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GAHC010261272024
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT AT GUWAHATI
(The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh)
Principal Seat at Guwahati
Civil Revision Petition No. 133/2024.
Kuaripukhuri High School A,
Represented by its Headmaster cum Member Secretary,
Md. Abul Hashem,
S/o Maulana Abdul Bari,
R/o Galandikash,
Mouza – Pachim Dalgaon,
P.O. – Kuaripukhuri,
Dist. – Darrang, Assam,
PIN - 784115.
…… Petitioner.
-Versus1. Md. Abdul Jalil,
S/o Late Sadek Ali,
Vill. – Galandikash,
Mouza – Pachim Dalgaon,
P.O. – Kuaripukhuri,
Dist. – Darrang, Assam,
PIN - 784115.
2. Md. Abdul Kader,
S/o Late Sadek Ali,
Vill. – Galandikash,
Mouza – Pachim Dalgaon,
P.O. – Kuaripukhuri,
Dist. – Darrang, Assam,
PIN - 784115.
3. Md. Abdul Samad,
S/o Kasem Ali,
Vill. – Galandikash,
Mouza – Pachim Dalgaon,
P.O. – Kuaripukhuri,
Dist. – Darrang, Assam,
PIN - 784115.
4. Md. Khus Mahmood,
S/o Hasen Ali,
Vill. – Galandikash,
Mouza – Pachim Dalgaon,
P.O. – Kuaripukhuri,
Dist. – Darrang, Assam,
PIN - 784115.
5. Md. Joynal Abedin,
S/o Late Hajrat Ali,
Vill. – Galandikash,
Mouza – Pachim Dalgaon,
P.O. – Kuaripukhuri,
Dist. – Darrang, Assam,
PIN - 784115.
6. Md. Abul Kashem,
S/o Late Asgar Ali,
Vill. – Galandikash,
Mouza – Pachim Dalgaon,
P.O. – Kuaripukhuri,
Dist. – Darrang, Assam,
PIN - 784115.
7. Md. Hasen Ali,
S/o Late Fakaruddin,
Vill. – Galandikash,
Mouza – Pachim Dalgaon,
P.O. – Kuaripukhuri,
Dist. – Darrang, Assam,
PIN - 784115.
8. Md. Shahajamal,
S/o Late Sahabu Mandal,
Vill. – Galandikash,
Mouza – Pachim Dalgaon,
P.O. – Kuaripukhuri,
Dist. – Darrang, Assam,
PIN - 784115.
…… Respondents.
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
Advocate for the petitioner
Advocate for the respondents
::-
Mr. K. Rahman.
Mr. M.U. Mahmud.
Date of hearing
Date of which judgment is reserved
Date of pronouncement of judgment
:::-
26.02.2026.
26.02.2026.
06.04.2026.
Whether the pronouncement if of the
operative part of the judgment?
:-
N/A
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced?
:-
Yes
JUDGEMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. K. Rahman, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Mr. M.U. Mahmud, learned counsel for the respondents.
2.
In this petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
read with Section 115 of the CPC, the petitioner has challenged the
judgment and order dated 12.11.2024, passed by the learned Civil
Judge (Senior Division), Darrang at Mangaldai (appellate court
hereinafter), in Misc. Appeal No. 14/2023.
3.
It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and order
dated 12.11.2024, the learned appellate court had affirmed the adinterim temporary injunction order dated 02.11.2023, passed by the
learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Darrang at Mangaldai
(trial court hereinafter), in Misc. (J) Case No. 25/2023.
4.
It is also to be noted here that vide order dated 02.11.2023,
the learned trial court had restrained the petitioner herein and its
tenants from encroaching the Schedule A1, A2, A5 – A10 land and
also from disturbing the possession of the respondents in any
manner till final disposal of the suit.
5.
The back ground facts, leading to filing of the present petition,
are briefly stated as under:“Kuaripukhuri High School A, represented by its Headmaster
cum Member Secretary, the petitioner herein, was earlier a
Madrassa institution, which was converted to a High School and
it is covering an area about 6 Bighas 1 Katha 9 Lechas and
since the petitioner school is running under the Directorate of
Secondary Education, Government of Assam, the said property
now becomes the Government property.
