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Page No.# 1/17
GAHC010279862025
2026:GAU-AS:13598-DB
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Writ Petition (Civil) No.145/2026
1. KENDRIYA VIDYALAYA SANGATHAN
THROUGH THE JOINT COMMISSIONER
ADMINISTRATION,
18 INSTITUTIONAL AREA,
SAHEED JEET SINGH MARG,
NEW DELHI- 100016
2. THE COMMISSIONER,
KENDRIYA VIDYALAYA SANGATHAN,
18 INSTITUTIONAL AREA,
SAHEED JEET SINGH MARG,
NEW DELHI-1100016
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
KENDRIYA VIDYALAYA SANGATHAN,
REGIONAL OFFICER SILCHAR
NEAR LION’S EYE HOSPITAL,
CAPTAIN N.M. GUPTA SARANI,
SILCHAR- 788001, ASSAM
4. THE PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE
KENDRIYA VIDYALAYA,
BSF, GOKUL NAGAR,
P.O.- BISHALGARH,
DISTRICT – SEPAHIJALA,
TRIPURA, PIN 799102
……Petitioners
Page No.# 2/17
-Versus-
Shri Kallol Roy,
Son of Late Birendra Chandra Ray,
Residential Address: C/o Nibas De,
Adjacent to Bishalgarh English Medium
School, Gokul Nagar, P.O. Bishalgarh,
District- sepahijala, Tripura, PIN- 799102
…… Respondents
–BEFORE–
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. ASHUTOSH KUMAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
Advocate for the petitioner(s) :
Mrs. R.S. Chowdhury,
Advocate
Advocate for the respondent :
Mr. Kallol Roy,
respondent-in-person
Date of Hearing
Date of Judgment
:
10.09.2026.
:
10.09.2026.
Page No.# 3/17
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
(Ashutosh Kumar, C.J.)
We have heard Ms. R.S. Chowdhury , learned Advocate for the
petitioners/Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) & 3 Ors. and Mr. Kallol
Roy, respondent-in-person.
2.
The petitioners have come up before this Court against the
order dated 12.11.2025, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal
(hereinafter to be referred as “Tribunal”), Guwahati Bench, in O.A.
No.94/2025, whereby the termination of the service of the sole
respondent from the post of Principal Grade-II of the newly opened
Kendriya Vidyalaya, BSF, Gokul Nagar, Sepahijala, District-Tripura, has
been interfered with and a direction has been issued for his
reinstatement.
3.
The respondent was appointed as Vice Principal (designated
as Principal Grade-II) in the Kendriya Vidyalaya in Tripura, which post he
joined on 10.11.2023 on probation for a period of two years , which was
extendable by one year under the direct recruitment Rules of 2023. The
appointment of the respondent was governed by a memorandum of
appointment which contained specific terms, including Clause-5 thereof ,
which allowed termination during the extended probation period, if
performance of the probationer would be found to be unsatisfactory or
he/she would be found lacking suitability.
Page No.# 4/17
4.
It appears from the records that during the probation period,
several issues arose which ultimately led the respondent being subjected
to a disciplinary proceeding, in which he was awarded a minor penalty
of reduction of one stage in pay for one year without cumulative effect,
along with recovery of salary for an unauthorized absence period. It may
be noted that several allegations were raised against him of his
unauthorised absence from the school and also with respect to
irregularities in maintaining the attendance register.
5.
Thereafter, the period of probation of the respondent was
extended by one year, effective from 10.11.2025. This obviously was for
the reason that his performance was not found satisfactory during the
two years’ probation period. Later, it appears, a fact-finding inquiry
committee was constituted by the Regional Office , Silchar, regarding the
respondent’s unauthorised absence from duty; his unauthorised station
leaves; wilful manipulation of official records; lack of devotion to duty
and doubtful integrity. The members of the fact-finding inquiry committee
comprised Assistant Commissioner, KVS, Regional Office, Silchar and the
Principal, Kendriya Vidyalaya, ONGC, Agartala. The fact-finding inquiry
committee, referred to above, was provided with necessary documents
which have been listed in the report.
6.
During the course of inquiry by the fact-finding committee ,
statements of witnesses were taken and the respondent was also asked
to submit his written statement, which he had promptly submitted.
7.
After a thorough inquiry, the fact-finding inquiry committee
Page No.# 5/17
found that the respondent had been on unauthorised absence from
official duty and had wilfully manipulated the official records. He was
found to be lacking in devotion to duty and his integrity was also found
to be doubtful. The fact-finding inquiry committee concluded that all the
allegations levelled against the respondent were proved , which were
quite unbecoming of any KVS employee. The committee , therefore,
recommended for initiation of appropriate disciplinary action against the
respondent.
8.
This report was submitted on 09.01.2025.
