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SHAMURAILATPAM SUSHIL
SHARMA
SHARMA
Date: 2025.08.07 16:49:01 +05'30'
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
W.P.(Crl.) No. 7 of 2025
Shri Lisham Premananda Singh @ Tony @ Brajamohon
Vs.
Petitioner
The District Magistrate and 3 Others
Respondents
BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. KEMPAIAH SOMASHEKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH
ORDER
(K. Somashekar, C.J. and A. Bimol Singh, J)
06.08.2025
[1]
Heard Mr. L. Shashibhushan, learned senior counsel assisted
by Md. Fakharuddin, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Mr.
Phungyo Zingkhei, learned Deputy GA appearing for respondent Nos. 1, 2
and 4 and Mr. BR Sharma, learned CGSC appearing for respondent No. 3.
[2]
The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order
dated 06.02.2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Kakching District
detaining the petitioner under the provisions of the National Security Act,
1980, order dated 14.02.2025 issued by the Commissioner (Home),
Government of Manipur approving the detention order passed by the District
Magistrate, Kakching District and also order dated 13.03.2025 issued by the
Commissioner (Home) Government of Manipur confirming the order of
detention and ordering for detaining the petitioner for a period of 12
(twelve) months from the date of detention.
Page | 1
[3]
Even though several grounds have been raised in the present
writ petition, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner advanced only
one ground before use in assailing the impugned detention orders.
[4]
It has been submitted by the learned senior counsel that the
District Magistrate, while issuing the said detention order dated 06.02.2025
failed to mention that the petitioner is likely to be released on bail and that
on his being release on bail the petitioner is likely to continue to carry out
prejudicial activities. The learned senior counsel submitted that the District
Magistrate passed the impugned detention order without application of
mind and on this ground alone, the impugned detention orders are liable to
be quashed and set aside. In support of his contention, the learned senior
counsel relied on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Union of India vs. Paul Manickam and another reported
in (2003) 8 SCC 342 wherein it has been held at paragraph No. 14 as
under :
“14. So far as this question relating to procedure to be adopted
in case the detenu is already in custody is concerned, the matter
has been dealt with in several cases. Where detention orders are
passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some
other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind
and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of
detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The
necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the
preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting
custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of
his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must
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depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention
being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the
maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc.
ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in
custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the
fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into
account while making the order. If the detaining authority is
reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is
likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities
which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in
order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial
activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the
detention order in respect of a person already in custody does
not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the
order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of Tamil
Nadu and : Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of
India). The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v.
Union of India. The principles were set out as follows: even in
the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly
passed : (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the
fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to
believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a)
that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that
on being released, he would in all probability indulge in
prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him
to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after
recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid.
In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of
detention show an awareness of custody and/or possibility of
release on bail.”
Page | 3
[5]
The learned senior counsel also relied on the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Champion R. Sangma
vs. State of Meghalaya and another reported in (2015) 16 SCC 253
wherein at paragraph Nos. 9 to 15 of the said judgment it has been held as
under :
“9. Coming to the ground on which we intend to allow this
appeal, we may point out that even if the appellant is in jail in
connection with some criminal case(s) there is no prohibition in
law to pass the detention order. Law on this aspect is well
settled and stands crystallised by plethora of judgments of this
Court. However, a reading of those very judgments also
clarifies that there are certain aspects which have to be borne
in mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those
aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention order.
10. There are three such factors which were restated
in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India & Anr. reported in (1991) 1
SCC 128 :
“13. From the catena of decisions referred to
above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a
person in custody a detention order can validly be
passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of
the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason
to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before
him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being
released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he
would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity
and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him
from so doing. If the authority passes an order after
recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order
cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper
course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if
Page | 4
bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to
question it before a higher court. What this Court stated
in the case of Ramesh Yadav was that ordinarily a
detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt
or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are
essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with
under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that
even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts
and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be
had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be
quite clear from the case law discussed above and there
is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which
our attention was drawn since they do not hold
otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the
contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there
was no valid and compelling reason for passing the
impugned orders of detention because the detenus were
in custody."
11. The aforesaid dicta is reiterated in subsequent judgments as
well. Some of which are as under :
(i) T.V. Sravanan v. State, (2006) 2 SCC 664,
(ii) K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of T.N.,(2008)9 SCC 89
(iii) Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur and
Ors., (2012) 7 SCC 181
12. In the present case, as already pointed out above, the
appellant was under incarceration as he is implicated in as
many as 8 cases. In fact till date he is in jail and has not been
granted bail.
