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W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Extraordinary Jurisdiction)
---------------------------------------------------------------------S.B.: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH K. AGNIHOTRI, CJ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------W.P. (C) No. 20 of 2015
1.
Shri Kunga Nima Lepcha
Son of late C.B. Lepcha,
Resident of at Upper Tathangchen,
Post Office Raj Bhawan,
Police Station, Gangtok,
East Sikkim, Sikkim.
2.
Sonam Lama
S/o late Sh. Chung Tshering Bhutia,
R/o Sang Bazar,
East Sikkim, Sikkim.
3.
Prem Singh Tamang
S/o Sh. Kaloo Singh Tamang
R/o Lumsey Busty, 5th Mile
P.O. Tadong, East Sikkim, Sikkim.
4.
Taraman Rai,
S/o Late Hangjit Rai,
R/o Ranipool, Marchak,
East Sikkim.
5.
Sonam Wangdi Bhutia,
S/o Late Sharki Bhutia,
R/o Hotel Rendezvous,
Gangtok, East Sikkim.
6.
Lalit Sharma
S/o Late Indra Prasad Sharma,
R/o Tarku, South Sikkim.
7.
Labzong Bhutia
S/o Late Akhey Tshering Bhutia
R/o Hospital Road
P.O. Ravangla, South Sikkim.
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
8.
Dawa Lepcha
S/o Sh. Lhazang Lepcha
R/o Lingdong
P.O. Sankalang, Dzongu,
North Sikkim.
9.
Pawan Kumar Gurung
S/o Late D.B. Gurung
R/o Nam Nang, Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
10.
Kamal Neopaney
S/o Pravakar Neopaney,
R/o Lower Sichey, Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
… Petitioners.
Versus
1.
The State of Sikkim,
Through the Chief Secretary
Having his office at
Tashiling, Gangtok,
Gangtok, East Sikkim.
2.
Union of India,
Ministry of Home,
Through Secretary,
North Block,
New Delhi-110001.
3.
The Director
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
Having its office at CGO Complex,
Lodhi Road, New Delhi -
4.
Jt. Director
Central Bureau of Investigation,
Government of India
Nizam Palace, 2nd MSO Building,
15th Floor, 234/4, A J C Bose Road,
Kolkata-700 020.
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
5.
Department of Personnel & Training
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievance
& Pension,
Through its Secretary
Union of India
North Block, New Delhi.
… Respondents.
Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Mr. Arvind Kumar Gupta, Mr. Kausik Chatterjee and
Mr. Ashok Subba, Advocates for the Petitioners.
Mr. A. Mariarputham, Advocate General, Mr. J.B.
Pradhan, Addl. Advocate General with Mr. Santosh Kr.
Chettri and Ms. Pollin Rai, Asstt. Govt. Advocates for
Respondent No. 1.
Mr. Karma Thinlay, Central Govt. Advocate with Mr.
D.K. Siwakoti, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.
None for Respondents No. 3, 4 and 5.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
(06.10.2017)
Satish K. Agnihotri, CJ
Questioning
the
validity
and
constitutionality
of
provisions of Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment
Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as ―DSPE Act‖), as being ultra
vires and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the
instant petition is filed.
The petitioners have also sought
quashment of the notification No. 70/HOME/2010 dated 21 st July
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
2010 (Annexure P-10) whereby and whereunder the general
consent granted earlier was withdrawn prescribing that the prior
consent in respect of public servants employed in connection with
the affairs of the Government of Sikkim and persons employed in
connection with the affairs of any authority subject to the control
of the Government of Sikkim or any corporation, company or
bank owned or controlled by the Government of Sikkim in
offences referred thereto, is required for the investigation of any
such
offence
by
the
Delhi
Special
Police
Establishment
(hereinafter referred to as ―DSPE‖). The petitioners are stated to
be the residents of Sikkim and some petitioners are people‘s
representative and Members of Legislative Assembly.
During
currency of the petition, the original petitioners 2, 3, 4 and 6
have sought withdrawal from the petition, which was accorded by
the order dated 02nd June 2017.
2.
The relevant facts, as projected by the petitioners, are
that after accession of the Kingdom of Sikkim as State of Sikkim
to the republic of India in 1975, the State of Sikkim by
notification dated 20th October 1976 accorded general consent,
as required under Section 6 of DSPE Act to DSPE for the
investigation of offences punishable, as referred thereto, of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ―IPC‖) and
also under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
On 10th July
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
1979 (Annexure P-2), some more offences were included under
grant of consent to DSPE for investigation.
Subsequently, on
24th December 1983, 28th June 1984, 10th December 1984, more
offences were brought under schedule of consent granted to
DSPE. Subsequently, vide notification dated 07 th January 1987,
the State Government withdrew the schedule of consents granted
earlier under Section 6 of DSPE Act.
challenged
in
Kazi
Lhendup
This notification came to be
Dorji
v.
Central
Investigation in Writ Petition (C) No. 313 of 19931.
Bureau
of
It is averred
that the Supreme Court quashed the notification dated 07th
January 1987.
Consequent thereupon, a notification dated 2nd July
3.
1994 was issued by the Government of Sikkim, wherein it was
clarified that consent given by the State Government under
Section 6 of DSPE Act for investigation of offences by DSPE stood
revived with effect from 7th January 1987, as per the schedule of
consents given earlier in letters dated 20th October 1976, 10th
July 1979, 24th December 1983, 28th June 1984 and 10th
December 1984.
Offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 were further added vide notification dated 2nd July
1994.
(1994) Supp 2 SCC 116
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
4.
It appears that the first petitioner along with others
filed a writ petition by way of public interest litigation under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the Supreme Court,
being Kunga Nima Lepcha & others v. State of Sikkim & others
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 353 of 2006), seeking a direction to the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) against the founder
President of the Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF), who have been
the Chief Minister of the Government of Sikkim since 12 th
December 1994. The Supreme Court, while rejecting the prayer
of the petitioners vide order dated 25th March 20102, observed
that it was open to the petitioners to approach the investigative
agencies directly with the incriminating materials and it is for the
investigative agencies to decide on the further course of action.
5.
General consent accorded to DSPE earlier came to be
withdrawn vide notification dated 21st July 2010, which is sought
to be impugned in the instant petition.
It appears that Justice
R.K. Patra Commission was appointed to look into the allegations
made by the petitioners.
In the meantime, Sikkim Lokayukta
Act, 2014 was notified by the State of Sikkim on 27th February
2014. Accordingly, all the allegations made in the petition were
transferred to the Lokayukta and the same is under examination.
(2010) 4 SCC 513
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
6.
Mr. Arvind Kumar Gupta, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioners would contend that the impugned notification
dated 21st July 2010 issued in exercise of Section 6 of DSPE Act
does not serve any public purpose as it was with sole motive to
protect the corrupt persons.
Mr. Gupta would further contend
that on conjoint reading of Sections 5 and 6 of DSPE Act, there is
no contemplation of classification of offences on the basis of
offender.
Thus, the issuance of notification is colourable
exercise, which is illegal, perverse, arbitrary and mala fide. It is
further urged that there was no reason to withdraw the
notification all of a sudden, when the charges of corruption
leveled against the public functionaries came to light.
There is
no rational and reasonableness in issuance of the said notification
and by virtue of this notification, two separate classes have been
carved out by the State of Sikkim, one is for the offence
committed by Central Government servants and another is by
the
State
Government
servants.
This
distinction
and
discrimination is unreasonable, perverse and improper, as it
defeats the object and purpose of the enactment.
It is also
contended that the Lokayukta has no power to examine the
validity of the impugned notification.
It is also canvassed that
after establishment of Lokayukta on 27th February 2014, how the
report dated 05th March of Justice Patra Commission was
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
submitted, when according to the State Government, Justice
Patra Commission ceased to exist on creation of Lokayukta
establishment on 27th February 2014.
This confusion indicates
that the respondents are avoiding and scuttling the issue to
protect themselves.
There is no provision under Section 6 of
DSPE Act, empowering the State Government to withdraw the
consent already given. Issuance of the notification is bad for the
ground the allegations are against Council of Ministers.
The
State Government has no power to withdraw the consent, even
under the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 (hereinafter referred to as ―the Act of 1897‖) as the Act of
1897 is not applicable to DSPE Act, which is a piece of conditional
legislation and the exercise made under Section 6 is not
reversible.
To bolster up the aforestated contention, Mr. Gupta
refers to and relies on the observations made by the Supreme
Court in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and others 3,
Maharashtra Land Development Corporation and others v. State
of Maharashtra and another 4 , and Subramanian Swamy v.
Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another5.
7.
In
oppugnation,
Mr.
A.
Mariarputham,
learned
Advocate General appearing for the first respondent, would
(1991) 4 SCC 54
(2011) 15 SCC 616
(2014) 8 SCC 682
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
contend that DSPE Act is a preconstitution legislation. Drawing a
reference from Entry 39 of the Federal Legislative List of the
Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, it is
submitted that under Entry 80 of List-I (Union List) of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, Parliament is
competent to frame Section 6 of the DSPE Act, which is legal
within the frame work of the Constitutional Scheme. In support,
he refers to a decision in The Management of Advance Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Shri Gurudasmal and others6, wherein it was observed
that the investigation by the CBI could be extended to any State
only with the consent of the State. It is further contended that
Sections 5 and 6 have to be read and understood together. In
the event, Section 6 is held to be ultra vires, Section 5 cannot be
operative and be also held as invalid.
8.
―Police‖ is a State subject and the investigation of
allegation of corruption can be done by the local police also.
It
is further urged that after establishment of Lokayukta, in
pursuance of Section 63 of the Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 2013,
the allegation of corruption has to be investigated by the
Lokayukta and not by the CBI.
9.
It is further submitted that the State Government is
fully competent to withdraw the consent, as is done in the
1970 (1) SCC 633
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
present case, vide impugned notification dated 21 st July 2010.
The impugned notification has been accepted by the Central
Government, as is evident from the notification dated 13th April
2011, which is not the subject matter of challenge under this
petition.
10.
Responding to the plea of unreasonable classification,
Mr. Mariarputham would submit that the Central Government
employees and State Government employees form two separate
classes and as such classification is valid.
It is also contended
that reliance of the petitioners in Subramaniyam Swamy’s case5
is misplaced as there was sub classification among the Central
Government employees, giving a preferential treatment to some
employees holding the rank of Joint Secretary and above.
The
Supreme Court held that the classification was unreasonable.
11.
Referring to the observation made
by the Supreme
Court in M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of M.P. and
others 7, on the question of mala fide, Mr. Mariarputham would
submit that the allegation of mala fide is also misplaced as there
cannot be an allegation of mala fide against the Council of
Ministers as a body.
