab, Raipur,
where certain hookah-related materials, including hookah pipes,
papers and flavours, valued at ₹45,755/-, were seized. At the relevant
time, petitioner No.1 was working as the Branch Manager and
petitioner No.2 as a Delivery Boy in the said establishment. On the
allegation that the seized articles were being illegally stored and
supplied, FIR bearing Crime No.71/2025 was registered against the
petitioners on 10.02.2025 for the offences punishable under Sections 4
and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003. Upon completion of investigation,
the police filed charge-sheet (Challan No. 31/2025 for the offence
under Section 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021),
whereupon the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, by order
dated 25.02.2025, took cognizance of the aforesaid offences.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have preferred the present petition
seeking quashment of the FIR, charge-sheet, the order taking
cognizance and all consequential criminal proceedings.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are
merely employees of Blinkit Company, petitioner No.1 being the
Branch Manager and petitioner No.2 being a Delivery Boy, and had no
ownership, control or knowledge regarding the hookah-related articles
seized from the dark store. It is contended that the seized articles were
only stored in packed condition for logistics and delivery purposes and
that the petitioners were neither operating nor running any hookah bar.
Referring to Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021,
learned counsel submits that the said provisions prohibit the opening
or running of a hookah bar and do not criminalize the mere storage or
delivery of hookah-related materials. It is further argued that even if the
allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during
investigation are accepted in their entirety, no offence under the
aforesaid provisions is made out against the petitioners. It is, therefore,
submitted that continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount
to an abuse of the process of law, warranting exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for quashing the impugned FIR, chargesheet, order taking cognizance and all consequential proceedings.
6.
Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits
that the FIR was registered on the basis of credible information
regarding illegal storage and supply of hookah-related materials from
the Blinkit dark store. It is contended that during the raid, hookahrelated articles were seized from the premises where petitioner No.1
was working as the Branch Manager and petitioner No.2 as the
Delivery Boy, and since the petitioners failed to produce any valid
documents authorizing the storage of such articles, a prima facie case
for the offences punishable under Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA
Amendment Act, 2021 was found to be made out. It is further
submitted that, after due investigation, charge-sheet has already been
filed and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has taken cognizance of
the offences. According to the learned State counsel, the allegations
disclose the commission of cognizable offences and the issues raised
by the petitioners involve disputed questions of fact which are matters
of trial. It is, therefore, submitted that no case is made out for exercise
of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the petition deserves
to be dismissed.
7.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their
rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the
records with utmost circumspection.
8.
Considering the facts of the present case, the question arises here as
to whether the allegations contained in the FIR and the material
collected during investigation, even if accepted in their entirety,
constitute the offences punishable under Sections 4A and 21A of the
COTPA Amendment Act, 2021. It is necessary here to take notice of
relevant provisions of Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment
Act, 2021, which reads as under:Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment
Act, 2021)
4A. Prohibition of hookah bar –Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, no person shall, either
on his own or on behalf of any other person, open or
run any hookah bar or serve hookah to customers in
any place including the eating house.
Explanation.–The term “eating house” means any
place where food or refreshment of any kind are
provided for visitors, and sold for consumption.
21A. Punishment for running hookah bar.––
Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 4A
shall be punishable with imprisonment which may
extend to three years but which shall not be less that
one year and with fine which may extend to fifty
thousand rupees but which shall not be less than ten
thousand rupees.
9.
The allegations against the petitioners are not in dispute. The
prosecution case itself is that the petitioners were working as Branch
Manager and Delivery Boy, respectively, in the Blinkit dark store from
where hookah-related articles were seized. There is no allegation in
the FIR, seizure memo or charge-sheet that the petitioners had
opened, established, managed or were running any hookah bar, or
that the premises in question was being used for serving hookah for
consumption by customers. Rather, the allegations merely indicate that
hookah-related materials were found stored in the dark store of Blinkit.
10.
Section 4A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021 specifically prohibits
any person from opening or running a hookah bar in any place
including an eating house. Section 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act,
2021 merely prescribes the punishment for contravention of Section 4A
of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021. Thus, the essential ingredient of
the offence is the opening or running of a hookah bar. Mere
possession, storage or transportation of hookah-related accessories, in
the absence of any allegation that the accused was operating or
facilitating a hookah bar, does not satisfy the ingredients of the offence.
The prosecution has not placed any material to show that hookah was
being served or consumed at the premises or that the petitioners were
operating any hookah bar. Consequently, even if the entire prosecution
case is accepted as true, the ingredients of Sections 4A and 21A of the
COTPA Amendment Act, 2021 are conspicuously absent.