9.
Three months later, vide order dated 11.04.2025 , the service of
the
respondent
was
terminated
by
invoking
Clause-5
of
the
Memorandum of Appointment. The respondent was found to be entitled
to receive a sum equivalent to his pay and allowances for the period of
one month’s notice, at the same rate at which he was drawing salary
immediately before termination of his services.
It may be noted here that before the impugned order of
termination was passed, the Deputy Commissioner, Regional Office,
Silchar had sent a proposal for action under Clause-5 of the
Memorandum of Appointment to the Additional Commissioner (Admn.),
KVS (Headquarter), New Delhi.
10.
Challenging the termination of his service , the respondent
approached the Tribunal with a grievance that without subjecting the
respondent to any disciplinary inquiry/formal inquiry , his services were
terminated
on
the
recommendation
of
the
fact-finding
inquiry
Page No.# 6/17
committee, which actually meant that the termination was stigmatic. The
very foundation and the motive of the constitution of the fact-finding
inquiry committee was to find out the truth of the allegation made
against the respondent. Under such circumstances, the sequel order of
termination, even though was issued ostensibly invoking Clause-5 of the
Memorandum of Appointment, was punitive and not a termination
simpliciter during the probation period.
11.
The Tribunal, on consideration of the facts presented before it,
found that the basic reason/foundation for the termination of the
respondent was the proven charges against him and , therefore, those
foundational facts were very akin to motive for termination. This could not
have been done by invoking Clause-5 of the Memorandum of
Appointment
and,
perforce,
if
so
deemed
necessary
by
the
organisation/KVS, the respondent deserved to be subjected to a
disciplinary proceeding before this termination so that he could have
voiced his cause.
12.
The original application filed by the respondent was thus
allowed. The respondent was directed to be reinstated in service , who
had to be permitted to continue as probationer with all consequential
benefits, including the wages for the period that he was kept off from
employment.
13.
While saying so, the Tribunal relied on the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh and other -Vs- State of Punjab &
Ors. :: 1986 (3) SCC 277; Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi -Vs- State of
Page No.# 7/17
U.P. & Ors. :: (1991) 1 SCC 212; Pradeep Kumar -Vs- Union of
India :: (2012) 13 SCC 182; Radhey Shyam Gupta
-Vs- U.P.
State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. & Anr. :: (1999) 2 SCC 21;
Dipti Prakash Banerjee -Vs- Satyendra Nath Bose, National Centre
for Basic Science, Calcutta & Ors. :: (1999) 3 SCC 60; V.P. Ahuja
-Vs-
State of Punjab & Ors :: (2000) 3 SCC 239 and Chandra
Prakash Shahi -Vs- State of U.P. & Ors :: (2000) 5 SCC 152.
14.
The Tribunal noted the distinction made by the Supreme Court
in Chandra
Prakash
Shahi (supra) between the motive and
foundation. In the afore-noted judgments of the Supreme Court, it was
held that the important principles which are deducible on the concept
of "motive" and "foundation", concerning a probationer, are that a
probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be
terminated at any time during, or at the end of the period of probation,
on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If, for the
determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question or
for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an enquiry is held
and it is on the basis of that enquiry that a decision is taken to terminate
his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are
allegations of misconduct and an enquiry is held to find out the truth of
that misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed on the
basis of that enquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the enquiry
was held not for assessing the general suitability of the employee for the
post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations of misconduct
against that employee. In that situation, the order would be founded on
Page No.# 8/17
misconduct and it would not be a mere matter of "motive".
15.
The "Motive", on the other hand, is to be construed as the
moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it
differently, "motive" is a factor, which incites or stimulates a person to do
an act.
16.
The Supreme Court went on to explain that an order
terminating the services of an employee is an act performed by the
employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this
action, is what has to be assessed. If it were the factor of general
unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would
be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious
misconduct against the employee and a preliminary enquiry is held
behind his back or in his presence to ascertain the truth of those
allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order,
having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the
allegations of misconduct, which were found to be true in the preliminary
enquiry.
17.
Challenging the afore-noted decision of the Tribunal, Mrs. R.
Chowdhury, learned Advocate for the petitioners has strenuously argued
that the very contents of the letter of termination makes it very obvious
that it was on the invocation of Clause-5 of the Memorandum of
Appointment. The respondent’s service was terminated on grounds of
unsuitability during the extended period of probation of the respondent.
Any inquiry, which preceded before such termination, ought not to be
Page No.# 9/17
read as the motive for assessing the truth in the allegation so raised.
