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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Heard on
:
15.06.2017
& 24.07.2017
Pronounced on : 26.07.2017
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Single Bench.: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN,
JUDGE.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Crl. A. No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung,
S/o Late Lall Bahadur Gurung,
R/o Dodak Busty, Soreng,
P.O & P.S. Soreng,
West District of Sikkim
.… Appellant.
Versus
State of Sikkim
… Respondent.
Appeal under Section 374 (2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Mr. Ajay Rathi, Mr. Rahul Rathi, Mr. Aditya Makkim, Ms. Pema
Wongmu Bhutia, Ms. Phurba Diki Sherpa and Mr. Pramit
Chhetri Legal Aid Counsels for the Appellant.
Ms. Pollin Rai, Asstt. Public Prosecutor, for the Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------JUDGMENT
(26.07.2017)
Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, J
1.
A Trial of the offences under Section 307 and
Section 392 IPC conducted by the Learned Session Judge, East
Sikkim at Gangtok (hereinafter the learned Session Judge) resulted
in the conviction of the Appellant on both the charges after
examining 17 witnesses. The Appellant is aggrieved by the
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
Judgment
of
the
Learned
Session
Judge
dated
24.07.2015
(hereinafter the impugned Judgment) and the order on sentence
dated 27.07.2015 (hereinafter the impugned sentence). The present
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015 (hereinafter the present Appeal)
seeks to assail both the impugned Judgment and impugned
sentence.
2.
On
23.07.2013,
Dr.
Sangeeta
Pradhan,
Medical
Officer in Sir Thutob Namgyal Memorial Hospital (hereinafter the
STNM Hospital), Gangtok, examined a patient, one Suresh Agarwal,
found a deep cut injury in front portion of his neck and lodged an
FIR with the Sadar Police Station.
3.
Around the same time Sub Inspector (S.I.), Rinku
Wangmu Bhutia of Sadar Police Station, Gangtok received a
telephonic
information
from
Bhim
Bahadur
Basnett,
former
Superintendent of Police about the incident, on the basis of which
FIR number 182/2013 dated 23.07.2013 under Section 307, Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter the IPC) was registered at 2010 hrs
against unknown person(s) and investigation taken up.
4.
On completion of investigation, the Prosecution filed
a charge-sheet No. 199 dated 01.10.2013 (hereinafter the chargesheet) u/s 307 and 392 of the IPC.
5.
A supplementary charge-sheet was also filed on
17.10.2013 on receipt of forensic report from the Regional Forensic
Science Laboratory (hereinafter RFSL), Saramsa, Ranipool.
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
On 30.05.2014 the Court of the Principal Session
6.
Judge, East Sikkim, Gangtok, framed two charges as under:“Firstly – That you on 23.07.2013 at around 8 p.m at Diesel
Power House Road, Gangtok, East Sikkim under the jurisdiction
of Sadar P.S., East Sikkim, did an act, to wit, you used a knife to
cut the throat of the victim Suresh Agarwal with such knowledge
that under such circumstances that if by that act you had caused
the death of the said Suresh Agarwal, you would have been
guilty of murder and by the said Act you caused hurt to Suresh
Agarwal and thereby committed an offence punishable under
Section 307 of the IPC, 1860, and within my cognizance.
Secondly- that you on the same date, day , time and place
as above committed robbery by taking a bag belonging to the
victim Suresh Agarwal, containing a sum of Rs. 4,840/- (Rupees
four thousand, eight hundred and forty) only, which was the
property of the said Suresh Agarwal and in his possession and
which you robbed him of in the Diesel Power House Road,
Gangtok, East Sikkim at about 8 p.m. and thereby committed an
offence under Section 392 of the IPC, 1860, and within my
cognizance.”
7.
The Appellant having pleaded not guilty the case was
put to trial.
8.
The Prosecution examined 17 witnesses.
9.
After the Prosecution closed its evidence, examination
of the Appellant u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter the Cr.P.C) was recorded on 10.06.2015 by the learned
Session‟s Judge.
10.
Although an opportunity to enter his defence was
granted to the Appellant, the Appellant declined.
11.
On 24.07.2015 the learned Session Judge rendered
the impugned Judgement holding, inter-alia, that the Prosecution
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
had proved its case against the Appellant u/s 307 and 392 of the
IPC, beyond all reasonable doubt and thus, the Appellant stands
convicted and liable to be sentenced in accordance with law.
12.
On 27.07.2015, the Learned Session Judge sentenced
the Appellant to undergo (i) simple imprisonment for one year and
six months and a fine of ₹ 10,000/- under Section 307 IPC and in
default of fine to undergo further imprisonment for six months; (ii)
imprisonment for one year and six months along with fine of ₹
10,000/-
under Section 392 IPC and in default of fine to undergo
further imprisonment for six months. The sentences were to run
consecutively. The period of imprisonment already undergone by the
Appellant during investigation and trial would be set off against this
sentence. The amounts of fines if recovered were to be made over
to the victim as compensation under Section 357 Cr.P.C..
13.
This Court has heard Mr. Ajay Rathi, Learned Counsel
for the Appellant (hereinafter the learned Counsel for the Appellant)
as well as Ms. Pollin Rai, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor
(hereinafter the learned APP) for the Respondent-State.
The Appellant’s case.
14.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would argue
that the Prosecution case suffers from material discrepancies which
have rendered the case of the Prosecution improbable. The learned
Counsel for the Appellant for the aforesaid purpose would draw the
attention of the Court to the cross-examination of the various
Prosecution witnesses and highlight, what according to him, were
the material discrepancies. It was also argued that Seema Singhal
(PW 6), the wife of Suresh Kumar Singhal, (PW 16) (hereinafter the
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
victim (PW 16) who is said to have gone down to the „jhora‟ and
taken the bag from the assailant could not also identify the
Appellant. The learned Counsel for the Appellant would argue that
there is no eye witness in the present case. He would further argue
that the victim (PW 16) had in cross-examination deposed that:- “it
is true that I had not seen the accused injured after he jumped from
the “jhora”. I heard from others that the accused had been injured”.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would point out that Deven
Bajaj (PW 2), Sharavan Kumar Sharma (PW 3) and Pradeep Singhal
(PW 4) also could not identify the accused. Infact, it was argued,
that Shravan Kumar Sharma (PW 3) who had stated that he had
seen the assailant running could not identify the Appellant. Besides,
the learned Counsel for the Appellant would also draw the attention
of this Court
to
the
discrepancy
in
the
statement
of
Tashi
Wangchuk Rana (PW9), Jigme Bhutia (PW 10), Dadiram Chettri (PW
13). The learned Counsel for the Appellant would emphasise on the
fact that the victim (PW 16) had not named the Appellant to the
Doctor at both the STNM hospital as well as the Central Referral
Hospital, Tadong and would thus argue that the identification of the
Appellant in Court could not be considered. The learned Counsel for
the Appellant would draw the attention of the Court to the
statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C to question no. 82
wherein the Appellant had stated that on the relevant night he was
going to his Aunt‟s house for dinner on her invitation when he heard
people shouting „chor chor‟ and saw a man running away and thus
he too started chasing the said man because of which he had fallen
down into the „jhora‟ and that the actual assailant had jumped
across the „jhora‟ and run away and argue that, therefore, it was a
case of mistaken identity and that the Appellant had provided
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
adequate explanation. The learned Counsel for the Appellant would
also question the alleged recovery and seizure of material objects. It
was also argued that the prosecution could not stand in the leg of
the defence and it would have to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt and that the chain of circumstances has not been established
to sustain a conviction. The learned Counsel for the Appellant would
also argue that human blood could not be detected in the „rambo
knife‟ (MO II) and thus it could not be connected to the crime. The
learned Counsel for the Appellant would also argue that Test
Identification Parade having not been conducted the identification of
the Appellant in Court would have no value. He would also argue
that there was personal enmity between the Appellant and the
victim (PW 16) as the Appellant owed Rs. 70,000/- to the victim
(PW 16) which fact was available in the statement recorded of the
Appellant to question no. 75 and 81 of the Section 313 of the Cr.P.C
statement.
15.
In contra, the learned APP would contend that the
present case is a case of direct evidence of the victim (PW 16) and
not circumstantial evidence as argued by the learned Counsel for
the Appellant. The learned APP would also argue that to justify the
conviction under Section 307, IPC it is not essential that bodily
injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted and
although the nature of injury actually caused may often give
considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of
the accused, such intention may also be deducted from other
circumstance, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without
any reference at all to actual wounds. She would rely upon the
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
Judgment of the Apex Court in Girija Shankar Vs. State of U.P1 for
the said purpose. The learned APP would also argue that it is
sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307, IPC if there is
present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
The learned APP would argue that the presence of the accused in
the place of occurrence has been adequately proved by Seema
Singhal (PW 6), Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9) and Jigme Bhutia (PW
10). Learned APP would also argue that Test Identification Parade
was not required as the victim (PW 16) himself was a witness and
that the plea of alibi taken by the Appellant is proved to be false.
