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CGHC010354802026
2026:CGHC:39909
RUCHI Digitally
signed by
YADAV RUCHI YADAV
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 4639 of 2026
1 - Laxman Manikpuri S/o Late Purukhu Aged About 64 Years Residents Of
Devrikhud, Near Bahora Hotel, Colony Chowk, Bilaspur, Tehsil And District
Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh)
2 - Smt. Uttara Manikpuri W/o Lakshman Manikpuri Aged About 51 Years
Residents Of Devrikhud, Near Bahora Hotel, Colony Chowk, Bilaspur, Tehsil
And District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Secretary, Revenue Department,
Mantralaya, New Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Chhattisgarh Board Of Revenue, Bilaspur Through The Registrar, C.G.
Board Of Revenue, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh Tehsil-Post- Bilaspur, P.S.- Civil
Line- Bilaspur (C.G.)
3 - Divisional Commissioner Bilaspur (C.G.) Koni, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
4 - Tehsildar, Bilaspur Tehsil And District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh), P.S.- Civil
Line- Bilaspur (C.G.)
5 - D.P. Tiwari S/o Late J.L. Tiwari Resident Of Devrikhud, Colony Chowk,
Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) P.S.- Sarkanda- Bilaspur
(C.G.)
... Respondents
(Cause title taken from CIS System)
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Sunil Kumar Soni , Advocate
For Respondent/State
:
Dr. Arham Siddiqui, P.L.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board
11.09.2026
1. The petitioners have filed the instant writ petition seeking the following
reliefs:“(i) Issue a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate
writ, order, or direction, quashing the Impugned Order
dated 18.09.2025 passed by the Board of Revenue,
Bilaspur(ANNEXURE P/10) ;(ii) Declare that the order
dated 20.06.2022 passed by the Tehsildar, Bilaspur is
without jurisdiction, illegal, void ab initio, and has zero
legal value;
(iii) Declare that the proceedings conducted by the
Tehsildar manually after 01.10.2020 are in violation of
the Government Circular dated 15.06.2020 and are
null and void;
(iv) Declare that the Tehsildar, having conducted
manual
proceedings
in
contravention
of
the
Government mandate, was liable to have his revenue
court powers ceased for a period of three years and
consequently lacked authority to pass the order dated
20.06.2022;
(v) Declare that the Board of Revenue failed to
exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Section 8 of
the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and
mechanically dismissed the Petitioners' application.
(vi) Pass any other order or direction which this
Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the interest of
justice and equity. It is Further Prayed to Issue a writ
of Mandamus directing the Divisional Commissioner,
Bilaspur to immediately issue a valid Power of
Attorney (POA) under Rule 106 to the Government
Advocate for all future appearances before the Board
of Revenue.
(vii) Issue a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate
writ, order, or direction, quashing the Impugned Order
dated 18.09.2025 passed by by the the Bo Board of
Revenue, Bilaspur (ANNEXURE P/10), on the ground
that the proceedings were conducted and orders
were passed by Members of the Board of Revenue
who illegally and without any statutory authority used
the Seal of the Chairman, thereby rendering the
entire proceedings void ab initio;
(viii) Declare that all interlocutory orders passed by
Member Reeta Shandilya on 15.03.2023, 06.04.2023,
08.06.2023, 20.07.2023, 08.02.2024, 16.11.2023,
16.08.2023,
02.05.2024,
03.07.2024,
and
18.09.2024, and by Member Topeshwar Verma on
02.01.2025 and 02.04.2025, using the Seal of the
Chairman, Board of Revenue, are without jurisdiction,
illegal, void ab initio, and have zero legal value;
(ix) Declare that the use of the Seal of the Chairman
by a Member of the Board of Revenue, who is not the
duly appointed Chairman, constitutes a usurpation of
judicial power and a fundamental jurisdictional error,
and that any proceedings conducted or orders
passed under the said seal are ultra vires the
statutory provisions governing the Board of Revenue;
(x) Declare that the doctrine of merger cannot and
does
not
operate
to
cure
the
fundamental
jurisdictional defect arising from the misuse of the
Chairman's seal, and that the final order dated
18.09.2025,
being
the
culmination
of
tainted
proceedings, is equally void and cannot be sustained
in law;
(xi) Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, order, or direction, commanding the
Respondents to produce before this Hon'ble Court
the valid authorization, notification, or order of
appointment empowering Member Reeta Shandilya
and Member Topeshwar Verma to use the Seal of the
Chairman, Board of Revenue, during the periods
when they were functioning merely as Members;
(xii) Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, order, or direction, commanding the
Respondents to strictly comply with the statutory
provisions governing the constitution and composition
of the Board of Revenue, and to ensure that the Seal
of the Chairman is used only by the duly appointed
Chairman or by an officer expressly authorized in
writing by the competent authority under the relevant
statutory provisions;
(xiii) Declare that the actions of the Respondents in
misusing the Seal of the Chairman constitute a gross
abuse of process, a violation of the principles of
natural justice, and a systemic maladministration that
undermines the rule of law and erodes public
confidence in the judicial system;
(xiv) Issue any other writ, order, or direction as this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case, including but not
limited to:
(a) Directing the Board of Revenue to re-hear the
matter from the stage of admission before a properly
constituted Board in accordance with law;
(b) Directing the Respondents to place on record a
complete list of all cases where the Seal of the
Chairman was used by unauthorized Members;
(c) Directing the Respondent authorities to take
appropriate corrective and disciplinary action against
the officers who have been found to have misused
the Seal of the Chairman;
(d) Granting costs of the present proceedings to the
Petitioner; and
(xv) Pass such other and further relief(s) as this
Hon'ble Court may deem just, proper, and equitable
in the circumstances of the case.”
