Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page No.# 1/27
GAHC010094052025
2026:GAU-AS:8555DB
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : PIL/22/2025
SHRI KIRON PAIRA
UNITED NORTH BLOCK-B,PAIRA COLONY,DIMAPUR-797112, NAGALAND
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA
THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS,GOVT. OF INDIA,SOUTH BLOCK,NEW
DELHI
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY
DISPUR
ASSAM
3:THE STATE OF NAGALAND
THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY
THE GOVT. OF NAGALAND
KOHIMA NAGALAND
4:THE HOME COMMISSIONER
DEPT. OF HOME AFFAIRS
GOVT. OF NAGALAN
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MR. N. GAUTAM, MR. V. RAJKHOWA,MR. S. BORTHAKUR
Advocate for the Respondent : MR. K.N. BALGOPAL, AG, NAGALAND, MS. R.B BORA, Jr. GA,
ASSAM,MS. ENATOLI SEMA,MS. M. KECHII, ADDL. AG, NAGALAND,MS. T. KHRO ADDL.
AG, NAGALAND
Page No.# 2/27
Linked Case : PIL/29/2025
UTTAM BATHARI
S/O SRI HIRU BATHARI
RESIDENT OF PROTECH PARK
UPPER HENGRABARI
GUWAHATI ASSAM 7810.36
2: KANGTHIM RONGHANG
S/O SRI RAJEN RONGHANG
RESIDENT OF DONGKAMUKAM
DIST WEST KARBI ANGLONG
ASSAM 782485
3: SARKLIM BEY
S/O SR. MANIRAM BEY
RESIDENT OF RONGSAMPRI
DIPHU
DIST KARBI ANGLONG
ASSAM
782460
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND ORS
REP BY THE SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
GOVT. OF INDIA
NEW DELHI 110001
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006
3:THE STATE OF NAGALAND
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF NAGALAND
NAGALAND CIVIL SECRETARIATE
KOHIMA
NAGALAND
797004
4:THE HOME COMMISSIONER
HOME DEPARTMENT
GOVT. OF NAGALAND
Page No.# 3/27
NAGALAND CIVIL SECRETARIATE
KOHIMA
NAGALAND
797004
5:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
DIMAPUR
O/O THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
DIMAPUR
797112 NAGALAND
-----------Advocate for : MR A.J.SARMA
Advocate for : GA
NAGALAND appearing for THE UNION OF INDIA AND ORS
Linked Case : PIL/67/2025
KIRON PAIRA
UNITED NORTH BLOCK-B
PAIRA COLONY
H. NO. 78
DIMAPUR- 797112
NAGALAND
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 5 ORS.
THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY
THE GOVT OF INDIA
SOUTH BLOCK
NEW DELHI.
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY
THE GOVT OF ASSAM
DISPUR
ASSAM.
3:THE STATE OF NAGALAND
THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY
THE GOVT OF NAGALAND
KOHIMA
NAGALAND.
Page No.# 4/27
4:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
DIMAPUR DISTRICT
DIMAPUR
NAGALAND
5:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
CHUMOUKEDIMA DISTRICT
CHUMOUKEDIMA
NAGALAND.
6:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
NIULAND DISTRICT
NIULAND
NAGALAND.
-----------Advocate for : MR P CHOWDHURY
Advocate for : DY.S.G.I. appearing for THE UNION OF INDIA AND 5 ORS.
BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
For the Petitioners
:Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. K.
Mohammed, learned counsel in PIL No. 22/2025 and PIL No.
67/2025,
Mr. S. Borthakur, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. V.
Rajkhowa, learned counsel in PIL No. 29/2025.
For the Respondents
:Mr. K. N. Balgopal, Advocate General, Nagaland assisted by Ms.
M. Kechii, Additional Advocate General, Nagaland and Ms. T.
Khro, Additional Advocate General, Nagaland and with Ms. A.
Sema, Additional Advocate General, Nagaland, Ms. N. Nambiar,
Advocate., Ms. Y. Bhusan Aggarwal, Advocate., Ms. V. Kense,
Advocate, Ms. L. A. Shishak, Advocate., Ms. S. Singh, Advocate.
:Mr. S. K. Medhi, CGC.
Date on which the Judgment is Reserved
:
09.06.2026
Page No.# 5/27
Date of the pronouncement of Judgment
:
16.06.2026
Judgment
:
NA.
Whether the full Judgment has been pronounced
:
Yes.
Whether the pronouncement is the operative part of the
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
(A.D.Choudhury, J)
1.
These three Public Interest Litigations (PILs) are taken up together for final disposal.
2.
PIL No. 22/2025 and PIL No. 67/2025 have been filed by a resident of Dimapur,
Nagaland, assailing:
I.
Notification No. CON-3/ PAP/65/10, dated 20.09.2024, whereby the Inner Line
Permit (ILP) regime has been extended to the districts of Dimapur, Chumuke-Dima
and Niuland;
II.
The Nagaland Land and Revenue Regulation (Amendment) Act, 1978.
III.
Notification No. CON/RIIN/50/2020 dated 20.9.2024, which sets out the criteria for
issuing the Indigenous Inhabitant Certificate.
3.
The other PIL No.29/2025 has been filed by three individuals belonging to the Dimasa
and Karbi tribes and residents of the state of Assam, assailing:
I.
The Notification No. CON-3/PAP/65/10 dated 20th September, 2024.
II.
