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Page No.# 1/13
GAHC010263102023
2026:GAU-AS:6779
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/6778/2023
KUSHAL BAWRI
S/O- LATE SHANKAR LAL BAWRI, R/O- JYOTI NAGAR, P.O., P.S. AND DIST.
DIBRUGARH, ASSAM, PIN- 786001.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS
REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM, DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
DISPUR, GUWAHATI-6.
2:THE DIBRUGARH MUNICIPAL BOARD
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN
DIBRUGARH MUNICIPAL BOARD
DIBRUGARH
ASSAM
PIN- 7856001.
3:THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER
DIBRUGARH MUNICIPAL BOARD
DIBRUGARH
DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM
PIN- 786001.
4:SMTI. DOLA DUTTA
D/O- RABI RANJAN DUTTA
R/O- ASHIT NAGAR
P.O.
P.S. AND DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM
PIN- 786001
Page No.# 2/13
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH
For the Petitioner(s)
: Mr. N. N. Upadhyaya, Advocate
For the Respondent(s)
: Ms. S. Sharma, Advocate
: Mr. G. Bokolial, Government Advocate
·
Date on which Judgment was reserved
: N/A
·
Date of Pronouncement of Judgment
: 15.05.2026
·
Whether the pronouncement is of
the Operative Part of the Judgment
: No
·
Whether the full Judgment has been
Pronounced
: Yes
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. N. N. Upadhyaya, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the Petitioner and Mr. G. Bokolial, the learned Government Advocate
appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.1. I have also heard Ms. S.
Sharma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.4.
None appears on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
2.
The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated
11.08.2023 passed by the Chairperson of the Dibrugarh Municipal Board,
whereby it was opined that both the Petitioner as well as the Respondent
No.4 would continue their possession and occupation upon their individual
site premises subject to the condition that they will remain within their
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respective site premises. It was also opined that the Petitioner as well as the
Respondent No.4 shall have to abide by the terms and conditions as well as
the rules and regulations of the Dibrugarh Municipal Authority in force and
any other terms and conditions to be enforced by the Authority.
3.
It is relevant to take note of that the said order dated 11.08.2023 was
passed pursuant to certain directions passed by this Court. To appreciate
that, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the brief facts which led to
the filing of the present writ petition.
4.
It is the case of the Petitioner that the Dibrugarh Municipality, as it then
was, leased out a plot of land admeasuring 21 ft. x 50 ft i.e. 1,050 square
feet included in Dag No.618 of Periodic Patta No.91(new) within the
Marwaripatty Ward, Dibrugarh Town, Sadar Sub-Division of Dibrugarh in the
District of Dibrugarh to the grandfather of the Petitioner.
5.
It is the further case of the Petitioner that his grandfather had
constructed a shop house over the said plot of land and the said shop house
was covered by a Municipal Holding No.276 of Ward No. 11 of Dibrugarh
Municipality. The said shop house was rented out to the Respondent No.4 on
monthly rent basis on the condition that the Respondent No.4 would vacate
and deliver possession of the said shop house to the Petitioner as and when
required.
6.
Pursuant thereto, in the year 1995, a fresh lease deed was entered into
by and between the Petitioner’s father and the Dibrugarh Municipality in
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respect to the said plot of land and the area was specifically identified as Site
No.15 in a map enclosed to the lease deed. The period of the lease was 20
years with effect from 01.04.1995 to 31.03.2015.
7.
It is the further case of the Petitioner that on the night of 06.06.1989, a
devastating fire broke in by which the shop of the Petitioner was gutted and
the Petitioner thereupon constructed the same with the due permission of
the Dibrugarh Municipality. Upon reconstruction, some part of the shop was
again rented out to the Respondent No.4. However, in the year 1997, a
notice was issued by the Executive Officer of the Dibrugarh Municipality
asking the Petitioner to show cause as to why the lease agreement should
not be terminated upon certain allegations. The Petitioner submitted the
show cause notice and further came to learn that the show cause notice was
issued at the instance of the Respondent No.4.