Learned APP would rely upon the Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of
Uttar Pradesh2, Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar 3 and Jumni
and Others v. State of Haryana4. The learned APP should also argue
that the ingredient of Section 392 IPC i.e. robbery had been fully
satisfied. Learned APP would thus argue that the impugned
Judgment and sentence needs no interference.
Consideration:-
16.
Raju Ghosh (PW 5) who works in an online lottery
shop situated near hotel Hungry Jack, National Highway, Gangtok,
East Sikkim as a money collector does not remember the date but
sometime in the month of July 2013 he remembered that their
customer, the victim (PW 16) who is a lottery agent had come to
their shop at around 07.00 to 07.15 pm and deposited some
amount and thereafter left the shop. In cross-examination, he
stated that:- “it is true that I was not in office on the relevant day.”
(2004) 3 SCC 793
(1981) 2 SCC 166
(1997) 1 SCC 283
(2014) 11 SCC 355
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would submit that therefore
the evidence of Raju Ghosh (PW 5) is unreliable. This Court would
not consider the evidence of Raju Ghosh (PW 5).
The evidence of the injured victim (PW 16).
17.
The victim (PW 16), a resident of Diesel Power
House Road (hereinafter the DPH Road), Gangtok, East Sikkim
owned an online lottery shop near Denzong Cinema Hall, opposite
Super Market, Gangtok. On 23.07.2013 at around 07.00 pm he
closed his shop and started returning to his residence carrying Rs.
70,000/- in a bag. En route, he made payment to the lottery
manager for purchasing the lottery tickets from him. When he
reached DPH road, at around 07.30 pm he was called from the back
by a person who put his hand over his shoulder. When he turned
the said person assaulted him with a sharp weapon over his neck
and started snatching his bag which had around Rs. 4,000/- in it.
The victim (PW 16) protested but the said person cut the handle of
his carry bag with the said weapon and snatched his bag containing
money and a water bottle. In the process, the victim (PW 16) also
kicked the said person. On his kick the weapon fell down. He ran
after the said person shouting „thief thief‟ and saw him jumping over
the „jhora‟ (the word „jhora‟ is in nepali. Translated it means deep
drain). Since he was injured and blood was oozing out from his neck
he proceeded to STNM hospital. On reaching the Emergency ward of
the STNM hospital, the hospital personnel informed the police. Police
came to the STNM hospital and enquired about the matter.
Thereafter, the Doctor of STNM hospital sutured his wounds and on
the same day he was referred to Central Referral Hospital, Tadong
and discharged after three days of the incident.
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
The victim (PW 16) also identified and exhibited the
18.
following material objects :1.
MO I – the bag the Appellant had snatched from him on the
relevant night.
2.
MO VII- the water bottle that he was carrying in the bag MO
I.
3.
MO VIII – money amounting to Rs. 4840/- the Appellant had
stolen from him on the relevant night.
4.
MO VI- the blood stained T-shirt that he was wearing during
the relevant time which was seized by the police.
5.
MO IX- the pant he was wearing at the relevant
time which
was also seized by the police.
The victim (PW 16), could not identify (MO II)-the
19.
knife, as it was dark when he was assaulted by the Appellant.
The victim (PW 16), however, categorically identified
20.
the Appellant, as the assailant.
In his examination-in-chief,
the
victim (PW 16) stated :-
“I know the accused person (identified) as he is the person who
had assaulted me on that day.”
In his cross-examination, the victim (PW 16) on being
21.
led stated:“it is true that I was able to speak when I reached Emergency
Ward at STNM hospital after the alleged incident. It is true that
the Doctors did not record my statement at Emergency Ward.
(Volunteers to say that the Doctors advised me not to talk since
there was injury on my neck and my condition would deteriorate)
......... It is true that I did not mention the name of the accused
to the Doctors at STNM hospital or at Central Referral Hospital,
Tadong.”
22.
The victim (PW 16) also admitted in his cross-
examination that, he cannot correctly identify the currency note
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
marked (MO VIII) as the same currency note which was carried by
him because he had not affixed any identification marks on it.
Perhaps, it may be almost impossible to identify
23.
currency notes unless one records the numbers thereon seals the
sense and leaves identification marks to identify the currency notes.
The Investigating Officer (PW 17) ought to have done so. The failure
of the victim (PW 16) to identify the unmarked currency notes
however, also, reassures this Court of his truthfulness to the
identification of the Appellant in Court.
[[[
24.
Although there was no identification mark on the bag
(MO I) and the water bottle (MO VII), the victim (PW 16) reiterated
that he could still identify the said articles as the said articles
belonged to him. (MO VII) was his water bottle, (MO I) was his bag
which was snatched by the Appellant. Of course, the victim (PW 16)
would be able to identify the material objects even without the
identification mark. As correctly held by the learned Session Judge,
the victim (PW 16), in fact, was a truthful witness.
25.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would contend
that inspite of the fact that the victim (PW 16) knew the Appellant
he did not name the Appellant to the Doctor at the STNM hospital,
Dr. Sangeeta Pradhan (PW 1) and identified the Appellant only in
Court. The learned Defence Counsel, however, has not put a single
question to the victim (PW 16) to demolish the identification of the
Appellant in Court. In fact, there is not even a denial of the
identification of the Appellant in Court by the victim (PW 16).
26.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would argue,
based on certain answers to the questions put to the Appellant
under Section 313, Cr.P.C, that the victim (PW 16) had falsely
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
identified the Appellant in Court as the said Appellant owed the
victim (PW 16) certain sums of money. The learned Counsel for the
Appellant would also argue, again based on, certain answers to the
questions put to the Appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C, that in fact
the Appellant was going to his aunt‟s house for dinner as she had
invited the Appellant and while on his way near DPH road he heard
people shouting „chor chor‟ and saw a man running away after
which he also started chasing the said person but slipped and fell
down in the „jhora‟.
27.
It was not the case of the Prosecution that the Appellant
owed money to the victim (PW 16). It was also not the case of
Prosecution that the Appellant was going to his aunt‟s house for
dinner on invitation when the incident happened. Both the aforesaid
facts were the defence of the Appellant. Although the Learned
Session Judge, having given the opportunity to lead defence
evidence, the Appellant did not. It is difficult to accept the said
defence.
28.
An injured person in the natural course of events would
not implicate an innocent person and let go the real culprit. The
identification of the Appellant by the victim in Court, although after
one year and 11 months is without any hesitation and unblemished.
In the present case, the victim (PW 16), although in the night, had
seen the Appellant, from close proximity. The FIR having been
lodged by Dr. Sangeeta Pradhan (PW 1) and not by the victim (PW
16), the non mention of the name of the Appellant in the FIR
(Exhibit 1) is not of much significance.
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
29.
The Apex Court in re: Jodhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh 5
has held as under :“28. ............. Additionally, we may note with profit that
these witnesses had sustained injuries and their evidence as we
find is cogent and reliable. A testimony of an injured witness
stands on a higher pedestal than other witnesses. In Abdul
Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010)
10 SCC 259 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262] , it has been observed
that: (SCC p. 271, para 28)
“28. The question of the weight to be attached to the
evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of
the occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court.
Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in
the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally
considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with
a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and
is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely
implicate someone.”
It has been also reiterated that convincing evidence is required
to discredit an injured witness. Be it stated, the opinion was
expressed by placing reliance upon Ramlagan Singh v. State of
Bihar [Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar, (1973) 3 SCC 881 :
1973 SCC (Cri) 563] , Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P. [Malkhan
Singh v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 311 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 919]
, Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan [Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan,
(2009) 10 SCC 477 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 302] , Balraje v. State
of Maharashtra [Balraje v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC
673 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211] and Jarnail Singh v. State of
Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719 :
(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107] .
29. From the aforesaid summarisation of the legal principles, it is
beyond doubt that the testimony of the injured witness has its
own significance and it has to be placed reliance upon unless
there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the
basis of major contradictions and inconsistencies. As
has been
stated, the injured witness has been conferred special status in
law and the injury sustained by him is an inbuilt guarantee of his
presence at the place of occurrence. Thus perceived, we really do
(2015) 11 SCC 52
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel
for the appellant that the evidence of the injured witnesses have
been appositely discarded being treated as untrustworthy by the
learned trial Judge.”