The Notification No. DC/ILP-1/2018-D/PT/1459 dated 27 th May, 2025, issued by the
Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, whereby documentary requirements for the
grant of Inner Line Permit were notified.
4.
Heard Mr K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr K. Mohammed,
learned counsel for the petitioner in PIL No. 22/2025 and PIL No. 67/2025, Mr S. Borthakur,
learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr V. Rajkhowa, learned counsel for the petitioner in PIL No.
29/2025.
Page No.# 6/27
5.
We have also heard Mr K. N. Balgopal, learned Advocate General, Nagaland, assisted by
Ms M. Kechii, learned Additional Advocate General, Nagaland and Ms T. Khro, learned Additional
Advocate General, Nagaland.
6.
During the course of the hearing, Mr K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel,
appearing for the petitioners in PIL No. 22/2025 and PIL No.67/2025, submitted that the
challenge originally lay to the Nagaland Land and Revenue Regulation Amendment Act, 1978, and
Notification No. CON/RIIN/50/2020, which lays down criteria governing the issuance of
Indigenous Inhabitants Certificates, is not being pursued.
7.
Therefore, the surviving challenge in the PILs is confined to the Notification No. CON-3/
PAP/65/10, dated 20.09.2024 and Notification No. DC/ILP-1/2018-D/PT/1459 dated 27 th May,
2025.
8.
Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel, for the petitioners, contends that the
impugned notification
constitutes
an
impermissible
restriction
upon
the
freedoms
guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
9.
According to the petitioners, the notification seeks to impose substantive restrictions
on movement and residence through executive action, unsupported by a valid law, thereby
transgressing constitutional limitations.
10.
The submission advanced on their behalf is that the notification amounts to a restriction
on movement, which could be imposed, if at all, only by a law satisfying the requirements of
Article 19(5) of the Constitution of India. It is contended that the impugned notification issued by
the Executive cannot substitute a Legislative enactment.
11.
It is further argued that the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, upon which the
State places reliance, is a colonial enactment conceived under a fundamentally different
Constitutional Order and cannot today furnish a valid basis for restricting Constitutional freedoms
guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India.
12.
According to the petitioners, continuation of such enactments through Constitutional
adaptation does not immunise it from the constitutional scrutiny inasmuch as such a regulation
cannot be elevated to a status of law as required under Article 19(5) of the Constitution of India.
Page No.# 7/27
13.
The learned Senior Counsel further argues that the State admits in their affidavit that
the Inner Line Permit Regime was consciously not implemented in Dimapur for decades.
Such exemption, according to him, therefore, was not accidental but represented a considered
policy choice intended to facilitate trade, commerce, and economic integration, which is clear
from the state affidavit filed by the respondent/Nagaland state.
14.
According to him, in Dimapur, there are non-Naga, non-indigenous residents, including
some tribes recognised in Assam since their forefathers. The subsequent extension of the regime
is therefore urged to be arbitrary and unsupported by a discernible constitutional rationale.
15.
It is also argued that the state has failed to place any empirical material demonstrating
the necessity of extending the regime to Dimapur.
16.
According to the petitioners, where a measure is justified on the basis of protection of
indigenous interests, demographic concerns, or preservation of cultural identity, constitutional
legitimacy requires at least some demonstrable factual foundation.
17.
Particular emphasis has been placed upon the proposition that Article 371A remains
subject to Part III of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that constitutional protections
accorded to Nagaland cannot override the guarantees contained under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of
the Constitution of India.
18.
While endorsing the arguments of Mr K.N. Choudhury, Mr S. Borthakur, learned Senior
counsel for the petitioners in PIL No. 29/2025, further argues that his clients have filed the PIL
espousing the cause of the Dimasa and Karbi community residing in the adjoining districts of Dima
Hasao and Karbi Anglong in the state of Assam.
19.
According to the learned Senior Counsel, members of the Dimasa community maintain
deep historical, familial, and cultural ties with the residents of Dimapur. According to him, such
ties are not recent but trace their origin to the historical association of Dimapur with the Kachari
kingdom, which was admittedly, the capital of the Kachari Kingdom.
20.
It is argued that the permit requirement imposes recurring hardship upon the members
of the community who are required to travel frequently to Dimapur for familial, social,
commercial, and cultural purposes.
Page No.# 8/27
21.
Learned Senior Counsel further contends that the States' own affidavit disclosed that
Dimapur was historically kept outside the operational ambit of the inner-line permit system for
economic reasons. It is therefore urged that the present attempt to justify the extension on the
grounds of public security and law and order suffers from internal inconsistency inasmuch as,
even under regulation, the object to empower the state to declare inner-line is for the protection
of the Naga tribes, and not for any security and law and order situation.
22.
A further grievance concerns the insistence upon NRC-related documentation. It is
submitted that the National Register of Citizens process in Assam has not attained finality and
that insistence upon such documentation for issuance of ILP effectively creates a condition
incapable of compliance.
23.
The State of Nagaland contests the challenge.
24.
Mr. K.N. Balgopal, the learned Advocate General, submits that the notification is
traceable to the powers expressly conferred under Section 2 of the Bengal Eastern Frontier
Regulation, 1873 and therefore cannot be characterised as a mere executive instruction.
25.
It is submitted that the regulation itself forms part of the continuing body of law
recognised by Article 372 of the Constitution and that its validity cannot be ignored merely
because of its colonial origin.
26.
The State further relies upon the historical position of the Naga Hills as a frontier
and protected region. According to the State, the inner-line system has constituted a
continuous legal mechanism for regulating entry into protected areas and preserving the interests
of the indigenous communities.
