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Sr. No.2
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
CM(8178/2025) IN Arb P 5/2022
CM(1854/2026)
c/w
i)WP(C) 2394/2024
CM(1065/2025) CM(2185/2026)
CM(6433/2024)
KUCHAY
CONSTRUCTION,
CONTRACTOR(SENIOR CITIZEN)
Through:
PWD …Petitioner(s)/appellant(s)
Mr. Manzoor Ahmad Dar, Advocate with
Mr. Luqman S Dar, Advocate &
Mr. Javaid Ahmad, Advocate
Vs.
THE CHIEF ENGINEER AND ORS. (JAL
SHAKTI / PHE DEPARTMENT)
Through:
...Respondent(s)
Mr. A.R. Malik, Sr. AAG with
Mr. Zahid Qais Noor, GA
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
ORDER
30.10.2026
1. This Court is hearing CM No. 8178/2025 in Arbitration Petition No.5 of
2025. The Hon’ble Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated
07.08.2026, directed that the instant CM be listed along with Writ Petition
No.2394/2024. Consequently, both the matters have been tagged together
and are being argued jointly.
2. The prayer in the CM is as follows:
a) "That the parties have been litigating in the matter before the
learned Arbitrator for a considerable period and, as such,
considerable time, energy and financial resources have been
consumed. In view of the fact that the proceedings are at the final
stage, it would be expedient in the interest of justice to allow the
application and grant an extension of time for a period of four
months from the date of grant of this application. The intervening
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period may also be condoned/regularized for facilitating the
learned Arbitrator in finalising the award.
b) That there exists no legal impediment for this Hon‘ble Court to
grant the application in light of the dismissal of the application
seeking termination of the arbitral proceedings.
c) That the ends of justice would be met by allowing the instant
application.
d) That no prejudice whatsoever would be caused to either of the
parties by allowing the application."
3. The prayer in the writ petition is as follows:
I) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the impugned
orders dated 23.08.2024 and 03.09.2024 passed by the learned Sole
Arbitrator, M.A. Chashoo (Advocate), in the arbitration titled Kuchay
Constructions PWD v. Chief Engineer, PHE and Others.
II) Any other writ, order or direction which this Hon‘ble Court may deem
fit and proper may also be issued in favour of the petitioner and against
the respondents.
4. The prayer in the CM is for an extension of the mandate of the learned
Arbitrator. Learned counsel appearing for Kuchay Constructions submits
that, after the arbitration proceedings commenced in tandem with the order
passed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the
matter proceeded until the learned Arbitrator passed an order allowing the
summoning the witness Mr. Fayaz Ahmad Yatoo, the then Assistant
Executive Engineer, Sumbal Division, vide order dated 05.12.2023.
5. Learned counsel for the Union Territory informed the learned Arbitrator that
a writ petition bearing No. 2394/2024 had been filed and was pending
consideration before this Court. Simultaneously, Kuchay Constructions filed
an application seeking an extension of time. However, the learned Arbitrator
stopped the proceedings on the ground that the matter was sub judice before
this Court in Writ Petition No. 2394/2024.
6. Since the questions arising in both the matters are intricately connected, both
the issues have been tagged together and are being argued jointly.
7. The core question arises in the writ petition, in which the impugned orders
dated 23.08.2024 and 03.09.2024 passed by the learned Arbitrator are under
challenge, whereby the power of the Arbitrator to summon a witness during
the course of arbitral proceedings has been questioned. Since the filing and
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pendency of the writ petition resulted in the stoppage of the arbitral
proceedings, therefore, extension of the time of the arbitration proceedings is
a subsequent issue arising out of the determination of the writ petition.
8. Learned counsel for the Union Territory, Mr. Malik, has drawn the attention
of this Court to the order dated 05.12.2023, in which the learned Arbitrator
had allowed the application of the claimant to summon one Mr. Fayaz
Ahmad Yatoo, the then as Assistant Executive Engineer, PHE, Sub-Division
Sumbal, for examination in support of the claimant’s case.
9. Learned counsel for the Union Territory submits that such summoning would
not be sustainable in the eyes of law in view of Section 27 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, which prescribes a procedure for summoning of
witnesses with the assistance of the Court.