30.
Deven Bajaj (PW 2), a resident of Paljor Stadium road,
Gangtok, East Sikkim and who runs a business of electrical goods
there, at around 07.00 to 07.30 pm of 23.07.2013, while watching a
program on television in his house, situated on the third floor of a
building, suddenly heard people shouting “chor chor” below his
house on the road side. He came out of his house to find out what
was the commotion about and he saw people gathered at the said
place of occurrence.
31.
Deven Bajaj (PW 2) in his deposition also stated that
:- “I learn that the victim Suresh Kumar Agarwal has been looted
and assaulted by a person on the same roadside”. The fact that
Deven Bajaj (PW 2) heard that the victim (PW 16) has been looted
and assaulted by a person on the same roadside is admissible under
Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter the
Evidence Act) but the truth of what Deven Bajaj (PW 2) heard is not
admissible unless the person who told him so is brought to the
witness box since the „best evidence‟ has not been put up.
32.
Similarly,
Sharavan
Kumar
Sharma
(PW
3),
a
resident of DPH road, Gangtok, East Sikkim, in the ground floor of
a building owned by T. T. Tamang, at exactly the same time (07.00
pm to 7.30 pm) on 23.07.2013 also heard some people shouting
“chor chor” from the road side. When he went out to find out what
happened he saw a person running towards Norkhil Hotel and a few
persons chasing him. In cross-examination, the said witness,
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
Sharavan Kumar Sharma (PW 3) admitted that the victim (PW 16)
used to reside in the upper floor of the same building where he
resided.
33.
Both Deven Bajaj (PW 2) and Shravan Kumar Sharma
(PW 3) corroborates the testimony of the victim (PW 16) to the
extent that both heard someone shouting „chor chor‟ at the same
time the victim (PW 16) shouted the said words, after the incident
and started chasing the Appellant.
34.
Bhim Bahadur Basnett (PW 12), a retired Senior
Superintendent of Police, who was residing at DPH complex at the
relevant time, also heard noises below his house and some persons
shouting that a thief had fallen into a „jhora‟ while escaping on
23.07.2013 at around 07.00 pm to 07.30 pm. He came out of his
house and went to check. He saw a group of people near the house
of Additional DGP, T.T Tamang in the same colony. On enquiry he
was told that one „marwari‟ had been assaulted by a knife by a
person after which the said „marwari‟ had been evacuated to STNM
hospital and the assailant had fallen into a „jhora‟. He looked into
the „jhora‟ and saw a man lying therein. He could not see the face of
the assailant as it was dark. He telephoned and informed the duty
officer and directed him to depute police personnel to the spot. After
about 10-15 minutes, 2-3 police personnel arrived at the spot and
went into the „jhora‟ after he told them to check if the man had
broken bones and whether he was still alive. He was informed by
the police personnel inside the „jhora‟ that the assailant was still
breathing. Thereafter, he returned home.
35.
The fact that Bhim Bahadur Basnett (PW 12) made an
enquiry and he was told that one „marwari‟ had been assaulted by a
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
knife by a person after which the said „marwari‟ had been evacuated
to STNM hospital and the assailant had fallen into a „jhora‟, is
admissible. The truth about what Bhim Bahadur Basnett (PW 12)
heard is not, unless, the person who told him so was brought to the
witness box. The rest of his evidence is clear and acceptable.
36.
Dadiram Chettri (PW 13), a resident of DPH
complex, Gangtok, East Sikkim was also watching television at
around 07.30 to 08.00 pm in the year 2013 (he does not remember
the date or month when he deposes on 26.03.2015 after nearly a
year and seven months after the incident) when he heard some
noise below his house. He went out and saw a group of person
gathered there. Amongst the people gathered, he saw the retired
Senior Superintendent of Police, Bhim Bahadur Basnett (PW 12)
there. He went to where the crowd was. There he learnt that one
Suresh Kumar Singhal (PW 16) had been assaulted with a knife by
an unknown person who while escaping after the assault, fell into
the „jhora‟ behind Norkhil hotel, Gangtok. After sometime 3-4 police
personnel came there and evacuated the assailant to the hospital in
a police vehicle. As he was quite far from the „jhora‟ he could not
see the face of the assailant.
37.
The fact that Dadiram Chettri (PW 13) learnt that one
Suresh Kumar Singhal (PW 16) has been assaulted with a knife by
an unknown person who while escaping after the assault fell into the
„jhora‟ behind Norkhil Hotel, Gangtok, is admissible. However, the
truth about what he learnt is not, unless, the person from whom he
learnt was brought to the witness box.
38.
Dadiram Chettri‟s (PW 13) evidence corroborates the
testimony of Bhim Bahadur Basnett (PW 12) both on the factum of
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
his presence at the place of occurrence and police personnel
reaching there and evacuating the assailant from the „jhora‟ to the
hospital.
39.
Rinku
Wangmu
Bhutia
(PW
11)
was
the
police
personnel who received the telephonic information from Bhim
Bahadur Basnett (PW 12). On receipt of the information he directed
Constable Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9), who was on beat duty, to
go to the place of occurrence and verify the facts. On verification,
Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9), informed him that the Appellant was
inside the „jhora‟ having fallen after he had made a bid to escape
and that the Appellant may have broken his back. Thereafter, he
directed Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9), to take the Appellant to the
STNM hospital.
40.
Rinku Wangmu Bhutia (PW 11) corroborates the
testimony of Bhim Bahadur Basnett (PW 12) about the call made by
him and giving information to the police station about the incident.
Rinku Wangmu Bhutia (PW 11) also corroborates the testimony of
both Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9) and Jigme Bhutia (PW 10) about
finding the Appellant inside the „jhora‟ immediately after the
occurrence with a suspected broken back.
41.
Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9), a police personnel
on patrolling duty, on 23.07.2013, received information from Sadar
Police Station on his walkie-talkie that one person after assaulting a
man and while running away had fallen into a „jhora‟ near Norkhil
hotel and that they should bring the person who had fallen to the
Sadar Police Station. As directed they had gone to the place and
found the Appellant inside the „jhora‟ in an unconscious state.
Thereafter, he reported the matter to Sadar Police Station and took
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
the Appellant to the STNM hospital. The said witness also identified
the Appellant in Court on 18.03.2015.
The said witness, Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9),
42.
in his examination-in-chief stated that he received the information
about the assault on 23.07.2013 at around 05.30 pm to 6.30 pm.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would contend that it is a
serious discrepancy. The learned APP would contend that it is but a
minor inconsistency. This Court does not consider this as such a
discrepancy
that
would
render
the
evidence
inadmissible.
Considering human conditioning, it is difficult to expect witnesses to
remember every little detail with mathematical precision, especially
of events which have transpired much earlier. There is a need for
completion of effective investigation and filing of charge sheet
before good evidence is lost due to lapse of time and faded
memory.
43.
Jigme Bhutia (PW 10), a home guard, was also
on patrolling duty along with Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9) when
Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 6) received a call on the wireless set
from Sadar Police Station while on patrolling duty to the effect that
one person was assaulted by a thief with a knife and the assailant
had run away after snatching a bag from the victim (PW 16) and
while running away the assailant fell into a drain near the Norkhil
Hotel. They were directed over the wireless set to bring the
assailant to the Police station. Jigme Bhutia (PW 10) correctly states
the time of receipt of the information as 07.15 pm on 23.07.2013.
He, after Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9) received the information on
his wireless set about the assault, accompanied Tashi Wangchuk
Rana (PW 9) also to the drain (in nepali “jhora”) and saw the
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
Appellant person lying in semi conscious state and moaning in pain.
The Appellant was not in a position to talk and stand by himself.
They informed the Sadar Police Station of the situation over the
wireless set.
A vehicle was sent from the Sadar Police Station in
which the Appellant was put and taken to the STNM hospital with a
driver. Tashi Wangchuk Rana, (PW 9) accompanied the Appellant.
Jigme Bhutia (PW 10) could not, as the Appellant had to be kept in
lying position.
44.
The testimony of Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9) and Jigme
Bhutia (PW 10), both police personnel, reassures this Court and
corroborates the identification of the Appellant in Court by the
victim (PW 16). Their depositions also makes it evident that it was
the Appellant and Appellant alone who was lying fallen into the
same „jhora‟ where the victim (PW 16) testified the Appellant had
fallen after he tried to escape. Their depositions also corroborate the
evidence of Bhim Bahadur Basnet (PW 12).
45.
