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Page No.# 1/13
GAHC010213452025
2026:GAU-AS:3030
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/5645/2025
LNK 221 KHIRUD BHUYAN
1ST A.P. BATTALION, LIGIRIPUKHURI, NAZIRA, S/O LATE NILAMONI
BHUYAN, R/O MORANJAN, P.O. MORAN JAN, P.S. MORANHAT, DISTRICT SIVASAGAR (ASSAM
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND OTHRS
REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT.
OF ASSAM, HOME DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI6, DISTRICTKAMRUP
2:THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
ULUBARI
GUWAHATI-07
3:THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
JORHAT ASSAM
4:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
CHARAIDEO
SONARI
DIST- SIVASAGAR
ASSAM
5:THE COMMANDANT
OF 1ST ASSAM POLICE BATTALLION
LIGIRIPUKHURI
NAZIRA
SIVASAGAR
ASSAM
Page No.# 2/13
6:THE OFFICER IN CHARGE
KAKATIBARI POLICE STATION
CHARAIDEO
SONARI
SIVASAGAR
ASSAM
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH MAZUMDAR
Advocate for the petitioner
: Mr. P.K. Gogoi
Advocate for the respondent(s)
: Ms M. Bhattacharjee, GA, Assam
Date on which judgment was reserved: NA
Date of pronouncement of judgment
:21.02.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the: NA
operative part of the judgment?
Whether the full judgment has been : Yes
pronounced?
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. P.K. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and also
heard Ms. M. Bhattacharjee, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate
Assam, appearing for the all respondents.
2.
At the outset, Ms. M. Bhattacharjee, had prayed for time to file an
affidavit-in-opposition to the writ petition and stated that the records of the
disciplinary proceedings are available.
3.
The matter was kept as part heard on 09.02.2026 and upon production of
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the records by Ms. M. Bhattacharjee, this Court had taken up the matter for
consideration to examine whether the records revealed any infirmity in the
process during the disciplinary proceedings.
4.
The facts of the case as arising from the records made available to this
Court and as reflected in the writ petition, are to the effect that the petitioner
was served with a show cause notice dated 26.03.2025 which contained a
statement of allegations, a list of documents, and a list of witnesses. The
petitioner was asked to file his written statement which he accordingly did on
the 28th of May, 2025. Not being satisfied with the reply filed by the petitioner,
the disciplinary authority had appointed an enquiry officer and a presenting
officer and the enquiry commenced.
5.
The enquiry officer initiated the enquiry proceedings and examined as many
as 5 out of the six listed witnesses. Thereafter, the petitioner was asked to
submit his statement of defence, which he duly did. The enquiry proceedings
were concluded by submission of the enquiry report by the enquiry officer on
02.06.2025.
6.
The petitioner was thereafter served a second show-cause notice, although
the date in the notice appears to be a typographical error. The petitioner replied
to the second show-cause notice. Taking into account the allegation and
the defence made, the disciplinary authority had proceeded to impose the
punishment of dismissal upon service on the petitioner with effect from
10.07.2025. The appeal preferred by the petitioner herein also came to be
dismissed.
7.
The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the
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disciplinary proceedings had suffered from gross illegalities, inasmuch as, in the
enquiry proceedings he was not allowed the assistance of a defence assistant,
he was not allowed the opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses which
were produced on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the enquiry report has
been prepared without giving any opportunity to address the submissions of
presenting officer etc.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the second
show-cause notice has been issued with a pre conceived mind about the guilt of
the petitioner and the same would be apparent by the language of the second
show cause notice itself.
9.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the
disciplinary authority had passed the impugned orders without reference to the
reply given by the petitioner to the second show cause notice and therefore, it
is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the entire
proceedings require the interference of this Court.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that on the same
cause of action two show-cause notices were issued to the petitioner. The
counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the first show-cause notice had
already stated that the changes was proved beyond reasonable doubt. No
reason for disagreement was given while issuing a second show-cause notice
again holding the charges to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
11.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the issuance of two
show-cause notices on the same cause of action is not permissible, therefore,
when the first show-cause notice had already been replied to, the disciplinary
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authority was not authorized to impose punishment based on the second showcause notice.
12. Ms. M. Bhattacharjee, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, has
submitted that a perusal of the records would reveal that the initial chargesheet was issued along with the list of documents and list of witnesses and was
further accompanied by a statement of allegations. In any event it is not the
case of the petitioner that the first show-cause notice suffered any procedural
defect.
13.
The learned Additional Senior Government Advocate has thereafter
submitted that the records would show that the petitioner had conducted crossexamination of at least 4 witnesses and for the other witnesses there was a
statement recorded by the enquiry officer that there was no cross-examination
done by the petitioner.
14. The learned Additional Senior Government Advocate has submitted when
the enquiry report had opined that the guilt of the petitioner had been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, the disciplinary authority, in all fairness has supplied a
copy of the enquiry petitioner along with the second show-cause notice.
15. The learned Additional Senior Government Advocate has further submitted
that the second show-cause notice does not indicate that the disciplinary
authority had a pre-conceived mind regarding the guilt of the petitioner and
had, in fact, required the petitioner to submit a reply within 10 days time.
16. The learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, has further submitted
that upon receipt of the reply to the second show-cause notice, the disciplinary
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authority imposed the penalty of dismissal from service after taking into account
the conspectus of the matter. It is therefore contended that order of dismissal
does not warrant any interference by this Court.
17. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and have also perused
through the records available.