10.Learned counsel for the Union Territory has further taken this Court to the
impugned order dated 23.08.2024, whereby the application seeking recall of
the order of summoning was decided by the learned Arbitrator and, while
affirming the earlier order dated 05.12.2023, the witness, namely, Fayaz
Ahmad Yatoo, the then Assistant Executive Engineer, was allowed to be
summoned at the expense of the claimant.
11.Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the power to summon a
witness was not within the powers of the Arbitrator and that, even if such a
summons were issued, then also the learned Arbitrator should have clarified
that the witness was not compelled to appear or depose through any process
issued by the Tribunal itself.
12.Learned counsel appearing for Kuchay Constructions, however, submits that
Section 19 of the Act of 1996 confers ample powers upon the Arbitrator, who
adopts its own procedure, and, therefore, the summoning of the said witness
was in tandem with the law in vogue.
13.Learned counsel for Kuchay Constructions further submits that, once the
learned Arbitrator had independently applied his mind in exercise of the
powers under Section 19 of the Act of 1996, it was the incumbent upon the
Union Territory to comply with the directions so issued rather than seeking
remedies to avoid compliance with the order so made by the learned
Arbitrator.
14. Learned counsel further submits that, in the interest of justice and having
regard to the scheme of the arbitration law, it is necessary to confer greater
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independence upon the Arbitrator, as envisaged under Section 19 of the Act
of 1996, and, thus, any procedure adopted by the Arbitrator ought to be
sustained so that the Arbitrator may pass reasoned and justifiable orders by
adopting a judicious approach.
15.Learned counsel for the Union Territory, Mr. Malik, has, however,
vehemently opposed the aforesaid submissions on the ground that the
procedure under Section 19 could have been adopted only so long as it was
not in contrary to or in conflict with the procedure specifically provided
under the Act, and, once a procedure for seeking assistance of the Court in
taking evidence is provided under Section 27 of the Act, it is not open to the
Arbitrator to repeatedly pass orders which have the effect of compelling a
witness to depose without following the procedure prescribed therein.
16.After hearing the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties,
the limited questions which arise for consideration before this Court are:
(a) Whether an Arbitrator has the power to summon a witness
during the course of arbitral proceedings?
(b) Whether, in the event such a witness does not appear, the
Arbitrator has the power to compel his attendance?
17.After answering the aforesaid two questions, this Court shall consider the
issue of extension of the mandate of the learned Arbitrator beyond the
statutory period.
18.The limited controversy before this Court, therefore, is that the claimant,
Kuchay Constructions, sought the summoning of a witness, namely, Mr.
Fayaz Ahmad Yatoo, posted as Assistant Executive Engineer, PHE, SubDivision Sumbal, which request was acceded to by the learned Tribunal and
summons were issued vide order dated 05.12.2023.
19.The Union Territory filed an application seeking recall of the order dated
05.12.2023, which was reconsidered and reaffirmed by the learned Tribunal
vide order dated 23.08.2024, whereby the learned Arbitrator maintained the
order dated 05.12.2023, and that the witness, namely, Fayaz Ahmad Yatoo,
be summoned at the expense of the claimant.
20.The reiteration of the earlier order, particularly when the same was sought to
be recalled in the interest of justice and the Union Territory was also seeking
its recall on the ground that it should not be compelled to secure the
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attendance of the said witness, the learned Arbitrator, thus, arrived at a
conclusion that, by reiterating the earlier order and rejecting the prayer for
not compelling the witness to appear, the learned Arbitrator effectively
arrived at the conclusion that the witness ought to be summoned.
21.This Court has carefully examined Section 19 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, which reads as follows:
“Section 19 – Determination of rules of procedure
"(1) The arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
(2) Subject to this Part, the parties are free to agree on the procedure
to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings.
(3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), the arbitral
tribunal may, subject to this Part, conduct the proceedings in the
manner it considers appropriate.
(4) The power of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (3) includes
the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and
weight of any evidence."
22.Thus, the determination of the rules of procedure is not governed by the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, whereas
the parties would be free to agree upon the procedure to be followed by the
Arbitral Tribunal and, in the absence of such an agreement, the Arbitral
Tribunal has the power to conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers
appropriate.