13. In view of the above, it was for the respondents to satisfy
the Court as to whether the triple requirements, as postulated
Page | 5
above, stand satisfied in the present case. We find that the
respondents have miserably failed to fulfill this requirement.
14. In the instant case, though the detention order and even the
grounds of detention record the factum of appellant's being in
custody, no satisfaction has been recorded by the detaining
authority that there was reliable material before the authority
on the basis of which it would have reasons to believe that there
was real possibility of his release on bail. It is not mentioned as
to whether any bail application was even moved by the
appellant or not, what to take out likely fate of such an
application. The order is also conspicuously silent on the aspect
as to whether there was any probability of indulging in activity
if the appellant would be released on bail. On the contrary, we
are amazed that the averments made in the counter-affidavit
which are self-defeating and clinching the issue against the
respondent at Page 171 Para 3 of the paper book which reads
as under :
"3. I state that the submission of the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner that the detaining authority
was satisfied that there was some likelihood of the
petitioner being released on bail and thereafter the
detention order was passed to prevent such contingency
is completely unfounded. In fact the detention order was
passed on 29-1-2013 and from the detention order it no
way reflects that with a view to pre-empt the petitioner
from getting the bail in the pending 8 criminal cases that
the detention order 2013 was passed. In fact after
noticing the fact that the petitioner was arrested by the
police in various unlawful activities and crimes like
extortion, dacoity, kidnapping, murder and robbery with
deadly weapons for ransom, for disruption of public
order, etc. and being satisfied that if the petitioner is
Page | 6
allowed to remain at large he would act in a manner
prejudicial to the security of the State and shall be a
constant threat to peace that the detention order was
passed under Section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive
Detention Act, 1995.
15. We, thus, have no option but to hold that the detention order
suffers from material illegality, thereby vitiating the same. This
appeal is accordingly allowed, setting aside the impugned
judgment of the High Court and quashing the detention order."
Relying on the said judgments, the learned senior counsel
prays for quashing the impugned detention order.
[6]
In the present case, counter affidavit on behalf of the
respondent No. 3, i.e. Union of India and counter affidavit on behalf of
respondent No. 4, i.e. Superintendent, Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa has been
filed. However, no counter affidavit on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2,
who are the detaining authorities and who issued the impugned detention
orders, have not filed any counter affidavit and did not deny any averments
made by the petitioner in the present writ petition. However, the learned
Deputy GA produced and placed before us the relevant Government file
relating to the issuance of the impugned detention orders.
[7]
The learned Deputy GA appearing for the respondents No. 1,
2 and 4 submitted that in the impugned detention order, the District
Magistrate, Kakching mentioned that an application for granting bail has
been filed on behalf of the petitioner. However, the District Magistrate failed
Page | 7
to specifically mention that the petitioner is likely to be released on bail.
According to the learned Deputy GA, such non-mentioning is not fatal and
in support of his contention, the learned Deputy GA relied on the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and
Another vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad reported in (2019) 20 SCC 609
wherein at paragraphs No. 38 to 40 it has been held as under :
“38. In the light of the well settled principles, we have to see, in
the present case, whether there was awareness in the mind of
the detaining authority that detenu is in custody and he had
reason to believe that detenu is likely to be released on bail and
if so released, he would continue to indulge in prejudicial
activities. In the present case, the detention orders dated 17-052019 record the awareness of the detaining authority:
(i)
that the detenu is in custody;
(ii)
that the bail application filed by the detenus have been
rejected by the Court.
Of course, in the detention orders, the detaining authority has
not specifically recorded that the “detenu is likely to be
released”. It cannot be said that the detaining authority has not
applied its mind merely on the ground that in the detention
orders, it is not expressly stated as to the “detenue’s likelihood
of being released on bail” and “if so released, he is likely to
indulge in the same prejudicial activities”. But the detaining
authority has clearly recorded the antecedent of the detenus and
its satisfaction that detenus Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar
have the high propensity to commit such offences in future.
39. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is
already in custody and he is likely to be released on bail and on
Page | 8
being released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial
activities is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
In Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. and Another (2006) 5 SCC
676, the Supreme Court held that the satisfaction of the
authority coming to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the
detenu being released on bail is the “subjective satisfaction”
based on the materials and normally the subjective satisfaction
is not to be interfered with.
40. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu
may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining
authority. On the facts and circumstances of the present case,
the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the
detenu is likely to be released on bail is based on the materials.
