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SHAMURAILATPAM SUSHIL
SHARMA
SUSHIL SHARMA
Date: 2025.10.14 18:05:14 +05'30'
Sl. No. 9
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
WP(Crl.) No. 22 of 2025
Konjengbam Akash Singh @ Pari
Petitioner
Vs.
District Magistrate, Thoubal District and 2 others
Respondents
BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH
ORDER
(Order of the Court was made by M. Sundar, CJ)
14.10.2025
[1]
This order will now dispose of the captioned writ petition which
has been filed with the habeas corpus plea.
[2]
Proceedings made by this court in earlier listings dated
18.09.2025 and 08.10.2025 read as follows :
“18.09.2025
Mr. S. Rajeetchandra, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Athouba Khaidem, learned Government
Advocate for the respondents are before us in the physical Court.
The detaining authority has exercised power to
detain the detenu for 12 (twelve) months at one go, which
according to the writ petitioner, is impermissible.
Learned counsel sought time to examine the case
laws on the above proposition. List a week hence.
List on 25.09.2025.”
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“08.10.2025
Mr. S. Ranjeetchandra, learned counsel for petitioner
and Mr. Kh. Athouba, learned GA for State(respondents) are before
this Court.
After some arguments, learned counsel for petitioner
sought time to produce case laws on the following two points.
(i) Non-application of mind.
(ii) The ground of detention is in the realm of surmise
and conjecture because it uses the expression
‘probably’.
Request acceded to.
List on 13.10.2025.”
[3]
Adverting to the afore-referred two proceedings, Mr. S.
Rajeetchandra, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, in the hearing today,
submitted that the points canvassed by him and captured in the aforereferred proceedings will now be articulated in terms of two points and they
are as follows :
1)
The impugned preventive detention order has been made
by the detaining authority i.e. 1st respondent (District
Magistrate, Thoubal District, Government of Manipur,
Thoubal, Manipur) for a period of 12 (twelve) months in
one go and that is impermissible;
2)
The detenu was arrested on 19.05.2025 and the
impugned preventive detention order was made by 1st
respondent on 24.06.2025 while the detenu was
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incarcerated but in the impugned preventive detention
order there is no recording of subjective satisfaction of
imminent possibility of the detenu being enlarged on bail.
[4]
As regards the respondents, Mr. Athouba Khaidem, learned
senior counsel and Government Advocate instructed by Mr. Phungyo
Zingkhei, learned Deputy Government Advocate for all the 3 (three)
respondents is before us.
[5]
Responding to the first point on which the counsel for writ
petitioner predicated his campaign against the impugned preventive
detention order, Mr. Athouba Khaidem, adverting to the impugned
preventive detention order submitted that it very clearly mentions that the
detention is for a period of 12 (twelve) months from the date of the issue of
the order or until further orders. Stressing on the expression ‘or until further
orders’, learned State counsel submitted that further orders i.e., approval
and confirmation orders were made well within the statutorily prescribed
timelines and therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the impugned preventive
detention order is bad or vitiated.
[6]
To be noted, as regards the first point, learned counsel for the
writ petitioner placed reliance on Makhan Singh Tarsikka case and
learned counsel placed before us the case as reported in (1951) Legal
Eagle (SC) 69. We find that the SCC equivalent is (1951) SCC 1140.
Adverting to Makhan Singh it was argued that the detaining authority
making a detention order for 12 (twelve) months at one go which is the
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maximum period is bad and it vitiates the impugned preventive detention
order.
[7]
We have no difficulty in accepting the submission of learned
senior counsel for State that Makhan Singh is distinguishable on facts.
[8]
Learned State counsel pointed out that in Makhan Singh
Tarsikka the detenu while in detention pursuant to a preventive detention
order was clamped with another preventive detention order for a period from
30.07.1951 to 31.03.1952 which is the date on which the concerned Act [the
Preventive Detention Act, 1950] elapses and the amended Act kicks in. In
the instant case, the impugned preventive detention order does not fix any
period though it refers to 12 (twelve) months as it makes it clear that it is
12 (twelve) months or until further orders.
[9]
We carefully examined this aspect of the matter and the rival
submissions on the first point.