8.
It is the further case of the Petitioner that the Respondent No.4 also
defaulted in making payment.
9.
The Petitioner on 09.07.1997 was served with a copy of an order passed
by the Executive Officer, Dibrugarh Municipality dated 26.05.1997, wherein it
was informed that the registered deed entered into by and between the
Petitioner and the Dibrugarh Municipality was partly cancelled to the extent
of 13 ft x 50 ft area which was under the occupation of the Respondent No.4
who was a tenant of the Petitioner.
10. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner filed a suit before the Court of the
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learned Munsiff No.1 at Dibrugarh which was registered and numbered as
Title Suit No.10/2009 seeking for declaration that the order dated
26.05.1997 passed by the Executive Officer, Dibrugarh Municipality, in favour
of the Respondent No. 4 granting him lease of the property mentioned in the
schedule thereby cancelling partly the Petitioner's lease agreement dated
31.08.1995 was null and void; for cancellation of the lease granted in favour
of the Respondent No.4 which have been mentioned in the order dated
26.05.1997 as well as for recovery of possession of the leased out premises
by the Petitioner from the Respondent No.4.
11. The said suit was decreed in favour of the Petitioner vide a judgment
and decree dated 21.03.2013 whereby the Court of the learned Munsiff
No.1, Dibrugarh declared that the order dated 26.05.1997 passed by the
Executive Officer, Dibrugarh Municipality, whereby the lease granted to the
Petitioner was partly cancelled to be null and void and the Dibrugarh
Municipality was directed to restore the possession of the Petitioner over the
suit premises. Further to that, the Respondent No.4 was also directed to
deliver vacant possession of the suit premises to the petitioner.
12. Being aggrieved, the Respondent No.4 filed an Appeal before the Court
of the learned Civil Judge at Dibrugarh, which was registered and numbered
as Title Appeal No.32/2013. The learned First Appellate Court vide the
judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 upheld the findings of the learned
Trial Court insofar as the Issue No.(iv) i.e. as regards the legality and validity
of the order dated 26.05.1997. However, insofar as the decision pertaining to
as to whether the Respondent No.4 was a tenant of the Petitioner, was
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interfered with. The learned First Appellate Court vide the said judgment and
decree dated 17.08.2017 directed the Dibrugarh Municipality to call upon the
Respondent No.4 as well as the legal representatives of the Plaintiff (the
Petitioner herein) by giving sufficient time and after giving them reasonable
opportunities of hearing to review the impugned order dated 12.06.1997 and
thereupon pass a Speaking Order afresh. It was further directed that the
said process be completed within 3 (three) months from the date of receipt
of the copy of the judgment and decree.
13. The record reveals that the said judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017
passed in Title Appeal No.32/2013 had not been put to challenge by filing a
Second Appeal. Subsequent thereto, it is seen that on 01.03.2019, a lease
deed was entered into by and between the Respondent No.2 with the
Respondent No.4. The records further reveal that the Executive Officer of the
Respondent No.2 issued a notice dated 18.11.2020 to both the Petitioner as
well as the Respondent No.4. It is under such circumstances, the
Respondent No.4 had approached this Court by filing a writ petition which
was registered and numbered as WP(C) No.5638/2020 challenging the
notice dated 18.11.2020. This Court vide a judgment and order dated
11.11.2022, had disposed of the said writ petition holding inter alia that the
lease deed which was entered into by and between the Respondent No.2
with the Respondent No.4 was contrary to the directions passed by the
learned First Appellate Court in the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017
in Title Appeal No.32/2013 and under such circumstances, this Court
interfered with the lease deed dated 01.03.2019. The analysis and
determination by this Court in the judgment and order dated 11.11.2022 is
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contained at Paragraph Nos. 12 and 13 which being relevant are reproduced
herein under:
“12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused
the materials on record. It appears from the judgment and decree
passed by the First Appellate Court that there was a specific direction
given to the Dibrugarh Municipal Board to review the order dated
12.06.1997 by giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the
parties and thereupon to pass a speaking order afresh. It was
specifically directed that the whole process be completed within a
period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the said
judgment and order. The petitioner has not filed any order passed by
the Dibrugarh Municipal Board in pursuance of the direction passed by
the Court of the Civil Judge at Dibrugarh in Title Appeal No.32/2013.