Earlier one Dhepu Sheikh, was the owner of the said land
and during his lifetime, he had orally gifted the said land in the
name of Kuwari Pukhuri Kharejia Madrassa, which was, later
on, converted to Kuwari Pukhuri High School A and out of the
total land, the petitioner school had given a plot of land,
measuring 5 Bighas, to several local people for cultivation in
yearly 'thika' basis and the paddy received from the said
cultivators was used for the development/management of the
institution and after conversion, the petitioner school was
provincialised on 15.08.1994, and thereafter, the said land was
mutated in the name of the petitioner school in the year 1999.
Then, in the year 2014, out of the said land, 2 Kathas 10
Lechas had been given to Galandi Hafizia for temporary
settlement and the same has been functioning in the house
constructed over the said land without interruption and 1 Bigha
of the total land has also been developed and maintained as a
cemetery for the public and around 3 Kathas of land in front of
the Galandi Hafizia Madrassa was used by its students as a
playground. Thereafter, in the year 2021, the respondent Nos.
1 – 4, along with one Akabar Ali and Sahamat Ali, illegally
entered into the land and forcefully dispossessed them from the
same and illegally constructed an „ekchalia house‟ over the
same.
In the meantime, the land has been mutated in the name
of Kuwari Pukhuri High School A, vide Government order No.
DSE/GIS/Amal/9/2021/127, dated 06.05.2022. Then, in the
month of May, 2021, after the expiry of the thika period, the
Kuwari Pukhuri High School „A‟ had taken over the possession
of the land measuring 5 Bighas from respondent Nos. 5 – 8.
Thereafter, on 22.12.2022, the School authority had
arranged a public meeting and the 5 Bighas of land were once
again given in thika basis, as per open tender No.1, in
exchange of Rs. 25,000/-, for a period of 11 months and had
requested the respondent Nos. 1 – 4 along with one Akabar
and Sahamat Ali to vacate 3 Kathas of land immediately. But,
they had refused and illegally applied for allotment of the said
land by stating that they had been occupying the land under
the permission of Kuwari Pukhuri High School A, in order to
forcefully dispossess them from the same.
Thereafter, the respondents have filed one title suit,
being Title Suit No. 42/2023, with a prayer for declaration of
right title and interest over the suit land. Along with the said
title suit, they have also filed an application for temporary
injunction, on the ground that the schedule lands are
Government Khas land and they are in possession of the same
for last 50 – 60 years without any interruption and they have
applied for allotment of the suit land.
Thereafter, an inquiry was conducted by the Circle
Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle and it was found that the
Government of Assam has the absolute right, title and interest
over the suit land and except the Government of Assam, no
other persons have any right, title and interest over the suit
land and none of them have the right to evict the respondents
herein from the suit land and even the Government of Assam
without following due procedure of law has no right or power to
evict the respondents from the suit land.
Then, after hearing both the parties, the learned trial
court, vide order dated 02.11.2023, found the prima-facie case
in favour of the respondents herein and also found the balance
of convenience and irreparable loss in their favour and
thereafter, allowed the petition for ad-interim temporary
injunction and thereby, restrained the petitioner herein from
encroaching upon the Schedule A1, A2, A5 – A10 land and also
from disturbing the possession of the respondents, in any
manner, till final disposal of the suit.
Thereafter, being aggrieved, the petitioner herein filed an
appeal, before the learned appellate court, upon which the
Misc. Appeal No. 14/2023, had been registered and after
hearing both the parties and also considering the facts and
circumstances on the record, the learned appellate court had
affirmed the order, dated 02.11.2023, passed by the learned
trial court.”
Being aggrieved, the petitioner herein has approached this
Court, by filing the present petition, under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, on several grounds.
6.
Mr. Rahman, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
impugned order passed by the learned trial court as well as by the
learned appellate court, suffers from manifest illegality. He has
pointed out that the land in question, in fact belongs to a Madrassa,
which was converted to a High School and the said school was
provincialised in the year 1994 and with such provincialisation, the
land became the property of the Government.
6.1. Mr. Rahman further submits that Section 3(6) of the Assam
(Temporarily
Settled
Areas)
Tenancy
Act,
(1971
Act
hereinafter), defines that „land‟ means agricultural land and
„agricultural land‟ means land used for agricultural purpose or
purposes subservient thereto and Section 3 (17) of the 1971 Act
provides that a person who cultivates or holds land immediately
under the State Government is not a tenant within the meaning of
this definition and that as the petitioner school is running under
Government of Assam, the land belonging to the school is also come
under the Government of Assam. Mr. Rahman also submits that as
per definition provided under Section 3(17) of the 1971 Act, the
respondents herein are not even tenants and as such, raising of claim
of possessory right over the suit land is illegal and arbitrary and no
cause of action also arises thereon and on such count, impugned
order of the learned trial court granting a temporary injunction and
affirming same by the learned appellate court suffers from manifest
illegality.
