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HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
****
CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 2345/2022 & 419/2026
CRP No.2345 of 2022:
Between:
Katta Srinivasu
.....PETITIONER
AND
M/s. IKF Finance Limited,
MG Road, Vijayawada,
Represented by its Legal Manager
D. Srinivasa Rao, and 2 others
.....RESPONDENTS
CRP No.419 of 2026:
Between:
Katta Srinivasu and another
.....PETITIONERS
AND
M/s. IKF Finance Limited,
MG Road, Vijayawada,
Represented by its Legal Manager
D. Srinivasa Rao, and another
.....RESPONDENTS
DATE OF JUDGMENT RESERVED
:
12.03.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED
:
10.04.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT UPLOADED
:
10.04.2026
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
1.
Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may
be allowed to see the Judgments?
Yes/No
2.
Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
Yes/No
3.
Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair
copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No
_______________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
____________________
BALAJI MEDAMALLI, J
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 2345/2022 & 419/2026
% 10.04.2026
CRP No.2345 of 2022:
Between:
Katta Srinivasu
.....PETITIONER
AND
M/s. IKF Finance Limited,
MG Road, Vijayawada,
Represented by its Legal Manager
D. Srinivasa Rao, and 2 others
.....RESPONDENTS
CRP No.419 of 2026:
Between:
Katta Srinivasu and another
.....PETITIONERS
AND
M/s. IKF Finance Limited,
MG Road, Vijayawada,
Represented by its Legal Manager
D. Srinivasa Rao, and another
.....RESPONDENTS
! Counsel for the Petitioners
Counsel for the Respondents
< Gist :
> Head Note:
? Cases Referred:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
(2020) 20 SCC 760
(2025) 4 SCC 641
2026 SCC OnLine SC 7
2026 SCC OnLine Bom 218
2017 SCC OnLine SC 1211
: Sri P. V. A. Padmanabham
: Sri V. V. L. N. Purnesh
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 2345/2022 & 419/2026
COMMON JUDGMENT: (per Hon‟ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)
Heard Sri P. V. A. Padmanabham, learned counsel for the petitioners and
Sri V. V. L. N. Purnesh, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. The aforesaid civil revision petitions have been filed under Article 227
of the Constitution of India. In CRP No.2345 of 2022 the challenge is to the
Order dated 30.09.2022 passed in Execution Petition No.676 of 2022 in
AOP.No.6 of 2020 in the application of the decree holder for attachment of the
bank account of the petitioner and in the other CRP No.419 of 2026 the
grievance raised for is the non-disposal of the petitioners‟ application for stay in
ARB OP No.02 of 2023 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (in short „Act 1996‟), pending in the same Court of VIII Additional District
Judge, Vijayawada.
I. Facts:
3. Briefly, the facts are, that there exists an arbitration award in favour
of M/s.INK Finance Limited, Vijayawada, the Finance Company, dated
20.01.2021 in AOP No.6 of 2020 passed by the sole arbitrator. The Award was
against both the petitioners in CRP.No.419 of 2026 and the only petitioner in
CRP.No.2345 of 2022.
The petitioner in CRP.No.2345 of 2022 is the 1st
petitioner in CRP No.419 of 2026. The Award is for recovery of amount under
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
loan basing on an agreement No.LN148437 in favour of the 1st respondent
finance company. The Sole Arbitrator, by name Sri B. Chalapathi Suri, passed
an award dated 20.01.2021 which is said to be an ex parte award without
service of notice on the petitioners. The 1st petitioner is the barrower and the
other petitioner is the guarantor.
Being aggrieved, the petitioners filed
AOP.No.2 of 2023 under Section 34 of the Act 1996 in the Court of the Principal
District Judge, Krishna at Mchilipatnam for setting aside the award in Award
No.6 of 2020, dated 20.01.2021.
The same is pending before the VIII
Additional District Judge, Vijayawada.
4. The 1st respondent filed E.P.No.676 of 2022 to execute the Award. In
the said EP the Order dated 30.09.2022 was passed to attach the amount lying
in the bank account of the 1st petitioner/Judgment Debtor in UCO Bank Athili
Branch, West Godavari District directing the Garnishee bank to withhold the
said amount and prohibit any transactions until further orders of the Court.
This Order is under challenge in CRP No.2345 of 2022.
5. The 1st respondent in the counter filed in CRP No.419 of 2026 has
inter alia stated that when the dispute arose due to non-payment of the
outstanding loan in spite of the demand notices, the 1st respondent company
referred the 2nd respondent in CRP No.419 of 2026 the retired Junior Civil Judge
as sole arbitrator to settle the dispute between the petitioners and the 1st
respondent. The petitioner did not give reply to the notice and remained silent
throughout the arbitration proceedings in AOP.No.6 of 2020 and even in the
E.P.No.676 of 2022 filed by the 1st respondent the petitioners never raised their
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
objections regarding appointment of sole arbitrator which waives the right of
the petitioner to object the appointment of sole arbitrator under Section 4 of
the Act 1996. The 1st respondent in the counter affidavit has further contended
that the sole arbitrator is an individual entity having no direct or indirect
relations with the 1st respondent company, and that the arbitrator was not
appointed by any person as per the categories prescribed in Seventh Schedule
and not barred under the provisions of Section 12 (5) of the Act.
6. The 1st respondent has filed counter in CRP.No.2345 of 2022 as well,
and inter alia, submitted that the arbitration proceedings and SARFAESI Act
proceedings can go together. The two Acts are cumulative remedies to the
secured creditor. The SARFAESI proceedings are in the nature of enforcement
proceedings. The arbitration proceedings would be in the form of adjudicator
process. So, both can go on simulataneously and one is not the bar for the
other remedy.