(2004) 8 SCC 788
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
12.
Mr. Mariarputham would further submit that the first
petitioner has withdrawn his writ petition being Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 328 of 2011 8 , on 08th August 2011, wherein liberty
was reserved to challenge the order by which the State
Government declined to give the consent to the CBI for
investigation.
The petitioner failed to challenge the decision of
the State Government dated 09th February 2011, whereby the
State Government declined to give consent.
The impugned
notification was the subject matter of one more petition in W.P.
(C) No. 16 of 20129, alleging mala fide in issuance of impugned
notification. The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition on
26th August 2014 observing that it was for Lokayukta to deal with
the allegations and declined the relief. The petitioner moved the
Supreme Court again in a writ petition, which was withdrawn on
18th December 2014 ex-parte without referring the earlier order
passed by the Supreme Court on the issue.
13.
On the issue of alternative prayer, learned Advocate
General would contend that in Writ Petition No. 16 of 2012 9, the
relief sought for was to quash the impugned notification and also
a direction to the Governor to accord sanction for prosecution
Kunga Nima Lepcha v. State of Sikkim and others
Delay Namgyal Barfungpa and another v. State of Sikkim and others
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
and direction to the CBI to register a case and prosecute the
second respondent therein. The said writ petition was disposed of
on having come to know that the Lokayukta consisting a retired
Chief
Justice
of
High
Court,
a
Judicial
Member
and
an
Administrative Member has been constituted and as such the
Lokayukta was requested to deal with the allegations, declining
other reliefs. As such, this Court may not sit over the Judgment
of the Supreme Court.
Thus, this petition deserves to be
dismissed.
14.
Supporting the contention put forth by the first
respondent, Mr. Karma Thinlay, learned Central Government
Counsel appearing for the second respondent (Union of India),
submits that the impugned notification is valid in accordance with
law and it has duly been accepted by the Union of India by
notification dated 13th April 2011 to that effect.
15.
The 3rd and 4th respondents (CBI) have categorically
stated in their affidavit dated 14th November 2015 that the
members of DSPE are not authorized to exercise power and
jurisdiction under Section 6 of DSPE Act, in absence of the
consent granted by the concerned State. Section 6 is framed in
view of the legislative field reserved for Parliament under Entry
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
80 of List-I and the State Government is competent to exercise
power of consent and as such the Section 6 of DSPE Act is
neither unconstitutional not
invalid or illegal.
The State
Government is fully empowered to withdraw its consent.
The
CBI, on receipt of a complaint by the first petitioner in May 2010
processed the complaint and made a request to the State
Government on 12th October 2010 to grant sanction/approval for
conducting investigation under Section 6 of DSPE Act, as the
general consent was withdrawn vide impugned notification dated
21st July 2010, which was declined by the State Government vide
letter dated 09th February 2011.
Thus, no further investigation
was conducted. The provisions of the Act are in accordance with
the constitution and law, warranting no interference.
16.
I have given anxious consideration to the submissions
put forth by the learned counsel appearing for the parties,
examined the pleadings and documents appended thereto.
17.
DSPE Act, 1946 was enacted to constitute a special
police force, to be called the Delhi Special Police Establishment
for the investigation, in any Union Territory, of offences notified
under Section 3.
investigated
by
Section 3 deals with the offences to be
special
police
establishment.
Section
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
prescribes for extension of powers and jurisdiction of special
police establishment to other areas, which reads as under: ―Extension of powers and jurisdiction of
special police establishment to other areas.—
(1) The Central Government may by order
extend to any area (including Railway areas),
1[in 2[a State, not being a Union territory]]
the powers and jurisdiction of members of the
Delhi Special Police Establishment for the
investigation of any offences or classes of
offences specified in a notification under
section 3.
(2) When by an order under sub-section (1)
the powers and jurisdiction of members of the
said police establishment are extended to any
such area, a member thereof may, subject of
any orders which the Central Government
may make in this behalf, discharge the
functions of a police officer in that area and
shall, while so discharging such functions, be
deemed to be a member of a police force of
that area and be vested with the powers,
functions and privileges and be subject to the
liabilities of a police officer belonging to that
police force.
(3) where any such order under sub-section
(1) is made in relation to any area, then,
without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (2) any member of the Delhi Special
Police Establishment of or above the rank of
Sub-Inspector may subject to any orders
which the Central Government may make in
this behalf, exercise the powers of the officer
in charge of a police station in that area and
when so exercising such powers, shall be
deemed to be an officer in charge of a police
station discharging the functions of such an
officer within the limits of his station.‖
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
18.
Section 6, which was inserted with effect from 6 th
March 1952, provides for consent of the State Government to
exercise powers and jurisdiction, reads as under: “6. Consent of State Government to exercise
of
powers
and
jurisdiction.—
Nothing
contained in section 5 shall be deemed to
enable any member of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment to exercise powers and
jurisdiction in any area in a State, not being a
Union territory or railway area, without the
consent of the Government of that State.‖
19.
Constitutionality of Section 6, wherein the State
Government has power to grant consent for investigation of
offence by DSPE is assailed in this petition.
Article 245 of the
Constitution of India empowers Parliament and the Legislature of
the States to make laws. Parliament is competent to make laws
for the whole or any part of the territory of India. Article 246 of
the Constitution contemplates that Parliament has exclusive
power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule.