Holding an inquiry for an allegation, or a set of allegations, is very
different from holding an inquiry to assess the suitability of a
candidate/employee. Even though the inquiry, referred to above, was
with respect to some of the allegations raised against the respondent,
that cannot be said to be the impelling factor for the employer/KVS to
invoke Clause-5 of the Memorandum of Appointment, which was an
independent exercise after taking into account the entire facts scenario,
where the respondent had suffered two more inquiries in the past and
had been subjected to a departmental proceeding which ended in a
minor punishment imposed upon him for his unauthorised absence from
the school. These are the issues on which the employer assesses the
suitability of an employee who, in this case, is the Vice Principal of the
school whose probation period had been extended. It presupposes that
during the initial probation period of two years, the respondent did not
prove his suitability and, therefore, the period was extended for one more
year.
18.
Mrs. Chowdhury, therefore, has submitted that even if adverse
material existed against the respondent, the termination order does not
ipso facto becomes punitive. Here, she has argued, the termination order
was absolutely innocuous and non-punitive/non-stigmatic, as it does not
allude to any misconduct for it to be held as the foundation, and that it
was only a motive.
19.
In order to buttress her contentions, Mrs. Chowdhury has relied
on the following paragraphs of the judgment rendered by the Supreme
Page No.# 10/17
Court in Pavenendra Narayan Verma -Vs- Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of
Medical Sci. & Anr. :: (2002) 1 SCC 520 :
“21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance
an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the
termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations
involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding
of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be
punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any
one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld.
22. ………..
23. ………..
29. Before considering the facts of the case before us one further,
seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test needs to be cleared
viz. what language in a termination order would amount to a stigma?
Generally speaking when a probationer’s appointment is terminated it
means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of
misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination
order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the
termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order
which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a
probationer’s appointment, is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by
the parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to
amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes
something over and above mere unsuitability for the job.”
20.
As opposed to the afore-noted contention, the respondent-in-
person reiterated the arguments advanced before the Tribunal to assail
the termination order as stigmatic.
Page No.# 11/17
21.
We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments
raised on behalf of the parties and have found that though the order of
termination was couched in simple terms as if it were a plain invocation
of Clause-5 regarding the unsuitability of the respondent, but in
substance, it imputes misconduct, attributes blameworthiness and does
cast a moral stigma.
22.
We say so on the strength of the background facts; the
narration of which would only be a repetition of what has been said
before and it would only make this judgment prolix. To put it shortly, the
period of probation of the respondent was extended. During the
unextended period of probation, certain allegations were raised against
the respondent and for few of such allegations, two fact-finding
committees were constituted. The respondent was also put to a
disciplinary proceeding which culminated in a minor punishment being
imposed upon him, the appeal against which order also could not be
sustained.
23.
These being the background facts, another inquiry having
been constituted/initiated for the purposes of finding out the truth in
approximately four charges against the respondent, makes it very
obvious that though, in form, the termination order is innocuous, but in
substance, it is stigmatic.
24.
In Radhe Shyam Gupta (supra), the Supreme Court has
clarified that the termination of service of a temporary servant, or one on
probation, on the basis of adverse entries, or on the basis of an
Page No.# 12/17
assessment that his work is not satisfactory, will not be punitive in as much
as the above facts are merely the motive and not the foundation. The
reason why they are the motive is that the assessment is not done with
the object to find out any misconduct on the part of the officer; rather, it
is done only with a view to decide whether he has to be retained or
continued in service. It was further adumbrated that the position would
not be different even if a preliminary inquiry is held because the purposes
of preliminary inquiry is to find out if there is a prima facie evidence or
material to initiate a regular departmental inquiry, as was held in the
case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah -Vs- The Union of India :: AIR
1964 SC 1854.
25.
The purpose of the preliminary inquiry is not to find out
misconduct on the part of the officer and, if a termination follows without
giving an opportunity, it will not be bad. Even in a case where regular
departmental inquiry is started, a charge-memo issued, reply obtained
and an inquiry officer is appointed, then, if at that point of time the
inquiry is dropped and a simple notice of termination is passed, the same
will not be punitive because the inquiry officer has not recorded any
evidence nor has given any findings on the charges. However, in cases
where the termination is preceded by an inquiry, evidence is received
and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind
the back of the officer and on the basis of such a report, the termination
order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles of natural
justice in as much as the purpose of such inquiry is to find out the truth of
the allegations with a view to punish the employee and not merely to
Page No.# 13/17
gather evidence for a future regular departmental inquiry. In such cases,
the termination is to be treated as based or founded on misconduct and
will be punitive. These are obviously not cases where the employer feels
that there is a mere cloud against the employee’s conduct but are cases
where the employer has virtually accepted the definitive and clear
findings of the inquiry officer.
26.
