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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 29th July, 2026
Pronounced on: 16th September, 2026
Uploaded on: 16th September, 2026
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CNR No :
DLHC010858912025
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RFA 1006/2025
1. Kiran Kriplani
....Appellant No.1
2. Ashok Kriplani, Advocate,
17/13, (G.F.), Old Rajinder Nagar,
New Delhi—110060.
.....Appellant No.2
Through: Mr. Ashok Kriplani, Appellant
No.-2 (in person) and on behalf
of Appellant No.1.
versus
ICICI BANK Ltd.
(Formerly known as Sangli Bank Ltd.)
NBCC Place, Bhishma Pitamah Marg,
Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium), Pragati Vihar,
New Delhi-110003
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Amol Sharma and Mr.
Ateev Mathur, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M
E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1.
The present Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 has been preferred by the Appellants/Plaintiffs against
the Judgment and Decree dated 31.05.2025, passed by the learned District
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Judge, Delhi, whereby their Suit bearing CS (DJ) No. 617664/2016 seeking
damages/compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- along with interest at the rate of
18% per annum compounded quarterly, against the Respondent/Defendant
for filing a false, frivolous and vexatious Civil Suit against them, has been
dismissed.
2.
The facts in brief are, that the Plaintiffs availed two loans of Rs.
2,50,000/- each from the Defendant Bank, then known as Sangli Bank Ltd.
(since merged with ICICI Bank Ltd.), on 30.12.1994, for a period of one
year, at an interest rate of 19.25% per annum. The loans were secured by
pledge of shares, the value of which exceeded the loan amount, in
accordance with the policy of the Defendant Bank. The Plaintiff No. 1, Smt.
Kiran Kriplani, was the borrower under one loan account (SOD A/c No.
257) with the Plaintiff No. 2, Sh. Ashok Kriplani, was the guarantor. The
Plaintiff No. 2 was the borrower under the second loan account (SOD A/c
No. 234), with Plaintiff No. 1 as the guarantor.
3.
An Agreement of Pledge dated 30.12.1994 was executed, entitling
the Defendant Bank to sell the pledged shares in the event that the value of
shares fell below the outstanding amount, or upon the expiry of one year,
whichever was earlier, with due notice to the Plaintiffs.
4.
The Plaintiffs also executed a Demand Promissory Note, a
Continuing Security Bond, a Letter of Lien and Set Off, and a Letter of
Guarantee, all dated 30.12.1994, in favour of the Defendant Bank.
5.
The Plaintiffs did not request extension of the loan period after the
expiry of one year, i.e. after 30.12.1995. Despite this and despite the
Plaintiffs' admitted inability to pay interest during the loan period, the
Defendant Bank did not sell the pledged shares, as envisaged under the
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Agreement of Pledge. The Defendant Bank instead, continued to levy
interest, escalating from 19.25% per annum to as high as 27% per annum,
compounded quarterly.
6.
By the end of 1995, the Plaintiff No. 2, who was engaged in the
business of shares, suffered financial losses and was compelled to close his
business. He relocated outside Delhi for employment with a private
Company, rendering it difficult for the Plaintiffs to monitor their loan
accounts with the Defendant Bank.
7.
In October 1996, the Plaintiffs requested the Defendant Bank, vide
Letter dated 10.10.1996, to swap certain pledged shares; specifically, to sell
8,400 shares of Indo Matsushita Appliances and 4,200 shares of Indo Gulf
Fertilizers, and instead to purchase 10,000 shares of Hitech Drilling Ltd.
and 2,000 shares of Swaraj Mazda Ltd. The Defendant Bank carried out the
swapping transaction, but did not furnish the details thereof, to the Plaintiffs.
The Account Statements of the Plaintiffs for the period October 1996 to
December 1996, contained blank spaces corresponding to the period of the
swap transaction.
8.
On 15.07.1997, the Defendant Bank sold 7,700 shares of Hitech
Drilling Ltd. from the loan account of the Plaintiff No. 2, and realised Rs.