20.
Entry 80 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule
provides for extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members
of a police force belonging to any State to any area outside that
State, with the consent of the Government of that State. Entry
80 of List I – Union List reads as under: -
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
―80. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction
of members of a police force belonging to any
State to any area outside that State, but not
so as to enable the police of one State to
exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area
outside that State without the consent of the
Government of the State in which such area is
situated; extension of the powers and
jurisdiction of members of a police force
belonging to any State to railway areas
outside that State.‖
Entry 2, List II-State List, deals with ‗police‘, as the
21.
subject matter of the State. The DSPE is a police force belonging
to any State from its inception within the meaning of Entry 80 of
Union List of the Seventh Schedule, corresponding to Entry 39 of
the federal legislative list of Seventh Schedule to the Government
of India Act, 1935. The issue came up for consideration in
Management
of
the
Advance
Insurance
Co.
Ltd.
v.
Shri
Gurudasmal, Supdt. of Police and others 10 before a Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court, wherein it was held that DSPE is a
Central Government Police Force. The Delhi High Court held as
under: ―14. ………… We have already stated that the
Delhi Special Police Establishment was a
Central Government Police Force.
It,
however, belonged to Delhi inasmuch as it
was constituted and functioned in Delhi. In
respect of its political or governmental
character, it was under the control of the
Central Government.
In respect of its
constitution and functioning, it was located in
Delhi. Therefore, the words ―for the State of
Delhi‖ or ―for the Chief Commissioner‘s
AIR 1969 Delhi 330
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
Province of Delhi‖ which existed in the Act
prior to the amendment of 1952 had never
meant
that
the
Delhi
Special
Police
Establishment was a police force of the State
of Delhi or of the Chief Commissioner‘s
Province of Delhi in the sense that it was
under the control of the Chief Commissioner
of the Part C State of Delhi or of the Chief
Commissioner‘s Province of Delhi. Therefore,
the substitution of the words ―in Delhi‖ for the
words ―for the State of Delhi‖ did not in any
way change the constitution and the
functioning or the nature of the Delhi Special
Police Establishment.
They remained the
same.‖
22.
It is a trite law that the entries in the various lists of
the Seventh Schedule are not source of legislative power but are
only indicative of the fields which the appropriate legislature is
competent to legislate.
It is apposite to refer to observations
made by the Supreme Court in various cases.
23.
In Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia and others vs.
Union of India and others11, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court held as under:
―8.
Before construing these entries it is
useful to notice some of the well-settled rules
of interpretation laid down by the Federal
Court and by this Court in the matter of
construing the entries. The power to legislate
is given to the appropriate Legislatures by
Article 246 of the Constitution. The entries in
the three lists are only legislative heads or
fields of legislation; they demarcate the area
over which the appropriate Legislatures can
operate. It is well-established that the widest
amplitude should be given to the language of
the entries. But some of the entries in the
1969 (2) SCC 166
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
different lists or in the same list may overlap
or may appear to be in direct conflict with
each other. It is then the duty of this Court to
reconcile the entries and bring about a
harmonious construction. ………………………………‖
24.
In Union of India vs. Shri Harbhajan Singh Dhillon12,
the Supreme Court held as under:
―22. It
must be remembered that the
function of the lists is not to confer powers;
they merely demarcate the legislative field.
…………‖
25.
Subsequently, in Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and
others vs. State of U.P. and others13, again a Constitution Bench
observed as under:
―67. ……………………………………
It is well settled
that the various entries in the three lists of
the Indian Constitution are not powers but
fields of legislation. The power to legislate is
given by Article 246 and other Articles of the
Constitution. The three lists of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution are legislative
heads or fields of legislation.
These
demarcate
the
area
over
which
the
appropriate legislatures can operate. It is well
settled that widest amplitude should be given
to the language of the entries in three Lists
but some of these entries in different lists or
in the same list may override and sometimes
may appear to be in direct conflict with each
other, then and then only comes the duty of
the court to find the true intent and purpose
and to examine the particular legislation in
question. Each general word should be held
to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters
which
can
fairly
and
reasonably
be
comprehended in it. In interpreting an entry
it would not be reasonable to import any
1971 (2) SCC 779
(1990) 1 SCC 109
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
limitation by comparing or contrasting that
entry with any other in the same list. It has
to be interpreted as the Constitution must be
interpreted as an organic document in the
light of the experience gathered.
In the
constitutional scheme of division of powers
under the legislative lists, there are separate
entries pertaining to taxation and other laws.
………………………………‖
26.
The
true
nature
and
character
of
legislation
is
determined to which Entry it belongs, in its pith and substance.
The Supreme Court in Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals,
Trichur and others v. State of Kerala and others 14 observed as
under: ―13. In determining whether an enactment is
a legislation ―with respect to‖ a given power,
what is relevant is not the consequences of
the enactment on the subject-matter or
whether it affects it, but whether, in its pith
and substance, it is a law upon the subjectmatter in question. ………‖
27.
A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court examining
the scope and jurisdiction of DSPE in The Management of
Advance Insurance Co. Ltd.6 , held as under:
―12. This entry speaks of a ―police force
belonging to any State‖ and not of a police
force belonging to the Union Territory. The
adaptation of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act by the Adaptation of Laws
(No. 3) Order, 1956 by substituting ―Union
Territories‖ in place of ―Part C States‖, it is
said, cut the Act adrift from the entry under
which the power could alone be exercised.
