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The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
9. In view of the aforesaid facts and the settled principles, learned counsel for the applicant seeks permission to withdraw this R/CR.MA/20360/2024 (GJHC240669522024) ORDER DATED: 16/10/2026 application. Permission as prayed for is granted. The present application as well as the connected appeal are disposed of as withdrawn, with a liberty to file appropriate appeal before the concerned Court, within a period of four months from the date of this order. Record and proceedings, if lying with this Court, be remitted back to the concerned Court forthwith.
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R/CR.MA/20360/2024
(GJHC240669522024)
ORDER DATED: 16/10/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL) NO. 20360
of 2024
In F/CRIMINAL APPEAL/38175/2024
==========================================================
LALCHAND RAMLOTER MOURYA
Versus
VIRENDRA LOCHANBHAI YADAV & ANR.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR DHARMESH R PATEL(5592) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR DIPESH D SONI(9996) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Respondent(s) No. 2
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M.
PRACHCHHAK
Date : 16/10/2026
ORAL ORDER
1.
This application is filed under Section 419 of the Bharatiya
Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’ for short) by the complainant
seeking leave to appeal to challenge the impugned judgment and
order dated 05.09.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class (Third Court), Surat (hereinafter referred to as “trial Court”)
whereby the learned trial Court had acquitted the Respondent Accused of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NI Act’ for
short).
2.
Heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.
3.
This matter is required to be transferred in view of the recent
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Celestium
R/CR.MA/20360/2024
(GJHC240669522024)
ORDER DATED: 16/10/2026
Financial Vs. A.Gnanasekaran Etc. reported in 2025 (3) GLH 747
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the original
complainant to be considered as a victim of the offence under Section
138 of the Act and, therefore, the complainant has right to file an
appeal under Section 372 of the Code before the lower Appellate
Court i.e. immediate Sessions Court before the District and the
judgment dated 22.12.2025 rendered in Criminal Misc. Application
No.12753 of 2019 with Criminal Misc. Application No. 12908 of 2019.
4.
Before entering into the merits of this case, this Court deems it
proper to refer to the decision rendered by this Court in the case of
Shivsinh Ganpatsinh Solanki Vs. State of Gujarat being Criminal
Miscellaneous Application Nos. 12753 of 2019 with 12908 of 2019 and
the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Celestium
Financial Vs. A. Gyanasekaran (supra) wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed and held that the complainant, in a
complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, considered to be a victim,
has a specific right to file an appeal against the order of acquittal
under Section 372 of the Code / Section 413 of the BNSS to the Court
which is immediately superior in hierarchy i.e. the Sessions Court.
5.
In view of the above, let the matter be remanded back to the
concerned Sessions Court.
6.
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has pointed out that the
matter in the case of Celestium Financial Vs. A. Gyanasekaran
(supra) is now pending at large before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 12350/2024 wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed that it is desirable that a larger Bench
gives an authoritative pronouncement on this issue as it has farPage 2 of 6
R/CR.MA/20360/2024
(GJHC240669522024)
ORDER DATED: 16/10/2026
reaching consequences. Therefore, the matter is to be decided
subject to the final outcome of the reference Court.
7.
In the case of Celestium Financial Vs. A. Gyanasekaran
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras –
7.8, 7.9 and 7.12 as under:“7.8 In the case of an offence alleged against an accused
under Section 138 of the Act, we are of the view that the
complainant is indeed the victim owing to the alleged
dishonour of a cheque. In the circumstances, the
complainant can proceed as per the proviso to Section 372
of the CrPC and he may exercise such an option and he
need not then elect to proceed under Section 378 of the
CrPC.
7.9 In this context, we wish to state that the proviso to
Section 372 does not make a distinction between an
accused who is charged of an offence under the penal law
or a person who is deemed to have committed an offence
under Section 138 of the Act. Symmetrical to a victim of an
offence, a victim of a deemed offence under Section 138 of
the Act also has the right to prefer an appeal against any
order passed by the court acquitting the accused or
convicting for a lesser offence or imposing an inadequate
compensation. When viewed from the perspective of an
offence under any penal law or a deemed offence under
Section 138 of the Act, the right to file an appeal is not
circumscribed by any condition as such, so long as the
appeal can be premised in accordance with proviso to
Section 372 which is the right to file an appeal by a victim,
provided the circumstances which enable such a victim to
file an appeal are met. The complainant under Section 138
is the victim who must also have the right to prefer an
appeal under the said provision. Merely because the
proceeding under Section 138 of the Act commences with
the filing of a complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC by a
complainant, he does not cease to be a victim inasmuch as
it is only a victim of a dishonour of cheque who can file a
complaint. Thus, under Section 138 of the Act both the
complainant as well as the victim are one and the same
person.