27.
The affidavit filed on behalf of the State asserts that the notification has been issued to
safeguard the interests of the indigenous people within the scope of the Bengal Eastern Frontier
Regulation, 1873, and within the Constitutional framework recognised under Article 29(1).
28.
The State further asserts that uncontrolled illegal immigration poses concerns relating to
public security, public safety and law and order and that effective implementation of the innerline system is necessary to address such concerns.
29.
It is also contended that unsafe migration undermines the Constitutional
Page No.# 9/27
safeguards recognised in favour of the people of Nagaland and that the impugned measure is
intended to preserve those safeguards.
30.
The State nevertheless maintains that the present ILP regime is not intended to create
internal barriers. According to the affidavit, the measure is regulatory in nature and seeks only to
strengthen the implementation of the inner-line system already recognised by law.
31.
Having noticed the rival submissions, it becomes necessary to briefly examine
the historical and constitutional background of the Inner Line system.
32.
The Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, introduced the concept of the Inner Line
in specified frontier regions. The regulation empowered the competent authority to prescribe and
alter by notification a line beyond which entry could be regulated.
33.
The object underlying the Legislation was to create a legal framework through which
frontier and tribal regions could receive differentiated treatment. The Naga Hills formed part of
the territories to which the protective framework extended.
34.
The region's subsequent historical development reflected a continuing pattern of
differentiated governance.
35.
Under the Scheduled District Act, 1874, various frontier and tribal areas were recognised
as requiring special administrative arrangements. Such areas were not subjected to the automatic
application of the general legal regime prevailing in the plains. The rationale underlying such
treatment was the recognition of distinctive social structures, customary institutions, and
patterns of landholding.
36.
The position became more pronounced under the Government of India Act, 1935.
The Naga Hills were treated as an excluded area outside the automatic application of ordinary
provincial Legislation. Provincial enactments could not extend to such areas unless specifically
directed by the Governor.
37.
The Governor was empowered to administer such areas through special regulations.
These provisions reflected a Legislative understanding that frontier and tribal regions required
differentiated governance.
38.
The Constitutional transition brought about by independence did not erase this history.
Page No.# 10/27
Article 372 ensured continuity of existing law. Consequently, laws operating immediately prior to
the commencement of the Constitution continued unless altered, repealed, or amended by a
competent authority.
The Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, accordingly survived the Constitutional transition
by virtue of the Adaptation of Laws Orders.
39.
Its authority thereafter derived not from colonial power but from the Constitution itself.
The legal continuity thus secured by Article 372 remains one of the foundational features of
constitutional governance.
40.
Subsequent Constitutional developments reinforced the distinctive position of Nagaland.
The State of Nagaland came into existence through the Constitutional and Statutory
arrangements leading to statehood.
41.
Simultaneously, Article 371A was incorporated into the Constitution, which represents
Constitutional recognition of the distinctive historical and cultural position occupied by Nagaland
within the Indian Union.
It reflects a Constitutional decision to preserve certain features of Naga identity and institutions
within the Constitution's broader framework.
42.
The significance of Article 371A lies not in creating an enclave outside
Constitutional scrutiny but in acknowledging that uniformity is not the sole Constitutional value.
43.
The differentiated treatment is not inherently inconsistent with equality. The
Constitution accommodate diversity as well as uniformity. The historical narrative, therefore,
demonstrates continuity rather than disruption.
44.
The impugned notification must therefore be examined against this Constitutional and
historical background.
45.
The challenge before us proceeds on two interconnected assumptions.
The first is that the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation 1873 does not constitute a Law capable of
sustaining restrictions contemplated by Article 19(5).
The second is that the Impugned notification is merely an Executive measure and lacks legislative
Page No.# 11/27
authority.
Since both assumptions lie at the foundation of the challenge, it is necessary to examine them at
the outset.
Thereafter, we shall proceed with the third concern, the challenge founded on Articles 14 and 19
of the Constitution, including submissions relating to Article 371A, the historical position of
Dimapur, and the grievances raised on behalf of the Dimasa and Karbi petitioners.
46.
The first question concerns the legal status of the Bengal-Eastern Frontier
Regulation, 1873.
47.
The submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners are that the regulation is a colonial
enactment conceived under a Constitutional order fundamentally different from the one
established by the Constitution of India. It is urged that restrictions upon constitutional freedoms
cannot today derive legitimacy from such a source.
48.
Such an argument possesses certain intuitive appeal.
The Regulation undoubtedly originated during the colonial era and reflected the frontier policies of
that period.
Constitutional adjudication, however, cannot proceed merely upon historical origins.
The relevant question is not how a law originated but whether it continues to derive force of law
from the Constitution.
49.
Article 372 of the Constitution of India embodies one of the foundational principles
governing constitutional transition. The Constitution did not envisage that every pre-existing law
would cease to operate on the date of commencement. Such an approach would have created
legal uncertainty of the highest order. Continuity of law was therefore recognised as a
constitutional necessity.
50.
Article 372 of the Constitution of India expressly provides for the continuance of all laws
in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution until altered, repealed or
amended by a competent authority. The continuance contemplated by Article 372 of the
Constitution of India is not provisional or symbolic; it is real and effective.
Page No.# 12/27
51.
A law continued by Article 372 of the Constitution of India derives its authority from the
Constitution itself. The Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, survived the constitutional
transition through adaptation and continued application.
52.