4,39,000/-. Thereafter, it closed his loan account, and transferred the credit
balance of Rs. 95,008.50, to the loan account of the Plaintiff No. 1, and
intimated the Plaintiff No. 2 vide its Letter of even date, to settle his
overdraft account. This was done without prior Notice to the Plaintiffs, as
required under Section 176 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
9.
Thereafter, on 19.12.1997, the Defendant Bank filed a Civil Suit No.
494/11 titled Sangli Bank Ltd. v. Kiran Kriplani & Anr, for recovery of
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Rs. 2,27,873.50/- against both Plaintiffs, before the Civil Judge, Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi. The Plaintiff No. 1 was arrayed as the borrower and the
Plaintiff No. 2 as the guarantor.
10.
During the pendency of Suit No. 494/11, the Defendant Bank sold
further pledged
500 and 100 shares of Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. on
11.05.1998 and 12.05.1998 respectively, and 100 shares of Siltap Chemicals
Ltd. on 11.05.1998, again without notice to the Plaintiffs, without informing
the Court, and without seeking its leave. The Defendant Bank intimated the
details of these sales, vide its Letter dated 08.09.1998 addressed to its own
advocate, Sh. K.K. Jain. The Defendant Bank did not amend its plaint, to
account for the amounts so realised.
11.
By judgment dated 22.12.2012, the learned Civil Judge, dismissed
Suit No. 494/11. It was observed that the Defendant Bank had some pledged
shares lying with it at the time of filing the Suit, and the Suit was filed
prematurely. It also failed to act with reasonable diligence by not selling the
pledged shares after the expiry of one year upon reasonable Notice, and the
Bank could not take benefit of its own wrong. It was further held that the
Bank was guilty of concealment of material facts. Furthermore, the pledged
shares were sold without reasonable notice to the Plaintiffs, and the sale was
void under Section 176 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Moreover, the
Bank had not given due credit of sale proceeds, in the account of the
Plaintiff No. 1. The Suit of the Defendant Bank was accordingly
dismissed. The Defendant Bank did not prefer an Appeal against the
said judgment.
12.
The Plaintiffs thereupon, instituted the present Suit on 22.12.2015,
seeking damages/compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- (confined from the total
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claim of Rs. 10,00,000/-) along with interest at 18% per annum compounded
quarterly from the date of institution till realisation, on the ground that the
Defendant Bank had filed a false, frivolous and vexatious Suit against them,
causing harassment, humiliation, defamation and mental agony. The Suit
was valued at Rs. 5,00,000/-, for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fees.
The Plaintiffs pleaded that the cause of action lastly arose on 22.12.2012
when the Defendant Bank's Suit was dismissed, and the present Suit was
within the three-year period of limitation.
13.
The Defendant Bank filed its Written Statement denying the
Plaintiffs' claims and raised preliminary objections that the Suit was devoid
of cause of action; was not maintainable; was barred by limitation, and was
filed with malafide intent, to harass bank officials.
14.
On merits, the Defendant Bank admitted that two loans of
Rs.2,50,000/- each had been granted on 30.12.1994, at 19.25% per annum
and that the same were secured by pledged shares. It was specifically stated
that the loan account of Plaintiff No.2 had been adjusted and settled upon
sale of the pledged shares, whereas Plaintiff No.1 had failed to repay the
outstanding dues despite repeated requests and reminders, which
necessitated institution of Suit No.494/11.
15.
The Defendant Bank categorically denied that any swapping of
shares was ever requested by the Plaintiffs or undertaken by the Bank. The
Defendant Bank attributed its inability to challenge the judgment dated
22.12.2012, to the merger of Sangli Bank Ltd. with ICICI Bank Ltd. and the
consequent administrative disruptions, staff transfers and procedural
challenges. The Defendant Bank did not file any document, in support of its
Written Statement.
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16.
The Plaintiffs in their Replication denied the contents of the Written
Statement and reaffirming the averments of the plaint. The Plaintiffs
specifically stated that the Defendant Bank had evaded replying on two
aspects; the failure to amend its plaint in Suit No. 494/11 after selling shares
during the pendency of that suit, and the arbitrary closure of the loan
account of the Plaintiff No. 2, and contended that such evasion should be
treated as admission.