6.2. Mr. Rahman, referring to Annexures of the petition, submits
that the Annexure No. 1 is a Chitha for Surveyed Villages, wherein
suit land has shown to be muted in the name of the school;
Annexure No. 2 is a certificate issued by the Circle Officer, Dalgaon
Revenue Circle and the same indicates that the suit land belongs to
Kuaripukhuri Senior Madrassa; Annexure No. 3 is a notification issued
by the Government of Assam, which indicates that Kuaripukhuri Title
Madrassa was converted to Kuaripukhuri High School A; Annexure
No. 4 is another notification issued by the Department of Secondary
Education, which indicates that Kuaripukhuri High School and Kuari
Pukhuri Siddique ME Madrssa were amalgamated and became
Kuaripukhuri High School A; and Anneuxre No. 5 is an order of a
Coordinate Bench of this Court, dated 23.06.2023, passed in WP(C)
No. 7469/2022, which was preferred by the respondents herein for
issuing a direction to the respondents therein for allotment of the
land, measuring 6 Bighas 1 Katha 9 Lechas and vide said order, the
Coordinate Bench of this Court had disposed of the petition, granting
liberty to the petitioners therein to approach the competent authority
for allotment of the land under their occupation and also to approach
the competent forum for resolving the land dispute between the
parties.
6.3. Further, Mr. Rahman submits that after the passing of the order
dated 23.06.2023, the respondents herein had instituted the Title
Suit No. 42/2023 for a declaration of possessory right, title and
interest over the suit land.
6.4. Mr. Rahman also submits that since the land belongs to the
school and the name of the school is mutated in the revenue record
and since the respondents herein are not tenants as defined under
Section 3(17) of the 1971 Act, the findings, so recorded by the
learned courts below, suffer from serious infirmity and the same
requires interference of this Court. He further submits that the suit
land is a public property, and Article 51A (i) of the Constitution of
India provided that it shall be the duty of every citizens of India "to
safeguard public property and to abjure violence”. But instead of
exercising fundamental duty, the respondents have instituted the
case against a Public School with a view to grab the land. Under such
circumstances Mr. Rahman has contended to allow this petition.
7.
Per-contra, Mr. Mahmud, learned counsel for the respondents
submits that the respondents have been occupying the land for the
last 50 – 60 years and they have been cultivating the same and
residing in the said plot of land by constructing their dwelling house,
and now, if they are evicted from the land, where they will go as they
have no place to reside. Mr. Mahmud further submits that they have
acquired possessory right and also applied to the Government for
allotment of the same to them, and that the learned trial court as
well as the learned appellate court had rightly appreciated the fact
and thereafter granted a temporary injunction in favour of the
respondents, by restraining the petitioner herein from interfering with
the possession of the respondents and on such count, the impugned
order suffers from no infirmity or illegality requiring any interference
of this Court and therefore, Mr. Mahmud has contended to dismiss
the petition.
7.1. In support of his submission Mr. Mahmud has referred to a
decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court passed in Suresh Kr.
Dhanuka vs. Kedar Nath Dhanuka, reported in 2004 GAULT 1
210.
8.
Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the
parties, I have carefully gone through the petition as well as the
documents placed on record, and also perused the impugned
judgment and order dated 12.11.2024, passed by the learned
appellate court and also the order dated 02.11.2023, passed by the
learned trial court.
9.
It is no more res-integra that in order to grant temporary
injunction, the party applying for the same has to satisfy three
golden principles. This aspect has elaborately been dealt with by
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad
Singh, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719, while dealing with Order
39 Rule 1(C) CPC, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“4.
………It is settled law that the grant of
injunction is a discretionary relief. The
exercise thereof is subject to the court
satisfying that
(1) there is a serious disputed question to be
tried in the suit and that an act, on the
facts
before
the
court,
there
is
probability of his being entitled to the
relief
asked
for
by
the
plaintiff/defendant;
(2) the court's interference is necessary to
protect the party from the species of
injury. In other words, irreparable injury
or damage would ensue before the legal
right would be established at trial; and
(3) that the comparative hardship or mischief
or inconvenience which is likely to occur
from withholding the injunction will be
greater than that would be likely to arise
from granting it.
