The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
32. In the instant cases, no cognizance of any offence was taken by the Court and even the cognizance of the complaint was not taken as the Court had rejected the applications for condonation of delay in not making the complaints within the prescribed period and therefore, there was no occasion to issue summons to the accused. It is manifest that criminal proceedings had not commenced based on the complaints. When criminal proceedings had not commenced, it will be incongruous to hold that the accused stands acquitted with the dismissal of the complaint.
33. In view of the above discussions, I am of the considered opinion that in a circumstance where a complaint is dismissed as a consequence of the Court being not satisfied that the complainant had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within the prescribed period, the same does not result in acquittal of the accused. Therefore, these leave petitions seeking leave to appeal are not maintainable.
34. Accordingly, Crl. L.P No.04/2019 and Crl. L.P No.05/2019 are dismissed reserving liberty to the petitioner to pursue remedy in accordance with law. It is also made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits with regard to the orders passed by the learned Magistrate. Chief Justice avi
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Crl. L.P No.04 of 2019
…PETITIONER
KIKI DOMA BHUTIA
VERSUS
…RESPONDENT
BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH
WITH
Crl. L.P No.05 of 2019
…PETITIONER
KIKI DOMA BHUTIA
VERSUS
BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH
Date :
…RESPONDENT
04-03-2020
CORAM :
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, CHIEF JUSTICE
J U D G M E N T & O R D E R (O R A L)
Crl. L.P No. 4/2019 is an application under Section 378 (4) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, CrPC), praying for special leave
to appeal to the appellant to prefer appeal against the order dated 26.02.2019
passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate– Ist Class, East Sikkim at Gangtok
in Private Complaint Case No. 33 of 2018. Crl. L.P No. 5/2019 is a similar
application filed under Section 378 (4) CrPC praying for special leave to
appeal to the appellant to prefer appeal against the impugned order dated
26.02.2019 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, East Sikkim at
Gangtok in Private Complaint Case No. 34 of 2018.
2.
Both Private Complaint Case No. 33 of 2018 and Private Complaint
Case No. 34 of 2018 are complaints filed by the appellant under Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, N.I Act) against the present respondent.
Crl. L.P No.04 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
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Crl. L.P No.05 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs. BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
3.
Private Complaint Case No. 33 of 2018 was accompanied by an
application under Section 142 (1) (b) of the N.I Act for condonation of delay
of 39 days in preferring the connected complaint. Private Complaint Case No.
34 of 2018 was also similarly accompanied by an application for condonation
of delay under Section 142 (1) (b) of the N.I. Act for condonation of delay of
78 days.
4.
The learned Magistrate had taken up the applications for
condonation of delay for consideration at the first instance. Without issuing
any notice to the respondent herein, after hearing the learned counsel for the
appellant, the learned Magistrate had come to the conclusion that the
appellant herein had not been able to show sufficient cause to allow the
applications for condonation of delay and had, accordingly, rejected both the
applications by separate orders dated 26.02.2019.
5.
Paragraph-8 of both the orders dated 26.02.2019, which is identical,
reads as follows:“In view of the above and since the Complainant has not been able
to show sufficient cause to allow condonation for her to file the
instant complaint, the complaint fails and is dismissed accordingly.”
6.
Challenging the aforesaid orders dated 26.02.2019, Crl. L.P No.
4/2019 and Crl. L.P No. 5/2019 have been filed along with Memos of Appeal.
7.
It is to be noted, at this juncture, that appeals have not been
registered till now as the instant Crl. L.P No.04/2019 and Crl. L.P No.05/2019
are pending adjudication.
Crl. L.P No.04 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
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Crl. L.P No.05 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs. BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
8.
In both the Criminal Leave Petitions, the respondents have filed
objections, contending, amongst others, that in absence of an order of
acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate, no right of appeal is conferred by
statute upon the appellant/complainant and therefore, the applications
seeking leave to appeal are not maintainable.
9.
I have heard Mr. Jorgay Namka, learned counsel for the appellant
and Mr. Anmol Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent.
10.
Mr. Namka submits that since the learned Magistrate had dismissed
the complaints, the same amounts to acquittal of the respondent and
therefore, appeal under Section 378 (4) CrPC would be maintainable. In
support of his submissions, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the
following decisions:
i.
Vinod Kumar vs. State of Punjab, reported in 1999 SCC Online P&H
687.
ii.
Kalpana Tyagi vs. Sneh Lata Sharma, reported in 2003 CRI.L.J. 3395.
iii.
S. Rajaram vs. S. Seenivasan, reported in 2007(4) CTC 136.
iv.
Mander Singh and others vs. Ladi, reported in 2008 SCC Online P&H
482.
v.
Harvinder
Singh
vs.
State
of
Punjab
in
Criminal
Revision
No.1275/2011 (Date of Decision: 28.01.2013).
vi.