A reading of the grounds of detention clearly indicates that
detenu Nisar Aliyar has been indulging in smuggling gold and
operating syndicate in coordination with others and habitually
committing the same unmindful of the revenue loss and the
impact on the economy of the nation. Likewise, the detention
order qua detenu Happy Dhakad refers to the role played by
him in receiving the gold and disposing of the foreign origin
smuggled gold through his multiple jewellery outlets and his
relatives. The High Court, in our view, erred in quashing the
detention orders merely on the ground that the detaining
authority has not expressly recorded the finding that there was
real possibility of the detenus being released on bail which is in
violation of the principles laid down in Kamarunnisa v. Union
of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 and other judgments and Guidelines
24. The order of the High Court quashing the detention orders
on those grounds cannot be sustained.”
[8]
In the present case, it is an undisputed fact that in the
impugned detention order as well as in the grounds of detention, the
Page | 9
detaining authority did not mention that the petitioner is likely to be released
on bail even though it was mentioned that he has applied an application for
granting bail. We also notice that the detaining authority failed to mention
that upon his being release on bail, the petitioner is likely to indulge in the
same prejudicial activities. We have carefully perused the judgments
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dimple Happy Dhakad
(supra) and we are of the view that the Hon’ble Apex Court took notice that
in that particular case, the detaining authority has specifically mentioned in
the grounds of detention that the detenu is likely to be released on bail and
that on his being release on bail, the detenue is likely to continue to indulge
in the same prejudicial activities and that such factum has been based on
the materials available on record. In our considered view, the aforesaid
judgment is quite distinguishable in that, in the present case, neither in the
detention order nor in the grounds of detention, the detaining authority ever
mentioned that the petitioner is likely to be released on bail and that on his
being release on bail, he is likely to continue to indulge in the same
prejudicial activities and there is also no material available on record to
arrive at such subjective satisfaction.
[9]
In view of such undisputed facts, we are satisfied that while
passing the detention order, the detaining authority has not applied his
mind. Needless to mention here that if a person is already in custody, there
is no possibility of his continuing to indulge in prejudicial activities.
Therefore, while issuing an order for detaining a person under the
Page | 10
preventive detention law, the detaining authority must take into
consideration on the basis of cogent materials available before him that the
person is likely to be released on bail and that on his being released on bail,
he is likely to continue to indulge in prejudicial activities. In the absence of
any materials available on record, we cannot agree that while passing the
impugned detention orders, the detaining authority has applied his mind
based on cogent materials. Accordingly, we come to the conclusion that the
impugned detention order has been issued by the detaining authority
without application of mind and as such, the impugned detention orders are
vitiated thereby rendering the continued detention of the petitioner illegal.
Accordingly, the impugned detention orders dated 06.02.2025 issued by the
District Magistrate, Kakching, the impugned order dated 14.02.2025 issued
by the Commissioner (Home) approving the detention order and the
impugned order dated 07.03.2025 issued by the Commissioner (Home)
confirming the detention order are hereby quashed and set aside.
Consequently, we direct the respondents to release the petitioner from his
detention forthwith unless his continued detention is necessary in
connection with any other cases pending against him.
[10]
However, in a given peculiar facts and circumstances in this
matter, the learned DGA has facilitated the judgment for reliances but
keeping in view the scope of the said provision of law and also the
observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the matters
relating to COFEPOSA of 1974 in Dimple Happy Dhakad (supra) and that
Page | 11
judgment is not squarely applicable to the present case on hand related to
the detailed orders rendered by the District Magistrate. Accordingly, we are
forming an opinion in this matter for seeking intervention, if not there shall
be some miscarriage of justice.
[11]
Whereas, in this writ petition, it is relevant to address the
scope of Article 21 of the Constitution of India having declared that no
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law, a machinery was definitely needed to
examine the question of illegal detention with utmost promptitude. The writ
petition as initiated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is "the
great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement". The writ has
been described as a writ of right which is grantable ex debito justitiae.
Though a writ of right, it is not a writ of course. The applicant/petitioner/
detenu/accused must show a prima facie case of his unlawful detention.
Once, however, he shows such a cause and the return is not good and
sufficient, he is entitled to this writ as of right." However, in this writ
petition, taking all the grounds which are available on record and also in the
materials which have been facilitated by the detaining authority and also
the investigating agency, even on this premises also, it is required to be
intervention of the detention orders rendered by the District Magistrate.
Therefore, on the aforesaid reasons and findings, it is deemed appropriate
that the writ petition is hereby allowed and consequently, setting aside the
detention orders rendered by the detaining authority/District Magistrate.
Page | 12
[12]
With the above observations and directions, the present writ
petition is disposed of.
Sushil
JUDGE
CHIEF JUSTICE
Page | 13
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