2. At the outset, learned counsel appearing for the parties submit that the
issue concerning the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court to entertain
proceedings and grant an injunction in respect of a residential property
has already been considered by this Court in Neeraj Jain and another
Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, WPC No.2476 of 2022,
decided on 07.09.2026. Learned counsel refer to paragraphs 11 to 15
of the said order and submit that the controversy, to the extent it relates
to the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar to entertain the proceedings and pass
the order dated 20.06.2022, stands covered by the aforesaid decision.
3. Paragraphs 11 to 15 of the said order read as under:“11. It is trite law that Revenue Courts lack
jurisdiction to entertain any application or to
initiate proceedings or to grant interim injunctions
with respect to a house constructed over a
residential land. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
time and again held that the jurisdiction of
Revenue Courts is confined to agricultural or
revenue assessed land and does not extend to
residential land over which constructions have
been erected. Once the property in dispute
includes a permanent structure or built up area,
the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court is ousted.
The Civil Court alone possesses exclusive
jurisdiction to determine title under Section 34 of
the Specific Relief Act as well as to grant
temporary and permanent injunctions under
Sections 37 and 39 of the said Act read with
Order 39 Rule 1& 2 of the CPC. A Coordinate
Bench of this Court has affirmed this view in
WP227 No.800/2015 (decided on 19.07.2018),
relying upon the principle laid down in Maya
Lalchandani (Mrs) and others Vs. Board of
Revenue and others reported in (2009) 3
MPLJ 660. In light of this settled legal position,
the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the petitioners that the Tahsildar has acted in
excess of jurisdiction are well founded and the
contention raised by respondent No.4 is not in
accordance with law.
12. This Court in Seraj Ahmad Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh & others 2017 (4) C.G.L.J. 559
has held that the order to grant injunction is
surely vested in the jurisdictional Civil Court and
the Revenue Courts cannot grant the order of
injunction and it was held that the revenue order
granting temporary injunction restraining the
transfer would be without jurisdiction and without
authority of law. The said judgment was based
on Maya Lalchandani (supra). Relevant part of
the decision is reproduced herein below:
"2 Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits
that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) has
passed order on 10.03.2016 granting temporary
injunction for which he has no jurisdiction,
therefore, the order passed by the Sub-Divisional
Officer (Revenue) is without jurisdiction and
without authority of law. He relies upon a decision
of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the
matter of Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.) and others
Vs. Board of Revenue and others in which the
M.P. High Court has held as under:4. After going through the order passed by the
learned President, Board of Revenue and taking
into consideration the legal provisions, we are of
the opinion that the directions issued in
paragraph 7 of the order passed by the Board of
Revenue cannot be allowed to stand. Section
32 of the Land Revenue Code talks of the
inherent powers of the Revenue Authorities
while Section 43 talks of applicability of the
Code of Civil Procedure. It is to be seen from
Section 32 that nothing in the Land Revenue
Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise
affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court
to make such orders as may be necessary to
meet the ends. of justice or as may be
necessary to prevent the abuse of the process
of Court. Section 43 simply provides that unless
otherwise expressly provided in the Code, the
procedure laid down in the Code of Civil
Procedure shall, so far as may be, followed in
all proceedings under the Code. Section 43 in
no case would authorise a Revenue Authority to
grant an injunction. Section 43 simply provides
that the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil
Procedure so far as may be followed in all
proceedings under the Code. It is also to be
seen from the provision of the Code of Civil
Procedure that an injunction can be granted
only by civil Court and by none else. Section 32
of the M.P. Land Revenue Code only talks of the
inherent powers of the Revenue Courts where
they are required to make such order as may be
necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent
the abuse of the process of the Court. The
powers under Section 32 can be exercised
within the Code itself and not beyond the Code.
If the Revenue Authority does not have the
power to grant injunction then the Board of
Revenue also could not grant injunction.
3. The order to grant injunction is surely vested in
the jurisdictional civil court, revenue courts
cannot grant order of injunction. Therefore, the
order passed by the revenue authority granting
temporary injunction restraining transfer following
the
principle
of
law
laid
down
in
Maya
Lalchandani (Supra) is without jurisdiction and
without authority of law. It is accordingly set
aside.
However,
the
Sub-Divisional
officer
(Revenue) is directed to take decision on merits
after hearing the parties in accordance with law,
expeditiously, within three months from the date
of receipt of a copy of this order.