17.
On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were
framed on 23.11.2022:
(i) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to get a decree of
recovery of damages/compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs from the
Defendant Bank, as prayed for? OPP;
(ii) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the interest on the
aforesaid amount, if so, at what rate? OPP;
(iii) Whether the present suit is not maintainable in the
present form? OPD;
(iv) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? OPD;
(v) Relief.
18.
In support of their case, the Plaintiffs examined two witnesses. PW-1,
Sh. Ashok Kriplani, Plaintiff No.2, tendered his evidence by way of
affidavit Ex. PW-1/A and relied upon Ex. PW-1/1 to Ex. PW-1/22. The
documents relied upon included the Judgment dated 22.12.2012 Ex. PW-1/1,
the letter dated 08.09.1998 regarding sale of shares during pendency of the
earlier Suit Ex. PW-1/2, the Applications under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and
the orders thereon as Ex. PW-1/3 to Ex. PW-1/6, the Agreement of Pledge
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Ex. PW-1/9, Letter dated 10.10.1996 seeking swap of shares Ex. PW-1/10,
Notice dated 03.10.2005 Ex. PW-1/11, statements of account Ex. PW-1/12
Colly, medical prescriptions of Plaintiff No.1 Ex. PW-1/14 (OSR), and the
letter dated 15.07.1997 relating to closure of the account of Plaintiff No.2
Ex. PW-1/20.
19.
PW-2, Sh. Jitender Kumar, JJA, Record Room Civil, Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi, produced the record of Suit No. 494/11 and confirmed the
originals of the documents exhibited by PW-1.
20.
The
Defendant
Bank,
despite
being
afforded
numerous
opportunities, did not lead any evidence. The Defendant's evidence was
closed, vide Order dated 22.02.2022.
21.
The learned District Judge, vide the impugned Judgment dated
31.05.2025, dismissed the Suit of the Plaintiffs. It was held that although the
Plaintiffs had strenuously asserted during arguments, that their case was not
one of malicious prosecution, a plain reading of the pleadings and the reliefs
sought, disclosed that the proceedings were in substance, directed towards
seeking compensation on the ground of malicious prosecution; the injury
claimed being the reputational and emotional harm occasioned by having to
face litigation, which the Plaintiffs asserted was avoidable and malicious,
and the title of the Suit itself signified that it was one for compensation for
harassment, humiliation and defamation on account of a false, frivolous and
vexatious Suit.
22.
The learned District Judge examined the claim within the framework
governing malicious prosecution and found that the essential ingredients
thereof were not made out. A lender-borrower relationship admittedly
existed, that the Plaintiffs had not disputed that the loan remained unpaid,
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and that their grievance was confined to the manner in which the Bank chose
to pursue recovery, rather than to the existence of any claim.
23.
It was further held that under Section 176 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872 the pawnee has the option either to sell the pledged goods upon
reasonable Notice or to institute a Suit for Recovery, and that no Notice is
required where the latter course is adopted. Furthermore, there was no
judicial determination, either in the judgment dated 22.12.2012 or otherwise,
that the Bank had acted with malice or wrongful intent, as the Suit of the
defendant was dismissed on procedural or technical grounds. The reliance
placed by the Plaintiffs upon H.S. Bedi vs. National Highway Authority of
India was distinguishable, as in the said judgement, the claims were
demonstrably false and devoid of any legal foundation, unlike the present
case where the liability stood admitted.
24.
The learned District Judge thus, concluded that the Suit, being in
substance one for malicious prosecution, was governed by Article 74 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes one year from the termination of the
impugned proceedings.
The cause of action arose on 22.12.2012 and the
limitation expired on 22.12.2013, whereas the Suit was instituted on
22.12.2015. Even assuming the case was founded on breach of contract, it
would be barred under Article 55, the latest alleged breach being the
sale of shares in the year 1998. The suit of the Plaintiffs was accordingly,
dismissed.