Skyline constructions and Housing Pvt. Ltd vs. T.D Kumaravell
Vasanthan, reported in MANU/ KA/2158/2017.
11.
Mr. Prasad, on the other hand, has submitted that a distinction has
to be borne in mind with regard to complaint dismissed prior to the
summoning of the accused and complaints dismissed subsequent to
Crl. L.P No.04 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
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Crl. L.P No.05 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs. BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
summoning of the accused. He has submitted that if a complaint is dismissed
prior to the summoning of the accused, such an order of dismissal can be
challenged only by way of a revision application and not by taking recourse
to filing an appeal under Section 378 (4) CrPC. He submits that cases under
N.I Act are tried by learned Magistrates following the procedure of trial in
summons-cases and if the complaint is dismissed on the grounds mentioned
in Section 256 CrPC, same will result in acquittal of the accused and in that
event, an appeal will be maintainable. In support of his submissions, Mr.
Prasad has also relied on Kalpana Tyagi (supra).
12.
I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for
the parties and have perused the materials on record.
13.
Section 142 (1) of N.I Act reads as follows:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 ( 2 of 1974) –
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under
section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee
or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which
the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section
138:
Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by
the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the
Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within
such period.
Crl. L.P No.04 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
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Crl. L.P No.05 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs. BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial
Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under
Section 138.”
14.
The proviso inserted to Section 142 (1) (b) N.I Act came into effect
from 06.02.2003.
15.
Section 378 (4) CrPC reads as follows:“If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted
upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made
to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to
appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may
present such an appeal to the High Court.”
16.
Section 378 (5) CrPC provides that no application under sub- section
(4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be
entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the
complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed
from the date of the order of acquittal. Section 378 (6) CrPC provides that no
appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section 1 or sub-section
2 of Section 378 if, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for the
grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused.
17.
The question that arises for consideration is as to whether on the
dismissal of a complaint consequent upon rejection of an application for
condonation of delay, the same amounts to acquittal of the accused. If the
answer is in the affirmative, necessarily, an application for grant of leave to
prefer appeal would be maintainable.
Crl. L.P No.04 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
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Crl. L.P No.05 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs. BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
18.
Before I proceed to deal with the question, it will be appropriate to
take note of the decisions cited at the Bar.
19.
In Vinod Kumar (supra), Punjab & Haryana High Court had held
that order of discharge in a case triable as summons-case has to be read as an
order of acquittal under Section 255 CrPC.
20.
In Mander Singh (supra), the Punjab & Haryana High Court had
observed that order of discharge, passed by a Magistrate in a summons-case,
amounts to acquittal of the accused and such an order can be assailed only
before the High Court by filing special leave to appeal under Section 378
CrPC. The High Court had further observed that in summons-cases, there
cannot be a question of discharge as there is no provision containing such a
word.
21.
In Harvinder Singh (supra), the petitioner therein had impugned an
order passed by the learned Sessions Judge whereby he had allowed the
revision filed by the State and had set aside the order of discharge passed by
the learned trial Magistrate. Relying upon Mander Singh (supra), the Punjab
and Haryana High Court held that the order of discharge passed by the
learned Magistrate will have to be deemed as an order of acquittal and
therefore, revision before the learned Sessions Court was not maintainable
and that only remedy available to the State was to approach the High Court
by way of leave to appeal.
22.
S. Rajaram (supra), which is a judgment of the High Court of
Madras (Madurai Bench), was passed on a Criminal Revision petition filed
under Section 397 read with Section 491 CrPC. In the aforesaid case, the
Crl. L.P No.04 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
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Crl. L.P No.05 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs. BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
learned Magistrate had dismissed the complaint filed under Section 138 of NI
Act on the ground that he was not satisfied with the reasons cited by the
complainant to explain delay. Holding that the complainant had shown
sufficient cause for condonation of delay, the High Court had allowed the
Criminal Revision.
23.
In Kalpana Tyagi (supra), challenge was made to orders passed by
the learned Magistrate dismissing in default the complaints filed by the
petitioner under Section 138 N.I Act. Such orders were passed after summons
was issued to the accused. Delhi High Court has held that in such a situation,
Section 256 CrPC had come into play and dismissal of complaints resulted in
acquittal of the respondent against which only appeals could be filed.
Accordingly, the revision petitions filed by the petitioner were held to be not
maintainable. The Delhi High Court had held that there is a distinction
between complaints dismissed prior to the summoning of an accused and
those dismissed subsequent to summoning of the accused. It was held that if a
complaint is dismissed prior to summoning of the accused, the order may be
challenged by way of a revision petition.
24.
Skyline and Housing Pvt. Ltd (supra), which is a judgment of
Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru, was rendered in an appeal filed
challenging an order whereby the application for condonation of delay was
rejected and consequently, the complaint was dismissed . The appeal came to
be allowed by condoning delay of five days and restoring the complaint
petition.