5.
Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by
evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise
that there is “a prima facie case” in his
favour which needs adjudication at the trial.
The existence of the prima facie right and
infraction of the enjoyment of his property or
the right is a condition for the grant of
temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not
to be confused with prima facie title which
has to be established, on evidence at the
trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial
question raised, bona fide, which needs
investigation and a decision on merits.
Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case
by
itself
is
not
sufficient
to
grant
injunction. The Court further has to satisfy
that non-interference by the Court would
result in “irreparable injury” to the party
seeking relief and that there is no other
remedy available to the party except one to
grant injunction and he needs protection from
the consequences of apprehended injury or
dispossession. Irreparable injury, however,
does not mean that there must be no physical
possibility of repairing the injury, but means
only that the injury must be a material one,
namely
one
that
cannot
be
adequately
compensated by way of damages. The third
condition also is that “the balance of
convenience” must be in favour of granting
injunction. The Court while granting or
refusing to grant injunction should exercise
sound judicial discretion to find the amount
of substantial mischief or injury which is
likely to be caused to the parties, if the
injunction is refused and compare it with that
which is likely to be caused to the other side
if the injunction is granted. If on weighing
competing possibilities or probabilities of
likelihood of injury and if the Court
considers that pending the suit, the subject
matter should be maintained in status quo, an
injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has
to exercise its sound judicial discretion in
granting or refusing the relief of ad interim
injunction pending the suit.
9.1. Again, in the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer vs. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai, reported in (2006) 5 SCC
282, same principles are reiterated as under: “30. The discretion of the court is exercised to
grant a temporary injunction only when the
following requirements are made out by the
plaintiff:
(i)
existence of a prima facie case as
pleaded, necessitating protection of
the plaintiff's rights by issue of a
temporary injunction;
(ii)
when the need for protection of the
plaintiff's rights is compared with or
weighed against the need for protection
of the defendant's rights or likely
infringement of the defendant's rights,
the balance of convenience tilting in
favour of the plaintiff; and
(iii)
clear possibility of irreparable injury
being caused to the plaintiff if the
temporary injunction is not granted. In
addition, temporary injunction being an
equitable relief, the discretion to
grant such relief will be exercised
only when the plaintiff's conduct is
free from blame and he approaches the
court with clean hands.”
Public Interest, the Fourth Dimension: 9.2. It is also to be mentioned here that in the case of Mahadeo
Savlaram
Shelke
and
Corporation and Another,
Others
vs.
Pune
Municipal
reported in (1995) 3 SCC 33,
Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held additionally that public interest
is one of the material and relevant considerations in either exercising
or refusing to grant ad interim injunction.
Finding of the Trial Court: 10. In the instant case, while examining the existence of a primafacie case in favour of the respondents herein, the learned trial court
has observed that the respondents herein have asserted their
possessory right over 10 different plots of land described in 10
different schedules, which have allegedly been in their possession for
the last 50 – 60 years. It is also observed that 5 Bighas of the land
were given to the respondents herein for permissive occupation on a
yearly „thika’ basis since the year 1960 and they had run the Kuari
Pukhuri Kharejia Madrassa, which is converted to Kuwari Pukhuri
High School „A‟, from the payment received from those permissive
occupiers. It is further observed that it is not clear as to which of the
parties‟ involved has any subsisting legal claim over the disputed
plots of land and these facts shall be addressed and taken up during
the course of the trial, where each party will be given an opportunity
to put forth all necessary evidence to prove their stances. Thereafter,
it is recorded that prima facie case does exist and there are certain
rights and liabilities of each party that need to be adjudicated upon
and will be decided at the end of the trial of the main suit.
10.1. In respect of the balance of convenience and irreparable loss,
the learned trial court has held that the respondents herein are in
possession of the suit land and the same has not been denied by the
petitioner herein, who has simply alleged that they were permissive
occupiers only and as such, they do not have any right to apply for
allotment of the plots of land included in the total land described in
Schedule „A‟ of the petition and that they have asserted that the suit
land is no longer Government land, as it was mutated in favour of the
Kuwari Pukhuri High School „A‟ in the year 1999. However, the
petitioner herein has not submitted any documents in support of its
contention, while the respondents herein have submitted the photo
copies of several documents, which show that different plots of land,
described under Schedule A1 – A10, have been under their
possession for a long time and that only the nature of its possession
over the said suit land is under dispute in the main suit. Thereafter,
the learned trial court has observed that the respondents herein are
currently in possession of the Schedule A1 – A10 suit land and
whether or not their possession is legal is a matter of evidence that
shall be considered in the trial of the main suit.