23.The powers of the Tribunal include the power to determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence. Thus, the legislature
envisaged broad procedural powers under Section 19 to the Arbitral
Tribunal, with the parties having the liberty to arrive at a conclusion
regarding the procedure to be followed, while the Tribunal is not being
bound by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Indian Evidence Act.
Thereafter, this Court has carefully examined Section 27 of the Act, which
deals with the power of the Arbitral Tribunal to seek assistance of the Court
in taking evidence.
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Section 27 – Court assistance in taking evidence--(1) provides
that the Arbitral Tribunal, or a party with the approval of the
Arbitral Tribunal, may apply to the Court for assistance in
taking evidence.
(2) The application shall specify--(a) the names and addresses of the parties and the
arbitrators,
(b) the general nature of the claim and the relief sought,
(c) the evidence to be obtained, in particular,__
(i) the name and address of any person to be heard as
witness or expert witness and a statement of the subjectmatter of the testimony required;
(ii) the description of any document to be produced or
property to be inspected..
(3) The Court may, within its competence and according to the
rules applicable to taking evidence, execute the request by
ordering that the evidence be provided directly to the Arbitral
Tribunal.
(4) The Court may, while making such an order, the Court may
issue the same processes to witnesses as it may issue in suits
tried before it.
(5) Persons failing to attend in accordance with such process,
or making any other default, or refusing to give their evidence,
or guilty of any contempt to the arbitral tribunal during the
conduct of arbitral proceedings, shall be subject to the like
disadvantages, penalties and punishments by order of the Court
on the representation of the arbitral tribunal as they would
incur for the like offences in suits tried before the Court.
(6) in this section the expression ― Processes‖ includes
summonses and commissions for the examination of witnesses
and summonses to produce documents.
24. Accordingly, the power has been conferred upon the Court, as defined in
the Act of 1996, to execute the request of the arbitrator for taking evidence
with the authority to issue process to witness in accordance with law.
25. This Court has also taken into consideration the judgment relied upon by
the learned counsel for Kuchay Constructions, which is Silor Associates S.A.
v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., rendered by the Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi and reported as 2014 Legal Eagle (DEL) 913.
26.This Court has perused the aforesaid judgment, particularly paragraphs 15 to
20, 26, 27, 29 to 31, 40 to 42, as well as paragraph 38(83) thereof. The
relevant observations recorded therein are reproduced hererinbelow:Shameem Hamid Mir
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“……..15. While hearing a petition under Section 27 of the Act,
no doubt, I am not hearing an appeal from the order passed by the
Tribunal. An appeal from an order passed by the Tribunal is
maintainable only in terms of Section 37(2) of the Act, and not
otherwise. But that does not mean that when an order passed by the
Tribunal invoking Section 27 of the Act, to seek the assistance of the
Court in taking evidence, is placed before the Court, the Court would
simply act on the request of the Tribunal, even if it appears to the
Court that the order of the Tribunal has been passed on an erroneous
premise in law. The Court is not bound to act on the request of the
arbitral tribunal on a misconception of law. In such a situation, when
the order appears to have been passed by the arbitral tribunal
mechanically – even in such a situation, the Court would not only be
entitled to, but would be duty bound to correct the error, if any, found
in the order passed by the Tribunal. In Managing Director, Army
Welfare Organisation (supra), the Supreme Court observed:
―72. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the award of the arbitrator
but can certainly interfere when the award suffers from nonapplication of mind or when a relevant fact is ignored or an irrelevant
fact not germane for deciding the dispute is taken into consideration‖.
In my view, the same principle applies to orders placed before
this court under Section 27 of the Act.
16. Section 27(3) mandates that the Court ―may‖ within its
competence ―and according to its rules on taking evidence‖, execute
the request made by the tribunal by ordering that the evidence be
provided directly to the tribunal. The use of the expression ―may‖
shows that the court is not bound to act on the request in every case
where a request for taking evidence is made by the tribunal. The
Court ―may‖ decline the request of the tribunal, if either it is not
within the competence of the court to make an order on the request, or
the request is not in accordance with the rules of the court on taking
evidence.