The Adaptation of Laws Orders, as well as Article 372 of the Constitution of India, gives
the Regulation the status of law. Indeed, the materials placed before us indicate that subsequent
constitutional and statutory developments proceeded on the footing that regulation continued to
remain operative. The Adaptation of Laws Orders recognised its continued existence as law.
53.
The State has also drawn attention to the Adaptation of Laws Amendment Orders, 2019,
by which references within the regulation were suitably adapted in relation to the State of
Nagaland. These developments are inconsistent with the petitioners' suggestion that the
Regulation ceased to exist in law.
54.
Article 372 embodies a Constitutional decision to continue in force all laws existing
immediately before the commencement of the constitution, subject, of course, to their
conformity with Constitutional limitations.
The provision does not preserve the operation of pre-constitution laws as executive instructions
or subordinate norms; it expressly continues them in force as law by the Constitution itself.
It derives its Post-Constitution legitimacy not from the colonial authority that originally created it,
but from the constitution. Article 372 does not merely preserve executive practice; it preserves
laws.
The Constitution itself confers continuing force upon them. To hold otherwise would render
Article 372 otiose and produce a legal vacuum in fields governed by pre-existing law.
55.
The further argument of Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel is that the Regulation
enacted prior to the commencement of the Constitution cannot be accorded the status of
primary legislation and therefore, cannot constitute the source of a restriction upon freedoms
guaranteed under Article 19.
56.
We are unable to accept the proposition.
57.
In the present case, the Constitution, by virtue of Article 372 and the Adoption Order,
declares the Regulation to continue as law. That itself addresses the foundation of the argument
Page No.# 13/27
that a regulation is inherently inferior to law for the purposes of Article 19.
58.
The argument further overlooks the distinction between the source of a law and its
Constitutional validity.
A Regulation enacted under a competent legislative authority prior to the Constitution was
legislative in character when enacted. Article 372 did not alter that character. It merely continues
its operation subject to constitutional scrutiny.
59.
Another important aspect is that the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation 1873 was
promulgated by the Governor General in Council, exercising its legislative power for the frontier
territories. Regulations made under sovereign legislative authority, as legislative enactments, have
the force of primary legislation unless the constitutional scheme itself indicates otherwise.
60.
Indeed, the petitioners’ submission, if accepted, would call into question the
Constitutional validity of innumerable Pre-Constitution enactments, which continue to operate
throughout the Country by virtue of Article 372. The Constitution itself does not recognise any
such distinction between laws enacted before and after its commencement, subject to the
adoption of pre-Constitution enactment under Article 372.
61.
Reliance was placed by Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, on the
decision in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. and another Vs. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North )
Ltd. and Others reported in (2002) 8 SCC 182. We do not find that decision of any assistant to the
petitioners.
62.
The controversy therein arises in an entirely different Constitutional setting involving
repugnancy, presidential accent and the continuity of a temporary enactment. The present case
concerns neither a temporary statute nor repugnancy. The Frontier Regulation, 1873, continues
by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution and the adaptation orders. The principle governing the
issue considered in the National Textile Corporation(supra) is, therefore, materially different from
the issues raised in the present lis.
63.
It is equally significant that the constitutional validity of the Regulation itself has not
been directly challenged before us. The petitioners do not seek a declaration that the regulation is
unconstitutional. Their principal challenge concerns the notification issued thereunder.
Page No.# 14/27
64.
In these circumstances, we are unable to accept the submission that the Bengal Eastern
Frontier Regulation, 1873, is not law within the meaning of the Constitution. A law does not cease
to be law merely because of its antiquity, nor does a statute lose legal force solely because it
originated before the commencement of the Constitution, so long as it continues under Article
372 of the Constitution of India and remains unrepealed or struck down. The Courts are bound to
recognise its existence and legal efficacy.
65.
The challenge then shifts from the parent law to the impugned notification.
66.
The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that Article 19(5) permits restrictions
on movement and residence only by law, not by executive action.
The proposition stated in the abstract admits of little controversy. Fundamental freedoms cannot
be curtailed merely because the executive considers such curtailment desirable. Restrictions upon
Constitutional freedoms must be referable to law.
67.
Reliance was also placed upon the State of Bihar and Others V. Project Ucccha Vidya,
Sikshak Sangh and others, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 545, for the proposition that restrictions on
fundamental rights cannot be imposed by executive instruction.
68.
The proposition is settled.
However, the premise on which the petitioner proceeds is itself erroneous.
As already noticed, the impugned notification is not the source of restriction. The source of
authority is Regulation 1873, which continues as law.
The decision, therefore, does not advance the petitioner’s case inasmuch as, in the given facts of
that case, the requirement was primary legislation, but it was done by an executive fiat, which is
not the case in the present litigation.
69.
The difficulty with the petitioners’ submission lies elsewhere. It proceeds on the
assumption that the impugned notification itself constitutes the source of restriction.
In our view, that assumption is not correct. The notification does not create the inner-line
system, nor does it introduce a regulatory framework previously unknown to the law.
70.
The existence of the inner-line system predates the notification by more than a century.
Page No.# 15/27
The notification merely extends and operationalises a mechanism already contemplated by the
Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation 1873. The source of authority is therefore the regulation itself.
71.
In constitutional terms, the notification is an exercise of delegated statutory authority.
Judicial Review in such cases does not proceed by isolating the notification from its parent source.
The relevant inquiry is whether the impugned action is traceable to authority conferred by law.
We find that it is.
72.
Before proceeding further, it would be useful to notice the scheme underlying the
Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation 1873.
73.
The challenge advanced before us has largely focused on Section 2 of the Regulation.