This power is limited in extent, it is argued,
(1981) 4 SCC 391
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
and cannot be used except as specifically
conferred and it applies to a police force
belonging to a State and not Union Territory.
In reply the provisions of the General Clauses
Act, as adapted by Adaptation Order (No. 1)
were brought to our notice. Section 3(58) of
the General Clauses Act was adapted to read:
―State—
(a) as respects any period before
the commencement of the Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall
mean a Part A State, a Part B State or a
Part C State; and
(b) as respects any period after
such commencement, shall mean a
State specified in the First Schedule to
the Constitution and shall include a
Union Territory.‖
Previously the definition read:
―State shall mean a Part A State, a
Part B State or a Part C State.‖
This definition furnishes a complete answer to
the difficulty which is raised since Entry 80
must be read so as to include Union Territory.
Therefore members of a police force belonging
to the Union Territory can have their powers
and jurisdiction extended to another State
provided the Government of that State
consents. ……………‖
(emphasis supplied)
28.
Again in A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration 15 the
extension of power under DSPE Act was examined, wherein the
Supreme Court held as under: ―13. ………………
Section 3 which empowers the Central
Government to specify the offences to be
investigated by the DSPE. has already been
(1973) 1 SCC 726
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
set
out.
The
notification
dated
November 6, 1956,
referred
to
earlier
specifies numerous offences under various
enactments including a large number of
ordinary offences under IPC clauses (a) to (j)
of this notification take within their fold
offences under a number of statutes specified
therein. Clause (k) extends the sweep of this
notification by including in its scope attempts,
abatements and conspiracies in relation to or
in connection with offences mentioned in
clauses (a) to (h) and also any other offence
committed in the course of those transactions
arising out of the same facts. It may also be
stated that after 1956 in a number of further
notifications the list of the offences specified
under Section 3 has increased manifold. We
consider it unnecessary to refer to them in
detail.
According
to
Section
the
superintendence of DSPE vests in the Central
Government and Section 5 empowers the
Central Government to extend to any area in
a State not being a Union Territory the powers
and
jurisdiction
of
members
of
this
establishment for the investigation of any
offences or classes of offences specified under
Section 3. Subject to the orders of the Central
Government
the
members
of
such
Establishment exercising such extended
powers and jurisdiction are to be deemed to
be members of the Police force of that area
for the purpose of powers, functions,
privileges and liabilities. But the power and
jurisdiction of a member of DSPE in such
State is to be exercised only with the consent
of the Government of the State concerned.
The scheme of this Act does not either
expressly or by necessary implication divest
the regular police authorities of their
jurisdiction, powers and competence to
investigate into offences under any other
competent law. As a general rule, it would
require clear and express language to
effectively exclude as a matter of law the
power of investigation of all the offences
mentioned in this notification from the
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
jurisdiction and competence of the regular
police authorities conferred on them by CrPC
and other laws and to vest this power
exclusively in the DSPE. The DSPE Act seems
to be only permissive or empowering,
intended merely to enable the DSPE also to
investigate into the offences specified as
contemplated by Section 3 without imparting
any other law empowering the regular police
authorities to investigate offences.‖
29.
Section 6 of DSPE Act is constitutional and valid, as
Parliament is competent to enact such a provision as stated
under Entry 80 of List I-Union List, prescribing power to grant
consent for the concerned State Government, to enable a
member of DSPE to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area
in the State.
Under the legislative scheme, Parliament has no
competence to extend power and jurisdiction of DSPE to any
other State without consent of the concerned State.
30.
The next issue is as to whether the impugned
notification
dated
21st
July
is
illegal
or
invalid.
Indisputably, the State Government has granted consent to the
extension of powers and jurisdiction to a member of DSPE in the
whole of State for investigation of offences punishable under
different provisions of the Penal Code, referred thereto, vide
letter dated 20th October 1976, which was further extended to
the offences provided under letter dated 10th July 1979 and
further by order dated 24th December 1983, consent was
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
accorded for investigation of offences punishable under Section
22, 23 and 25 of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976
(49 of 1976). Vide order dated 28th June 1984, further offences
punishable under Section 4 and 5 of the Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982
(65 of 1982) was brought within the schedule of consent granted
by the State Government. Again by order dated 10 th December
1984, some more offences were included in the schedule.
31.
various
All the consent granted earlier for investigation of
offences
as
provided
therein
was
withdrawn
vide
notification dated 07th January 1987, which came to be assailed
in the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 313 of 1993 1.
The Supreme Court upheld the power of the State to withdraw
the consent by notification dated 07th January 1987, clarifying
that the notification would operate only prospectively and the
same would not apply to the cases wherein consent was available
prior thereto.
Thereafter, the consent granted earlier vide
various letters and orders were revived vide notification dated 2nd
July 1994.
The first petitioner along with others moved the
Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 353 of 20062 seeking a direction to the
CBI to investigate the allegations leveled against the founder
President of Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF) who has been the
serving Chief Minister of the State of Sikkim since 12 th December
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
1994. The Supreme Court while dismissing the writ petition vide
order dated 25th March 2010, observed that the petitioner may
approach the investigating agency directly with the incriminating
materials before approaching the Court.
32.