On the other hand, the respondent No.4 has placed on record the
minutes of the hearing which was held on 15th November, 2017
wherein the respective contentions of were taken note of. It further
appears from the communication dated 16.11.2017 issued by the
Chairman, Dibrugarh Municipal Board that there was a request seeking
extension for holding the review hearing with regard to the direction
passed in the judgment and decree in Title Appeal No.32/2013 and
thereby to grant another 90 days in that regard. Thereupon abruptly it
appears that the Lease Deed was entered into with the petitioner on
01.03.2019. When the petitioner filed an application before the
Chairman, Dibrugarh Municipal Board seeking a copy of the order so
passed in pursuance of the direction passed in Title appeal No.32/2013,
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the Chairman, Dibrugarh Municipal Board rather than serving a copy of
the said order had only provided a copy of the Lease Deed dated
01.03.2019. Thereupon when the matter came up to the attention
before the Executive Officer, Dibrugarh Municipal Board he sought to
comply with the direction passed by the First Appellate Court in Title
Appeal No.32/2013 and accordingly had issued the impugned notice.
The petitioner who is already the beneficiary of the action of the
Dibrugarh Municipal Board therefore has filed the instant writ petition
challenging the said action on the ground that the Dibrugarh Municipal
Board has already adjudicated the said matter and granted a fresh
lease dated 01.03.2019. The said case made out by the petitioner
challenging the notice issued in 18.11.2020 on the face of it do not call
for any interference on the ground that the Dibrugarh Municipal Board
has not passed any speaking order as directed by the First Appellate
Court in Title Appeal No.32/2013 dated 17.08.2017. It has to be taken
note of that the First Appellate Court was categorical in passing the
directions to pass a speaking order. As none of the parties could
produce the order, the very edifice of the petitioner’s case does not
exist for which the instant petition is devoid of any merits and
consequently
dismissed.
The
interim
order
passed
earlier
on
18.12.2020 accordingly stands vacated.
13.
Before concluding, this Court would further like to observe
and direct the Dibrugarh Municipal Board, Dibrugarh to forthwith take
appropriate action as directed in the judgment and decree dated
17.08.2017 in Title Appeal No.32/2013 by giving an opportunity to both
Page No.# 9/13
the parties and thereupon pass an order in accordance with law. This
exercise be completed within a period of 2 (two) months from the date
a certified copy of the instant order is served upon the Chairman,
Dibrugarh Municipal Board, Dibrugarh. Taking into account that there
was no compliance to the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017, the
Lease Deed dated 01.03.2019 is also interfered with.”
14. The records further reveal that in pursuance thereto, the impugned
order was passed on 11.08.2023 which is the subject matter of the present
dispute.
15. This Court has taken note of that upon the filing of the present writ
petition, this Court vide an order dated 24.11.2023 issued notice.
16. The Respondent No.4 has filed a detailed affidavit-in-opposition thereby
supporting the order dated 11.08.2023. This Court has duly perused the
contents of the said affidavit-in-opposition as well as the enclosures to the
said affidavit-in-opposition.
17. In the backdrop of the above, this Court has also heard the learned
counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and has duly perused the
materials on record.
18. From a perusal of the impugned order dated 11.08.2023, it is seen that
the Respondent No.2 after taking into account the documents which were
placed by the parties, i.e. the Petitioner as well as the Respondent No.4,
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came to a categorical findings that both the parties had reconstructed the
shop building thereon at their individual site premises at their own cost after
the permission was granted on 14.06.1991. It was further mentioned that
individual lease deeds were executed by the Dibrugarh Municipal Authority in
favour of the Petitioner as well as the Respondent No.4. Insofar as the
Respondent No.4 is concerned, lease deed was entered into on 24.06.1997,
31.10.2008 and again on 01.10.2019 (sic 01/03/2019). Insofar as the
Petitioner is concerned, lease deed was entered into on 02.08.1976 and
thereupon on 1st day of April, 1995.