11.
In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, the Supreme
Court held that inherent powers can be exercised where the
allegations in the complaint or FIR, even if accepted in their entirety, do
not constitute the offence alleged. The said principle continues to
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. In
para 6 of the judgement, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under:“6. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it
is necessary to consider the nature and scope
of the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 561-A of the Code. The said section
saves the inherent power of the High Court to
make such orders as may be necessary to give
effect to any order under this Code or to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt
that this inherent power cannot be exercised in
regard to matters specifically covered by the
other provisions of the Code. In the present
case the Magistrate before whom the police
report has been filed under Section 173 of the
Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits
of the said report and it may be assumed in
favour of the appellant that his request for the
quashing of the proceedings is not at the
present stage covered by any specific provision
of the Code. It is well-established that the
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be
exercised to quash proceedings in a proper
case either to prevent the abuse of the process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted
against an accused person must be tried under
the provisions of the Code, and the High Court
would be reluctant to interfere with the said
proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not
possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise
of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may
indicate some categories of cases where the
inherent
jurisdiction
can
and
should
be
exercised for quashing the proceedings. There
may be cases where it may be possible for the
High Court to take the view that the institution or
continuance of criminal proceedings against an
accused person may amount to the abuse of the
process of the Court or that the quashing of the
impugned proceedings would secure the ends
of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question
is in respect of an offence alleged to have been
committed by an accused person and it
manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance of the said
proceeding the High Court would be justified in
quashing the proceeding on that ground.
Absence of the requisite sanction may, for
instance, furnish cases under this category.
Cases may also arise where the allegations in
the first information report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the
offence alleged; in such cases no question of
appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter
merely of looking at the complaint or the first
information report to decide whether the offence
alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it
would be legitimate for the High Court to hold
that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the
process of the criminal court to be issued
against the accused person. A third category of
cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court can be successfully invoked may
also arise. In cases falling under this category
the allegations made against the accused
person do constitute offence alleged but there is
either no legal evidence adduced in support of
the case or evidence adduced clearly or
manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing
with this class of cases it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there
is no legal evidence or where there is evidence
which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with
the accusation made and cases where there is
legal evidence which on its appreciation may or
may not support the accusation in question. In
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A
the High Court would not embark upon an
enquiry as to whether the evidence in question
is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial
Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open
to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent
jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable
appreciation of the evidence the accusation
made against the accused would not be
sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and
scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High
Court under section 561-A in the matter of
quashing criminal proceedings and that is the
effect of the judicial decisions on the point
(vide : In Re : Shripad G. Chandavarkar, Jagat
Chandra
Mozumdar
V.
Queen
empress,
Shanker singh (Dr) V. State of punjab, Nripendra
Bhusan Ray V. Gobind bandhu Majumdar and
Ramanathan
Chettiyar
v.
K.
Sivarama
Subrahmanya Ayyar)”
12.
The scope of interference by the High Court while exercising its
inherent jurisdiction is no longer res integra. In State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
illustratively held that criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed
where the allegations made in the FIR, even if taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or where the uncontroverted allegations and the material collected fail
to disclose the commission of any offence. The present case squarely
falls within the said categories.
13.
In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC
749, the Supreme Court observed that summoning an accused in a
criminal case is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be permitted
to be set into motion as a matter of course. Courts are duty-bound to
ensure that the allegations disclose the commission of an offence
before permitting criminal prosecution to continue.
14.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Sharma
and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2016 (9) SCC 1,
has held that:-
“35. While discussing the scope and ambit of
Section 482 of the Code, a similar view has
been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in
Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein it
was held as under: (SCC pp. 347-49, paras 2930)
29. The issue being examined in the
instant case is the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it
chooses to quash the initiation of the
prosecution against an accused at the
stage of issuing process, or at the stage
of committal, or even at the stage of
framing of charges. These are all stages
before the commencement of the actual
trial.