25.
Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 31.05.2025,
the present First Appeal has been preferred.
26.
The grounds of challenge are that the learned Trial Court adjudicated
the Suit on the grossly incorrect premises of malicious prosecution and
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breach of contract, neither of which was ever pleaded by the Appellants;
that what is alleged in a Plaint has first to be considered and dealt with
before any conclusion contrary thereto is arrived at; and that the finding that
the core grievance of the Plaintiffs is rooted in what essentially amounts to
an allegation of malicious prosecution, and that the legal action initiated by
the Bank was not only unwarranted but also malicious, amounts to putting
words into the mouth of the unwilling Appellants.
27.
It is the case of the Appellants that their Suit was founded neither
upon malicious prosecution nor upon breach of contract, but upon the
institution by the Respondent Bank of a false, frivolous and vexatious Suit,
which they assert to be a distinct cause of action; that no relief was ever
claimed by them on either of the two premises adopted by the learned Trial
Court; and that their Suit, not being covered by any specific Article of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, but was governed by the residuary
Article 113.
28.
It is further contended that the expression "prosecution" is employed
primarily in criminal matters and not in civil matters, as held by the Bombay
High Court in Vasantrao Bapurao Chiddarwar vs. Raghunathrao Anantrao
Deshmukh, which Judgment was referred
before the learned Trial Court,
but has not even been adverted to in the impugned Judgment. The limitation
Article 74 of the Limitation Act, 1963 commences when the plaintiff is
acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated; neither of which occurs
in a Civil Suit which is merely dismissed or rejected. The Suit of the
Appellants was, accordingly, governed by Article 113, the residuary
provision prescribing three years, the Suit having been instituted within
three years of 22.12.2012, when the cause of action arose.
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29.
It is also urged that in the impugned Judgment, it was observed that
the damages claimed are not premised on any breach of contractual terms,
which is in direct contradiction to paragraph 32 thereof, wherein it was
recorded that the Appellants attempted during arguments, to shift the cause
of action away from malicious prosecution and to emphasise an alleged
breach of contractual obligations. Moreover, the Written Submissions filed
by the Appellants before the learned Trial Court, did not refer even once, to
malicious prosecution or breach of contract.
30.
The Appellants have further assailed the finding in the impugned
Judgment, that the obligation to give Notice arises only when the pawnee
elects to dispose of the pledged goods and that no such Notice is required
where the pawnee approaches the Court by way of a recovery suit. It is
contended that the Respondent Bank had in fact, sold the shares without
Notice before institution of the Suit, as acknowledged by its own Letter
dated 15.07.1997, and had again sold the shares during the pendency of the
Suit, thereby violating Section 176 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, both
before and after the institution of the Suit.
31.
It is contended that the observation that there is no judicial
determination either in the Judgment dated 22.12.2012 or otherwise that the
Respondent Bank acted with malice or wrongful intent, is contrary to the
record. However, in the said Judgment itself, it was held that the Respondent
Bank guilty of concealment of material fact. Therefore, the conclusion in the
impugned Judgment, that the earlier Suit was not unfounded in law or
actuated by malicious motives, stands demolished thereby.
32.
Reliance has been placed by the Appellants upon H.S. Bedi vs.
National Highway Authority of India, RFA 784/2010, decided by this Court,
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upon S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1. Also, it is
asserted that it is a well settled principle that a party approaching the Court
with unclean hands, is entitled to no relief.
33.
The Respondent/Defendant Bank, in its Written Submissions, has
supported the impugned Judgment, contending that a plain reading of the
Plaint discloses that the cause of action for filing the present Suit arose upon
the dismissal of the earlier Suit by the learned Civil Judge, and that the
entire Plaint is founded upon allegedly malicious prosecution initiated by the
Bank against the Appellants. It is submitted that the learned District Judge,
upon examining the Plaint and the material placed on record, has rightly so
held, placing reliance upon West Bengal State Electricity Board vs. Dilip
Kumar Ray, (2007) 14 SCC 568.
34.