25.
The facts before Karnataka High Court and the Madras High Court
are similar to the facts of these two Criminal Leave Petitions. Perusal of the
Crl. L.P No.04 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
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Crl. L.P No.05 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs. BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
judgment of the Karnataka High Court, however, goes to show that the
question with regard to maintainability of the appeal was not raised before
the Court. Similarly, no issue was raised before Madras High Court that
Criminal Revision Petition was not maintainable and that in such
circumstances, only an appeal will be maintainable.
26.
Chapter XX relating to trial of summons-cases by Magistrate
provides for either conviction or acquittal of an accused. Section 255 CrPC
provides that if the Magistrate, upon taking the evidence referred to in section
254 and such further evidence, if any, as he may, of his own motion, cause to
be produced, finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of
acquittal. Section 255 (2) CrPC provides that where the Magistrate does not
proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section 325 or Section 360, he
shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon him according to law.
Charge is not required to be framed in summons-cases and therefore, use of
the word discharge in trial of summons-cases is really a misnomer. It was in
that context Punjab and Haryana High Court had held that discharge means
acquittal of the accused. However, in the present cases, there is no order of
discharge.
27.
Section 256 CrPC provides for acquittal of the accused on entirely
different grounds. Section 256 (1) CrPC provides that if the summons has
been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the
accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be
adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall,
notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless
for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some
Crl. L.P No.04 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
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Crl. L.P No.05 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs. BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
other day. Section 256 (2) CrPC provides that, so far as may be, provisions of
sub-section (1) shall also apply to cases where non-appearance of the
complainant is due to his death.
28.
It will be necessary to also consider the provision contained in
Section 203 CrPC which provides that if, after considering the statements on
oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the
enquiry or investigation (if any) under Section 202, the Magistrate is of the
opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the
complaint, and in every such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so
doing. Issue of process, namely, a summons in a summons-case or a warrant
in a warrant-case under Section 204 CrPC, arises only if the Magistrate taking
cognizance of an offence is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding.
29.
It is no longer res integra that an order of dismissal of first complaint
under Section 203 CrPC is no bar for the entertainment of a second complaint
on the same facts but it can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances
such as where the previous order was passed on incomplete record, or on a
misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or where new facts which
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the
previous proceeding. The fact that a second complaint can be entertained on
same facts, albeit in exceptional circumstances, after dismissal of a complaint
under Section 203 CrPC, demonstrates that dismissal of a complaint at every
stage does not automatically result in acquittal of the accused because if the
accused is acquitted, such acquittal can be questioned only by taking recourse
Crl. L.P No.04 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
WITH
Crl. L.P No.05 of 2019 (KIKI DOMA BHUTIA vs. BIJENDRA KUMAR SINGH)
to Section 378 (4) CrPC. As noticed earlier, dismissal of a complaint under
Section 203 CrPC is at a stage prior to issuance of process.
30.
Section 142 (1) of N.I Act provides that cognizance of any offence
punishable under Section 138 shall not be taken by any Court unless
conditions set out in Section 142 (1) (a) and (b) are satisfied. The word
„cognizance‟ is neither defined in the N.I Act nor in CrPC. In Chief
Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Limited and others, reported
in (2008) 2 SCC 492, the expression „cognizance‟ was explained by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court at paragraph 19 as follows:
“……..It merely means „become aware of‟ and when used
with reference to a court or Judge, it connotes „to take notice of
judicially‟. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes
judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in
respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.”
31.
At paragraph 20 of the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court
stated as follows:“ “Taking cognizance” does not involve any formal action of
any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the
suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to
commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is
thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial.
Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or
not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal
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application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to
have taken cognizance.”
32.
In the instant cases, no cognizance of any offence was taken by the
Court and even the cognizance of the complaint was not taken as the Court
had rejected the applications for condonation of delay in not making the
complaints within the prescribed period and therefore, there was no occasion
to issue summons to the accused. It is manifest that criminal proceedings had
not commenced based on the complaints. When criminal proceedings had not
commenced, it will be incongruous to hold that the accused stands acquitted
with the dismissal of the complaint.
33.
In view of the above discussions, I am of the considered opinion that
in a circumstance where a complaint is dismissed as a consequence of the
Court being not satisfied that the complainant had sufficient cause for not
making the complaint within the prescribed period, the same does not result
in acquittal of the accused. Therefore, these leave petitions seeking leave to
appeal are not maintainable.
34.
Accordingly, Crl. L.P No.04/2019 and Crl. L.P No.05/2019 are
dismissed reserving liberty to the petitioner to pursue remedy in accordance
with law. It is also made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion
on merits with regard to the orders passed by the learned Magistrate.
Chief Justice
avi
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