Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page No.# 1/9
GAHC040007442026
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
(ITANAGAR BENCH)
Case No. : WP(C)/230/2026
Keto Basar
Son of Jumke Basar, resident of Village Nyigam, PO Basar, Leparada District,
Arunachal Pradesh. 791101
VERSUS
The State of AP and 7 Ors
represented by the Principal Secretary, Department of Environment, Forest and
Climate Change, Itanagar 791111 2:The Principal Secretary
Age: 0
Occupation :
Department of Environment
Forest and Climate Change
Govt of Arunachal Pradesh
Itanagar 791111
3:The PCCF and HoFF
Age: 0
Occupation :
Environment
Forest and Climate Change
Govt of Arunachal Pradesh
Itanagar 791111
4:The Chief Conservator of Forest
Age: 0
Occupation :
Central Arunachal Circle
Pasighat
East Siang District
Arunachal Pradesh 791102
5:The Chief Conservator of Forest
Page No.# 2/9
Age: 0
Occupation :
East Arunachal Circle
Tezu
Lohit District
Arunachal Pradesh 792001
6:Goba Doka
Age: 0
Occupation :
Divisional Forest Officer
Sagalee Forest Division
Sagalee
PO Sagalee
Papum Pare District
Arunachal Pradesh 791112
7:Amarjeet Kujur
Age: 0
Occupation :
Divisional Forest Officer
Anini Forest Division
Anini
PO Anini
Dibang Valley District
Arunachal Pradesh 792101
8:Kardo Nyigyor
Age: 0
Occupation :
Deputy Speaker
Office of the Deputy Speaker
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly
Itanagar
Arunachal Pradesh 79111
Advocate for the Petitioner
Bordoloi
: Teto Taba, Nang walika Jenow,Nimcha Hondique,Begi Taba,P
Advocate for the Respondent : GA (AP), Honi Tana Tara,Oken Duggong,Atong Nangu,Baby
Palon,Phurpa Wangmu,Nani Kuru,Kirpi Nyorak,Nikita Danggen
Page No.# 3/9
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
ORDER
Date : 03.06.2026
Heard Shri P. J. Saikia, learned Senior Counsel, who is appearing online
assisted by Shri T. Taba, learned counsel for the petitioner, who is physically
present. Also heard Shri S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate,
Arunachal Pradesh. Ms. N. Danggen, learned counsel, is present for the
respondent No. 6.
2.
The challenge in the instant writ petition is against an order dated
18.05.2026, whereby the respondent No. 6 has been transferred from Sagalee
Forest Division to Likabali Forest Division and the petitioner has been sought to
be retained at Lohit Division.
3.
As per the facts projected, the petitioner, who was holding the substantive
post of ACF, was also the in-charge DFO of Lohit Division. Vide an order dated
13.10.2025, the petitioner was transferred from Lohit Division to Likabali
Division. By the said transfer order, respondent No. 6 was transferred from
Banderdewa to Sagalee Forest Division. There was, however, a remark in the
order that the same would take effect after 31.03.2026. By the said transfer
order, two other incumbents were also transferred.
4.
It is the case of the petitioner that after the stipulated date of 31.03.2026
was over, he has joined at Likabali by submitting a joining report on 02.04.2026,
and the same was forwarded to the appropriate authority. On 06.05.2026, the
petitioner had made a communication to the Principal Chief Conservator of
Forests, Arunachal Pradesh, intimating that full charge was taken over by him.
However, vide the impugned order dated 18.05.2026, the petitioner was sought
to be retained at Lohit Division, and the respondent No. 6 was sought to be
Page No.# 4/9
transferred from Sagalee to Likabali. The impugned order had mentioned that,
insofar as the parties are concerned, there was a partial modification of the
earlier order dated 13.10.2025.
5.
Shri Saikia, learned Senior Counsel, at the outset, has submitted that the
order dated 13.10.2025 was already executed and the petitioner had admittedly
joined at Likabali on 02.04.2026 and therefore, the question of modification of
the order dated 13.10.2025 would not arise.
6.
On the merits of the case, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that
though transfer is an incidence of service and the scope of challenge is limited,
such challenge can be made if the transfer is not accompanied by bona fide or
is not in accordance with the rules. He has submitted that normally the tenure is
of two years. However, in the instant case, apart from violating the prescribed
tenure requirement, the background would reveal that the impugned action has
been taken only at the behest of the local MLA and Deputy Speaker, who has
been arrayed as respondent No. 8. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn the
attention of this Court to the additional-affidavit filed, wherein Office Notings
have been enclosed, which have been procured by RTI Act. He has referred to
the Notings wherein the process was initiated on the recommendation of
respondent No. 8 to accommodate the respondent No.6. The learned Senior
Counsel has submitted that while the respondent No. 6 may be favoured, the
same cannot be done at the cost of the petitioner and in violation of the rules.
He has submitted that there is a Note indicating that the proposal made by
respondent No. 8 could be considered provided the incumbents had not joined.
He has also drawn the attention of this Court to Note No. 107, wherein there is
a clear reflection that the petitioner had joined and taken over charge. However,
in spite of all the Notings, there was an approval by the highest authority,
Page No.# 5/9
leading to passing of the impugned order dated 18.05.2026.
7.
The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the impugned order has
been passed without there being any exigency of service or without there being
any requirement of public interest. He has also highlighted that there is no
allegation of any nature against the petitioner requiring his transfer. The learned
Senior Counsel has relied upon the case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported
in AIR 2001 SC 2524 (Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab & Ors.) and the
following observations have been pressed into service.