It is further submitted that at the time of institution of the earlier Suit,
there was admittedly an outstanding against the Appellants, and that no
wrongful intent can therefore, be attributed to the Bank in prosecuting its
claim for recovery. Reiterating the stand taken in its Written Statement, it is
contended that under Section 176 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 the
pawnee has an election, either to bring a Suit upon the debt while retaining
the pledged goods as collateral security, or to sell the pledged goods upon
reasonable Notice; and the Bank having elected the former course, no notice
was required in law.
35.
On the aspect of limitation, it is submitted that a Suit founded on
malicious prosecution is governed by Article 74 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
which prescribes one year from the termination of the proceedings
complained of. The earlier Suit having been dismissed on 22.12.2012, the
present Suit ought to have been instituted on or before 22.12.2013, whereas
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it was filed on 22.12.2015. Moreover, even upon the alternative case of
breach of contract, the Suit is barred under Article 55, the latest alleged
breach being the sale of the pledged shares being in the year 1998.
36.
It is therefore, submitted that the impugned Judgment calls for no
interference.
Submissions heard and record perused.
37.
The Appellants and the Respondent Bank have been in litigation since
the year 1997, on account of two loans of Rs. 2,50,000/- each availed by the
Appellants on 30.12.1994 against pledge of shares. The following
proceedings ensued between the parties:
i. On 19.12.1997, Suit No. 494/11 titled Sangli Bank Ltd. vs.
Kiran Kriplani & Anr. was instituted by the Respondent
Bank for recovery of Rs. 2,27,873.50/- against the Appellant
No. 1 as borrower and the Appellant No. 2 as guarantor,
before the learned Civil Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
ii. On 06.08.2003, an Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
was moved by the Appellants in the said Suit for rejection of
the plaint on the ground of concealment of the sale of shares
effected after its institution, which was dismissed on
21.01.2004. A Review Application dated 25.02.2004 was
likewise, dismissed on 09.07.2004.
iii. On 20.08.2008, CS No. 99169/2016 was instituted by the
Appellants against the Respondent Bank for redemption and
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recovery of the pledged shares, which was dismissed vide
Judgment dated 11.08.2021.
iv. The Suit No. 494/11, was dismissed by the learned Civil
Judge Vide Judgment dated 22.12.2012 Ex. PW-1/1,
holding that the Bank had not acted with reasonable
diligence in failing to sell the pledged shares upon
reasonable notice after the expiry of one year; that some of
the pledged shares were lying with it at the institution of the
Suit, rendering the Suit premature and the Bank guilty of
concealment of material fact; that the sale effected without
reasonable notice was void under Section 176 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872; and that due credit of the sale proceeds
had not been given in the account of the Appellant No. 1.
The said Judgment was not carried in Appeal by the Bank.
v. On 22.12.2015, the present Suit bearing CS (DJ) No.
617664/2016 was instituted by the Appellants, seeking
damages and compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- along with
interest, on account of the Suit of the Bank being false,
frivolous and vexatious.
38.
The principal questions that arise for consideration, are:
(i) whether the Suit of the Appellants/Plaintiffs was, in substance, a Suit for
compensation for malicious prosecution; and
(ii) whether the Appellants/Plaintiffs, upon the evidence led, established
their entitlement to damages.
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I. Whether the Suit was for Compensation for Malicious Prosecution:
39.
The entire edifice of the Appeal rests upon the assertion that the Appellants never
founded their Suit upon malicious prosecution, and that the learned District Judge, in
holding otherwise, put words into the mouths of unwilling litigants. It is asserted that the
Written Submissions dated 29.07.2022 filed before the learned Trial Court, were "not
even once based on Malicious Prosecution or Breach of the Contract".
40.
This assertion, however, is not borne out from the record. Paragraph 2
of the Affidavit of Evidence of PW-1, Ex. PW-1/A, reads as under:
"So having violated the Statute by the defendant, an
Institution, it is elementary law & common sense to not to
plead or continue to plead before the Court and if pleaded
and continued to be pleaded then it is prima facie a false
and malicious case to harass and continue to harass the
opposite party therein the previous suit, hence is the
present suit."