Since the impugned notification has been issued in exercise of powers traceable thereto. Yet, the
Constitutional validity of the impugned action cannot be appreciated by viewing Section 2 of the
Regulation in isolation from the constitutional framework within which it operates.
74.
Section 2 of the Regulation empowers the competent authority to prescribe and alter
the inner line through notification.
75.
The provision thus performs a jurisdictional function. It identifies the territorial limits
within which the regulatory framework established by the regulation shall operate. The
significance of Section 2 lies in the fact that the legislature itself recognises that the precise
location of the inner line may require adjustment from time to time, depending upon
administrative and other relevant considerations.
76.
The power to alter the inner line is therefore embedded within the statutory
design itself. Section 3 regulates entry into that area. Section 4 secures compliance with the
regulatory framework.
77.
Viewed in this manner, the regulation does not merely authorise drawing of a
geographical line. It establishes a comprehensive statutory mechanism for regulating entry into
specified areas.
78.
The notification merely identifies the territorial area to which that framework shall
apply.
It demonstrates
that
the
notification
is
not
creating
rights,
obligations
or
disabilities independently of law. The rights and obligations flow from the statutory framework
Page No.# 16/27
embodied in the regulation.
79.
Consequently, the challenge, founded on the contention that the restrictions have been
imposed solely by executive fiat, overlooks the integrated statutory scheme set out in Sections 2,
3 and 4 of the Regulation.
Once the Regulation is recognised as a subsisting law continuing by virtue of Article 372 of the
Constitution, the notification must be viewed as an exercise undertaken within the bounds of the
said legislative framework.
80.
The challenge under Article 19 of the Constitution of India constitutes the
principal constitutional plank of the petitioners’ case.
81.
Article 19(1)(d) guarantees to every citizen the freedom to move freely throughout the
territory of India. Article 19(1)(e) guarantees the right to reside and settle in any part of the
territory of India. Article 19 (1)(g) protects the freedom to practice any profession or to carry on
any occupation, trade, or business.
82.
These freedoms occupy a central position within the constitutional scheme. They
facilitate mobility, economic integration, and national unity.
83.
Yet, the Constitution itself recognises that none of these freedoms is absolute.
84.
Article 19(5) expressly authorises the state to impose reasonable restrictions upon the
freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(d) and Article 19(1)(e) in the interest of the general
public or for the protection of the interests of any scheduled tribe. Likewise, Article 19(6) permits
reasonable restrictions upon the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g).
85.
The constitutional inquiry, therefore, is not whether a restriction exists. The inquiry is
whether the restriction is authorised by law and whether it satisfies constitutional standards of
reasonableness.
86.
We have already held that the impugned notification is traceable to an authority
conferred under the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation 1873 and is, therefore, supported by law.
87.
The remaining question concerns reasonableness. The petitioners urge that the
extension of the inner-line permit regime substantially impairs the movement and residence. The
contention requires examination of the nature of the impugned measure.
Page No.# 17/27
88.
The notification does not prohibit entry into Dimapur, Chumoukedima, or Niuland, nor
does it permanently exclude citizens from residing within those districts. The notification
introduces a permit-based regulatory mechanism.
Regulation and prohibition are not constitutional equivalents.
89.
Modern Constitutional governance frequently employs systems of registration,
licensing, permits, and procedural compliance. Such a mechanism may regulate the manner in
which a freedom is exercised without extinguishing the freedom itself.
90.
The affidavit filed by the State specifically asserts that the present ILP regime is intended
to improve implementation of an existing legal framework and is not designed to create internal
barriers. The State further asserts that measures seek to address concerns relating to migration,
public security, and preservation of indigenous interests.
91.
Whether those objectives are preferable as a matter of policy is not the concern
of constitutional
review.
The
court's
concern
is
whether
the
restriction
bears
a
rational relationship to the constitutionally legitimate objective.
92.
We find it does.
93.
The Constitution itself recognises protection of Scheduled Tribes as a permissible basis
under Article 19(5) of the Constitution of India. Equally, concerns relating to the regulation of
migration and public order fall within areas where a degree of deference is ordinarily accorded to
legislative and executive judgment. The measure does not create an absolute embargo. It does
not foreclose entry. It does not extinguish the right of residence. It regularises the exercise of
those rights through a permit mechanism established under law.
94.
We are conscious of the principles enunciated in the State of Madras v. V.G. Row,
reported in (1952) 1 SCC 410 and relied upon by Mr. Choudhury, that reasonableness must be
assessed with regard to the nature of the right, the purpose of the restriction, the extent of the
evil sought to be remedied, and the prevailing conditions.
95.
Tested on those parameters, the impugned measure cannot be characterised as
unreasonable. It is traceable to law, pursues constitutionality and permissible objectives, and
adopts a regulatory rather than prohibitory framework.
Page No.# 18/27
96.
In determining reasonableness, the Court must also bear in mind the distinctive
constitutional setting in which the measure operates. Nagaland occupies a position recognised by
the Constitution itself through Article 371A of the Constitution of India. While Article 371A cannot
override Part III, it forms part of the constitutional context in which reasonableness of the
restriction must be assessed.
97.
A constitutional adjudication does not occur in a vacuum, and context matters.
Article 371A reflects constitutional recognition of distinctive historical, social, and cultural
positions occupied by Nagaland within the Indian Union. It represents an acknowledgement by
the constitution itself that differentiated treatment in certain fields may legitimately exist.
98.
Mr Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, relied upon R.C. Poudyal v.