17. Section 19(1) of the Act, inter alia, provides that ―The
Arbitral Tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908) or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)‖. This
means that the Tribunal is not bound by the rigor and strict provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), or the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 (Evidence Act).
18. Section 19(2) states that subject to the provisions of Part I,
the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the
Arbitral Tribunal in conducting its proceedings. In the present case,
the parties have not agreed on any specific procedure to be followed
by the Arbitral Tribunal in conduct of its proceedings. Section 19(3)
states that ―failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), the
Arbitral Tribunal may, subject to this part, conduct the proceedings in
the manner it considers appropriate‖ (emphasis supplied). Therefore,
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the Arbitral Tribunal is free to devise its own procedure, subject to the
condition that such procedure should conform with the provisions of
Part I of the Act. The procedure that the Tribunal may devise should
meet the basic tenets of an adjudicatory process, namely, that the
procedure should treat parties equally, and each party should be
given a full opportunity to present its case (see Section 18). The
procedure to be evolved by the Tribunal cannot be such that it curtails
the rights of the parties under Sections 13, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25 & 26
of the Act, or any of them.
19. There is nothing in the Act to contra indicate the existence
of jurisdiction/power in the tribunal to require the parties to produce
documents, exhibits or other evidence, as the arbitral tribunal may
determine. The aforesaid provision has the effect of vesting the
tribunal with much greater autonomy in the matter of regulating its
procedure for conduct of the arbitration proceedings, than that
exercised by a civil court which is bound by the rigour of the Code of
Civil Procedure (CPC) and the Indian Evidence Act. The scheme
contained in Section 19 of the Act is not to denude the arbitral
tribunal of its power to regulate its procedure for effective and
expeditious conduct of the arbitration proceedings in a transparent
and fair manner. On the contrary, the legislative intent appears to be
to vest the arbitral tribunal with autonomy and flexibility in the matter
of conduct of its proceedings so as to expedite the proceedings and cut
the procedural wrangles witnessed in courts – which are governed by
the CPC and the Evidence Act.
20. The procedure that the Tribunal may adopt for conducting
the proceedings need not be evolved by consensus of the parties. It is
for the Tribunal to devise its own procedure, if the parties have
themselves not evolved the procedure consensually under Section
19(2).
26. Consequently, it is evident that the discovery, inspection
and production of documents by a party, at the request of the opposite
party, is a matter of procedure. It is for this reason that the same has
been dealt with in Order XI Rules 12 to 15 and 21, and Order 16 of
the CPC. Thus, the arbitral tribunal is not powerless to direct
production of a document – considered to be relevant evidence by it,
by one or the other party to the proceedings. This power is statutorily
conferred upon the tribunal Section 19 of the Act. Exercise of this
statutory power by the arbitral tribunal does not tantamount to
assumption of ―inherent power‖ by the arbitral tribunal – which
power does not vest in an arbitral tribunal.
27. It is one thing to say that the arbitral tribunal does not have
the power or the jurisdiction to direct production of documents by one
of the parties, and it is another thing to say that the arbitral tribunal
does not have the power to enforce compliance of such a direction. If
a direction issued by the arbitral tribunal directing production of
documents by a party is not complied with, it appears that the arbitral
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tribunal would be in a position to invoke Section 27 of the Act, since
Section 27 of the Act deals with the aspect of taking the courts
assistance for taking evidence. The aspect of production of documents
is specifically dealt with in Section 27(2)(c)(ii). However, the arbitral
tribunal in the present case has proceeded on an erroneous premise
that it does not have the jurisdiction to direct production of documents
by the respondent, even though the arbitral tribunal has found the
aforesaid two documents to constitute relevant evidence, and the
arbitral tribunal has straightaway invoked the provisions contained in
Section 27 of the Act to seek the courts assistance for a direction to
the respondent to produce the said documents.
29. Therefore, it is evident that the arbitral tribunal is
empowered on its own, without taking resort to Section 27 of the Act,
to direct, a party to produce documents, and upon the failure to
comply with the tribunals direction to produce documents, the
aggrieved party - who is aggrieved by the non production of
documents, may either require the arbitral tribunal to draw an
adverse inference against the defaulting party, or may chose to
require the arbitral tribunal to enforce the direction to produce the
relevant document with the assistance of the court by resort to Section
27 of the Act.