41.
The identical averment stands reproduced in the Written Submissions
filed by the Appellants before the learned Trial Court on 29.07.2022,
wherein it is stated that the conduct of the Bank rendered it "prima facie a
false and malicious case by the powerful to harass and continue to harass
the weak opposite party therein the previous suit, hence is the present suit."
42.
The Appellants thus, not only pleaded malice, but reiterated it in their
Affidavit of Evidence and in the Written Submissions, upon which they
now place reliance. The contention that the learned District Judge
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supplanted a case which the Appellants had not set up, is contrary to the
record and is liable to be rejected.
43.
Apart from the said pleadings, it is not the label affixed by a party,
but the substance of the pleadings and the nature of the injury complained
of, which determine the character of a Suit. The title of the Plaint itself reads
as under:
"Suit For Damages/Compensation On Behalf Of The Plaintiffs
Against The Defendant For Filing False, Frivolous Or Vexatious Suit
Against The Plaintiffs And Thus For Damages Also On Account Of
Harassment, Humiliation, Defamation, Etc."
44.
Paragraph 7 of the Plaint reads as under:
"The suit filed by the defendant was intentionally false,
frivolous and vexatious, to extort money from the then outstationed, thus incapable plaintiffs, hence this suit against
the defendant.
Defendant's false suit caused harassment, humiliation,
defamation, mental agony etc. to the plaintiffs and
especially defamation to the plaintiff no.2 who became an
advocate in year 2010 and had to face suit of the defendant
as an advocate in full and searching glare of the Hon'ble
Court, public and his colleagues, as a defendant."
45.
What is averred is thus, that the Bank by filing the earlier Suit, set a
civil proceeding in motion; that it did so with an improper motive and to
extort money; that the said proceeding terminated in favour of the
Appellants; and that the Appellants suffered injury to reputation and mental
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distress in consequence. These are the constituents of the tort of malicious
prosecution.
46.
The Supreme Court in West Bengal State Electricity Board vs. Dilip
Kumar Ray, (2007) 14 SCC 568, has explained that malice is not to be
understood in the sense of spite or hatred against an individual, but as
denoting that the party is actuated by an improper motive; the proper motive
for a prosecution being the desire to secure the ends of justice.
47.
The learned District Judge has, therefore, rightly held that the
Suit was, in substance, one for compensation for malicious prosecution
and was to be adjudged within that framework.
II. Whether the Appellants established their entitlement to damages:
48.
In order to constitute malicious prosecution, the following aspects
have to be established:
(i) institution or continuation of legal proceedings by the
defendant;
(ii) want of reasonable and probable cause;
(iii) malice; and
(iv) termination of the proceedings in favour of the plaintiff.
49.
Malice and want of reasonable and probable cause, are distinct
ingredients and neither can be inferred from the other, nor either from the
mere failure of the earlier proceeding.
50.
The institution of Suit No. 494/11 by the Bank and its termination in
favour of the Appellants, are not in dispute. The case of the Appellants,
however, founders upon want of reasonable and probable cause.
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51.
PW-1, in his cross-examination dated 11.04.2017, admitted the
execution of the Demand Promissory Note Ex. PW-1/D2, the continuing
Security Bond Ex. PW-1/D3, the Letter of Lien and Set Off Ex. PW-1/D4
and the Letter of Guarantee Ex. PW-1/D5, and that the shares stood pledged
as security in favour of the Bank under the Agreement of Pledge Ex. PW1/9.
52.
PW-1, in his cross-examination dated 11.01.2018, deposed as under:
"It is correct that we never said to the defendant bank to sale the pledged
shares in the market and adjust the sale proceeds in our loan account."
53.
PW-1, in his cross-examination dated 13.05.2019, further admitted:
"It is correct that we were not able to pay the interest of the
loan amounts which were sanctioned an granted to me and
my wife."
54.