On 23.07.2013, Dr. Sangeeta Pradhan (PW 1),
Medical Officer, STNM hospital, Gangtok, East Sikkim received a
patient, the victim (PW 16), a 55 year old male, with a history of
having been assaulted by an unknown person. On examination she
found a deep cut injury in front of his neck. Thereafter, she sent an
information to the Sadar Police Station vide a Exhibit 1.
Dr.
Sangeeta Pradhan (PW 1) was the Doctor who examined the victim
(PW 16) at the STNM Hospital and found a deep cut injury in front
of his neck. She wrote the fact about the victim (PW 16), being
found with a deep cut injury is front of his neck in the FIR (Exhibit
1) too, immediately on examining the victim (PW 16). She deposed
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
about the said fact once again in Court. The deep cut injury in the
front portion of the neck of the victim (PW 16) stands proved.
The said F.I.R (Exhibit 1) although not a substantive
46.
piece of evidence, however, reassures the Court and corroborates
the oral testimony of Dr. Sangeeta Pradhan (PW 1).
In cross-examination, Dr. Sangeeta Pradhan (PW 1)
47.
admitted that she had not mentioned that the injury was sufficient
to cause death in the F.I.R (Exhibit 1). There was no requirement
for her to do so. F.I.R (Exhibit 1) was only the first written
information to the Sadar Police Station given by the said Dr.
Sangeeta Pradhan (PW 1). The medical report of the victim (PW 16)
strangely, has not been produced by the Investigating Officer (PW
17). He ought to have done so.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would argue that
48.
the failure to name the Appellant to the Doctor was fatal and would
rely upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in re: Rehmat v. State of
Haryana 6 . The Apex Court had held that “ordinarily, in a medico-
legal case, the doctor is supposed to write down the history of the
injured but admittedly in this case medical papers of Padam Singh
(PW.4) do not indicate the name of the assailant.”
In the
present
case the medical papers of STNM hospital is not on the record. What
is on record is the First Information Report (Exhibit 1) filed by the
Doctor, who examined the victim (PW 16), at the STNM hospital.
Sonam Rinzing Shenga (PW 14), who was the Station
49.
House
Officer, Sadar
Police Station, Gangtok
received
an
information on 23.07.2013 at around 08.10 pm from the Medical
1996 (3) Crimes 238
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
Officer, Emergency Ward, STNM hospital, Gangtok to the effect that
they had received the patient who had been assaulted by an
unknown person and a patient had a deep cut injury in his neck. He
was also informed that the name of the patient is Suresh Agarwal,
(PW 16) aged about 55 years and a resident of Diesel Power House,
Gangtok. On receipt of the said information he registered Sadar P.S
Case No. 182/2013 dated 23.07.2013 under Section 307 IPC and
endorsed the case to the Investigating Officer (PW 17) for further
investigation.
Sonam Rinzing Shenga (PW 14) identified the FIR
50.
(Exhibit 1), by Dr. S. Pradhan, (PW 1), Medical Officer, STNM
hospital, Gangtok. He also identified and exhibited the formal FIR,
(Exhibit 4) and his signature thereon at (Exhibit 4 (a)).
Sonam Rinzing Shenga (PW 14) corroborates the
51.
testimony of Dr. Sangeeta Pradhan (PW 1) that she lodged the FIR
(Exhibit 1).
52.
Pradeep Singhal (PW 4), brother of the victim (PW
16), on 23.07.2013 at around 07.00 pm to 07.30 pm, received a
telephonic call from one Birju, a friend of his brother, who had in
turn received a call from his friend, Imtiaz of Diesel Power house
(DPH)
informing him that his brother had been assaulted by
someone and had been evacuated to the STNM Hospital and that he
should reach the hospital immediately.
53.
The fact that Pradeep Singhal (PW 4) received a call
from Birju and he heard what Birju told him is admissible. The truth
of what Birju told him is not admissible as both Birju and Imtiaz
were not brought to the witness box.
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
54.
On reaching the hospital Pradeep Singhal (PW 4) met
his brother, the victim (PW 16) in the emergency ward of the STNM
Hospital. Thereafter, he went to Sadar Police Station and verbally
lodged a complaint to the effect that his brother had been assaulted
with a knife by an unknown person. Pradeep Singhal (PW 4) also
deposed that his brother was operated upon at the STNM Hospital
after which they shifted him to the Central Referral Hospital,
Manipal, Tadong.
55.
In cross-examination, the said witness, Pradeep
Singhal (PW 4), on being led, admitted that his verbal complaint
was reduced to writing by police personnel at Sadar Police Station.
The verbal complaint reduced to writing is not on record. The
learned Counsel for the Appellant would contend that this fact is a
serious discrepancy. The factum of Pradeep Singhal (PW 4) having
gone to the Sadar Police Station and lodging a verbal complaint
which was reduced to writing has not been proved. This, however,
does not affect the fundamental and foundational facts of the
present prosecution.
56.
Pradeep
Singhal
(PW
4)
also
stated
in
cross-
examination, that at the relevant time he was not aware as to who
had assaulted his brother and that he still does not know the
Appellant. The identification of the Appellant by the victim (PW 16)
and by Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9) and Jigme Bhutia (PW 10)
being clear and without any hesitation, Pradeep Singhal (PW 4)
stating in cross-examination that he did not know and still does not
know the assailant does not demolish the identification of the
Appellant by the victim (PW 16), Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9) and
Jigme Bhutia (PW 10).
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
57.
Seema Singhal (PW 6), wife of the victim (PW 16), at
around 07.30 to 08.00 pm on 23.07.2013, also heard people
shouting below her house and went to the road. On reaching the
road she was informed that her husband had been assaulted with a
knife by someone and evacuated to the hospital. On the way to the
hospital she met her mother-in-law, Radha Devi Singhal, who
informed her that one thief had taken the cash bag that her
husband was carrying at the relevant time and while doing so the
thief had fallen. She went to see the thief and found her husband‟s
bag with him. The assailant had fallen into the „jhora‟ next to her
house. She took the bag from the possession of the said thief by
going to the place where he had fallen from the path along and
inside the „jhora‟. Thereafter, she went to the STNM hospital where
her house had been hospitalised. The following day the police came
to her house and seized the bag from her brother-in-law, Pradeep
Singhal (PW 4). She identified the bag (MO I) and as the one her
husband was carrying at the time of the incident. She could not
identify the person who assaulted her husband and took away the
money bag. In cross-examination she admitted that she had come
to the Court along with her husband and he was present in Court.
58.
This Court may presume that the Appellant who was
found in possession of the Bag (Mo I) belonging to the victim (PW
16) with Rs. 4840/- (MO VIII) in it along with a water bottle (MO
VII) by Seema Singhal (PW 6) soon after the incident is the person
who is the thief u/s 114 illustration (a) of the Evidence Act.
59.
It was but natural for the wife, Seema Singhal (PW 6)
to be accompanied by her husband to the Court. The learned
Defence Counsel, although got recorded the fact that the husband
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
of Seema Singhal (PW 6) was present in Court on 05.03.2014 when
her deposition was recorded, did not put any question regarding the
same to the victim (PW 16) when he was subjected to intense
cross-examination by the learned Counsel for the Appellant on
04.06.2015. The learned Defence Counsel cannot, therefore, take
advantage of an unknowing error committed by a witness unfamiliar
to Trial Court procedure. The learned Defence Counsel was well
within his right to desire that the victim (PW 16) be not present in
Court while recording the deposition of his wife Seema Singhal (PW
6). The learned Counsel for the Appellant, however, did not do so.
Justice may not be served if the Defence were to be allowed to steal
a march of an innocuous act of the victim (PW 16) to accompany his
wife, Seema Singhal (PW 6) to Court.
60.
Seema Singhal‟s (PW 6) mother-in-law, Radha Devi
Singhal was not produced as a witness. The truth of what Radha
Devi Singhal told Seema Singhal (PW 6) when she met her on her
way to the hospital is not admissible.
Identification in Court and Test Identification Parade
61.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would contend
that it was strange that inspite of Seema Singhal (PW 6) having
gone to the „jhora‟ and taken the bag from the possession of the
thief, she could not identify the Appellant. The learned Counsel for
the Appellant would also contend that the identification of the
Appellant, in Court by the victim (PW 16) would therefore be
doubtful since the Prosecution had failed to conduct a Test
Identification Parade and the victim (PW 16) had already seen the
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
Appellant when he had accompanied his wife, Seema Singal (PW 6)
to Court.