30. It may be that the aggrieved party (who is aggrieved on the
non production of the documents by the opposite party) may be
satisfied by the arbitral tribunal drawing an adverse inference against
the defaulting party, and may not wish to pursue the aspect of
production of documents by the opposite/defaulting party by resort to
Section 27 of the Act. It is not necessary for the arbitral tribunal in
every such case to seek assistance of the court, and it would depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether such assistance
should be sought. In any event, there would be no cause to seek
assistance of the court by resort to Section 27 of the Act, without first
issuing a direction to the concerned party to produce the document,
and only upon the failure to comply with such a direction, the arbitral
tribunal would be justified in seeking the assistance of the court under
Section 27 of the Act – if so desired by the aggrieved/non defaulting
party.
31. I find merit in the submission advanced by the petitioner
before the arbitral tribunal that if the arbitral tribunal is held not to
have jurisdiction to evolve its procedure requiring production of
documents (when there is no agreed procedure laid down by the
parties themselves), the same would delay the conclusion of the
arbitration proceedings as, in every case, the arbitral tribunal would
necessarily have to move for the courts assistance under Section 27 of
the Act to obtain a direction for production of the relevant documents
by one of the parties, even though the party from whom documents are
required to be produced may be willing to comply with such a
direction if it were to be so directed by the arbitral tribunal. It would
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also mean that even in a case where a party requiring production of
documents were to be satisfied with the drawing of adverse inference
against the defaulting party, the resort to Section 27 of the Act would
necessarily have to be undertaken - leading to unnecessary waste of
time and resources of the parties and delay in the arbitral process.
38(83) Though, in my opinion, there is no specific provision in
the Act, 1996 which specifically confers power on the Arbitrator to
direct discovery, the Arbitrator has absolute power and flexibility by
virtue of Section 19 of Act, 1996 to conduct the proceedings in the
manner it considers appropriate. I may mention that under the
Evidence Act, 1872 and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 27 of
Act, 1996, in my view, only deals with third party discovery and not
with regard to discovery of parties before the arbitral tribunal. This
inherent power of discovery, in my view, is found in Section 19(3) of
Act, 1996, which reads as under:
19. Determination of rules of procedure.–
xxxx xxxx xxxx
(3) Failing any agreement referred to in Sub-section (2), the
arbitral tribunal may, subject to this Part, conduct the proceedings in
the manner it considers appropriate.‖
40. In case the respondent were not to comply with the said
direction within the time granted, and the petitioner were to seek
enforcement of the said direction by resort to Section 27 of the Act,
the arbitral tribunal would have been justified in approaching the
court. However, the approach by the arbitral tribunal to this court to
seek assistance for production of documents is without any cause,
founded upon an erroneous premise that it does not have jurisdiction
to itself direct production of the documents, and, is also premature,
since it is possible that the respondent may produce the documents
when so directed by the tribunal – to avoid the drawing of an adverse
inference by the arbitral tribunal against the respondent, or the
petitioner may be satisfied by the drawing of an adverse inference
against the respondent on account of non production of the said
documents, and may not want to pursue its endeavour to seek
production of the documents by resort to Section 27 of the Act.
[41.] Mr. Chandhiok, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents has sought to assail the order passed by the arbitral
tribunal insofar as the arbitral tribunal has sought the assistance of
the court for production of the reply of the respondent, submitted to
the Vigilance Department, about the queries raised by the department
in respect of payment. As noticed herein above, I am not hearing an
appeal against the order passed by the arbitral tribunal on
20.07.2013, as the said order is not appealable. Insofar as the order
passed by the arbitral tribunal on the aspect of relevance of the
documents is concerned, a perusal of the same - on the face of it, does
not call for interference in these proceedings under Section 27 of the
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Act. I, therefore, do not consider it necessary to deal with the
submission of Mr. Chandhiok in this regard.