Union of India and Ors., reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324, to contend that the constitutional
provisions conferring special treatment cannot transgress the basic structure of the Constitution.
99.
100.
There can be no quarrel with that proposition.
The present case, however, does not involve any challenge to Article 371A itself, nor does
the impugned notification create an exclusion inconsistent with the basic constitutional
framework.
101.
We have already held that Article 371A is not being invoked as a source of overriding
power, but merely constitutes part of the constitutional context in which the reasonableness of
the impugned measure falls to be assessed.
102.
Viewed from that perspective, the regulatory framework introduced by the impugned
notification cannot be characterised as excessive, disproportionate, or destructive of freedoms
guaranteed under Article 19.
103.
The Constitution does not require that every citizen enjoy unrestricted access to every
part of the country, irrespective of all competing constitutional considerations. What it requires is
that restrictions be imposed through the authority of law and remain within the bounds of
reasonableness.
104.
We are also unable to accept the submissions of Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior counsel
for the petitioners, that considerations relating to security or migration are constitutionally alien
Page No.# 19/27
to the expression “in the interest of the general public”, occurring in Article 19(5).
105.
The constitution employs a deliberately broad expression and not a catalogue of
exhaustively enumerated grounds. The phrase “interest of the general public” is of wide
amplitude and designed to accommodate the diverse societal concerns affecting the welfare,
stability and collective interest of the community. To exclude considerations of migration,
demographic pressure, prevention of social equilibrium, or security-related concern from its
ambit would amount to reading limitations into the constitutional text which are not found
therein. The impact of large-scale migration is not confined to the question of individual
movement alone. It may have implications for land resources, employment opportunities, cultural
preservation, demographic balance, public administration and the protection of vulnerable
communities.
106.
Equally, security concerns arising from peculiar geographical, historical or strategic
circumstances of a region are matters directly bearing upon public welfare inasmuch as it is an
admitted position that the State of Nagaland, including Dimapur, is declared as a disturbed area
under the Armed Forces (Special Power) Act, 1958.
107.
It would therefore be difficult to hold that such considerations stand outside the realm of
“general public interest” merely because Article 19(5) does not expressly enumerate them or
does not include “public order” as prescribed under Article 19(1).
108.
The expression “general public” is necessarily contextual. What constitutes public interest
in a frontier State with special constitutional protections may legitimately differ from
considerations applicable elsewhere. Article 19(5) does not require constitutional blindness to
regional realities.
109.
The reliance on the decision in Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, regarding the
challenge to Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, concerning fraternity, is likewise misplaced.
The questions arising therein related to citizenship and the constitutional validity of the statutory
regime applicable in Assam. The present controversy concerns the regulation of entry under
Regulation 1873 and stands on altogether a different Constitutional footing.
110.
Here, we should remind ourselves that the protection of the interests of Scheduled Tribes
Page No.# 20/27
is not merely one among several permissible grounds under Article 19(5); it is specifically
enumerated in the Constitutional text itself.
111.
Indeed, Article 19(5) expressly recognises the protection of tribal interests as a
constitutionally permissible basis for restricting the rights under Article 19(1)(d) and Article 19(1)
(e). Concerns relating to migration, demographic transformation and security may, in the given
cases, bear a direct nexus to the preservation of indigenous communities and the maintenance of
conditions necessary for the protection of their constitutional interest.
112.
The true constitutional enquiry is not whether such considerations can be taken into
account at all, but whether the restriction founded upon them satisfies the requirement of
reasonableness. Once that threshold is met, there is no warrant for excluding such
considerations from the broad ambit of “interest of the general public”.
113.
Reliance of Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on Gurbachan
Singh Vs. State of Bombay and Anr. reported in (1952) 1 SCC 683 is also inapplicable, as the
impugned Notification does not create an extraordinary exclusionary regime but merely subjects
entry and residence to a regulatory permit mechanism recognised by law.
114.
Yet, another important aspect is that the impugned notification itself furnishes a strong
answer on the reasonableness because it does not treat all non-indigenous residents as a
homogeneous class. Instead, it creates three historically distinct categories based on the changing
legal and administrative status of Dimapur. The State has consciously differentiated between
persons settled in Dimapur prior to 1st December, 1963, persons who settled between 2nd
December, 1963 and 21st November, 1979 and persons entering thereafter.
115.
These dates are not randomly chosen. The first category corresponds to the position
obtained at the inception of the State of Nagaland, while the second category reflects the period
preceding the declaration of Dimapur as a Tribal Belt by government Notification dated 22nd
November, 1979. The Notification thus recognises distinct historical phases in the evolution of the
district and accords differential treatments to persons whose presence in the area stands
associated with those phases.
116.
Equally significant is the nature of benefits conferred upon each category. Persons
Page No.# 21/27
settled prior to 1st December, 1963, are exempted from ILP and may be eligible for Permanent
Resident Certificates (PRC in short). Persons settled between 2 nd December 1963 and 21st
November 1979 are likewise exempted from ILP and are also eligible for PRC. Only those persons
who entered after the declaration of the Tribal Belt are required to obtain an ILP in accordance
with the prevailing statutory regime.
117.
The State has thus adopted a graduated and accommodating framework, subjecting only
later entrants to regulatory requirements. Such a historical classification bears a direct nexus with
the allowed object of balancing the protection of indigenous and tribal interests with the legitimate
expectations of settled residents and therefore, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
reasonableness both under Articles 19(5) and Article 14.
118.