18. This Court is conscious that, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India in matters concerning disciplinary proceedings, this
Court does not sit as a Court of appeal. It would only evaluate whether the
required procedural propriety, as per the relevant provisions of law applicable in
the case has been adhered to by the respondent authorities and as to whether
the petitioner has suffered any prejudice when he was made to face disciplinary
proceedings. In this regard the Court is reminded of the judgment of the Apex
Court in Union of India and Others vs. P.Gunasekaran reported in (2015)
2 SCC 610 where it was held
“13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High
Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I
was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot
act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under
Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of
the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the
proceedings;
Page No.# 7/13
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by
some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or
extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that
no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and
material evidence;
h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which
influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been
conducted in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S.
Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723, many of the above principles have been discussed
and it has been concluded thus:
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether
the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to
hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of
the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly
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interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of
the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have
disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous
to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced
by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry
is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence
on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not
a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC
557, the principles have been further discussed at paragraph-21 to 24, which read as
follows:
“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up
before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S.
Sree Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a
public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal
trials thatan offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a
domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226
over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there
is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has
accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to
review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High
Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings
against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves form reaching a fair decision by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on
the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on
which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a
matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding
for a writ under Article 226.
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22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi
v. Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the
disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be
said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh
case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the
findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was
instrumental in compelling the shut-down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on
May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of
two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close
down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager
did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager
accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do
so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held
that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High
Court should not have interfered with the conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory
jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact
reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are
not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on
the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however
grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ
can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had
erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law
which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be
drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See
Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.”
19. There is no challenge made to the first show-cause notice issued to the
petitioner and, therefore, this Court is not called upon to examine the legality or
illegality of the same.
20. In so far as the enquiry proceedings are concerned, this Court has gone
through the records produced by the learned Additional Government Advocate
and found that the evidence of different witnesses has been taken up on
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different dates by issuing proper notices from the enquiry officer. On each
occasion when the statement of a particular witness was recorded, the
petitioner has either declined to cross-examine the witness or put one or two
questions in his cross-examination. Therefore, this Court does not find any force
in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he has been
deprived of the opportunity of cross-examination.
21. This Court further finds from the records of the disciplinary proceeding that
the petitioner did not make a request to be assisted by a defense assistant and
even during the arguments presented in the case no prejudice had been alleged
or demonstrated due to the absence of the defense assistant.
22.
The very fact that the petitioner had cross-examined the witnesses and
participated in the enquiry proceedings, and did not raise any grievance in that
regard either during the enquiry or while submitting his representation to the
second show-cause notice, as lead this Court to conclude that the petitioner has
not been able to demonstrate any prejudice on account of the absence of a
defense assistant.
23. Though it is true that in certain cases law may require the appointment of
a defense assistant, in the present case we see that the absence of a defense
assistant has been taken as a plea only after the disciplinary proceedings
culminated in an order adverse to the petitioner and, therefore, to this Court,
the said plea appears to be an afterthought. Accordingly, the aforesaid ground
taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected.
24. In so far as the second show-cause notice is concerned, this Court is of the
opinion that it does not amount to a second show-cause notice on the same
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cause of action. Rather, by way of the second show-cause notice, the petitioner
was required to reply to the report prepared by the enquiry officer.
25.
Upon perusal of the second show-cause notice, this Court does not find
that the disciplinary authority had expressed any conclusive view regarding
acceptance or non-acceptance of the findings of the enquiry officer. Therefore,
this Court is not convinced that the second show-cause notice failed to meet the
requirements of administrative fair play. On the contrary, on facts the same
appears to be in compliance with the principle of natural justice.
26. The impugned order has also been perused by this Court. In the impugned
order it is seen that the disciplinary authority has gone through all the records
and has also referred to the different replies given by the petitioner in his
representations against the first and second show-cause notices.
27.
This Court cannot evaluate as to whether there was sufficient evidence
which could have led the disciplinary authority to frame a particular opinion
regarding the allegations levelled against the petitioner. As already indicated in
the judgment of P.Gunasekaran (supra), this Court is not in a position to
evaluate the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence led during the enquiry
proceedings, unless the petitioner is able to show either a case of no evidence
or one of perversity in the appreciation of the evidence. Such is not the case in
the present litigation.
28. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made attempts to convince this
Court that the evidence led was not properly appreciated but unfortunately, reappreciation of evidence, is not called for in the present since it is not a case of
no evidence or perverse appreciation of available evidence.
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29.
In the order passed by the appellate authority, it is observed that the
appellate authority had not only considered the circumstances in which the
impugned order had come to be passed but had also evaluated the quantum of
punishment imposed upon the petitioner.
30.
In the case Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in
(2015) 2 SCC 610 the Apex Court had held that in a matter of disciplinary force,
the imposition of punishment on allegations of indiscipline would not require the
interference by a Court exercising authority under Article 226 of Constitution of
India, unless such punishment shocks the conscience of the Court.
The
quantum of punishment is essentially left to the wisdom of the disciplinary
authority.
31.
This Court has noticed that the allegation levelled against the petitioner
pertains to theft/participation in theft. Therefore, this Court is of the view that
the quantum of punishment imposed in the present case does not call for reconsideration in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
32. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.
33. However, it is made clear that since the learned counsel of the petitioner
has submitted that a criminal trial has now been initiated and is in progress, this
order of this Court shall not preclude the petitioner from preferring an appeal
against the impugned orders to the concerned authorities, in the event he is
acquitted in criminal trial. He shall be at liberty to prefer such representation or
appeal, as is allowed in law, and the same shall be considered on its own merits
without reference to the dismissal of the present writ petition.
34.
With the above observation the writ petition is dismissed. No cost.
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35.
The records produced by Ms M. Bhattacharjee during the course of the
proceedings be returned forthwith.
JUDGE
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