42. It shall be open to the respondent - if it has the courage of
its conviction, not to produce the said documents. However, it shall do
so entirely at its own risk and peril, and the respondent shall take the
consequence of its failure to produce the relevant documents.
Reference may be made to the observations of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Rajesh Bhatia & Ors. v. G. Parimala & Anr., IV (2005)
BC 215=2006 (3) ALT 129, wherein the court observed:
―42. Having regard to the view taken by me hereinabove, the
individual parties cannot be compelled to produce the documents if
they refuse to produce the documents pursuant to the notice served
upon him by the adversary or an order as a matter of that passed by
the Court so as to ascertain the truth in accordance with the
provisions contained in Section 165 of the Act for non-compliance of
such a direction to produce the documents the penal consequences
will not follow as in the case of discovery of documents as per the
provisions contained in Order 11, Rule 21 of the Code. However,
certainly the Court is entitled to draw the adverse inference”.
27. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has thus proceeded on the principle that
the autonomy and independence of the Arbitral Tribunal ought not to be
curtailed and, in case it decides to summon a witness, the same shall remain
within the ambit of Section 19 of the Act. However, at the same time, such
direction would not be enforceable except through the procedure envisaged
under Section 27 of the Act, in case of non-compliance.
28. The same judgment was also reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of
the Delhi High Court in Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. Silor Associates
S.A., reported as 2014 Legal Eagle (DEL) 1208.
29.Learned counsel appearing for the Union Territory, Mr. Malik, has placed
reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab
and Haryana at Chandigarh in BJ-Techno HSA (JV) v. National
Hydroelectric Power Corporation Limited, reported as 2019 SCC OnLine
P&H 2118. Learned counsel has invited the attention of this Court to
paragraphs 14, 16 and 19 of the said judgment, which are reproduced
hereinbelow:—
14. In ―National Insurance Company Limited v. S.A. Enterprises‖
Review Petition (L) No. 51 of 2015 in Arbitration Petition No. 1544 of 2015
decided on 16.10.2015, similarly the Bombay High Court had held—
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“40. In my view, the arbitral tribunal cannot issue a
witness summons itself or cannot enforce its own order of
producing certain documents or cannot force a party or a third
party to lead evidence or to produce documents. The arbitral
tribunal or a party to the proceedings with the approval of the
arbitral tribunal may apply to the Court for assistance in
taking evidence. In my view, at this stage, this Court cannot go
into the validity and correctness of the order passed by the
learned arbitrator granting permission to the respondent
herein for seeking assistance of this Court in taking evidence
under Section 27 of the Arbitration Act. It is for the arbitrator
to decide as to whether particular documents or presence of a
particular witness would be necessary for the proper
adjudication of the dispute between the parties or not, if any
such application is made by the parties to the arbitral
proceedings. In these proceedings under Section 27 of the
Arbitration Act, this Court cannot decide whether production
of such documents or presence of such witness was warranted
or not.‖
16. Similarly, in ―Montana Developers Pvt. Ltd. Mumbai v. Aditya
Developers, Mumbai‖, Arbitration Petition (Lodging) No. 680 of 2016
decided on 22.6.2016, the Bombay High Court had held—
“16. I am thus inclined to accept the submission of Mr.
Tulzapurkar, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner
that the powers under section 27 of the Arbitration Act are
not adjudicatory powers. In my view, the said provision
provides a procedure for providing assistance to a party in
whose favour the learned arbitrator has opined that the
production of documents or witness was warranted in the
facts of his case. Under section 19 of the Arbitration Act, it
is clearly provided that the learned arbitrator shall not be
bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or Evidence
Act, 1872. In my view, the arbitral tribunal is thus not
empowered to issue any witness summons itself or to
compel a party to produce any documents under the
provisions of the Arbitration Act. If the learned arbitrator
is satisfied on the application made by any of the party that
production of witness or documents which is not being
produced inspite of the attempts made by a party, the
arbitral tribunal can grant permission to such a party to
take the assistance of this Court under section 27 of the
Arbitration Act. In my view, merely because a party has
filed the arbitration proceedings in view of the agreement
between the parties, he cannot be put to disadvantage in
view of the powers of summoning a witness not having
been provided to the arbitrator under the provisions of the
Arbitration Act.