The
same
parameters
would
naturally be available for later stages as
well. The power vested in the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages
referred to hereinabove, would have farreaching consequences inasmuch as it
would
negate
the
prosecution's/
complainant's case without allowing the
prosecution/
complainant
to
lead
evidence. Such a determination must
always be rendered with caution, care
and circumspection. To invoke its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the
High Court has to be fully satisfied that
the material produced by the accused is
such that would lead to the conclusion
that his/their defence is based on sound,
reasonable, and indubitable facts; the
material produced is such as would rule
out and displace the assertions contained
in the charges levelled against the
accused; and the material produced is
such as would clearly reject and overrule
the veracity of the allegations contained in
the
accusations
levelled
by
the
prosecution/complainant. It should be
sufficient to rule out, reject and discard
the
accusations
prosecution/
levelled
complainant,
by
the
without
the
necessity of recording any evidence. For
this the material relied upon by the
defence should not have been refuted, or
alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted,
being material of sterling and impeccable
quality. The material relied upon by the
accused
should
be
such
as
would
persuade a reasonable person to dismiss
and condemn the actual basis of the
accusations as false. In such a situation,
the judicial conscience of the High Court
would persuade it to exercise its power
under Section 482 CrPC to quash such
criminal
proceedings,
for
that
would
prevent abuse of process of the court,
and secure the ends of justice.
30. Based on the factors canvassed in the
foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate
the following steps to determine the
veracity of a prayer for quashment raised
by an accused by invoking the power
vested in the High Court under Section
482 CrPC:
30.1. Step one: whether the material
relied upon by the accused is sound,
reasonable,
and
indubitable
i.e.
the
material is of sterling and impeccable
quality?
30.2. Step two whether the material relied
upon by the accused would rule out the
assertions
contained
in
the
charges
levelled against the accused i.e. the
material is sufficient to reject and overrule
the factual assertions contained in the
complaint i.e. the material is such as
would persuade a reasonable person to
dismiss and condemn the factual basis of
the accusations as false?
30.3. Step three: whether the material
relied upon by the accused has not been
refuted by the prosecution/complainant;
and/or the material is such that it cannot
be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/
complainant?
30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with
the trial would result in an abuse of
process of the court, and would not serve
the ends of justice?
30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the
affirmative, the judicial conscience of the
High Court should persuade it to quash
such criminal proceedings in exercise of
power vested in it under Section 482
CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides
doing justice to the accused, would save
precious
court
time,
which
would
otherwise be wasted in holding such a
trial (as well as proceedings arising
therefrom) specially when it is clear that
the same would not conclude in the
conviction of the accused."
15.
Likewise, in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, while cautioning that the power of
quashing should be exercised sparingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
simultaneously reiterated that where the allegations in the FIR do not
disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, or where the
essential ingredients of the alleged offence are absent, the High Court
would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse
of the process of law. It has been held that :"13. The power of quashing criminal proceedings
has to be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases and the court cannot be justified in
embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in
the FIR/complaint, unless the allegations are so
patently absurd and inherently improbable so that
no prudent person can ever reach such a
conclusion.
The
extraordinary
and
inherent
powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary
jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its
whims or caprice. However, the Court, under its
inherent powers, can neither intervene at an
uncalled for stage nor can it "soft-pedal the
course
of
justice"
at
investigation/proceedings.
a
crucial
The
stage
of
provisions
of
Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution of India and
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter called as "CrPC") are a device
to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The
power of judicial review is discretionary, however,
it must be exercised to prevent the miscarriage of
justice and for correcting some grave errors and
to ensure that stream of administration of justice
remains clean and pure. However, there are no
limits of power of the Court, but the more the
power, the more due care and caution is to be
exercised in invoking these powers. (Vide State of
W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.
Special Judicial Magistrate, G. Sagar Suri v. State
of U.P.31 and Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. 32)”
16.
Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present
case, this Court finds that the allegations in the FIR and the material
collected during investigation merely disclose recovery of hookahrelated articles from a Blinkit dark store where the petitioners were
admittedly employees. There is no allegation or material suggesting
that the petitioners had opened or were running a hookah bar or that
the premises was being used for serving hookah to customers.
Therefore, the foundational ingredients required for attracting Sections
4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021 are wholly absent.
Continuation of the criminal proceedings in such circumstances would
amount to permitting prosecution despite the absence of the basic
ingredients of the alleged offence, which would constitute an abuse of
the process of the Court.
17.
Accordingly, the present petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed.
The FIR bearing Crime No.71/2025 registered at Police Station Civil
Lines, District Raipur, for the offences punishable under Sections 4 and
21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003, the consequential charge-sheet
(Challan No. 31/2025 for the offence under Section 4A and 21A of the
COTPA Amendment Act, 2021), the order dated 25.02.2025 passed by
the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur taking cognizance
thereof, and all consequential criminal proceedings of Criminal Case
No. 1986 of 2025 pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Raipur are hereby quashed.
18.
No order as to costs.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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