On the heels of, the impugned notification came to be
issued on 21st July 2010, which reads as under:
―
SIKKIM
GOVERNMENT GAZETTE
EXTRA ORDINARY
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
GANGTOK WEDNESDAY 21TH JULY 2010 No.355
GOVERNMENT OF SIKKIM
HOME DEPARTMENT
GANGTOK
No. 70/HOME/2010
Date: 21.07.2010
NOTIFICATION
In order to have uniformity with the other
States in the matter of investigation of cases by
the members of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment, the Governor of Sikkim, in
exercise of the powers, conferred by Section 6 of
the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946
(Act No. 25 of 1946), and in supersession of all
previous notifications on the subject, is pleased
to accord his consent to all members of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment to exercise powers
and jurisdiction under the said Act in the whole
of the State of Sikkim in respect of the
investigation of the following:
(a) Offences committed by public servants
employed in connection with the affairs of the
Government of India and persons employed in
connection with the affairs of any local authority
subject to the control of the Government of India
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
or any corporation, company or bank owned or
controlled by the Government of India: (i)
punishable under Sections 120B, 124-A,
166, 167, 168, 169, 171E, 171F, 182, 193, 196,
197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 204, 211, 218, 231,
232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240,
241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249,
250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258,
259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 263-A, 379, 380, 381,
382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 403,
406, 407, 408, 409, 411, 412, 413, 414, 417,
418, 419, 420, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 472,
473, 474, 475, 476, 477-A, 489-A, 489-B, 489C, 489-D, 489-E, 500, 501, 502 and 505 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860);
(ii) punishable under the Prevention of
Corruption Act 1947 (Act No. 2 of 1947) and the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act No. 49
of 1988);
(iii) attempts, abetments and conspiracies in
relation to, or in connection with, the offences
mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) above.
(b) Offences punishable under the Central Acts
specified in the Annexure appended thereto.
Provided that where public servants employed in
connection with the affairs of the Government of
Sikkim and persons employed in connection with
the affairs of any authority subject to the control
of the Government of Sikkim or any corporation,
company or bank owned or controlled by the
Government of Sikkim are concerned in offences
referred to in items (a) (i) to (iii) and (b) above,
the prior consent of the State Government shall
be obtained for the investigation of any such
offence
by
the
Delhi
Special
Police
Establishment.
By order of the Governor of Sikkim.
Sd/(TT Dorji), IAS
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
Chief Secretary
F. No. GOS/Home-II/84/18
(C.M. Sharma)
Addl. Secretary (C),
Home department ‖
33.
Needless to state that on receipt of the complaint from
the first petitioner, a request was made to the State Government
for grant of consent to initiate formal investigation into the
matters on 12th October 2010 (Annexure P-11) which was
declined on 04th November 2010 (Annexure P-12).
One more
request was made on 20th December 2010 by the CBI. The State
Government again declined to give consent on the ground that
Justice
R.K.
Patra
Commission
has
been
appointed
vide
notification dated 07th January 2011 to examine the allegations
and as such it was not necessary to give consent. It has come
on record that feeling aggrieved, the first petitioner again
preferred a writ petition being Writ Petition (Civil) No. 328 of
20118, in the Supreme Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn
reserving the liberty to the petitioner to file another petition to
challenge the order of the Government of Sikkim whereby the
consent was declined.
It is pertinent to state here that no
petition to assail the order of the State Government to decline
consent was filed.
In the meantime, one Delay Namgyal
Barfungpa with Pema D. Bhutia preferred writ petition, being Writ
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
Petition (Civil) No. 16 of 20129 against the State and the present
Chief Minister of Sikkim in the Supreme Court, assailing the
legality and validity of the instant impugned notification dated
21st July 2010.
Further seeking a direction to the Governor of
the State of Sikkim to accord necessary sanction and in
alternative issue a direction to the CBI to register a regular case
and prosecute the second respondent therein.
The relevant
clause in the petition reads as under:
―a) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction
quashing the notification dated 21-7-2010 issued
by the State of Sikkim so far as it mandates
prior consent of the State Government against
the public servant employed with the affairs of
the State Government in respect of offences
under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988;
b)
Call for the records and quash by a writ in
the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate
writ order or direction, the undisclosed decision
of the Government of Sikkim referring prior
consent for investigation to the request of the
CBI contained in letter dated 12-10-2010 (i.e.
Annexure P-6);
c)
Issue an order or direction to the Governor
of the State of Sikkim in the nature of
mandamus to accord necessary sanction for the
prosecution of the respondent No. 2;
d)
In the alternative issue an order or
direction in the nature of Mandamus directing
the respondents No. 4 and 5 to register regular
cases and prosecute the respondent No. 2 and
others as mentioned in the CBI report forwarded
vide letter dated 12-10-2010;
e)
Grant such other relief/reliefs and pass
such other order/orders as this Hon‘ble court
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of
the case.‖
34.
The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition
recording
that
since
the
Lokayukta
for
Sikkim
has
been
established, the papers in possession of the Justice Patra
Commission
against
the
second
respondent
therein
was
transmitted to the Lokayukta, it was not necessary to consider
the prayer made in the writ petition.
The Lokayukta was
requested to complete the inquiry as early as possible.
35.
It is apposite to state that such allegations are
pending consideration before the Lokayukta, which is headed by
retired Chief Justice of a High Court. In such a situation, whether
it is proper for this Court to examine the validity of impugned
notification which was the subject matter before the Supreme
Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 16 of 2012 9 and the Supreme
Court declined to examine the same, on account of the fact that
the allegations made against the second respondent and others
were pending examination by Lokayukta.