[10]
We find that post impugned preventive detention order, the
State Government has approved the detention under 3 (4) of the ‘National
Security Act, 1980 (Act No. 65 of 1980)’ (‘NSA’ for the sake of brevity and
convenience) on 02.07.2025 which is well within the prescribed 12 (twelve)
days time. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that this
approval means that it is approved for 12 (twelve) months which is
impermissible. In our considered view, this is plainly incorrect. The reason
is, as rightly pointed out by learned State counsel, the approval is only is
approval of the expression ‘12 (twelve) months or until further orders’.
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Another reason is the 3 (three) months cap qua State Government is only
for delegation under subsection 3 and not for entire section 3. To be noted,
in
subsection
proviso
the
expression
‘subsection’
is
used
in
contradistinction to subsection 4 where the expression ‘section’ is used.
Therefore, the 3 (three) months is only with regard to delegation conferring
preventive detention powers on District Magistrate or Commissioner of
police. It is nobody’s case that 1st respondent has been delegated with
powers to make preventive detention order for a period exceeding 3 (three)
months. We find no infirmity whatsoever in the approval.
[11]
Be that as it may, confirmation has also be made (post placing
before Advisory Board) on 23.07.2025 and this confirmation is vide Section
12(1) of NSA.
[12]
Therefore, as further orders in the form of approval dated
02.07.2025 within 12 (twelve) days as per Section 3 (4) and confirmation on
23.07.2025 post placing it before Advisory Board has been made. The
‘further or until further orders’ expression in the impugned preventive
detention order operates. To be noted, as regards 12 (twelve) months
confirmation, the State Government can fix the period and there is cap and
the maximum period is 12 (twelve) months vide Section 13 of NSA.
[13]
If approval by State Government (further/other orders) had
not been made with twelve days the impugned preventive detention order
would have become liable for dislodgment in a/this habeas corpus legal drill.
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[14]
In the light of the narrative discussion and dispositive
reasoning thus far, we find that the first point does not make the cut with
this Court. In other words, the first point pales into insignificance and we
reject the same.
[15]
This takes this Court to the second point.
[16]
As regards the second point, paragraphs 2 of the impugned
preventive detention order is significant and the same reads as follows :
‘2.
Whereas, it has been reported that Shri Konjengbam
Akash Singh @ Pari (29yrs) S/o. K. Jugindro Singh of
Moirang Terakhongsangbi, PO/PS: Moirang, Bishnupur
District, Manipur, who was arrested in c/w FIR No.
22(05)2025KJM-PS u/s 17/20 UA(P)A. Act, 25(1-C) Arms Act
& 6(1-A) IWT Act 1993 dated 19th May, 2025, is now in
judicial custody. However, the Hon'ble Special Judge (NIA),
Thoubal has fixed the default bail hearing on 25th June, 2025.’
The above is completely contrary to the obtaining factual
position in the case on hand. It is contrary to the trajectory the matter has
taken in the trial court. As already alluded to supra, the detenu was arrested
on 19.05.2025 and the impugned preventive detention order was made by
R1 while the detenu remained incarcerated and the impugned preventive
detention order was made on 24.06.2025. Prior to the making of the
impugned preventive detention order, objection to the remand made by the
detenu was treated as a bail plea and the same was rejected by the trial
court in and by an order dated 26.05.2025, which has been placed before
us as Annexure-P/11. Thereafter, the undisputed factual position is, the
detenu has not moved any bail plea. Therefore, on the date of making of
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the impugned preventive detention order, no bail petition was pending much
less was a default bail petition pending. Another aspect of the matter is a
detenu arrested on 19.05.2025 obviously cannot seek default bail on
26.06.2025 in the light of the provisions of ‘the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967)’ (‘UAPA’ for the sake of brevity and
convenience) as 90 (ninety) days time available for filing final report and
there is provision for extention by another 90 days.
[17]
Be that as it may, obtaining legal position ennures to the
benefit of the petitioner in the case on hand. The obtaining legal position is,
a preventive detention order can be clamped on a detenu who is already
incarcerated but the requirement in such cases is, the detaining authority
should record subjective satisfaction of imminent possibility of the detenu
being enlarged on bail. Though this is ‘subjective satisfaction’, the same is
justiciable to the extent of applying judicial review drill to examine if
imminent possibility of the detune being enlarged on bail subjective
satisfaction is supported by a correct material. This principle was clearly laid
down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in N. Meera Rani vs. Government of
Tamil Nadu reported in (1989) 4 SCC 418. To be noted, Meera Rani is
also a case where on facts of preventive detention order was made under
NSA. In Meera Rani case the detenu’s wife assailed the impugned
preventive detention order in the High Court unsuccessfully and carried the
matter to Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of a petition under Article 136 of
the Constitution along with the separate writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to
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and reiterated the declaration of law made in Rameshwar Shaw vs.