62.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that
since it is the Prosecution‟s case that the Appellant and the victim
(PW 16) were known to each other he ought to have named the
accused to the Doctor at the STNM Hospital and failure to do so
makes the identification of the Appellant in Court doubtful. More so,
when admittedly no Test Identification Parade was conducted in the
present case. A thorough examination of the materials on record
makes it evident that Prosecution case was only to the extent that
the Appellant would visit the victim‟s (PW 16) lottery shop, time to
time for playing lottery. It was not the Prosecution‟s case that they
were known to each other or that the victim (PW 16) knew the
name of the Appellant. The reasoning that the victim (PW 16) gave
that the Doctors advised him not to talk since there was injury on
the neck and his condition would deteriorate on being crossexamined regarding his ability to speak at the STNM Hospital is
plausible and thus acceptable.
63.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would rely upon
the Judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in re: Noorahmmad
and Ors. v. State of Karnataka 7 to submit that since the Test
Identification Parade was not held in the present case, the Appellant
was entitled to an acquittal.
64.
In re: Noorahmmad (supra) the facts were different.
In the said case, the evidence on record clearly highlighted material
contradictions and discrepancies in the Prosecution evidence. In the
F.I.R which was registered, allegations were made against four
unknown persons and not against the Appellants therein despite the
(2016) 1 R.C.R. (Criminal) 961
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
fact that the
complainant knew the
name
of the
accused,
Noorahmmad, which fact became clear when the complainant
therein deposed before the Trial Court.
65.
The Apex Court in Mukesh & Another v. State for NCT of
Delhi & Ors.
decided by a three Judges Bench held that Test
Identification Proceedings corroborate and lend assurance to the
dock Identification of accused and that TIP does not constitute
substantive evidence. The Apex Court
referred
to
its previous
Judgments which held, inter-alia, that an identification test is
primarily meant for the purpose of helping the investigation agency
with an assurance that the progress with the investigation of an
offence is proceeding on the right line; Identification can only be
used as corroborative of the statement in Court; Identification
parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is no
provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the
investigating Agencies to hold, or confers a right upon the accused
to claim a test identification parade. They do not constitute
substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed by
Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Failure to hold a test
identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of
identification
in
Court.
The
weight
to
be
attached
to
such
identification should be for the Courts of fact; substantive evidence
is the evidence of identification in Court and the test identification
parade provides corroboration to the identification of witness in
Court,
if
required;
identification
of
accused
either
in
test
identification parade or in Court is not a sine quo non in every case
if from the circumstances the guilt is otherwise established. Many a
times, crimes are committed under the cover of darkness when
( 2017) 6 SCC 1
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
none is able to identify the accused. The commission of a crime can
be proved also by circumstantial evidence; and the proposition of
law is quite clear that even if there is no previous TIP, the Court
may appreciate the dock identification as being above board and
more than conclusive.
66.
The law with regard to the importance of Test
Identification Parade and identification in Court is well settled.
Failure to hold Test Identification Parade does not make the
evidence of identification in Court inadmissible. Identification in
Court is a substantive piece of evidence. Test Identification Parade,
if conducted, would corroborate the same. Failure to do so does not
make the evidence of identification in Court inadmissible.
67.
In the present case it was the victim who identified the
Appellant in Court. The Appellant who had been seen by the victim
(PW 16) from close quarters categorically identified the Appellant as
the assailant. His evidence is truthful and clear and needs no
corroboration. The eye witness account of the victim (PW 16) who
was injured with a deep cut injury on the neck could have easily
seen the face of the Appellant assaulting him and his appearance
and identity would well remain imprinted in his mind. As a result of
the Appellant trying to escape after the assault he fell into a nearby
„jhora‟ from where he was picked up by the Police, Tashi Wangchuk
Rana (PW 9), a police personnel on patrolling duty and Jigme Bhutia
(PW 10),
a home guard also on patrolling duty and taken to the
hospital. The evidence of Tashi Wangchuk Rana (PW 9) and Jigme
Bhutia (PW 10) who also categorically identified the Appellant in
Court further corroborates the evidence of the victim (PW 16).
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
68.
This Court is of the view that the Investigating Officer
(PW 17) not conducting Test Identification Parade, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, is not fatal.
MO II - ‘rambo knife’ and MO III – its sheath.
69.
The Investigating Officer (PW 17) has proved the
recovery and seizure of the „rambo knife‟ (MO II) and its sheath (MO
III) from the said „jhora‟.
70.
The Defence has not been able to demolish the
Investigating Officer (PW 17) on the said seizure. The seizure of the
„rambo knife‟ (MO II) and its sheath (MO III) from the „jhora‟ as
deposed to by the Investigating Officer (PW 17) has not even been
denied in cross-examination by the Defence.
71.
The seizure of the „rambo knife‟ (MO II) and the sheath
(MO III) was effected by the Investigating Officer (PW 17) vide a
property seizure memo (Exhibit 2) under the provisions of Section
102 Cr.P.C. This Section confers powers upon the police officer to
seize property suspected to be stolen, or found under circumstances
which creates suspicion of the commission of any offence. The
Investigating Officer (PW 17) is a police officer and as such,
authorised to exercise the power under Section 102 Cr.P.C.
72.
There is no such inflexible proposition of law that there
ought to be independent witnesses associated with the seizure.
Section 102 Cr.P.C does not require it. When the police is not going
in for the purpose of search for any specified object but for
investigation emergently into a case of alleged attempt to murder
and robbery there is no requirement of searching for respectable
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
citizens to be witnesses. The police officer in the course of
investigation can seize any property if such property alleged to be
stolen or is suspected to be stolen or is the object of the crime
under investigation or has a direct link with the commission of
offence. However, the Investigating Officer (PW 17), has examined
two witnesses to prove the seizure. In such circumstances, it has
become imperative to examine the evidence of the search witnesses
also.
73.
Kunj Bihari Agarwal (PW 7), a resident of Tadong, East
Sikkim and who runs an electrical hardware shop, opposite police
headquarter, Gangtok is a witness to the seizure and corroborated
that the said knife and sheath were seized from the „jhora‟ in his
presence vide a seizure memo (Exhibit 2). Kunj Bihari Agarwal (PW
7) exhibited the seizure memo (Exhibit 2) and identified his
signature thereon as (Exhibit 2a). The said witness also identified
(MO II) as the „rambo knife‟ and (MO III) as the cover of the said
knife recovered and seized by the police under property seizure
memo (Exhibit 2).
74.
During cross-examination, Kunj Bihari Agarwal (PW 7),
on being led, admitted “it is true that since no identification mark
was affixed on MO II, the knife shown in the Court room may not be
the seized knife also.” The learned Counsel for the Appellant
therefore, contends that the Prosecution has failed to prove and
connect the „rambo knife‟ to the crime. The learned Session Judge
found it unsafe to hold that the „rambo knife‟ (MO II) was the
weapon of offence. Rightly so, because even the second witness to
the seizure, Abhijit Saha Sardar (PW 8) could not state definitely as
to whether the „rambo knife‟ (MO II) and its sheath (MO III) shown
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
to him in the Court room on 12.03.2015 were the same articles
which was seized by the police under seizure memo (Exhibit 2) due
to lapse of time. Further there being no certainty as to where the
said „rambo knife‟ (MO II) was seized from.
75.
The learned Session Judge was, however, of the view
that this would not absolve the Appellant since non recovery of
weapon of offence by itself cannot be a reason to reject the
testimony of the witnesses which are reliable. The fact that the
Appellant had inflicted a deep cut injury in the front of the neck of
the victim (PW 16) by a sharp edged weapon having been proved,
the failure to clinchingly identify the weapon of offence by the
seizure
witnesses,
although
categorically
identified
by
the
Investigation Officer (PW 17), is irrelevant. The failure of the
Investigating Officer (PW 17) to put identification mark on material
objects for proper identification is improper. The Investigating
Officer (PW 17) ought to have done so. In the present case,
however, the failure of the Investigating Officer (PW 17) to do so
thereby allowing confusion to the mind of the seizure witnesses
does not detract the case of the Prosecution which has otherwise
been proved by cogent evidence.
Material objects- MO I – the bag, MO VII- the water bottle,
MO VIII – money amounting to Rs. 4840/-, O VI- the blood
stained T-shirt, MO IX- the pants.
76.
Item No. 1, 2 and 3 in the list of properties of seizure
memo (Exhibit 3) proved by the Investigating Officer (PW 17) were
the wearing apparels of the victim (PW 16) containing blood stains.
Item no. 8 was cash amount totalling to Rs. 4840/- belonging to the
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
victim (PW 16). As per the seizure memo (Exhibit 3) item no. 4, 5,
6 and 7 are suspected to belong to the Appellant.
77.