Shameem Hamid Mir
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19. I am not inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Sancheti, the
learned senior counsel for the respondents that in the proceedings under
section 27 of the Arbitration Act, the Court can decide the merits of the
order passed by the learned arbitrator. In my view, Mr. Tulzapurkar, the
learned senior counsel for the petitioner is right that under section 27 of
the Arbitration Act, a procedure is prescribed for taking assistance of
this Court for issuance of witness summons in terms of the order passed
by the learned arbitrator and the proceedings are not adjudicatory
proceedings.‖
30.The proposition thus gets narrowed down to the extent that Section 27 is a
power whereby the Arbitrator can seek the assistance of the Court for taking
evidence, but the word used is "may" and, thus, while such assistance from
the Court is a procedure envisaged under the Act of 1996, there shall also be
an independent power of procedure in the given circumstances under Section
19 of the Act of 1996. The legislative intention seems to be that, while giving
all the powers to the parties and the Arbitrator under Section 19 to decide the
issues of admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence, the
power has been further strengthened so that, in case there is non-compliance
with the directions issued, teeth have been given to the power under Section
27, whereby the assistance of the Court may be invoked by the Arbitrator for
continuing the proceedings.
31.Although the judgments cited of the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh, and the judgments cited within those judgments,
have taken a very strict interpretation that Section 27 is the only remedy to
compel the summoning of evidence, by invoking Section 27, at the same
time, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has put the analogy in a broader
perspective, whereby the independence of the Arbitrator would continue in
terms of Section 19, under which he can determine the aspects of
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence and also take the
help of the Court under Section 27, if required.
32.This Court is of the considered opinion that Section 19 confers independent
powers upon the Arbitral Tribunal to conduct its proceedings in the manner it
considers appropriate and also gives it the power to determine the
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence. The legislative
intention is very clear that, on all these aspects, the Arbitrator shall have
independent power; however, the moment Section 27 comes into operation, it
envisages that there may be circumstances where the compelling part of the
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process could be undertaken only under Section 27, by taking recourse to
making an appropriate application before the Court which is defined in the
Act of 1996.
33.Thus, this Court, in its considered opinion, finds that, in order to give effect
to the legislative intent underlying the Act of 1996, to confer full-fledged
powers upon the Arbitrator to continue the proceedings while, at the same
time, restraining the Arbitrator from converting such proceedings into
judicial proceedings by not conferring upon it the power to compel calling of
witness, it would be in consonance with the legislative scheme of the Act for
the Arbitrator to proceed in accordance with the procedure in vogue.
Thus, where the summoning of witnesses, which is the bone of contention in
the present matter, requires compulsion, the Arbitrator may seek the
assistance of the Court by invoking Section 27 of the Act of 1996.
34.Accordingly, while answering Question No. 1, this Court is of the considered
opinion that Section 19 has an independent ambit and the Arbitrator, where
the parties have not agreed upon the procedure to be followed, may conduct
the proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate, which includes the
power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of
evidence and, consequently, to issue summons or directions for the calling of
any of the witnesses.
35.Regarding Question No. 2, whether such witness/summons can be compelled
to appear pursuant to the summons issued by the Arbitrator, the answer is in
the negative. The power to compel attendance has been dealt with under
Section 27 of the Act, and the option has been given to the Arbitrator that he
may resort to applying to the Court for assistance in taking evidence.
36.Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Arbitrator shall be
required to seek assistance while taking evidence in case the summons issued
by him are required to be compelled to depose.
37.Since this Court has arrived at the considered opinion that the Arbitrator can
issue summons for securing the voluntary attendance of a witness, but the
parties cannot be compelled, we direct and clarify that both these orders shall
mean that, if the witness wishes to appear voluntarily in terms of the
summons, it shall be open for him to do so, and in case he does not appear,
then the Arbitrator would not be in a position to compel him to appear by
adopting Section 27 procedure. Thus, it shall be open for the Arbitrator to
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take recourse to Section 27 of the Act of 1996 by seeking the assistance of
the competent Court.