District Magistrate, Burdwan & Anr. To be noted, Rameshwar Shaw
is reported in AIR 1964 SC 334.
[18]
In the case on hand, the impugned preventive detention order
deserves to be dislodged on the point of no recording of subjective
satisfaction qua imminent possibility of detenu being enlarged on bail. The
dispositive reasoning is twofold and the same is as follows :
1)
As already alluded to supra, the impugned preventive
detention order does not record subjective satisfaction of
imminent possibility of detenu being enlarged on bail;
2)
The impugned preventive detention order records that a
default bail petition was pending on the date of the
impugned preventive detention order i.e., on 24.06.2025.
This is plainly incorrect factual position. No bail petition
was pending and the details have been articulated
elsewhere supra in this order.
[19]
We respectfully follow the declaration of law made by Supreme
Court in Rameshwar Shw which was referred to in Meera Rani. We
respectfully apply Meera Rani principle laid down by Supreme Court and
dislodge the impugned preventive detention order made by 1st respondent
on the ground that it neither records imminent possibility of detenu being
enlarged on bail nor is the recording regarding pendency of default bail
factually correct.
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[20]
This Court very recently, in WP(Crl.) No. 12 of 2025 (Md.
Sirajuddin Khan vs. State of Manipur & 3 Ors.) made an order dated
09.10.2025 applying Meera Rani principle which reiterates declaration of
law made by Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw. This Court is
informed that the detenu has since been released pursuant to this
09.10.2025 order. Relevant paragraphs in Sirajuddin are paragraphs 10
and 11 and the same read as follows :
‘[10] As regards subjective satisfaction qua a preventive
detention order clamped on a detenu who is already
incarcerated, the lead case is N. Meera Rani reported in (1989)
4 SCC 418. N. Meera Rani is also a case where a preventive
detention order was made under ‘National Security Act, 1980
(65 of 1980)’ which shall hereinafter be referred to as ‘NSA’ for
the sake of brevity. The detenu’s wife assailed the impugned
preventive detention order in the High Court unsuccessfully and
carried the matter to Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of a
petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India along
with a separate writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India. In this N. Meera Rani case, which was rendered by a
3 (three) Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, declaration
of law in Rameshwar Shaw reported in AIR 1964 SC 334 was
restated and it was made clear that while there is no bar in
clamping a preventive detention order on a detenue who is
already incarcerated, in such cases, it is imperative that the
detaining authority records subjective satisfaction that there is
imminent possibility of the detenu being enlarged on bail. It was
held that subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not
invalidate an order of preventive detention but, the decision
must depend on detaining authority being satisfied on cogent
materials that there is likelihood of detenu’s release and in view
of these antecedent activities which is proximate in point
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preventive detention order is necessary to prevent detenu from
indulging in prejudicial activities. In the case on hand, while
there is no bail application at all i.e. when the writ petitioner
has not moved a bail petition at all, the detaining authority has
proceeded on the basis that a bail petition submitted by the
detenu is pending and on that factual basis, come to the
conclusion i.e. recorded subjective satisfaction that there is
imminent possibility of detenu being enlarged on bail. Law is
well settled that subjective satisfaction though subjective is
justiciable but under limited circumstances. One such
circumstance is N. Meera Rani principle which restates
declaration of law made by Rameshwar Shaw about which
there is allusion elsewhere supra in this order.
[11]
The above means that the impugned detention order
deserves to be dislodged on the point that the subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority qua imminent
possibility of detenu being enlarged on bail is wholly bad as it
is based on an incorrect fact.’
[21]
A scanned reproduction release order in Sirajuddin is as
follows :
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[22]
Ergo, the sequitur is, captioned writ petition is allowed.
Impugned preventive detention order dated 24.06.2025 bearing Reference
No. Cril. NSA Case No. 10 of 2025 made by 1st respondent (District
Magistrate, Thoubal District, Government of Manipur, Thoubal, Manipur) is
set aside and the detenu (Shri Konjengbam Akash Singh @ Pari, aged
29 years, S/o K. Jugindro Singh of Moirang Terakhongsangbi, P.O.
& P.S. Moirang, Bishnupur District, Manipur) is directed to be set at
liberty forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case/cases.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Sushil
JUDGE
CHIEF JUSTICE
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