The Appellants thus availed the loans, failed to repay them, sought no
renewal upon the expiry of one year and gave no instruction to the Bank to
liquidate the security. A creditor who, in such circumstances, approaches a
Civil Court to recover what is due to him, acts in assertion of a subsisting
legal right. His Suit may fail for want of proof, for a defect in the conduct of
the litigation, or for a bar in law, but its failure does not render its institution
an actionable wrong.
55.
It is not the success or failure of a litigation which determines its
malicious character, but the intent and the motive with which it was initiated.
The grievance of the Appellants is not that no debt was due, nor that the
Bank believed no debt to be due, but that the Bank ought to have realised its
dues by sale of the pledged shares, rather than by recourse to litigation. That
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is a complaint directed at the choice of remedy, and does not establish want
of reasonable and probable cause.
56.
Pertinently, PW-1 was unable to furnish the particulars of the very
sales of which he complained. In his cross-examination dated 11.01.2018, he
deposed that he could not state the details of the shares sold by the Bank
before the filing of the earlier Suit, and did not remember the details of the
shares sold during the Court proceedings, volunteering only that he could
tell from the records. The allegation of sale without notice thus, remains
unparticularised, even in the testimony of the Appellants' own witness.
57.
The Appellants have rested their case upon the findings recorded in
the Judgment dated 22.12.2012 Ex. PW-1/1, contending that the same
constitute a judicial condemnation of the intent of the Bank.
58.
The learned Civil Judge dismissed the earlier Suit upon the reasoning
that if some of the pledged goods were lying with the Bank at the time of
institution of the Suit, the balance amount was not quantifiable at that stage,
and unless the entire pledged goods were sold after reasonable notice, no
cause of action arose to file the Suit. The dismissal thus, proceeded upon the
footing that the Suit was premature, and not upon any finding that no debt
was owing by the Appellants.
59.
The position is placed beyond doubt by the said Judgment, wherein
the learned Civil Judge, having held the sale of the pledged shares without
notice, was void under Section 176 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
concluded that the Bank "is not entitled to adjust the amount arising out of
void transaction in the account of defendant no.1." The necessary
consequence is that the amounts realised from the void sales, could not be
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credited against the liability of the Appellant No. 1. Far from extinguishing
the debt, the finding leaves the liability standing and unadjusted.
60.
The findings relating to concealment are undoubtedly, adverse to the
Bank. They pertain, however, to the sale of the pledged shares in May, 1998
effected during the pendency of the earlier Suit, and to the failure to disclose
the same to the Court or to amend the plaint. They relate to the conduct of
the Bank in the course of the litigation, and not to its state of mind on
19.12.1997 when the Suit was instituted. Misconduct in the course of a
proceeding, does not retrospectively deprive its institution of reasonable and
probable cause.
61.
The observation in the impugned Judgment that there is no judicial
determination that the Bank acted with malice or wrongful intent, is
imprecisely worded, findings of concealment having in fact been returned in
the Judgment dated 22.12.2012. The imprecision does not, however, disturb
the conclusion, for those findings do not bear upon the honesty of the
institution of the Suit.
62.
The reliance placed by the Appellants upon H.S. Bedi vs. National
Highway Authority of India, RFA 784/2010, is misplaced. The said decision
operates where the claim advanced was demonstrably false and the party had
no entitlement whatsoever, against the opposite side. Here, the availing of
the loans and the subsistence of the outstanding stand admitted.
63.
The reliance upon S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath, (1994) 1
SCC 1, is equally misplaced. The principle that a litigant approaching the
Court with unclean hands is entitled to no relief, operates as a defence in the
proceeding before the Court, and was so applied, the Suit of the Bank having
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been dismissed. It does not furnish a cause of action for a fresh Suit in
damages.
64.
There is a further aspect. Where a Suit is found to be false or
vexatious, the successful defendant is not without recourse. Section 35
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 empowers the Court to award costs to the
successful party; Section 35A empowers it, upon a finding that a claim or
defence is false or vexatious to the knowledge of the party advancing it, to
award compensatory costs; and Section 35B provides for costs occasioned
by delay. That remedy is to be worked in the Suit, in which the mischief
occurs.