R/CR.MA/20360/2024
(GJHC240669522024)
ORDER DATED: 16/10/2026
7.12 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to
see and can be elaborated as follows:
Firstly, the victim of a crime must have an absolute right to
prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any
condition precedent. In the instant case, a victim under
Section 138 of the Act, i.e., a payee or the holder of a
cheque is a person who has suffered the impact of the
offence committed by a person who is charged of the
offence, namely, the accused, whose cheque has been
dishonoured.
Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed
on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a
conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal
under Section 374 of the CrPC. A person convicted of a
crime has the right to prefer an appeal under Section 374
as a matter of right and not being subjected to any
conditions. Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the
nature of the crime, unconditionally must have a right to
prefer an appeal.
Thirdly, it is for this reason that the Parliament thought it
fit to insert the proviso to sub-section 372 without
mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled by the
victim of an offence, which expression also includes the
legal representatives of a deceased victim who can prefer
an appeal. On the contrary, as against an order of
acquittal, the State, through the Public Prosecutor can
prefer an appeal even if the complainant does not prefer
such an appeal, though of course such an appeal is with
the leave of the court. However, it is not always necessary
for the State or a complainant to prefer an appeal. But
when it comes to a victim’s right to prefer an appeal, the
insistence on seeking special leave to appeal from the High
Court under Section 378(4) of the CrPC would be contrary
to what has been intended by the Parliament by insertion
of the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC.
Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 to
circumscribe the victim’s right to prefer an appeal just as it
has with regard to a complainant or the State filing an
appeal. On the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the
proviso to Section 372 so as to envisage a superior right
for the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal on the
grounds mentioned therein as compared to a complainant.
R/CR.MA/20360/2024
(GJHC240669522024)
ORDER DATED: 16/10/2026
Fifthly, the involvement of the State in respect of an
offence under Section 138 of the Act is conspicuous by its
absence. This is because the complaint filed under that
provision is in the nature of a private complaint as per
Section 200 of the CrPC and Section 143 of the Act by an
express intention incorporates the provisions of the CrPC in
the matter of trial of such a deemed offence tried as a
criminal offence. Therefore, the complainant, who is the
victim of a dishonour of cheque must be construed to be
victim in terms of the proviso to Section 372 read with the
definition of victim under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC.”
8.
In the decision in case of M/s. Everest Automobiles Vs. M/s. Rajit
Enterprises dated 12.02.2026 passed in Special Leave to Appeal
No.12350 of 2024 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:“Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the
petitioner on the recent judgment of this Court in
“Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran1”. By way of
the said judgment, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court
held that a complainant in a case arising under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,
is a ‘victim’ who would be entitled to file an appeal
under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 19732. It was further held that
such appeal could be filed against an order of
acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code
without seeking special leave to appeal under Section
378(4) of the Code.
However, this judgment did not take into account the
earlier decisions of this Court in Satya Pal Singh vs.
State of M.P. and Subhash Chand vs. State (Delhi
Administration), which have a bearing on both the
aspects that were considered in the aforestated
judgment, as they held to the contrary.”
9.
In view of the aforesaid facts and the settled principles, learned
counsel for the applicant seeks permission to withdraw this
R/CR.MA/20360/2024
(GJHC240669522024)
ORDER DATED: 16/10/2026
application. Permission as prayed for is granted. The present
application as well as the connected appeal are disposed of as
withdrawn, with a liberty to file appropriate appeal before the
concerned Court, within a period of four months from the date of this
order. Record and proceedings, if lying with this Court, be remitted
back to the concerned Court forthwith.
10.
It is clarified that the period that may be consumed in filing the
present appeal may not be counted as delay in filing such appeal
before the concerned Court. Moreover, the certified copy of the
impugned judgment, be handed over to the applicant/appellant, as
per Rules, if asked for. It is open for the parties to agitate all the
grievance before the concerned Court afresh.
11.
Considering that the matter has been pending for considerable
time, the learned lower Appellate Court is required to make
endeavour to dispose of the matter, if so filed, as expeditiously as
possible.
12.
It is clarified that this Court has not gone into the merits of the
matter at this stage.
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
ANUSRI
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
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