13. The aforementioned decision was referred
with approval in the case of Vandana Gupta &
Ors. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. in WPC
No. 235/2020 and has observed thus:"9. Considering the nature of stay order, certainly it
would show that the Tahsildar has exceeded its
jurisdiction which is vested under the Land
Revenue Code and therefore, the order of the
nature would be without jurisdiction and without
authority of law. Since the order is without
jurisdiction, as such, the petitioner even if has not
availed the remedy of appeal, this Court in
exercise of power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India can look into such issue when
jurisdictional issue is involved in view of the
decision of the Supreme Court rendered in
Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 wherein, it has
been held as under:
14. The power to issue prerogative writs under
Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in
nature and is not limited by any other provisions
of
the
Constitution.
This
power
can
be
exercised by the High Court not only for issuing
writs
in
the
nature
of
habeas
corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo quarranto and
certiorari for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the
Constitution but also for "any other purpose".
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution the
High Court, having regard to the facts of the
case, has a discretion to entertain or not to
entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has
imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of
which is that if an effective and efficacious
remedy is available, the High Court would not
normally exercise its. jurisdiction. But the
alternative remedy has been consistently held
by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least
three contingencies, namely, where the writ
petition has been filed for the enforcement of
any of the Fundamental Rights or where there
has been a violation of the principle of natural
justice or where the order or proceedings are
wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act
is challenged. There is a plethora of case law
on this point but to cut down this circle of
forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old
decisions of the evolutionary era of the
constitutional law as they still hold the field.
16. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board Kairana
AIR 1950 SC 163 laid down that existence of
an adequate legal remedy was a factor to be
taken into consideration in the matter of
granting writs. This was followed by another
Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son V.
Income Tax Investigation Commission AIR
1954 SC 207 which reiterated the above
proposition and held that where alternative
remedy existed, it 16. would be a sound
exercise of discretion to refuse or to interfere in
a petition under Article 226. This proposition
was, however qualified by the significant words.
"unless there are good grounds therefor", which
indicated that alternative remedy would not
operate as an absolute bar and that writ petition
under Article 226 could still be entertained in
exceptional cases.
14. Coming to the facts of the present case, in
light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid
judgments and further in light of the findings
recorded by the competent Civil Court in Civil
Suit No.27-A/2009 (judgment dated 26.4.2016
passed by the Second Civil Judge Class-I,
Mahasamund (CG)) filed by respondent No.4
(plaintiff
therein),
wherein
the
prayer
for
permanent injunction was refused and the finding
under issue No.6 establishing the existence of a
permanent structure on the suit land attained
finality, this Court is of the firm view that the
Tehsildar possessed no power or jurisdiction to
entertain an application for injunction in any
manner
whatsoever.
Such
disputes
fall
exclusively within the domain of the Civil Court
and are non-amenable to the jurisdiction
of the Revenue Courts.
15. As a result, the Petition is Allowed. The
entire subject proceedings pending before the
concerned Tehsildar together with the impugned
interim order dated 25.4.2022, are hereby
quashed. ”
4. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for
the parties and having perused the material available on record, this
Court finds that the controversy involved in the present petition, insofar
as it relates to the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar to entertain the
proceedings and pass the order dated 20.06.2022, is squarely covered
by the judgment dated 07.09.2026 passed by this Court in Neeraj Jain
and another Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, WPC No.2476 of
2022.
5. The ratio laid down therein is that where the dispute relates to a
residential property having a permanent structure thereon and the relief
sought before the Revenue Authority is, in substance, one of injunction
or restraint, the Revenue Court cannot assume the jurisdiction vested
in the competent Civil Court.
6. In the present case also, the challenge to the order dated 20.06.2022
proceeds on the ground that the Tehsildar lacked jurisdiction to pass
such order. The petitioners have specifically challenged the jurisdiction
of the Tehsildar as well as the consequential order passed by the Board
of Revenue dated 18.09.2025.
7. Once the foundational proceedings before the Tehsildar are held to be
without jurisdiction, the consequential order passed by the Board of
Revenue, insofar as it sustains or proceeds upon such proceedings,
cannot be permitted to stand.
8. In view of the aforesaid legal position and having regard to the
judgment rendered by this Court in Neeraj Jain (supra), this Court is of
the considered opinion that the order dated 20.06.2022 passed by the
Tehsildar, Bilaspur, as well as the proceedings culminating in the said
order, cannot be sustained in law.
9. Consequently, the impugned order dated 18.09.2025 passed by the
Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, which arises out of the aforesaid
proceedings, also cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
10.The proceedings initiated before the Tehsildar, Bilaspur, culminating in
the order dated 20.06.2022, are hereby quashed and set aside.
11.Consequently, the impugned order dated 18.09.2025 passed by the
Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, is also quashed and set aside.
12. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the respective claims of the parties regarding title, ownership
or possession over the subject property. The parties shall be at liberty
to avail such remedy as may be available to them in law before the
competent forum.
13. In view of the aforesaid, the other reliefs claimed by the petitioners,
including the reliefs concerning the alleged use of the Seal of the
Chairman, constitution/authorization of the Board and consequential
disciplinary or administrative directions, do not require separate
adjudication in the present proceedings.
14. The writ petition stands allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid
terms.
15. No order as to costs.
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Ruchi
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