10.2. Thereafter, it is observed that if the respondents herein are
forced out of the Schedule A1 – A10 suit land, during the pendency
of the suit, without giving them a fair opportunity to prove their claim
over it, they will suffer irreparable loss and the same cannot be
compensated by monetary relief. Further, the learned trial court has
observed that the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the
respondents herein, as the extent of loss that would be suffered by
them if they are dispossessed of the Schedule A land, during the
pendency of the trial, would be far greater as compared to such loss,
if any, suffered by the petitioner herein, if the situations were left
untouched.
Finding of the Appellate Court:11. Further, from the perusal of the impugned order, so passed by
the learned appellate court, it appears that the respondents herein
have claimed their possession over the Schedule A1 – A10 land and
on the other hand, the petitioner herein has denied the claim of the
respondents herein, over the Schedule land and pleaded that the
land measuring 5 Bighas, out of total land measuring 6 Bighas 1
Katha 9 Lechas, has been given on seasonal thika basis, in
exchange of Rs. 5,000/- per bigha, to the respondents herein Nos. 5
– 8 and run the Kuwari Pukhuri High School „A‟ from the payment
received from those permissive occupiers.
11.1.
The learned appellate court had further observed that there
is a dispute regarding the rights of the parties over the Schedule
land. It had also observed that the petitioner herein has denied the
entire claim of the respondents herein including their possession over
the Schedule „A‟ land at any point of time claimed its continuous
possession over the disputed land. It was also observed that the law
is well settled that mutation neither confer any right, title and interest
nor extinguishes any title. But, the basic fact remains that there is a
dispute regarding legal claim over the suit land and both sides are
claiming the same and apparently, the fact of claim of rights over the
suit land, by both sides, shows that there are some questions, which
have to be decided at the time of trial and this fact is sufficient to
hold that there is a dispute regarding right and possession over the
suit land and accordingly, there is a prima-facie case for proceeding
to the trial and thereafter, it had recorded concurrence with the
findings of the learned trial court.
11.2.
In respect of the balance of convenience, the learned
appellate court had recorded a finding that the learned trial court had
dealt with this matter in details. The respondents are claiming to
have their possession over the Schedule A1 – A10 land and the
respondents are still in possession of the Schedule plots of land, and
as such, the balance of convenience lies in favour of them. It had
also recorded that the respondents are in possession of their part and
appellant (petitioner herein) has created trouble in their possession
by claiming the land in dispute. Thereafter, it was found that the
balance of convenience is in favour of the respondents and in the
event of restraining the appellant (petitioner herein) from disturbing
the possession of the respondents; the appellant (petitioner herein) is
not going to suffer any inconvenience.
11.3.
In respect of irreparable loss, the learned appellate court
had held that the respondents are in possession of the suit land and
they have the right to protect their property and enjoy the benefit of
the same and nobody can be allowed to evict them by using force.
Any sort of unlawful dispossession will certainly cause irreparable loss
and injuries to the respondents and thereafter, it had affirmed the
finding so recorded by the learned trial court in respect of irreparable
loss.
Consideration of Submissions of the Parties: 12. While the submissions of learned Advocates for both the parties
are examined in the light of given facts and circumstances on the
record, and also in the light of legal framework and also in the light
of the precedents, presently occupying the field, I find substance in
the submission of Mr. K. Rahman, learned counsel for the petitioner.
13. Having examined the findings, so recorded by the learned
courts below, in respect of a prima-facie case, this Court is unable to
agree with the same. A prima-facie case requires showing a serious
triable issue on merit at the interim stage. The prima-facie case
under Order 39 CPC for temporary injunctions means the plaintiff
demonstrates a bona fide dispute or substantial question needing full
trial, based on pleadings and documents without deep factual probe.
13.1. In the instant case the respondent herein are in possession of
the suit land. But, it appears that they are the permissive occupiers
under the petitioner herein. Further, it appears that they are also not
tenants as described under the 1971 Act. Mr. Rahman has rightly
pointed this out. And that being so, they cannot claim any right over
the suit land.
13.2.