Far from operating retrospectively against the settled populations, the impugned
notification substantially preserves accrued expectation while subjecting later entrants to
regulatory requirements.
119.
The principles governing reasonable classification, as explained in Binoy Viswam Vs. Union
of India and Ors. reported in (2017) 7 SCC 59, relied on by Mr. Borthakur, learned Sr. counsel for
the petitioners, do not assist the petitioners.
120.
Nothing stated in Kaushal Kishor Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2023) 4
SCC 1, relied on by Mr Borthakur, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners, detracts from the settled
position that restrictions expressly contemplated by Article 19(5) remain constitutionally
permissible, if otherwise reasonable.
121.
The challenge founded upon Article 19 of the Constitution of India must therefore fail.
122.
This brings us to the principal challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
123.
The edifice of the petitioners’ case is that Dimapur remained outside the
operational framework of the ILP regime for decades, and its sudden inclusion is arbitrary and
excessive.
124.
The petitioners contend that the State cannot now turn around and justify the extension
of the regime on the grounds of security, migration control, or protection of indigenous interests
and that too without having any quantifiable data.
Page No.# 22/27
125.Referring to the justification advanced by the State that effective implementation of the ILP
regime is necessary in view of the concerns relating to uncontrolled migration, public security, and
law & order, the learned Counsel for the petitioners have strenuously argued that such a
justification is inconsistent with the historical position adopted by the State itself. It was urged that
Dimapur remained outside the operational framework of the Inner Line system for decades,
precisely in order to facilitate trade, commerce, and economic integration, and that the State
cannot now rely upon law and order considerations to justify the contrary policy.
126.
The submission, though attractive, overlooks a basic feature of constitutional governance.
127.
Consistency in governmental decision-making is undoubtedly a relevant constitutional
value. At the same time, constitutional review must recognise the dynamic character of public
policy. Governance is not conducted in static conditions. Social, economic, demographic, and
administrative realities evolve with time. The Constitution does not require the State to remain
permanently bound by an earlier policy choice merely because that policy was once considered
desirable.
128.
Economic consideration may legitimately predominate at one stage. Concerns relating to
migration, administration, or security may subsequently assume greater significance. The mere
fact that one set of considerations prevailed in the past does not render a later assessment
constitutionally suspect.
129.
It is equally necessary to bear in mind that Courts possess neither the institutional
competence nor the democratic legitimacy to undertake a fresh balancing of competing policy
considerations. The choice originally belongs to the Executive Branch acting within the bounds of
law.
130.
The affidavit filed by the State raises concerns regarding the regulation of migration, the
protection of indigenous interests, public security, and the preservation of constitutional
safeguards recognised in favour of people of Nagaland. In that backdrop, it cannot be said that
the extension of the ILP regime to Dimapur bears no nexus to the object sought to be achieved by
the Regulation, 1873.
131.
The constitutional question is narrower. Are the concerns wholly extraneous, irrational, or
incapable of supporting the policy adopted?
Page No.# 23/27
132.
We are unable to answer that question in the affirmative. The reasons relied upon by the
State cannot be described as fanciful or wholly unrelated to the object sought to be achieved.
133.
That being so, the challenge founded on arbitrariness must fail.
134.
Considerable reliance was placed by the petitioners on the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in M. Nagaraj and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2006) 8 SCC 212,
to contend that extension of the ILP regime to Dimapur after so many years of exemption and
abruptly, could not have been undertaken in the absence of quantifiable data.
135.
We are unable to accept the submission. The requirement of collection and evaluation of
quantifiable data in Nagaraj (supra) arose in the specific constitutional context of reservation and
consequential seniority under Articles 16 (4), 16 (4)(A) and 16 (4)(B), where the Constitution
predicates affirmative action upon satisfaction of particular constitutional conditions, was held to
require a demonstrable factual foundation.
136.
The present cases concern neither reservation nor representational guarantees, but rather
the territorial extension of a pre-existing statutory framework under the Regulation, 1873.
137.
Secondly, the factual premise underlying the submission is itself not borne out by the
record.
The learned Advocate General has produced before this Court the materials that preceded the
impugned notification, including committee reports, departmental deliberations, and successive
Cabinet decisions culminating in the extension of the ILP regime to Dimapur, Chumoukedima, and
Niuland.
138.
The
record,
therefore,
discloses
that
the
decision
was
preceded
by
institutional consideration at multiple levels of government and was not taken in an evidentiary
vacuum. Whether the material was sufficient to justify the ultimate policy choice is not a
matter of judicial determination in the exercise of the power of judicial review. The Court is
concerned with the existence of relevant material and not with re-evaluating the sufficiency of
that material as an appellate authority over Governmental policy, in the absence of manifest
arbitrariness.
139.
Once it is shown that the decision was preceded by consideration of reports and
Page No.# 24/27
recommendations placed before the Cabinet, the challenge founded upon the absence of
quantifiable data cannot be sustained.
140.
The reliance on Dr. Jagadish Saran and Ors. Vs. Union of India reported in (1980) 2 SCC
768 is equally misplaced.
Unlike the affirmative preference examined therein, the present case concerns the territorial
application of an existing statutory regime. In any event, the material placed before us discloses
committee reports, Department deliberations and successive Cabinet decisions preceding the
impugned notification.
141.
The challenge founded under Article 14 must therefore fail.
142.
The submission advanced on behalf of the Dimasa and Karbi petitioners deserves separate
consideration.
143.