As stated earlier, the victim (PW 16) also identified and
exhibited, Exhibit (MO I) – the bag, the Appellant had snatched
from him on the relevant night; Exhibit (MO VII)- the water bottle
that he was carrying in the bag Exhibit (MO I); Exhibit (MO VIII) –
money amounting to Rs. 4840/- the Appellant had stolen from him
on the relevant night; Exhibit (MO VI)- the blood stained T-shirt
that he was wearing during the relevant time which was seized by
the police and Exhibit (MO IX)- the pants which he was wearing at
the relevant time which was also seized by the police. Pooja Lohar
(PW 15), a forensic expert from RFSL, Saramsa clearly stated both
in the Forensic Report (Exhibit 5) as well as in her deposition that
human blood of group AB was detected in the dried blood sample
(MO IV), vest (MO V) and T-shirt (MO VI) belonging to the victim
further corroborating the fact that in fact the victim (PW 16) was
injured due to the assault on the relevant day.
78.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would submit
that the failure of the prosecution to explain how the said items no.
4, 5, 6 and 7 of the seizure memo (Exhibit 3) suspected to belong
to the Appellant, were seized vide seizure memo (Exhibit 3) and
found in the bag of the victim (PW 16) would create adequate doubt
about the Appellant being falsely prosecuted.
79.
A perusal of the seizure memo (Exhibit 3) would show
ten items were seized. Item 1, 2 and 3 were wearing apparels said
to belong to the victim (PW 16) containing blood stains. Item No. 4,
5, 6 and 7 of the said seizure memo (Exhibit 3) were found in a
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
cream colour bag which were said to belong to the Appellant. Item
no. 8, 9 and 10 of the seizure memo were cash amount of Rs.
4,840/-, one dark blue colour bag and one water bottle said to
belong to the victim (PW 16). The dark blue colour bag seized vide a
seizure memo (Exhibit 3) was infact the bag (MO I) of the victim
(PW 16). The Investigating Officer (PW 17) states that (MO I) is the
blue coloured bag. The said (MO I) has been identified by the victim
(PW 16) and his wife Seema Singhal (PW 6). The said items nos. 4Grey colour shirt, 5- Brown colour wallet with Rs. 200/- in it, 6- ATM
Card of State Bank, 7- two numbers of passport photo were infact
found in another cream colour bag which was stated to belong to
the Appellant as would be clear from the seizure memo (Exhibit 3).
The Defence has not given a suggestion to the Investigating Officer
(PW 17) that said articles 4,5, 6 and 7 of the seizure memo (Exhibit
3) were planted.
The items 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the seizure memo
(Exhibit
all
3)
were
personal
items
of
the
Appellant.
The
Investigating Officer (PW 17) ought to have explained why those
items were seized from the house of the victim (PW 16). Whether
the said items were picked up by Seema Singhal (PW 6) from the
place of occurrence or it was collected by the Police officers
immediately after the incident remains unanswered.
80.
The failure of the Prosecution to explain how items no.
4, 5, 6 and 7 of the seizure memo (Exhibit 3) were seized from the
house of the victim (PW 16) does not in any way, however, create
any doubt of the seizure of the bag (MO I) of the victim (PW 16)
along with the seizure of the money (MO VIII) amounting to Rs.
4840/- and the water bottle (MO VI).
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
81.
The Court has a duty to ensure that truth prevails. In
material particulars the fact being well established, this Court is of
the view that the said discrepancy does not shake the foundational
facts of the present case.
Exhibit 9-Wound Certificate of the Victim (PW 16).
82.
The Investigating Officer (PW 17) also collected the
medical report of the victim (PW 16) from the Central Referral
Hospital and exhibited the Wound Certificate issued by the Central
Referral Hospital under the signature of Dr. Tarpan Limboo. The
Investigating Officer (PW 17) identified and exhibited
the said
Wound Certificate as (Exhibit 9) and Dr. Tarpan Limboo‟s signature
as (Exhibit 9 (a)), identifying the signature as he prepared the
Wound Certificate in his presence and signed it. The said wound
Certificate records the following injuries on the victim (PW 16) :“(1). Sutured cut injury at the level of upper border of thyroid
cartilage extending from (R) anterior border of SCM to left
posterior border of SCM.”
83.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would submit
that the Wound Certificate (Exhibit 9) is not admissible in evidence.
The fact that the Investigating Officer (PW 17) obtained the said
Wound Certificate (Exhibit 9) under the signature of Dr. Tarpan
Limboo from the Central Referral Hospital is admissible. However,
as Dr. Tarpan Limboo was not brought to the witness box, the
contents of the wound certificate (Exhibit 9) are inadmissible as the
„best evidence‟ of Dr. Tarpan Limboo has not been brought on
record.
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
Exhibit 10 – certificate of Injury of the Appellant.
84.
The Investigation Officer (PW 17) also collected
the Certificate of Injury sustained by the Appellant from Central
Referral Hospital as he was shifted to Central Referral hospital from
STNM Hospital. He exhibited the said Certificate of Injury as (Exhibit
10). He collected the certificate from the counter of Central Referral
hospital, Tadong, Gangtok. The said Certificate of injury reflected
that the Appellant was admitted to Central Referral Hospital,
Tadong, on 26.07.2013 for spinal injury and paraplegia and he was
operated on 01.08.2013. A perusal of Certificate of Injury (Exhibit
10) reflects that it is signed by one Dr. P.R.K Prasad. The said
Doctor was not examined. The contents of the said Certificate of
Injury (Exhibit 10) also stands not proved.
Exhibit 11- the Arrest Memo.
85.
The Investigating Officer (PW 17) proved the arrest
memo dated 25.07.2013 of the Appellant and identified his
signature at Exhibit 11 (a), 11 (b) and 11 (c) as the signature of the
relative of the Appellant. The said arrest memo (Exhibit 11) would
show the Appellant was arrested on 25.07.2013 at 14.00 hrs at
STNM hospital where he was under treatment.
Exhibit 12- the rough sketch map.
86.
The Investigating Officer (PW 17) also exhibited a
rough sketch map (Exhibit 12) prepared by him. The contents of the
rough sketch map prepared by the Investigating Officer (PW 17)
24.07.2013 is admissible except the identification of the place of
occurrence marked “P.O” as the same is hit by the provisions of
section 162 Cr.P.C. No witness has come forward and deposed that
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
the place of occurrence was shown to the Investigating Officer (PW
17) by him / her. The rough sketch map (Exhibit 12) would however
and importantly show that „jhora‟ was 24‟x24‟ 6” (dimension). This
fact totally improbablises the defence of the Appellant given in
answer to question no. 82 of the Section 313 Cr.P.C statement of
the Appellant that the actual assailant who the Appellant also
chased, jumped across the „jhora‟ and ran away. An act, perhaps
humanly impossible.
Section 307 IPC- Attempt to murder.
The Appellant has been charged under the provision of
87.
Section 307 I.P.C. Section 307 reads as under:“ Attempt to murder.- whoever does any act with such
intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he
by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;
and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender
shall be liable either to imprisonment to life, or to such
punishment as is herein before mentioned.”
88.
The Apex Court in re: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mohan
and Ors9. : has held that :“14. ..... In order to attract Section 307, the injury need not
be on the vital parts of the body. In order to attract Section 307,
causing of hurt is sufficient. If anybody does any act with
intention or knowledge that by his act he might cause death
and
hurt
is
caused,
that
is sufficient to attract life
imprisonment. Section 307 uses the word “hurt” which has been
explained in Section 319 IPC and not “grievous hurt” within the
meaning of Section 320 IPC. Therefore, in order to attract
Section 307, the injury need not be on the vital part of the
body.” (emphasis supplied)
(2013) 14 SCC 116
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
A similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in
89.
re: Anjani Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar & Ano.10.
The Appellant called the victim (PW 16) from the back,
90.
put his hand on his shoulder and when the victim (PW 16) turned
around assaulted him on his neck, a vital part of his body, with a
sharp edged weapon an inflicted a deep cut injury. A deep cut injury
in front of the neck caused by a sharp edged weapon inflicted by the
Appellant on the victim (PW 16) is more than a „hurt‟. The intention
and knowledge is clear. The Appellant, obviously, would have known
that a deep cut injury in front of the neck by a sharp edged weapon
would definitely cause death and he would be guilty of murder.
There is premeditation which is discernible in the act of the
Appellant. The Appellant knew what he was doing. The Appellant
committed the heinous act, unprovoked. The time, place and
manner of the commission of the crime are indicative of the motive
of the Appellant.
The learned Session Judge has held thus:-
91.
“43. The nature of injuries sustained by the victim was “deep
cut injury” on the front portion of neck which PW-1 (Dr.