38.Having answered the aforesaid questions and clarified the legal position
governing the impugned orders, the controversy arising out of the writ
petition stands resolved to the extent indicated above.
39.Now, coming to CM No. 8178/2025, seeking extension of the mandate of the
learned Arbitrator, it is observed by this Court that, as per the directions of
the Hon’ble Apex Court passed in C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, Civil Appeal
arising out of SLP (C) No. 6551 of 2025, reported as 2026 INSC 112,
learned counsel for the Union Territory has drawn the attention of this Court
to paragraph 13, which reads as follows:13.
Section 29A, as explained in recent decisions of this
Court in Rohan Builders (supra), Lancor Holdings (supra) and
Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule can be formulated as
under:
(I)
Sub-section (1) of Section 29A mandates that the award
shall be made within 12 months of the completion of pleadings
before the Arbitral Tribunal . While sub-section (2)
incentivises expeditious making of the Award, proviso to subsection (4) and sub-section (8) authorises the Court to impose
penalty for delay in making the award.
(II) Sub-section (3) enables parties, by consent, to extend
the period of 12 months for making the award by a further
period not exceeding 6 months.
(III) If the award is not made within the stipulated period of
12 months or the extended period of 6 months, the mandate of
the arbitrator(s) shall terminate.
(IV) This termination is subject to the power of the Court to
extend the period
(V)
The ‗Court‘ under Section 29A shall be the Civil Court
of ordinary original jurisdiction in a district and includes the
High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction under
Section 2(1)(e), and shall not be the High Court or the
Supreme Court under Section 11(6) of the Act. Section 42 of
the Act relating to jurisdiction for applications will also not
apply to Section 11 of the Act .
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(VI) There is no statutory prescribed time limit for the Court
to exercise the power under Section 29A(4) for extending the
period, except for its own discretion. The Court can exercise
the power before or after the expiry of the period under subsections 29A(1) or (3) . Further, there is no prescription of an
outer limit for extending the time for the conclusion of arbitral
proceedings. Given this power, the Court will exercise it with
circumspection, balancing the remedy with the rights of other
stakeholders.
(VII) The power of the Court to extend the time under subsection (4) may be exercised on an application by any of the
parties. Once such an application for extension of time is
pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the
disposal of such application under sub-section (9). The Court
shall endeavour to dispose of such an application within 60
days .
(VIII) Delay in the delivery of an arbitral award, by itself, is
not sufficient to set aside that award. It is only when the effect
of the undue delay in the delivery of an arbitral award is
explicit and adversely reflects on the findings therein, such
delay and, more so, if it remains unexplained, can be
construed to result in the award being in conflict with the
public policy of India.
(IX) Under Section 29A(6), while exercising the power of
extension, it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or all
the arbitrators. This is a discretionary power that the Court
would exercise in the facts and circumstances of the case
40.He submits that, for the purpose of an application for extension of the time of
the Arbitrator, the powers under Section 11(6) cannot be exercised, but the
powers under Section 29A have to be exercised, and, thus, only the Court of
the Commercial Division or the Original Court, as defined under Section
2(1)(e), can examine the matter for extension of time. The law laid down by
the Hon’ble Apex Court under Section 29A(2) envisages that the parties, by
consent, can extend the period by 12 months for making the award and,
further, for a period not exceeding six months. In the case before this Court,
both the parties, namely, the Union Territory and Kuchay Constructions are
in agreement in consenting to extend the period by 12 months. Ordinarily,
this Court would not have liked to exercise such power of extension, as the
power under Section 29A should have been exercised by the competent
Court; however, since the writ petition itself was the cause of delay in
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adjudication and the consequent stoppage of the proceedings, and since the
precedent laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as well as the legislation,
makes it clear that, by consent of the parties, the time can be extended, in the
limited and peculiar factual matrix of the case, the time is extended by 12
months, with a word of caution to the learned Arbitrator to proceed strictly in
accordance with law.
41.The writ petition, along with all connected CMPs, including CM No.
8178/2025, stands disposed of in the above terms.
(DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI)
CHIEF JUSTICE
SRINAGAR
30.10.2026
Shameem H.
Whether approved for reporting? : Yes
Shameem Hamid Mir
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