Mr Borthakur, learned Senior counsel, emphasises the historical association of Dimapur
with the Kachari kingdom and continuing familial, cultural, and social ties maintained by the
members of the Dimasa community residing across the present State boundary.
144.
The historical significance of these submissions cannot be doubted.
145.
History forms an important part of the identity of communities and regions. The existence
of enduring familial and cultural relationships between populations residing in adjoining districts
of Assam and residents of Dimapur is neither implausible nor insignificant.
146.
Yet, Constitutional adjudication proceeds on existing constitutional arrangements rather
than on competing claims of historical sovereignty. The Court is not called upon to determine the
territorial contours of pre-colonial kingdoms, nor are we concerned with adjudicating historical
claims to sovereignty. The controversy before us concerns the Constitutional validity of a
contemporary regulatory measure.
147.
Viewed from that perspective, the historical association of Dimapur with the Kachari
kingdom cannot by itself determine the outcome of the present proceeding. The Notification does
not prohibit members of the Dimasa or Karbi communities from entering Dimapur. What it
requires is compliance with a permit regime and an application to persons who do not fall within
the exempted categories.
Page No.# 25/27
148.
Mere inconvenience resulting from compliance with such requirements cannot furnish a
sufficient ground for invalidating the measure. We therefore find ourselves unable to accept the
challenge on these grounds.
149.
Mr Bothakur, learned Senior Counsel, also urged that insistence upon NRC
documentation creates an impossible condition of compliance because the NRC process in Assam
has not attained finality.
150.
The grievance essentially concerns the implementation of the notification rather than its
constitutional validity. The present proceedings concern the legality of the notification itself.
151.
At the same time, the concerns expressed on behalf of such petitioners cannot
be regarded as wholly devoid of substance, particularly having regard to the peculiar
circumstances pointed out by the petitioners and the fact that the NRC process in Assam has not
yet attained finality.
152.
However, in the course of the hearing, the learned Advocate General, after due
consultation with the highest authorities of the State government, fairly stated that the
concern expressed by the petitioners stands substantially addressed.
153.
The learned Advocate General submitted that insofar as the districts of Cachar, Hailakandi,
Dima Hasao, and Karbi Anglong, the neighbouring districts of Assam, are concerned, the
competent authorities shall not insist upon production of a final NRC registration document.
154.
It was further submitted that production of a “Receipt of claim”, which displays the
details of an individual applicant for NRC registration, with an ARN number generated in the
course of the NRC process and available in the public domain in downloadable form, shall be
treated as sufficient for the purpose of processing applications under the applicable framework.
155.
The statement made by the learned Advocate General is recorded. We have also kept on
record one sample of such a receipt produced by the learned Advocate General.
156.
In view of the stand taken by the State Government, the apprehension expressed on
behalf of the petitioners substantially stands addressed. Therefore, in terms of the stand taken by
the State government, the apprehension expressed on behalf of the petitioners in PIL No.
29/2025 does not survive for further adjudication.
Page No.# 26/27
157.
Another ancillary aspect of the matter is that the learned Advocate General has drawn to
the attention of the Court the contents of Writ Petition Civil No. 594 of 2019 instituted before the
Supreme Court of India by Mr. Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, challenging the amendment to ChapterX of the Revenue Regulation, the criteria for issuance of the Indigenous Certificate, and the ILP
regime and its implementation. The learned Advocate General has also produced an order dated
02-07-2019, whereby the Supreme Court dismissed the said writ petition, finding no merit
warranting interference.
158.
It is contended by the learned Advocate General, that as the petitioner in PIL No. 22/2025
initially approached the Hon’ble Apex Court and filed the present PIL being relegated to this Court
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and as the said writ petition referred by the petitioner, the
Supreme Court was represented by Mr. Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, a Senior Advocate, the
petitioner has had all the knowledge regarding such factum of dismissal of similar writ petition
preferred by the said Senior Counsel. Therefore, in the fitness of things, the petitioners ought to
have disclosed such factum.
159.
Public Interest Litigation rests upon utmost candour and complete disclosure of all
material facts. A litigant invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of a constitutional Court in a
representative capacity is expected to disclose earlier proceedings concerning the same subject
matter. At the same time, dismissal of the writ petition without a reasoned adjudication does not
constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, nor does it by itself foreclose
examination of a subsequent challenge.
160.
In the facts of the present cases, we do not consider it necessary to return any conclusion
on whether the omission amounted to deliberate suppression, since we have independently
examined the challenge on its merits and found no ground for interference; we leave the issue
there.
161.
To summarise and conclude, we have held that:
I.
The Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, continues to constitute law by
virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution of India.
II.
We have further held that the impugned notifications dated 20.09.2024 and
dated 27.05.2025 derive authority from that Regulation and therefore, cannot be
Page No.# 27/27
characterised as a mere executive fiat.
III.
We are also unable to hold that the extension of the ILP regime to Dimapur,
Chumoukedima and Niuland is manifestly arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
IV.
The challenge founded upon Article 19 likewise fails.
V.
The submission based upon Article 371A, historical association of Dimapur with
the Kachari Kingdom and the absence of qualifiable data does not furnish grounds
warranting interference.
162.
For the discussions made and reasons recorded hereinabove, the challenge to the
Notification No. CON-RIIN/50/2020 dated 20.09.2024, and to Notification No. DC/ILP-1/2018D/PT/1459 dated 27.05.2025 fails.
163.
The present petitions are accordingly dismissed.
164.
Interim order, if any, in these petitions stand vacated.
165.
There shall be no order as to cost.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
CHIEF JUSTICE
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review