Sangeeta Pradhan) has clearly testified and about which the
victim has elaborated. It is therefore, manifest that the victim
had been assaulted by the accused with a sharp edged weapon
on a vital part of the body (neck). Though it is uncertain whether
the knife (marked M.O –II) was the same weapon of offence. It
is however, unmistakable that the accused had used a sharp
edged weapon to inflict the injury on the victim.”
92.
This Court is of the view that the learned Session Judge has
correctly come to the finding as quoted above. The learned Session
(2014) 12 SCC 286
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
Judge has correctly relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in
re: Girija Shankar v. State of U.P 11 which held that to justify a
conviction under Section 307, IPC the Court has to see whether the
act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or
knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section.
In view of the aforesaid the impugned Judgment
93.
convicting the Appellant under Section 307, IPC is upheld.
Section 392 IPC-robbery
The Appellant has also been charged under Section 392
94.
IPC and convicted by the learned Session Judge. Section 392 IPC
reads as under: “392. Punishment for robbery. – Whoever commits robbery
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if
the robbery be committed on the highway between sunset and
sunrise, the imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years.”
Robbery has been defined in Section 390 IPC which
95.
reads as under: “390. Robbery.- in all robbery there is either theft or
extortion.
When theft is robbery.- Theft is “robbery” if, in order to the
committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying
away or attempting to carrying away property obtained by theft,
the offender, for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to
cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful strained, or fear of
instant
death
or
of
instant
hurt
or
of
instant
wrongful
restraint……………….
………………………..
Explanation.-
the offender is said to be present if he is
sufficiently near to put the other person in fear of instant death,
of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.”
(2004) 3 SCC 793
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
96.
The second clause of Section 390, IPC, relating to
“when extortion is robbery” is not attracted in the present case.
Therefore, it is important to examine what is „theft‟.
“Theft” has been defined in Section 378, IPC which
97.
reads as under:“378. Theft.-
whoever, intending to take dishonestly any
movable property of the possession of any person without that
person‟s consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is
said to commit theft.”
98.
The basis of the offence of robbery under Section 390,
IPC is either theft or extortion committed under the circumstances
specified therein. In the present case, extortion is not an issue.
Theft is an ingredient of robbery. The felonious taking from the
person of another or in his presence against the persons will, by
violence or putting him in the form of injury elevates theft to
robbery. For the Section to apply it is necessary that the accused
should
have
from
the
very
start,
the
intention
to
deprive
complainant of the property and should for that purpose either hurt
him. As distinguished from theft, robbery consists in the causing or
attempting to cause death, hurt, or wrongful restraint, or fear of
instant death, hurt or wrongful restraint.
99.
In re: Venu alias Venugopal and others v. State of
Karnataka12 , the Apex Court held:
“8. Section 392, IPC provides for punishment for robbery.
The essential ingredients are as follows:
1. Accused committed theft.
2. Accused voluntarily caused or attempted to cause.
(i)
death , hurt or wrongful restraint;
(2008) 3 SCC 94
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
(ii)
fear of instant death, hurt or wrongful
restraint.
3. He did either act for the end
(i)
to commit theft;
(ii)
while committing theft;
(iii)
in carrying away or in the attempt to
carrying away property obtained by theft.”
100.
The victim (PW 16) has categorically deposed :-
“On 23.07.2013 at around 7 p.m. I closed my shop and started
returning back to my residence carrying ₹ 70,000/- in a bag. En
route I made payment to Lottery Manager for purchasing the
lottery tickets from him .When I reached DPH road, it was
around 7.30 p.m where I was called from the back by a person
and he put his hand over my shoulder. When I turned back, he
assaulted me with a sharp weapon over my neck and started
snatching my bag where around ₹ 4,000/- was there. I protested
but the accused cut the handle of my carry bag with the said
weapon and snatched my bag containing my money and a water
bottle. In the process I kicked him. I know the accused person
(identified) as he is the person who had assaulted me on that
day. On my kick, the weapon carried by the accused fell down. I
ran after him shouting “thief thief” and saw him jumping over
the “jhora”. Since I was injured and blood was oozing out from
my neck, I proceeded to STNM hospital. On my reaching the
Emergency Ward of the hospital, the hospital personnel informed
the police. Police came to STNM hospital and enquired about the
matter. Thereafter the Doctor of STNM hospital sutured my
wounds and on the same day I was referred to Central Referral
Hospital, Tadong.”
101.
Seema Singhal (PW 6), the wife of the victim (PW
16) has deposed that on hearing the thief had taken away the cash
bag (MO I), the victim (PW 16), her husband, was carrying she went
into the „jhora‟ and took the said bag (MO I) from the possession of
the said thief and the following day the said bag (MO I) was seized
from her house from her brother, Pradeep Singhal (PW 4). The fact
that the bag (MO I) had been seized from the house of Seema
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
Singhal (PW 6) has been proved. The seizure memo (Exhibit 3) also
record so. It is not the Appellant‟s case that the money Rs. 4840/(MO VIII) found in the bag (MO I) which was taken from the
possession of the Appellant from the „jhora‟ by Seema Singhal (PW
6) was not found inside the bag (MO I) which was identified by the
victim (PW 16). Seema Singhal (PW 6) also identified the bag (MO
I) as the bag, her husband, the victim (PW 16), was carrying at the
time
of
incident.
The
presence
continuously established by the
of
the
evidence
Appellant
has
of
prosecution
the
been
witnesses as held above.
102.
The evidence of the victim (PW 16) and Seema Singhal
(PW 6) read with other evidence on record clearly brings the act of
the Appellant within the parameters of the Section 392, IPC and
amounts to „robbery‟ as defined therein.
103.
This Court is of the view that the Prosecution has been
able to discharge the burden of proof which lay on it to prove the
charge under Section 307 and 392 IPC, proving all the ingredients
of the offence, beyond all reasonable doubt leaving no uncertainty
that it is the Appellant and the Appellant alone who committed the
said offences and no other.
Sentence
104.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant would finally argue
that if this Court was to uphold the conviction then the sentences
may be directed to run concurrently and not consecutively as has
been done by the learned Session Judge.
105.
The object and purpose of imposing adequate sentence
as held by the Apex Court time and again is to protect the society
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
and to deter the criminal in achieving the avowed object of law by
imposing appropriate sentence. The sentence imposed ought to
reflect the conscience of the society. Sentence without considering
its effect on the social order may not serve the avowed object.
106.
This Court has perused the impugned sentence passed
by the learned Session Judge. A person found guilty of offence
under Section 307, IPC is liable for punishment with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and
shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by
such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life,
or to such punishment, as provided in the first part of the said
Section.
107.
In the present case, it has been found that the victim
(PW 16) was inflicted a deep cut injury in the front of his neck, a
vital part of his body, which injury is more grievous than a hurt.
108.
Similarly a person found guilty of offence under Section
392, IPC is liable for rigorous imprisonment for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. In the present
case, the Appellant has also been found guilty of the offence of
robbery.
109.
For the purpose of examining whether the learned
Session Judge
was right
in directing
the
sentences
to run
consecutively, it is important to examine Section 31 of Cr.P.C.
110.
Section 31 of Cr.P.C provides :“31. Sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at
one trial. - (1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two
or more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of
section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ), sentence him
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor
which such Court is competent to inflict; such punishments when
consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the
expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct,
unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run
concurrently.
(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be
necessary for the Court by reason only of the aggregate
punishment for the several offences being in excess of the
punishment which it is competent to inflict on conviction of a
single offence, to send the offender for trial before a higher
Court: Provided that(a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to imprisonment
for longer period than fourteen years;
(b) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the
amount of punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for
a single offence.
(3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person, the
aggregate of the consecutive sentences passed against him
under this section shall be deemed to be a single sentence.”
111.
The Apex Court in re: O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala13, held
as under:“10. Section 31 CrPC relates to the quantum of punishment
which may be legally passed when there is (a) one trial, and (b)
the accused is convicted of “two or more offences”. Section 31
CrPC says that subject to the provisions of Section 71 IPC, the
court may pass separate sentences for two or more offences of
which the accused is found guilty, but the aggregate punishment
must not exceed the limit fixed in provisos (a) and (b) of subsection (2) of Section 31 CrPC. In Section 31(1) CrPC, since the
word “may” is used, in our considered view, when a person is
convicted for two or more offences at one trial, the court may
exercise its discretion in directing that the sentence for each
offence may either run consecutively or concurrently subject to
the provisions of Section 71 IPC. But the aggregate must not
exceed the limit fixed in provisos (a) and (b) of sub-section (2)
of Section 31 CrPC, that is; (i) it should not exceed 14 years;
(2015) 2 SCC 501
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
and (ii) it cannot exceed twice the maximum imprisonment
awardable by the sentencing court for a single offence.