“15. In the system of Indian Democratic Governance as contemplated by the
Constitution senior officers occupying key positions such as Secretaries are not
supposed to mortgage there own discretion, volition and decision making
authority and be prepared to give way or being pushed back or pressed ahead
at the behest of politicians for carrying out commands having no sanctity in law.
The Conduct Rules of Central Government Services command the civil servants
to maintain at all times absolute integrity and devotion to duty and do nothing
which is unbecoming of a Government servant. No Government servant shall in
the performance of his official duties, or in the exercise of power conferred on
him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under
the direction of his official superior. In Anirudhsinhji Jadeja (1995) 5 SCC 302:
(1995 AIR SCW 3543: AIR 1995 SC 2390), this Court has held that a statutory
authority vested with jurisdiction must exercise it according to its own
discretion; discretion exercised under the direction or instruction of some higher
authority is failure to exercise discretion altogether. Observations of this Court in
the Purtabpur Company Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 1896, are instructive and apposite.
Executive of officers may in exercise of their statutory discretions take into
account considerations of public policy and in some context policy of Minister or
the Government as a whole when it is a relevant factor in weighing the policy
Page No.# 6/9
but they are not absolved from their duty to exercise their personal judgment in
individual cases unless explicit statutory provision has been made for
instructions by a superior to bind them. As already stated we are not recording,
for want of adequate material, any positive finding that the impugned order was
passed at the behest of or dictated by someone else than its author. Yet we
have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order betrays utter nonapplication of mind to the facts of the case and the relevant law. The manner in
which the power under S. 22 has been exercised by the competent authority is
suggestive of betrayal of the confidence which the State Government reposed in
the Principal Secretary in conferring upon him the exercise of drastic power like
removal of President of a Municipality under S. 22 of the Act. To say the least
what has been done is not what is expected to be done by a senior official like
the Principal Secretary of a wing of the State Government. We leave at that and
say no more on this issue.”
8.
Per contra, defending the impugned action, Shri S. Tapin, learned Senior
Government Advocate, has submitted that posting for a period of two years is
only a norm which is not give an indefeasible right to an incumbent. He has
submitted that a transfer on the basis of a note of a public representative, per
se, cannot be held to be illegal, as the note had taken into consideration certain
relevant aspects, including the aspect that the respondent No. 6 was on the
verge of his retirement and belongs to Likabali. He has relied upon the case of
Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors., reported in AIR 2024
12 SCC 292.
9.
Ms. N. Danggen, learned counsel for the respondent No.6, while endorsing
the submissions of the learned State Counsel, has submitted that there was a
stipulation in the original order of transfer dated 13.10.2025 that the same
would take effect only after 31.03.2026. She has highlighted that the present
Page No.# 7/9
process, which culminated in the order dated 18.05.2026, had started long
back, more specifically on 28.10.2025, which would be reflected in the note
sheet. She has accordingly submitted that the impugned order does not suffer
from any illegality. She has also submitted that relevant factors were taken into
consideration, which led to passing of the impugned order dated 18.05.2026.
10.
Rival submissions have been duly considered and the materials placed
before this Court have been carefully examined.
11.
It is a settled position of law that transfer being an incidence of service,
the scope of interference is limited and only in case of violation of statutory
rules or presence of mala fide, such orders can be interfered. The original order
of transfer dated 31.10.2025 has stipulated that the same would take effect
after 31.03.2026. It is not in dispute that the petitioner, who was in Lohit, had
joined his new place of posting at Likabali on 02.04.2026, and there are further
communications to fortify this aspect. However, on 18.05.2026, the impugned
order was passed, whereby the petitioner was sought to be retained at Lohit.
This Court finds force in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner
that, after joining pursuant to the earlier order dated 13.10.2025, there was no
scope for modification of the said order. The matter would have been different if
a fresh order had been issued, which, however, would also be subject to judicial
scrutiny if so instituted.
12. The reasons for passing the impugned order are placed on record by way
of the additional-affidavit in the form of Office Notings, which are also not
disputed. It is not in dispute that the process started with a recommendation by
the respondent No.8, who is a local MLA and Deputy Speaker. While such a
recommendation, per se, may not be termed illegal, the aspects of compliance
Page No.# 8/9
with the applicable norms and public interest cannot be overlooked or ignored.
In the instant case, the impugned order has been passed within a span of one
and a half months from the date of joining. There is no element of public
interest involved in the aforesaid transfer, as the same was done only on the
basis of the note of the respondent No. 8. The Office Note would also reveal
that there was a stipulation that the proposal could have been acted upon if the
incumbents had not joined, and the subsequent Office Note would indicate that
the petitioner had indeed joined in the new place of posting at Likabali.
13.
That being the position, there was no occasion to pass the impugned
order dated 18.05.2026 even though there was a recommendation/request by
the respondent No.8. This Court makes it clear that while there is no absolute
bar on a public representative making a recommendation or request, such a
recommendation can be acted upon only when it serves public interest and is
not done at the cost of any other incumbent.
14.
So far as the case of Pubi Lombi (supra) is concerned, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, relying upon its earlier decisions, including Union of India v.
S.L. Abbas, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 357, has reiterated that public interest
and lack of mala fide has to be the basis of any transfer order.
15.
As observed above, the impugned order does not appear to have been
passed in the public interest.
16.
In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that a case for
interference is made out. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 18.05.2026 is
interfered with and set aside.
17.
The interference is only with regard to the transfer of the petitioner.
Consequently, the petitioner shall be allowed to continue at Likabali in terms of
Page No.# 9/9
the earlier transfer order under which the petitioner had already joined.
18.
The authorities are at liberty to make appropriate arrangements to
accommodate other officers, without disturbing the petitioner from his present
place of posting at Likabali.
19. The writ petition accordingly stands disposed of.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review