Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
$~60 (27.08.2026)
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
#
CNR No. DLHC011733352014
+
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
KIMAYA ENERGY LTD. & ORS.
Through:
.....Petitioners
Mr. Manish Jha, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Shashi Shanker, Ms. Pooja, Mr.
Arnav Dhama, Mr. Himanshu, Advs.
versus
STATE & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through:
Mr. Manoj Pant, APP.
Mr. Vivek Gurnani and Ms. Snehal
Kaila, Advs. for R2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN
%
ORDER
31.08.2026
1.
This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
2.
This matter has been taken up today as 27.08.2026 was declared a Court
holiday.
3.
The present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CrPC’) has been filed seeking
quashing of Complaint Case No. 3735/1 under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NI Act’), titled
“Ravinder Kalia v. M/s Kimaya Energy Ltd. & Ors.”, and the proceedings
emanating therefrom. The Petitioners were arrayed as accused Nos. 1 to 5 in
the said complaint. Vide order dated 26.03.2011, the learned MM took
cognizance and summoned the Petitioners. The said order dated 26.03.2011
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
has not been specifically assailed in the present petition.
BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND
4.
The dispute arises out of a transaction concerning premises bearing
Shop/Office No.112A, Centrum Plaza, Sector-53, Gurgaon, Haryana. A lease
agreement
dated
07.09.2010
was
executed
between
Respondent
No.2/Complainant and Petitioner No. 2, Mr. Gaurav Khullar. The agreement
records a lease term of three years and an 18-month lock-in period. Clause 1.5
provides that, where the lease has commenced and the lessee terminates it
during the lock-in period, rent equivalent to the remaining lock-in period,
including the notice period, would be payable. Clause 2.1 records that
physical and peaceful possession of the premises was handed over to the
lessee on 04.09.2010 and that the lease commenced from the said date. Clause
2.2, however, provides that the lease would commence upon offer of physical
and peaceful possession after completion of the fit-outs to the satisfaction of
the lessee.
5.
In connection with the aforesaid transaction, four cheques bearing
Nos.039751, 039753, 039807 and 039810, for sums of Rs.2,36,799/-,
Rs.63,936/-, Rs.94,720/- and Rs.25,574/- respectively, aggregating to
Rs.4,21,029/-, were handed over. Upon presentation, the cheques were
returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds. Respondent No. 2 thereafter issued
a statutory demand notice dated 27.01.2011. In their reply dated 12.02.2011,
the Petitioners took the stand that the premises had not been furnished as
assured, that the agreement had not been finalised and that possession had not
been handed over after completion of the fit-outs. At the same time, the said
reply refers to amounts and cheques having been handed over towards
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
security and advance rent and also records payment of maintenance and
electricity charges.
6.
Respondent No. 2 thereafter instituted the complaint under Section 138
of the NI Act on 14.03.2011. The complaint alleges, inter alia, that accused
Nos.2 to 5 were looking after the business and day-to-day affairs of accused
No.1-company and had participated in the negotiations relating to the
premises. It was further alleged that the cheques in question had been issued
towards partial payment of rent and discharge of the liability arising from the
transaction. During the course of trial, Respondent No.2 was cross-examined
on several dates. The present challenge is founded substantially upon the
answers elicited during such cross-examination, which, according to the
Petitioners, are inconsistent with the case pleaded in the complaint.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
7.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the complaint
proceeds on the specific case that the four cheques were issued towards partial
payment of rent, whereas Respondent No. 2 subsequently stated in his cross
examination that, except one cheque towards security, the remaining cheques
were towards rent for the lock-in period. It is argued that a claim for the
unexpired lock-in period is, in substance, a claim for damages and could not
constitute a legally enforceable debt unless first adjudicated and crystallised.
Thus, according to the Petitioners, no legally enforceable liability
corresponding to the cheque amount existed on the date when the cheques
were presented.
8.
Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the lease itself was
conditional upon completion of the fit-outs and delivery of physical and
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
peaceful possession to the satisfaction of the lessee. It is contended that the
requisite fit-outs were never completed, possession was never handed over
and, consequently, the lease never commenced. It is also urged that although
the complaint refers to premises Nos.112 and 112A, Respondent No. 2
admitted during cross-examination that the lease executed by him pertained
only to premises No. 112A and that he had no written authority to deal with
premises No. 112. According to the Petitioners, the aforesaid statements strike
at the very foundation of the complaint.
9.
Qua accused Nos. 3 to 5, learned Senior Counsel submits that the
complaint merely attributes designations to them without establishing their
role in the affairs of accused No.1 - company. Reliance is placed upon
portions of the cross examination wherein Respondent No. 2 stated that he did
not possess documentary proof to show that accused Nos. 3 and 4 were
Directors or that accused No. 5 was the Financial Controller of the company.
It is further pointed out that although the complaint alleges participation of all
the accused in the negotiations, Respondent No. 2 stated at one stage of his
cross examination that he had not personally met accused Nos. 3 and 4. It is,
therefore, submitted that the proceedings, at least qua accused Nos. 3 to 5,
deserve to be quashed.
10.
As regards the objection that the summoning order dated 26.03.2011
has not been independently challenged, learned Senior Counsel submits that
the present petition was filed after the cross examination of Respondent No.
2 brought the aforesaid contradictions on record. It is submitted that there is
no prescribed period of limitation for invoking jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC and that the prayer seeking quashing of the complaint and all
consequential proceedings is sufficient to grant the relief sought.
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
11.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has placed reliance upon
Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 435; Delhi
Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., Criminal
Appeal No. 3114 of 2024; Alka Khandu Avhad v. Amar Syamprasad
Mishra, (2021) 4 SCC 675; Indus Airways (P) Ltd. v. Magnum Aviation (P)
Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539; M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, (2006)
6 SCC 39; Vineet Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2017) 13 SCC 369;
Rajnish Kumar Biswakarma v. State of NCT of Delhi, SLP (Crl.)
No.5290/2024; Bharatbhai K. Patel v. C.L. Verma, 2002 SCC OnLine Guj
314; Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441; Enforcement Directorate
v. Ajay Bakliwa, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 1166; S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
v. Neeta Bhalla & Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 89; National Small Industries
Corporation Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal & Anr., (2010) 3 SCC 330; Sunil
Todi & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2022) 16 SCC 762; Pradnya Pranjal
Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948;
Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel & Anr.,
(2023) 1 SCC 578; and Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh
& Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS
12.
Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 submits that the
present petition seeks adjudication of disputed questions of fact under the
guise of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC. At the outset, it is contended
that the judicial order dated 26.03.2011, whereby cognizance was taken and
summons were issued, has not been challenged. It is further pointed out that
the complaint and the summoning order are of the year 2011, whereas the
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
present petition came to be filed only in the year 2014 after the trial had
progressed.
13.
On merits, learned counsel submits that issuance of the cheques and the
signatures thereon are not disputed. It is emphasised that the Petitioners’ own
reply dated 12.02.2011 acknowledges that an agreement had been signed and
that amounts and cheques had been handed over towards security and advance
rent. The reply also records payment of maintenance and electricity charges.
It is, therefore, submitted that the Petitioners’ present case that the transaction
never commenced and that they never entered or used the premises cannot be
accepted without appreciation of evidence.
14.
Learned counsel further relies upon Clause 2.1 of the lease agreement,
which expressly records handing over of physical and peaceful possession on
04.09.2010 and commencement of the lease from that date. Reliance is also
placed upon the 18-month lock-in clause. It is submitted that whether the fitouts were complete, whether possession had in fact been delivered, whether
the lease had commenced and whether the cheques represented security,
advance rent or rent relatable to the lock-in period are all questions which
require appreciation of evidence. It is further pointed out that Mr. Sanjay
Dutta Gupta, the intermediary/broker, has also been examined before the
learned Trial Court and has supported the case that the premises were
furnished.
15.
Learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 has placed reliance upon
Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1948; HMT Watches Ltd. v. M.A. Abida & Anr., (2015) 11 SCC
776; Vihan Exims Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi
& Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3782; M. Gurunathan v. R. Amutha, (2005)
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
13 SCC 58; Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy
Development Agency Ltd., (2016) 10 SCC 458; S. Suryalakshmi Cotton
Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir Industries Ltd. & Ors., (2008) 13 SCC 678; Constellation
Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. P.E.C. Ltd., (2006) 87 DRJ 558; Sanjay
Dalmia & Ors. v. State & Anr., 2005 SCC OnLine Del 1284; and Womb
Laboratories Private Limited v. Vijay Ahuja & Anr., 2019 SCC OnLine SC
2086.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
16.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
17.
The issue which arises for consideration is narrow. At this stage, the
Court is not required to determine whether the defence raised by the
Petitioners would ultimately succeed. The question is whether the material
relied upon by them is of such an unimpeachable character that continuation
of the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act would itself amount to an
abuse of process warranting interference under Section 482 CrPC.
18.
In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) &
Anr., (2022) 20 SCC 661, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to
proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act where the accused contended
that the cheques were contingent/security cheques and did not represent a
legally enforceable liability. The Supreme Court held that the burden of
establishing absence of an existing debt or liability is to be discharged at trial
and that the statutory presumption attending issuance of the cheque must
receive due weight. It was further held that, where facts are disputed, a
quashing Court ought not to undertake a detailed enquiry into the merits of
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
the competing versions. A factual defence warranting termination of the
prosecution without trial must be founded upon material of unimpeachable
quality which, by itself, rules out the allegations in the complaint.
19.
Tested on the aforesaid principle, the present petition does not meet the
threshold for quashing. The principal defence of the Petitioners is that the
lease never commenced because the fit-outs were not completed and
possession was never delivered. The record itself presents competing material
on this issue. Clause 2.2 of the lease agreement refers to commencement of
the lease upon offer of possession after completion of the fit-outs to the
satisfaction of the lessee, whereas Clause 2.1 of the very same agreement
records that physical and peaceful possession had been handed over on
04.09.2010 and that the lease commenced from that date. The Petitioners rely
upon the former clause together with their assertion that the stipulated
condition was never fulfilled, whereas Respondent No. 2 relies upon the latter
clause and maintains that the premises were already furnished and possession
had been delivered. The intermediary has also entered the witness box.
Accepting one version over the other would necessarily require appreciation
of evidence, which is the function of the learned Trial Court.
20.
The controversy regarding the nature of the cheques stands on the same
footing. The Petitioners describe them as security cheques which could not
have been presented once the transaction failed. Their own reply to the
statutory notice, however, refers to amounts and cheques having been handed
over towards security and advance rent. Respondent No. 2, during cross
examination, stated that one cheque was towards security and the remaining
cheques were towards part payment of rent for the lock-in period. Whether a
legally enforceable liability existed on the date of presentation can, therefore,
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
be determined only after examining whether the lease had commenced,
whether possession had been delivered, what obligations had arisen under the
agreement and the purpose for which the respective cheques had been issued.
These are intertwined questions of fact which cannot be conclusively
determined in proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.
21.
The submission that the amount relatable to the unexpired lock-in
period is merely a claim for unliquidated damages also cannot be considered
in isolation from the disputed factual foundation of the transaction. Whether
the amount claimed represents damages requiring prior adjudication or an
amount which had become payable under the contractual arrangement
necessarily depends upon the nature and effect of the lease, its commencement
and the obligations which had accrued thereunder. Acceptance of the
Petitioners’ submission at this stage would require this Court to first
adjudicate these very disputed questions.
22.
The alleged change in the case of Respondent No.2 from “partial
payment of rent” in the complaint to “rent for the lock-in period” during cross
examination also does not furnish a ground for quashing. Whether the
subsequent statement constitutes a material contradiction, an explanation of
the liability pleaded in the complaint, or otherwise affects the credibility of
the witness is a matter for appreciation of evidence. Individual answers
elicited during cross examination cannot be severed from the remaining
testimony and documentary material and treated as conclusive proof that the
complaint has become unsustainable.
23.
The contention concerning premises Nos. 112 and 112A is also
essentially evidentiary. The lease placed on record pertains to premises No.