11. The
words
“unless
the
court
directs
that
such
punishments shall run concurrently” occurring in sub-section (1)
of Section 31, make it clear that Section 31 CrPC vests a
discretion in the court to direct that the punishment shall run
concurrently when the accused is convicted at one trial for two or
more offences. It is manifest from Section 31 CrPC that the court
has the power and discretion to issue a direction for concurrent
running of the sentences when the accused is convicted at one
trial for two or more offences. Section 31 CrPC authorises the
passing
of
concurrent
sentences
in
cases
of
substantive
sentences of imprisonment. Any sentence of imprisonment in
default of fine has to be in excess of, and not concurrent with,
any other sentence of imprisonment to which the convict may
have been sentenced.
12. The words in Section 31 CrPC
“… sentence him for such offences, to the several
punishments
prescribed
therefor
which
such
court
is
competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of
imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the
other in such order as the court may direct”
indicate that in case the court directs sentences to run one
after the other, the court has to specify the order in which the
sentences are to run. If the court directs running of sentences
concurrently, order of running of sentences is not required to be
mentioned. Discretion to order running of sentences concurrently
or consecutively is judicial discretion of the court which is to be
exercised as per the established law of sentencing. The court
before exercising its discretion under Section 31 CrPC is required
to consider the totality of the facts and circumstances of those
offences against the accused while deciding whether sentences
are to run consecutively or concurrently.”
Then further at Page 510:
“16. When the prosecution is based on single transaction
where it constitutes two or more offences, sentences are to run
concurrently. Imposing separate sentences, when the acts
constituting different offences form part of the single transaction
is not justified. So far as the benefit available to the accused to
have the sentences to run concurrently of several offences based
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
on single transaction, in V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana [(2013)
7 SCC 211 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 498 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 282] ,
in which one of us (T.S. Thakur, J.) was a member, this Court
held as under: (SCC p. 217, para 16)
“16. … we may say that the legal position favours exercise of
discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in cases where the
prosecution is based on a single transaction no matter different
complaints in relation thereto may have been filed as is the
position in cases involving dishonour of cheques issued by the
borrower towards repayment of a loan to the creditor.””
Then further at Page 511:
“19. As pointed out earlier, Section 31 CrPC deals with quantum
of punishment which may be legally passed when there is (a)
one trial; and (b) the accused is convicted of two or more
offences. The ambit of Section 31 is wide, covering not only a
single transaction constituting two or more offences but also
offences arising out of two or more transactions. In the two
judgments in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v.
Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 921]
and Manoj [(2014) 2 SCC 153 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 763] , the
issue that fell for consideration was the imposition of sentence
for two or more offences arising out of the single transaction. It
is in that context, in those cases, this Court held that the
sentences shall run concurrently.
20. Under Section 31 CrPC it is left to the full discretion of the
court to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of
conviction for two or more offences. It is difficult to lay down any
straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion
by the courts. By and large, trial courts and appellate courts
have invoked and exercised their discretion to issue directions for
concurrent running of sentences, favouring the benefit to be
given to the accused. Whether a direction for concurrent running
of sentences ought to be issued in a given case would depend
upon the nature of the offence or offences committed and the
facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion has to be
exercised along the judicial lines and not mechanically.
21. Accordingly, we answer the reference by holding that Section
31 CrPC leaves full discretion with the court to order sentences
for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently, having
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
regard to the nature of offences and attendant aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. We do not find any reason to hold that
normal rule is to order the sentence to be consecutive and
exception is to make the sentences concurrent. Of course, if the
court does not order the sentence to be concurrent, one
sentence may run after the other, in such order as the court may
direct. We also do not find any conflict in the earlier judgment in
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of
Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] and Section
31 CrPC.”
A perusal of the impugned sentence makes it evident
112.
that the sentences against the Appellant has been directed to run
„consecutively‟, however, the learned Special Judge has failed to
specify the order in which the sentences are to run which is the
mandate of the law.
113.
The learned Session Judge has held that: “the intention of
the accused was to rob the victim of his money bag and in the
process, he had attacked him with a sharp weapon on a vital part of
the body (i.e. front portion of the neck) though the victim survived,
the circumstances would show that the accused had sufficient
knowledge that the consequence of such murderous attack would
result in the victim‟s death.” It is evident that the commission of
attempt to murder was in pursuit of the act of robbery. As held by
the Apex Court in re: O.M Cherian (supra) when the prosecution is
based on single transaction where it constitutes two or more
offences, sentences are to run concurrently. Imposing separate
sentences, when the acts constituting different offences form part of
the
single
transaction
is
not
justified.
Although,
the
facts
constituting the offence of attempt to murder and robbery are
distinct and different. The Apex Court in re: Kuldeep Singh v. State
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
of Haryana and Ors.14 was examining the sentence imposed to run
consecutively for offences under Section 307 and Section 148 read
with Section 149 of the IPC. While doing so, the Apex Court held:“5. Since the occurrence is the same, and the punishment is
under different provisions of the IPC, for the same incident, we
are satisfied that the sentence awarded under the different
provisions of the IPC ought to have been ordered to run
concurrently,
specially
keeping
in
mind
the
facts
and
circumstances of the present case. Ordered accordingly.”
In the circumstances, it is held that the award of
114.
sentence on the Appellant to run consecutively was not correct and
it ought to run concurrently as held by the Apex Court as above.
When the learned Session Judge found the Appellant
115.
guilty of the offence of robbery u/s 392, IPC it was incumbent upon
him to sentence the Appellant with „rigorous‟ imprisonment. Section
392 IPC does not grant any discretion there. The impugned
sentence u/s 392, IPC is, therefore, required to be converted to
„rigorous‟ imprisonment
for one year and 6 months, keeping the
rest of the sentence as awarded by the learned Session Judges as it
is. In re: State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nirmala Devi15 . the Apex
Court held that:“15. .....................
In an appeal from conviction, if the conviction is maintained,
the Appellant Court has the power to alter the nature or the
extent, or the nature and extent, if the sentence (though it
cannot enhance the same). However, such a power has to be
exercised in terms of the provisions of Indian Penal Code etc. for
which the accused has been convicted.
Power to alter the
sentence would not extend to exercising the powers contrary to
law.”
Manu/SC/1546/2016
2017 SCC online SC 374
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
116.
Evidently this is also a case of heavenly retribution. The
Appellant, as per the impugned sentence passed by the learned
Session Judge, suffers from paralysis of the lower half of the body
as it appears from his appearance and requires help in performing
daily chores. Incapacitation, in the present case, also seems to have
been achieved by the heavenly retribution. Both the offences
committed by the Appellant being heinous offences the deterrence
theory as a rationale for punishing the Appellant were more
relevant, without anything more.
117.
The act of discouraging criminality may perhaps have
been partially achieved by the paraplegic incapacitation. When the
Appellant, the offender, suffered serious physical injury in a bid to
escape after the crime and in the process physically incapacitated
himself, this fact, would be relevant for sentencing specially if there
are long lasting consequences. Although the present case involves
heinous crimes committed by the Appellant, in the present case, in
the peculiar facts, the learned Special Judge has passed the
impugned sentence keeping in mind both the aggravating as well as
mitigating circumstances.
118.
Giving this Courts anxious consideration to the facts
and peculiar circumstances of the present case and the law laid
down by the Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the cause of
criminal justice would be purposefully and adequately served if the
sentences imposed by the learned Session Judge is directed to run
concurrently and not consecutively. At the same time the sentence
imposed for the offence of robbery under Section 392 by the
learned Session Judge is changed from simple imprisonment to
Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2015
Kaziman Gurung Vs. State of Sikkim
rigorous imprisonment as per the law. As the learned Counsel for
the Appellant claims that the Appellant suffers from disability it is
hoped that the prison authorities would keep in mind the disability,
on being so satisfied, and protect his human rights, which is
paramount.
119.
In view of the above, the Appeal is partly allowed. The
sentences under Section 307 and 392 IPC are directed to run
concurrently. The sentence imposed under Section 392 IPC is to be
rigorous imprisonment. The rest of the sentences, fines and
directions passed by the learned Session Judge is upheld
120.
Copy of this judgment be remitted to the Court of learned
Session Judge forthwith along with records of the Court for
compliance.
121.
The Appellant is on bail he shall surrender before the
Court of learned Session Judge on 28.07.2017 to undergo sentence
as pronounced.
122.
Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the learned Counsels for the parties upon compliance of
all formalities.
Sd/-
(Bhaskar Raj Pradhan)
Judge
26.07.2017
/avi
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