On the basis of the above, it was opined that both the parties continue
their possession and occupation upon their individual site premises subject
to the condition that they would remain within their respective site premises.
19. Mr. N. N. Upadhyay, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner submitted that the Dibrugarh Municipality had not decided as per
the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 passed in Title Appeal No.
32/2013 inasmuch as, the learned First Appellate Court had already upheld
the decision of the learned Trial Court whereby the order dated 26.05.1997
was held to be null and void.
20. The learned counsel for the Petitioner therefore submitted that it was
the incumbent duty of the Respondents Nos.2 and 3 to decide as to whether
the Respondent No.2 without cancelling the subsisting agreement dated
01.04.1995, which was valid up till 31.03.2015 could have unilaterally
cancelled partly the lease and grant a lease in favour of the Respondent
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No.4. The learned counsel submitted that the Dibrugarh Municipality
completely failed to take into account that the lease dated 24.06.1997 was
on the basis of the order dated 26.05.1997 which was already declared to be
null and void and therefore there was a duty cast upon the Dibrugarh
Municipality to decide the same.
21. Per contra, Ms. S. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the Respondent No.4 submitted that the impugned order which have been
passed duly takes note of that the Respondent No.4 had established the
shop in the present premises wherein it is functioning since the year 1985
and this would be apparent from a perusal of the order dated 11.08.2023
and more particularly the finding No.2. She therefore submitted that these
are questions of fact which have been adjudicated by an authority and this
Court may not like to interfere with the order dated 11.08.2023. In that
regard, the learned counsel referred to the various documents enclosed to
the affidavit-in-opposition in support of the Respondent No.4’s claim over the
premises.
22.
This Court has given an anxious consideration to the respective
submissions.
23. The issue which arises in the present writ petition is whether the
Respondent No.4’s shop is within Site No.15 which is the land leased out to
the Petitioner in terms with the lease deed dated 01.04.1995.
24. This Court had duly taken note of the order dated 11.08.2023 and there
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is nothing decided by the Dibrugarh Municipality in respect to the said issue.
In fact, in terms with the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 passed by
the learned First Appellate Court, the Dibrugarh Municipality was required to
decide this very aspect. Under such circumstances, it is the opinion of this
Court that the impugned order dated 11.08.2023 passed by the Chairperson
of the Respondent No.2 as well as the Respondent No.3 is contrary to the
judgment and decree dated 17.08.2017 passed in Title Appeal No. 32/2013
as well as the directions so passed by this Court in the order dated
11.11.2022 in WP(C) No.5638/2020.
25.
Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands disposed of with the
following observations and directions:
(i)
The impugned order dated 11.08.2023 passed by the Chairperson of
the Respondent No.2 as well as by the Respondent No.3 is set aside
and quashed.
(ii)
The Respondent Nos.2 and 3 are directed to decide the question as to
whether the leased out premises to the Respondent No.4 is a part of
the land which was leased out to the father of the Petitioner vide the
lease deed dated 01.04.1995 and the area specifically described in the
Schedule to the lease deed dated 01.04.1995 with specific reference to
Site No.15 of the site map enclosed to the said lease deed.
(iii) Upon arriving at the decision on the issue directed to be decided as per
Clause (ii) hereinabove, the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 thereupon shall
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comply with the directions passed by the learned Appellate Court in
the
judgment
and
decree
dated
17.08.2017
in
Title
Appeal
No.32/2013.
(iv) While carrying out the adjudication, the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 shall
give an opportunity of hearing to both the parties i.e. the Petitioner
and the Respondent No.4.
(v) The said exercise be completed within a period of 4 (four) months from
the date a certified copy of the instant judgment is served upon the
Respondent No.3.
(vi) No costs.
JUDGE
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