Subsequently, the
petitioner herein filed one more petition, being Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 1036 of 2014 16, which was withdrawn ex-parte with
liberty to approach the High Court.
Shri Kunga Nima Lepcha & others v. The State of Sikkim & others
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
36.
Learned Advocate General has categorically pointed
out that subsequent petition being Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1036 16
of 2014 was withdrawn without disclosing that the earlier
challenge before the Supreme Court was rejected as not being
necessary in view of the pendency of the allegations before the
Lokayukta. On perusal of the writ petition, it appears that it was
stated in the writ petition that the earlier writ petition, filed for
the same relief, was not considered, however, it is not clear as to
whether it was brought into the notice of the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court or not, when petition was withdrawn, ex-parte.
37.
The Act of 1897 is applicable to all enactments in all
situations unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context.
DSPE Act does not exclude applicability of the Act of
1897 in any context.
Competence of the State Government to
accord consent or withdraw the same cannot be doubted.
Section 21 of the Act of 1897 is in the following terms:
―21. Power to issue, to include power to
add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications,
orders, rules or bye-laws.- Where, by any
Central Act or Regulations a power to issue
notifications orders, rules or bye-laws is
conferred, then that power includes a power,
exercisable in the like manner and subject to the
like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to,
amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders,
rules or bye-laws so issued.‖
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
38.
Under Section 21 of the Act of 1897, the authority
which has the power to issue a notification has the undoubted
power to rescind or modify the notification in the like manner.
The Supreme Court, examining the ambit and scope of Section
21 of the Act of 1897, in Rasid Javed v. State of Uttar Pradesh17,
held as under:―55. The aforesaid provision came up for
consideration before the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of
India [AIR 1957 SC 676] way back in 1957.
The majority opinion stated: (AIR p. 685, para
19)
―19. … It is to be remembered that
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act
embodies a rule of construction, and
that rule must have reference to the
context and subject-matter of the
particular statute to which it is being
applied;‖
56. It seems to be fairly settled that under
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, an
authority which has the power to issue a
notification has the undoubted power to
rescind or modify the notification in the like
manner. ………………‖
39.
Further, it was reiterated in Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd.
v. State of Uttar Pradesh18, as under: ―38. Section 21 is based on the principle that
power to create includes the power to destroy
and also the power to alter what is created.
Section 21, amongst other things, specifically
(2010) 7 SCC 781
(2011) 3 SCC 193
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
deals with power to add to, amend, vary or
rescind the notifications. The power to rescind
a notification is inherent in the power to issue
the notification without any limitations or
conditions. Section 21 embodies a rule of
construction. The nature and extent of its
application must be governed by the relevant
statute which confers the power to issue the
notification, etc. However, there is no manner
of doubt that the exercise of power to make
subordinate legislation includes the power to
rescind the same. This is made clear by
Section 21. On that analogy an administrative
decision is revocable while a judicial decision
is
not
revocable
except
in
special
circumstances. Exercise of power of a
subordinate legislation will be prospective and
cannot be retrospective unless the statute
authorises such an exercise expressly or by
necessary implication.
39. The principle laid down in Section 21 is of
general application. The power to rescind
mentioned in Section 21 is without limitations
or conditions. It is not a power so limited as
to be exercised only once. The power can be
exercised from time to time having regard to
the exigency of time. When by a Central Act
power is given to the State Government to
give some relief by way of concession and/or
rebate to newly-established industrial units by
a notification, the same can be curtailed
and/or
withdrawn
by
issuing
another
notification under the same provision and
such exercise of power cannot be faulted on
the ground of promissory estoppel.‖
40.
In the light of the aforestated well-settled principles of
law, I have no hesitation to hold that the State Government has
power to give consent under the valid provision of law and also
to withdraw the same.
Withdrawal of consent to initiate an
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
investigation is not final and it may be granted in any specific
offence in future at any point of time or can be withdrawn.
In
the case on hand, request for consent was made after the State
Government had withdrawn the general consent given vide
earlier notifications.
The impugned notification is valid and
proper and was exercised within the full competence of the State
Government.
41.
The petitioners have further raised the issue of mala
fide against the Council of Ministers chaired by the Chief Minister,
who has approved the issuance of impugned notification. It is a
trite law that mala fide cannot be attributed to an institution, the
members of Council of Ministers without impleading them by
name and person. In the case on hand, mala fide is attributed
without setting out details and without impleading any one in the
case, as party.
Thus, the allegation of mala fide cannot be
countenanced.
42.
In M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of M.P.
and others19, the Supreme Court held as under: ―25. On the same analogy in the absence of
any material brought on record, it may not be
possible to hold that the action on the part of
the Council of Ministers was actuated by any
malice. So far as plea of malice is concerned,
the same must be attributed personally
against the person concerned and not
(2004) 8 SCC 788
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
collectively. Even in such a case the persons
against whom malice on fact is alleged must
be impleaded as parties.‖
43.
In State of M.P. and others v. Nandlal Jaiswal and
others20, the Supreme Court held as under:
―39. ………………… It is true that in the writ
petitions the petitioners used words such as
‗mala fide‘, ‗corruption‘ and ‗corrupt practice‘
but the use of such words is not enough.