A clear reading of such distinction made by the Supreme
Court in Radhe Shyam Gupta (supra) only enunciates a substance and
not a form test. The distinction becomes stark, when the termination order
is preceded by an inquiry. True it is that there was no formal inquiry, as
contemplated in a disciplinary action against an employee, where
charge-memo is framed, inquiry officer and presenting officer are
appointed and such officers of the organisation are named as the friend
of the employee/proceedee; evidence is taken with opportunity given to
the employee to rebut the charges and a conclusion is arrived at by the
inquiry authority, which forms the basis for taking action by the
disciplinary authority.
27.
Here, in the case at hand, though there was no disciplinary
proceeding started against the respondent but, for all practical
purposes, the fact-finding committee comprised such members who
could have acted as the inquiry officer and the presenting officer and
they also recorded the statements of the witnesses with respect to the
gist of charges and concluded that all the charges had been proved
and that disciplinary action be taken against the respondent. If this is not
an inquiry against the misconduct, then, perhaps, no other proceeding
Page No.# 14/17
would.
28.
We have also noted that the concluding part of the report of
the fact-finding committee did not ask for any departmental inquiry
against the respondent, but recommended for a disciplinary action
against him as if all the charges in the inquiry were proved and it was
only left to the disciplinary authority to impose requisite punishment.
29.
Precisely, similar views have been expressed by the Supreme
Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), wherein also it has been held
that it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and
the language or words employed in the order of termination of the
probationer, to judge whether the words employed amounted to a
stigma or not. The principle remains the same, namely, that if, in an
inquiry into any alleged misconduct, the findings are arrived at with or
without a regular departmental inquiry, the simple order of termination is
to be treated to have been founded on the allegation and it shall be
bad. But if the inquiry is not held, no findings are arrived at and the
employer is not inclined to conduct any inquiry, but at the same time, he
does not want to continue the employee in service, against whom there
are complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would
not be bad.
30.
Similar would be the position if the employer does not inquire
into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental
proceeding, or he is doubtful about securing adequate evidence, in
which circumstances, the inquiry into the allegations would be a motive
Page No.# 15/17
and not foundation, and such a simple order of termination would be
valid.
31.
We have already explained the background facts to arrive at
the conclusion that the plain/innocuous order of termination, even
though not referring to the proven guilt of the respondent, was actually
punitive in nature in substance.
32.
The
conundrum
of
the
entire
decision-making
process
becomes further clear by the determinative test applied by the Supreme
Court in case of Pavenendra Narayan Verma (supra). The test has very
pithily been laid down in para 21 of the afore-noted judgment, which has
been quoted herein above.
33.
It has been explained that before considering the facts of any
case, so far as the first test is concerned, it is required to be seen as to
what language in a termination order would tantamount to a stigma?
Generally speaking, when a probationer’s appointment is terminated, it
means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of
misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the
termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit
in the termination, but a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination
order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination
of a probationer’s appointment, is also not stigmatic. In order to amount
to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something
over and above mere unsuitability for the job.
34.
The Supreme Court further clarified that if an inquiry is held
Page No.# 16/17
prior to the order of termination, all innocuous orders may not be termed
as punishment. An employer would be entitled to satisfy itself as to the
competence of a probationer to be confirmed in service and, for this
purpose, satisfy itself as to the very truth of any allegation that may have
been made about the employee. A charge-sheet merely details the
allegation so that the employee/proceedee may deal with them
effectively. It need not be repeated that the constitution of the factfinding committee preceding the order of termination was with a specific
intent, namely, to find out the truth in respect of the gist of the
allegations, which committee recorded the statements of the witnesses,
including the respondent, and came to a finding that all the charges
were proved and that the disciplinary authority must award punishment.
35.
These facts make the termination order clearly punitive and
stigmatic, which may not be permissible in the eyes of law.
36.
During the course of arguments, several other grounds were
raised with respect to territorial jurisdiction of this Court as the respondent
was terminated while he was serving in Tripura and, for judging his
suitability, Annual Performance Appraisal Reports were important and, in
which case, the respondent, indeed, was much above the threshold
bench-mark and that the extended period of probation had not even
begun when the order of termination was passed. However, we are of
the view that these issues are not required to be answered, as those were
not pressed to their logical conclusion.
37.
Thus, we hold that if the respondent was to be terminated from
Page No.# 17/17
service, he deserved to be subjected to a departmental inquiry on the
charges levelled against him, which formed the basis of his termination.
38.
We, thus, uphold the order dated 12.11.2025 passed by the
Tribunal and direct for reinstatement of the respondent, with the liberty to
the petitioner/KVS to initiate a departmental proceeding against the
respondent, if so deemed necessary, in accordance with law.
39.
Accordingly, this writ petition stands dismissed, with the liberty
as aforesaid.
40.
Any interim order passed by this Court stands rescinded.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
CHIEF JUSTICE
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