The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
11. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities is circumscribed by the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code and they cannot exercise powers which are vested exclusively in Civil Courts. The grant of an injunction, whether temporary or permanent, restraining a party from alienating immovable property is essentially a civil remedy governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and can be granted only by a Court having competent civil jurisdiction. In the absence of any statutory provision empowering the Tehsildar to impose such a restraint, the impugned direction cannot be sustained in law. Merely because second appeals are pending before this Court would not, by itself, authorize the Revenue Authority to create a restriction upon the proprietary rights of a party, particularly when no interim order to that effect has been passed by the appellate Court. The learned Tehsildar, therefore, clearly exceeded the limits of his statutory jurisdiction by incorporating a condition restraining alienation of the disputed property. An order passed by an authority beyond the scope of the powers conferred upon it is without jurisdiction, non est in the eyes of law and void ab initio.
12. Consequently, the writ petition deserves to and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 03.10.2025, to the extent it directs that the petitioners shall not alienate the disputed property during pendency of the second appeals, is hereby quashed and set aside. It is, however, made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the inter se rights of the parties over the disputed property. Liberty is reserved in favour of respondent No.4 to avail such remedy as may be available in law before the Court of competent jurisdiction for seeking appropriate interim or final relief, if so advised. It is further observed that since Second Appeal No.23 of 2025 preferred by the petitioners as well as Second Appeal No.31 of 2025 preferred by respondent No.4 are pending consideration before this Court, it shall remain open to either party to move an appropriate application in the said proceedings seeking such interim protection or other consequential relief as may be permissible in accordance with law. Any such application, if filed, shall be considered on its own merits, uninfluenced by any observation made in the present order.
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
YOGESH
TIWARI
Digitally
signed by
YOGESH
TIWARI
Date:
2026.07.22
10:10:46
+0530
CGHC010485262025
2026:CGHC:30793
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 5973 of 2025
1 - Lav Kumar Agrawal S/o Vipin Bihari Agrawal Aged About 40 Years
R/o Village - Datan, Tehsil - Palari, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara
Chhattisgarh
2 - Kush Kumar Agrawal S/o Vipin Bihari Agrawal Aged About 42 Years
R/o Village - Datan, Tehsil - Palari, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioners
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Department Of Revenue And
Disaster Management, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
2 - Collector Balodabazar-Bhatapara, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara
Chhattisgarh
3 - Tehsildar Palari District Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh
4 - Sanjay Agrawal S/o Late Banke Bihari Agrawal Aged About 53 Years
R/o Purani Basti, Baniya Para, Raipur, Tehsil And District - Raipur
Chhattisgarh (Objector)
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners
: Mr. Shobhit Koshta, Advocate
For State/Respondents
No.1 to 3
: Mr. Soumitra Kesharwani, Panel Lawyer
For Respondent No.4
: Mr. Vivek Kumar Agrawal, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
Order on Board
20.07.2026
1.
By filing the present writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioners have called in question the
legality, validity and propriety of the order dated 03.10.2025
passed by the learned Tehsildar, Palari, District BalodabazarBhatapara whereby, while deleting the entry relating to the status
quo order from the revenue records, the learned Tehsildar further
directed that the petitioners shall not alienate the disputed
property during the pendency of the second appeals before this
Court, despite there being no interim order operating against the
petitioners restraining such alienation. The petitioners have
prayed for following relief(s) :“10.1 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to issue appropriate writ and quash / set-aside
the impugned order dated 3/10/25 in the interest
of justice.
10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
call for the entire records of the instant case, for
kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court.
10.3 This Hon'ble Court may also be pleased to
grant the cost of the petition to the petitioners.
10.4 Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court
deem fit and proper may also kindly be granted
to the petitioners in the interest of justice.”
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned
order dated 03.10.2025 is wholly without jurisdiction, contrary to
the settled principles of law and, therefore, liable to be set aside. It
is contended that the petitioners derive title over the disputed
property by virtue of a registered Will executed by their
predecessor-in-interest, which has already been upheld by the
competent Civil Court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court. It
is further submitted that during the pendency of the first appeal,
an order of status quo was operating and, consequently, an
appropriate entry was made in the revenue records. However,
upon dismissal of the first appeal, the petitioners rightly
approached the learned Tehsildar seeking deletion of the said
entry. Though the Tehsildar deleted the status quo entry, he
simultaneously proceeded to direct that no alienation of the
disputed property shall be effected till the pendency of the second
appeals before this Court.
3.
Learned counsel submits that such a direction is ex facie without
authority of law, inasmuch as the Tehsildar, being a Revenue
Officer exercising limited statutory powers under the Chhattisgarh
Land Revenue Code, has no jurisdiction to grant an injunction or
impose a restraint upon alienation of immovable property. It is
argued that the power to grant temporary or permanent
injunctions is vested exclusively in the competent Civil Court
under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and
such equitable relief cannot be assumed by a Revenue Authority
in the absence of any statutory provision conferring such
jurisdiction. It is further contended that admittedly no interim order
has been passed by this Court in either of the pending second
appeals restraining the petitioners from dealing with the property.