What is necessary is to give gull particulars of
such allegations and to set out the material
facts specifying the particular person against
whom such allegations are made so that he
may have an opportunity of controverting
such allegations. …………………‖
44.
Again in State of Bihar and another v. P.P. Sharma,
IAS and another21, the Supreme Court observed as under:
―55. It is a settled law that the person
against whom mala fides or bias was imputed
should be impleaded eo nomine as a party
respondent to the proceedings and given an
opportunity to meet those allegations.
In
his/her absence no enquiry into those
allegations would be made.
Otherwise, it
itself is violative of the principles of natural
justice as it amounts to condemning a person
without an opportunity. ……………‖
45.
In J.N. Banavalikar vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
and another22, the Supreme Court held as under:
(1986) 4 SCC 566
1992 Supp (1) SCC 222
1995 Supp (4) SCC 89
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
―21. ……………… Further, in the absence of
impleadment of the junior doctor who is
alleged to have been favoured by the course
of action leading to removal of the appellant
and the person who had allegedly passed
mala fide order in order to favour such junior
doctor, any contention of mala fide action in
fact i.e. ‗malice in fact‘ should not be
countenanced by the court. …………………‖
46.
In Federation of Railway Officers Association and
others v. Union of India23, the Supreme Court observed as under:
―20. ……………
Allegations regarding mala
fides cannot be vaguely made and it must be
specific and clear. It this context, the Minister
concerned who is stated to be involved in the
formation of the new zone at Hajipur is not
made a party who can meet the allegations.‖
47.
An alternative relief to issue an order or direction to
the 3rd and 4th respondents (CBI) to register an FIR regular case
and prosecute the persons indicted in report dated 12 th October
2010, was sought to be made subsequently by amendment
application dated 30th May 2017.
In view of the order dated 08th
August 2011 rendered in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 328 of 20118 by
the Supreme Court, wherein specific prayer was made for a
direction to the CBI in the same nature as sought for herein, it is
not proper to consider and grant alternative prayer at this stage,
when in pursuance of Section 63 of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas
Act,
2013,
the
Sikkim
Lokayukta
notified on 27th February 2014.
(2003) 4 SCC 289
Act,
has
been
The Lokayukta, comprising
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
of a Chairperson, a retired Chief Justice of a High Court and two
Members,
have
been
properly
constituted.
Further,
the
allegations, as referred in the report dated 12 th October 2010 is
under examination by the Lokayukta, as observed by the
Supreme Court in its order rendered in Writ Petition (Civil) No.
of
20118.
The
Sikkim
Lokayukta
Act
provides
for
constitution of an Inquiry Wing as well as Prosecution Wing, fully
competent to inquire into the allegations and initiate prosecution,
if necessary.
48.
In Bangalore Medical Trust3 cited by Mr. Gupta,
interpretation of Section 19 of the Bangalore Development
Authority Act, 1976 was involved, wherein power was exercised
in absence of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court observed that the
authority exercising discretion must not appear to be impervious
to legislative directions.
In the case on hand, the power was
exercised
the
well
within
competence,
permissible
under
enactment i.e. DSPE Act. Thus, the ratio is not applicable to the
facts involved in the case on hand.
49.
In Maharashtra Land Development Corporation case4,
referred by Mr. Gupta, it was again a case wherein it was held
that in the light of the legislative scheme, the disputed lands will
vest with the respondent State as a private forest. The claim of
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
the Corporation was denied, the Supreme Court observed that
the purpose of the statute and the intention of the legislature in
enacting the same must be of paramount consideration while
interpreting its provisions. The facts are distinguishable and the
ratio laid down therein is not applicable to the facts of this case.
50.
In Subramanian Swamy’s case5, the issue was as to
whether the Central Government is competent to discriminate
the employees on the basis of rank held by the officers for whom,
sanction was required.
Section 6-A of DSPE Act provides for
prior approval of the Central Government, where such allegation
relates to the employees of the Central Government of the level
of Joint Secretary and above, the Supreme Court held as under:―99. In view of our foregoing discussion, we
hold that Section 6-A(1), which requires
approval of the Central Government to
conduct any inquiry or investigation into any
offence alleged to have been committed under
the PC Act, 1988 where such allegation
relates to: (a) the employees of the Central
Government of the level of Joint Secretary
and above, and (b) such officers as are
appointed by the Central Government in
corporations established by or under any
Central Act, government companies, societies
and local authorities owned or controlled by
the Government, is invalid and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution. As a necessary
corollary, the provision contained in Section
26(c) of Act 45 of 2003 to that extent is also
declared invalid.‖
declaring the provision as invalid.
W.P.(C) No. 20 of 2015
Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & Ors.
51.
In the case on hand, there is no such classification
between the employees of different cadre, as consent is required
for extension of power and jurisdiction of DSPE in case of all the
Sikkim
Government
employees
or
other
public
servants
employed in connection with the affairs of the Government of
Sikkim and persons employed in connection with the affairs of
any authority subject to the control of the Government of Sikkim
or any corporation, company or bank owned or controlled by the
Government of Sikkim.
Thus, the ratio laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case is not applicable to the facts of this
case.
52.
The local police as well as members of DSPE have
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate an offence, but in case of
members of DSPE, prior consent of the State Government is
necessary.
53.
For the reasons and analysis made hereinabove, the
petition is bereft of merit and deserves dismissal.
54.
As a sequel, the writ petition is dismissed.
made easy.
Chief Justice
06.10.2017
jk
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