65.
The Appellants were the successful parties in Suit No. 494/11. It was
open to them to press for costs, including compensatory costs, before the
learned Civil Judge. The Judgment dated 22.12.2012 records that no order as
to costs was made. Having not availed of the remedy afforded to them in
that very Suit, the Appellants could not institute an independent Suit three
years thereafter, to recover as damages that which lay available to them as
costs.
66.
Even otherwise, the claim to damages is unsustainable upon the
evidence. The Plaint merely asserts that the Bank, "having deep pockets is
liable for damages/compensation to the plaintiffs of Rs.10 lakhs but confined
to Rs.5 lakhs due to paucity of court fees at present", without furnishing any
particulars of the manner in which the said figure was arrived at.
67.
The head-wise break-up, apportioning Rs. 1,00,000/- to the false and
vexatious Suit, Rs. 1,00,000/- to concealment of facts, Rs. 2,00,000/- to
mental agony, Rs. 2,00,000/- to professional defamation, Rs. 1,00,000/- to
abuse of power and position, Rs. 2,00,000/- to the dragging of the case and
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Rs. 1,00,000/- towards deterrence, appears for the first time in the Affidavit
of Evidence Ex. PW-1/A. PW-1. In his cross-examination dated 13.05.2019,
it was admitted that "the details as mentioned in para no. 13 of my affidavit
have not been given in my plaint." The evidence travelling beyond the
pleadings cannot be looked into.
68.
At the outset, it is to be noticed that the Appellant No. 1, who is said
to have suffered aggravated depression, did not enter the witness box at all.
Her case was deposed to by the Appellant No. 2, who admitted in his crossexamination dated 11.01.2017, that he had not filed any copy of a General
Power of Attorney or Special Power of Attorney executed by her, on record.
The person who allegedly suffered the injury has thus, neither deposed nor
has been subjected to cross-examination.
69.
The claim of aggravated depression suffered by the Appellant No. 1,
rests upon the Medical Prescriptions Ex. PW-1/14 (OSR), the exhibition
whereof was objected to at the stage of tendering on 11.01.2017 on the
ground of mode of proof, the said documents being required to be proved by
the concerned medical practitioner. Though a doctor of Sir Ganga Ram
Hospital stood cited in the List of Witnesses dated 16.11.2016, no such
witness was examined. The said documents thus remain unproved, and no
finding as to the health of the Appellant No. 1 or its causal connection with
the Suit of the year 1997, can be founded thereupon.
70.
The claim of professional defamation of the Appellant No. 2, rests
upon bare assertion. He was enrolled as an Advocate in the year 2010, that is
to say, some thirteen years after the institution of the earlier Suit, and not an
iota of evidence has been adduced to establish any loss of professional
standing, clientele or income, attributable thereto. Moreover, PW-1
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admitted in his cross-examination dated 11.01.2018, that the sale proceeds
of the pledged shares stood credited to his own loan account and that no case
was filed by the Bank against him as the principal borrower; he having been
arrayed in the earlier Suit only in his capacity as guarantor for the Appellant
No. 1.
71.
It has been urged that the Bank led no evidence whatsoever, its right
having been closed, vide Order dated 22.02.2022, and that its defence must
consequently fail. The onus under Issue Nos. 1 and 2 was, however, cast
upon the Appellants. The failure of a defendant to lead evidence enures to
the benefit of a plaintiff only where he has first discharged the burden
resting upon him, and does not convert an unproved claim into a proved one.
Conclusion:
72.
In the absence of any foundational pleading of malice, absence of
evidence establishing want of reasonable and probable cause at the
institution of the earlier Suit, and absence of proof of the damages allegedly
suffered, the learned District Judge has rightly dismissed the Suit of the
Appellants/Plaintiffs vide the impugned Judgment and Decree dated
31.05.2025.
73.
There is no merit in the present Appeal, which is hereby, dismissed.
74.
Pending Applications, if any, are also disposed of, accordingly.
(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 16, 2026/va/RS
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