Therefore, by incorporating a condition prohibiting alienation on
his own accord, the learned Tehsildar has travelled beyond the
scope of his statutory authority and has virtually granted an
injunction in favour of respondent No.4, which could have been
granted only by a Court of competent civil jurisdiction. Such an
order, being passed without jurisdiction, is a nullity in the eye of
law and is liable to be declared void ab initio.
4.
Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the impugned
order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error warranting
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is
submitted that the learned Tehsildar has not adjudicated the civil
rights of the parties nor has he decided any issue relating to title.
According to the learned State counsel, considering that the
dispute between the parties is pending before this Court in second
appeals, the learned Tehsildar merely passed a temporary
protective direction to preserve the subject matter of the litigation
so that no further complications may arise. It is submitted that the
order is purely interim in nature, intended to maintain the existing
state of affairs till the rights of the parties are finally adjudicated,
and therefore cannot be faulted with.
5.
Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 supports the
impugned order and submits that the learned Tehsildar has
exercised his powers in a fair and equitable manner. It is argued
that the direction restraining alienation is merely a temporary
measure to protect the disputed property during the pendency of
the second appeals and does not amount to adjudication of title. It
is further submitted that if the petitioners are permitted to alienate
the property during pendency of the litigation, irreparable
prejudice would be caused to respondent No.4 and multiplicity of
proceedings would ensue. It is, therefore, contended that the
impugned order subserves the ends of justice and does not call
for interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
6.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused
the material available on record.
7.
From the undisputed facts emerging on record, it is evident that
the sole purpose for which the petitioners approached the learned
Tehsildar was deletion of the entry in the revenue records relating
to the order of status quo, which had ceased to operate upon
dismissal of the first appeal. While partly allowing the said
application, the learned Tehsildar Palari, District BalodabazarBhatapara not only deleted the status quo entry but further
proceeded to direct that the petitioners shall not alienate the
disputed property during the pendency of the second appeals
before this Court.
8.
This Court in Seraj Ahmad Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others
2017 (4) C.G.L.J. 559 has held that the order to grant injunction is
surely vested in the jurisdictional Civil Court and the Revenue
Courts cannot grant the order of injunction and it was held that the
revenue order granting temporary injunction restraining the
transfer would be without jurisdiction and without authority of law.
The said judgment was based on a decision of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court rendered in Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.) Vs.
Board of Revenue 2009 (3) MPLJ 660. I am also in respectful
agreement with the judgment passed by this Court in Seraj
Ahmad Vs. State of C.G. (Supra) on earlier occasion and the
relevant part of the decision is reproduced herein below:
“2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits
that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) has
passed
order
on
10.03.2016
granting
temporary injunction for which he has no
jurisdiction, therefore, the order passed by the
Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) is without
jurisdiction and without authority of law. He
relies upon a decision of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Maya
Lalchandani (Mrs.) and others Vs. Board of
Revenue and others in which the M.P. High
Court has held as under:
"4. After going through the order passed by
the learned President, Board of Revenue
and taking into consideration the legal
provisions, we are of the opinion that the
directions issued in paragraph 7 of the
order passed by the Board of Revenue
cannot be allowed to stand, Section 32 of
the Land Revenue Code talks of the
inherent powers of the Revenue Authorities
while Section 43 talks of applicability of the
Code of Civil Procedure. It is to be seen
from Section 32 that nothing in the Land
Revenue Code shall be deemed to limit or
otherwise affect the inherent power of the
Revenue Court to make such orders as
may be necessary to meet the ends of
justice or as may be necessary to prevent
the abuse of the process of Court Section
43 simply provides that unless otherwise
expressly
provided
in
the
Code,
the
procedure laid down in the Code of Civil
Procedure shall, so far as may be, followed
in all proceedings under the Code, Section
43 in no case would authorise a Revenue
Authority to grant an injunction. Section 43
simply provides that the procedure laid
down in the Code of Civil Procedure so far
as may be followed in all proceedings
under the Code. It is also to be seen from
the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure
that an injunction can be granted only by
civil Court and by none else. Section 32 of
the M.P. Land Revenue Code only talks of
the inherent powers of the Revenue Courts
where they are required to make such
order as may be necessary for the ends of
justice or to prevent the abuse of the
process of the Court. The powers under
Section 32 can be exercised within the
Code itself and not beyond the Code. If the
Revenue Authority does not have the
power to grant injunction then the Board of
Revenue also could not grant injunction."
3. The order to grant injunction is surely
vested in the jurisdictional civil court, revenue
courts cannot grant order of injunction.
Therefore, the order passed by the revenue
authority
granting
temporary
injunction
restraining transfer following the principle of
law laid down in Maya Lalchandani (Supra) is
without jurisdiction and without authority of
law. It is accordingly set aside. However, the
Sub-Divisional officer (Revenue) is directed to
take decision on merits after hearing the
parties in accordance with law, expeditiously,
within three months from the date of receipt of
a copy of this order.”
9.