It also appears that the suit land was originally belonged to
one Dhepu Sheikh, who had donated the same to Kuwari Pukhuri
Kharejia Madrassa and thereafter, the said Madrassa was converted
to Kuaripukhuri High School „A‟. And later on, it was provincialised by
the Government of Assam and since the school was provincialised,
the land in question has become the property of the Government and
as such, the same cannot be allotted to the respondents herein. The
Annexure No. 1 indicates that the land in question is mutated in the
name of the school and also the certificate issued by the Circle
Officer, Dalgaon, Annexure No. 2, indicates that the Kuaripukhuri
Senior Madrassa is situated on the land measuring 3 Bighas 4 Kathas
1 Lecha under Dag No. 83 & 84 and 6 Bighas 1 Katha 9 Lechas under
Dag No. 44.
13.3. In view of those documents and also under the given facts
and circumstances on record, the finding so recorded by the learned
trial court that there exists a prima-facie case in favour of the
respondents herein, cannot be said to have withstood the legal
scrutiny.
14.
Further, though the respondents herein are in possession of
the suit land, yet, they, having been found to be just permissive
occupier, cannot claim any right over the suit land. Though they
claimed, having been in possession for about 50/60 years, yet no
supporting documents could be placed on record. And that being so,
the balance of convenience, cannot be found in their favour.
15.
It is a fact that the respondents herein will suffer loss, if they
are evicted from the suit land, as they are occupying and cultivating
over the same. And as such, irreparable loss will be caused to them.
But, the respondents herein can be adequately compensated for the
loss caused to them by award of damages in the event of them
succeeding in the suit. Even if it is assumed that the loss, the
respondents would suffer cannot be compensated, then also, in view
of non-existence of a prima-facie case and balance of convenience in
their favour, even if the irreparable loss is found in their favour, the
injunction cannot be granted in favour of the respondents herein.
16. Further, it is not in dispute that the suit land, over which
Kuaripukhuri High School „A‟ is presently standing, becomes the
property of the Government after the same being provincialised. It is
a public institution now. And public interest is involved therein and if
the claims of the respondents herein are allowed, then the public
interest will suffer. But, this aspect eschewed consideration of both
the learned courts below.
17. In that view of the matter the order passed by the learned trial
court, dated 02.11.2023, granting temporary injunction in favour of
the respondents herein and impugned order dated 12.11.2024,
passed by the learned appellate court, affirming the temporary
injunction order passed by the learned trial court, fails to withstands
the legal scrutiny and accordingly, the same stands interfered with.
18. This Court has also considered the submissions of Mr. Mahmud,
learned counsel for the respondents herein and also gone through
the decisions referred by him and finds that the fact of the case
relied upon by him is different from the present case and as such,
this Court is unable to record concurrence to the submissions of Mr.
Mahmud, learned counsel for the respondents.
19. It is well settled in the case of Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd.
v. Coca Cola Company, reported in (1995) 5 SCC 545, that an
order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and,
therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from other
considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the
jurisdiction of the Court. Relevant paragraph is extracted herein
below:“47. ……………
…………. Under Order 39 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court
to interfere with an order of interlocutory or
temporary injunction is purely equitable and,
therefore, the Court, on being approached,
will, apart from other considerations, also
look to the conduct of the party invoking the
jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to
interfere unless his conduct was free from
blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in
nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of
the Court has to show that he himself was not
at fault and that he himself was not
responsible for bringing about the state of
things complained of and that he was not
unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the
party against whom he was seeking relief. His
conduct should be fair and honest. These
considerations will arise not only in respect
of the person who seeks an order of injunction
under Order 39 Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the
party approaching the Court for vacating the
ad interim or temporary injunction order
already granted
proceedings.”
20.
in
the
pending
suit
or
As submitted by Mr. Rahman, the suit land belongs to the
petitioner School and the same is a public property. And Article 51A
(i) of the Constitution of India casts a duty upon every citizens of
India "to safeguard public property and to abjure violence”. But
instead of exercising fundamental duty, the respondents herein
instituted the case against a Public School with a view to grab the
land. Looking to their conduct, in invoking the jurisdiction of the
Court, it cannot be said that their conduct was free from blame.
Being the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the respondents,
invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, have failed to demonstrate that
they are not at fault and that they are not unfair or inequitable in
their dealings with the party against whom they were seeking relief.
Thus, in equity, they are not entitled to the relief.
21. In the result, this Court finds sufficient merit in this petition and
accordingly, the same stands allowed, leaving the parties to bear
their own costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
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