112A, whereas the complaint contains a reference to premises Nos. 112 and
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
112A. Respondent No. 2 has been extensively cross examined regarding his
right and authority in respect of the two premises. The effect of this
discrepancy upon the alleged liability arising from the cheques must be
assessed on the evidence as a whole. The discrepancy, by itself, does not
render continuation of the complaint an abuse of process.
24.
The submission that no disputed question of fact arises because the
Petitioners rely only upon the cross examination of the Complainant is equally
untenable. Cross examination is itself part of the evidence. Whether an answer
amounts to an unequivocal admission, whether a contradiction is material,
whether an explanation offered by the witness is acceptable and what
consequence follows therefrom are matters of appreciation of evidence.
Proceedings under Section 482 CrPC cannot be converted into a premature
evaluation of testimony already recorded before the learned Trial Court.
25.
In Mr. Rakesh Y.S. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr., 2024:DHC:5834,
this Court dealt with proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act which had
reached the stage of cross-examination. The accused sought quashing on the
ground that the cheques were security cheques and that the material relied
upon by him established absence of liability. This Court declined interference,
holding that the defence raised by the accused, when controverted by the
complainant, required proof by evidence. The Court also noticed that issuance
of the cheques was admitted, the summoning order had not been challenged
and the matter had reached the stage of cross examination where the accused
sought to establish his defence.
26.
The present case stands on a similar footing. The order dated
26.03.2011 taking cognizance and summoning the Petitioners has not been
specifically challenged. This circumstance is not being treated as an absolute
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
bar to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC; it is, however, relevant
when the relief now sought is founded substantially upon an assessment of
evidence recorded subsequent to the summoning order. Similarly, the delay
in approaching this Court is not, by itself, sufficient to reject the petition. The
petition fails on the more fundamental ground that the relief sought cannot be
granted without adjudicating contested facts and weighing the evidence
already before the learned Trial Court.
27.
The challenge qua accused Nos. 3 to 5 also does not merit interference
at this stage. The complaint does not rest merely upon their respective
designations. It expressly alleges that accused Nos. 2 to 5 were looking after
the business and day-to-day affairs of accused No.1-company, had
participated in the negotiations and that the cheques were issued with their
consent, knowledge and approval. The Petitioners rely upon subsequent
answers in cross-examination to contend that Respondent No. 2 had no
documentary proof regarding their status or role and had given inconsistent
answers as to the persons whom he had personally met. Those answers may
have a bearing upon the ultimate proof of the allegations, but their evidentiary
value cannot be conclusively assessed in the present proceedings.
28.
There is a material distinction between a defence which may ultimately
succeed at trial and a defence which, on its face and on unimpeachable
material, renders continuation of the prosecution legally untenable. The
present case falls in the former category. Exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC cannot substitute the High Court for the Trial Court in
determining the credibility of witnesses, reconciling alleged contradictions,
construing contested contractual obligations or deciding whether the statutory
presumption under the NI Act stands rebutted.
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
29.
Applying the principles laid down in Rathish Babu (supra) and
Rakesh Y.S. (supra), this Court is of the considered view that the material
relied upon by the Petitioners does not furnish an unimpeachable basis for
terminating the complaint. The pleas raised by the Petitioners constitute
matters of defence which must be adjudicated by the learned Trial Court upon
appreciation of the evidence in its entirety.
30.
It is borne out from the record that Petitioner No. 3, Mr. Harish Khullar,
expired on 03.02.2023 and the death certificate placed on record has also been
verified. The present petition, therefore, does not survive qua Petitioner No.
3 and is disposed of as infructuous to that extent.
31.
Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed qua Petitioner Nos. 1, 2,
4 and 5 and is disposed of as infructuous qua Petitioner No. 3.
32.
The interim order dated 12.08.2015 stands vacated. Pending
application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
33.
The learned Trial Court shall proceed with the matter in accordance
with law, uninfluenced by any observations made in the present order.
34.
The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.
MADHU JAIN, J
AUGUST 31, 2026/m
CRL.M.C. 5886/2014
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/09/2026 at 10:43:25
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review