Considering the nature of stay order, certainly it would show that
the Tahsildar has exceeded its jurisdiction which is vested under
the Land Revenue Code and therefore, the order of the nature
would be without jurisdiction and without authority of law. Since
the order is without jurisdiction, as such, the petitioner even if has
not availed the remedy of appeal, this Court in exercise of power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can look into such
issue when jurisdictional issue is involved in view of the decision
of the Supreme Court rendered in Whirlpool Corporation
Versus Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1
wherein it has been held as under:
“14. The power to issue prerogative writs
under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary
in nature and is not limited by any other
provisions of the Constitution. This power can
be exercised by the High Court not only for
issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of
the Constitution but also for "any other
purpose".
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
High Court, having regard to the facts of the
case, has a discretion to entertain or not to
entertain a writ petition. But the High Court
has imposed upon itself certain restrictions
one of which is that if an effective and
efficacious remedy is available, the High Court
would not normally exercise its jurisdiction.
But
the
alternative
remedy
has
been
consistently held by this Court not to operate
as a bar in at least three contingencies,
namely, where the writ petition has been filed
for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental
Rights or where there has been a violation of
the principle of natural justice or where the
order or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
There is a plethora of case law on this point
but to cut down this circle of forensic
whirlpool, we would rely on some old
decisions of the evolutionary era of the
constitutional law as they still hold the field.
16.
Rashid Ahmed
v.
Municipal
Board,
Kairana AIR 1950 SC 163 laid down that
existence of an adequate legal remedy was a
factor to be taken into consideration in the
matter of granting writs. This was followed by
another Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid &
Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission
AIR 1954 SC 207 which reiterated the above
proposition and held that where alternative
remedy existed, it would be a sound exercise
of discretion to refuse or to interfere in a
petition under Article 226. This proposition
was, however, qualified by the significant
words, "unless there are good grounds
therefor", which indicated that alternative
remedy would not operate as an absolute bar
and that writ petition under Article 226 could
still be entertained in exceptional cases.
(Emphasis supplied)”
10.
Further the Supreme Court in Harbanslal Sahnia Versus Indian
Oil Corporation Ltd (2003) 2 SCC 107 Para 7 reiterated the
principles laid down in Whirlpool Corpn. V. Registrar of Trade
Marks (supra) and held that in spite of availability of the
alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ
jurisdiction in at least three contingencies as observed in Para 7,
which reads thus:
“7. So far as the view taken by the High Court
that the remedy by way of recourse to
arbitration clause was available to the
appellants and therefore the writ petition filed
by the appellants was liable to be dismissed
is concerned, suffice it to observe that the
rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by
availability of an alternative remedy is a rule
of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an
appropriate case, in spite of availability of the
alternative remedy, the High Court may still
exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three
contingencies: (i) where the writ petition
seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental
rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles
of natural justice: or (iii) where the orders or
proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or
the vires of an Act is challenged. (See
Whirlpool Corpn. V. Registrar of Trade
Marks).
The
present
case
attracts
applicability of the first two contingencies.
More
over,
as
noted,
the
petitioners'
dealership, which is their bread and butter,
came to be terminated for an irrelevant and
non-existent cause. In such circumstances,
we feel that the appellants should have been
allowed relief by the High Court itself instead
of driving them to the need of initiating
arbitration proceedings.
(Emphasis supplied)”
11.
It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities is
circumscribed by the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Land
Revenue Code and they cannot exercise powers which are
vested exclusively in Civil Courts. The grant of an injunction,
whether temporary or permanent, restraining a party from
alienating immovable property is essentially a civil remedy
governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and
can be granted only by a Court having competent civil jurisdiction.
In the absence of any statutory provision empowering the
Tehsildar to impose such a restraint, the impugned direction
cannot be sustained in law. Merely because second appeals are
pending before this Court would not, by itself, authorize the
Revenue Authority to create a restriction upon the proprietary
rights of a party, particularly when no interim order to that effect
has been passed by the appellate Court. The learned Tehsildar,
therefore, clearly exceeded the limits of his statutory jurisdiction
by incorporating a condition restraining alienation of the disputed
property. An order passed by an authority beyond the scope of the
powers conferred upon it is without jurisdiction, non est in the
eyes of law and void ab initio.
12.
Consequently, the writ petition deserves to and is hereby allowed.
The impugned order dated 03.10.2025, to the extent it directs that
the petitioners shall not alienate the disputed property during
pendency of the second appeals, is hereby quashed and set
aside. It is, however, made clear that this Court has not expressed
any opinion on the merits of the inter se rights of the parties over
the disputed property. Liberty is reserved in favour of respondent
No.4 to avail such remedy as may be available in law before the
Court of competent jurisdiction for seeking appropriate interim or
final relief, if so advised. It is further observed that since Second
Appeal No.23 of 2025 preferred by the petitioners as well as
Second Appeal No.31 of 2025 preferred by respondent No.4 are
pending consideration before this Court, it shall remain open to
either party to move an appropriate application in the said
proceedings
seeking
such
interim
protection
or
other
consequential relief as may be permissible in accordance with
law. Any such application, if filed, shall be considered on its own
merits, uninfluenced by any observation made in the present
order.
13.
With the aforesaid observations and liberty reserved, the writ
petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review