II. Submissions:
i) For petitioners:
7. Sri P. V. A. Padmanabham,
learned counsel for the petitioners,
submitted that the award dated 20.01.2021 is by the sole arbitrator. The said
Arbitrator was appointed unilaterally by the Finance Company-1st respondent.
He submitted that the 1st respondent and its authority which appointed the sole
arbitrator was ineligible to act as an Arbitrator and so also to nominate an
Arbitrator unilaterally in the dispute. He submitted that in view of Section 12
read with Schedule Seven, there was ineligibility to act as an Arbitrator and also
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
to unilaterally nominate the Arbitrator by the said Finance Company through its
authority.
The Award, as such, is without jurisdiction.
The execution
proceedings for the execution of such an invalid award, which is non est having
been passed an authority, statutorily barred, as also the Order of attachment
are without jurisdiction and deserve to be set aside. Learned counsel for the
petitioner placed reliance in the following judgments:
1. Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd.1
2. Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO
MCML (JV)2
3. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of
India3
4. L & T Finance Ltd. v. Sangeeta Bhansali (Borrower)4
8. We place on record that the learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that though a plea has been taken in the grounds of revision that the
Finance Company having initiated the steps for realization / recovery of the loan
amount under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002,
could not resort to the arbitration proceedings, but, he submitted further that,
in view of the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court on the said aspect settling
the law in M. D. Frozen Foods Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Hero Fincorp Ltd.5 that
(2020) 20 SCC 760
(2025) 4 SCC 641
2026 SCC OnLine SC 7
2026 SCC OnLine Bom 218
2017 SCC OnLine SC 1211
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
the SARFAESI proceedings and arbitration proceedings can go hand in hand, he
is not pressing that ground of challenge which therefore need be consideration.
ii) For Respondents:
9. Sri V. V. L. N. Purnesh, learned counsel for the respondent Finance
Company, submitted that in the appointment of the sole Arbitrator notice was
issued to the petitioner, but he did not raise any objection. He submitted that
Section 4 of the Act 1996 is attracted. He submitted that there was waiver of
right to object on the part of the petitioner. If the petitioner had any objection,
he could have raised this plea either objecting to the letter or raising objection
before the Arbitral Tribunal which was competent to rule on its jurisdiction
under Section 16 of the Act 1996. He submitted that on the said ground it
cannot be said that the Award passed by the sole Arbitrator is without
jurisdiction or non est and incapable of execution.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents raised an objection that the
plea of lack of jurisdiction in the arbitrator has not been raised in the revision,
challenging the execution proceedings/order of attachment.
iii) Reply submissions:
11. In reply, Sri P. V. A. Padmanabham, learned counsel for the
petitioners, submitted that Section 4 of the Act 1996 is not attracted.
The
present is a case of the sole Arbitrator appointed unilaterally and such an
appointment or nomination of Arbitrator has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that
the principle of equal treatment of parties applies not only to the arbitral
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
proceedings, but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators. He
submitted that the principle of express waiver exists under the proviso to
Section 12 (5) of the Act 1996, but for the applicability of such waiver, there
should be an express agreement in writing waiving the applicability of SubSection (5) of Section 12 of the Act 1996.
He submitted that there is no
express agreement in writing in the present case between the petitioner and
the Finance Company and so, the waiver provision under Section 12 (5) is not
attracted and the Award passed by the unilaterally appointed Arbitrator would
be void and inexecutable.
12. In response to the objection of the learned counsel for the
respondents that plea of lack of jurisdiction in the arbitrator has not been raised
in the revision, the learned counsel for the petitioner specifically referred the
ground No.2 in CRP No.2345 of 2022, in which the ground taken is that the
award itself is invalid and the execution proceedings are not maintainable in the
eye of law. Further, in CRP No.419 of 2026 also specific grounds have been
taken that the jurisdictional defects can be raised at any stage of the
proceedings and even in the collateral proceedings as also that the sole
Arbitrator unilaterally appointed is bad in law as ordered by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court. Consequently, the grounds have been raised and therefore, we proceed
to deal with those grounds in the light of the arguments raised by the learned
counsels for both the sides and the law laid down on the subject.
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
III. Points for consideration:
13. In view of the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the
parties, the following points for consideration arise:
(i) Whether the unilateral appointment of the sole Arbitrator by the 1 st
respondent Company is invalid, and such an Arbitrator had no jurisdiction
to arbitrate?
(ii) Whether the Award dated 20.01.2021 is without jurisdiction for lack of
inherent jurisdiction in the unilaterally appointed Arbitrator?
(iii) Whether there was waiver on the part of the petitioner under Section 4
of the Act 1996 or/and Section 12 (5) of the Act 1996 to the jurisdiction
of the unilaterally appointed Arbitrator?
(iv) Whether the question of lack of inherent jurisdiction in the arbitrator, on
the aforesaid grounds, can be raised in the present civil revision
petitions?
IV. Analysis:
14. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the
material on record.
15. The aforesaid points (i) to (iv) are connected and therefore we
proceed to consider simultaneously.
16. We firstly refer to the provisions of Sections 4, 12, 14 and 16 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, which read as follows:
“4. Waiver of right to object.—A party who knows that—
(a) any provision of this Part from which the parties may derogate, or
(b) any requirement under the arbitration agreement
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without
stating his objection to such non-compliance without undue delay or, if a time
limit is provided for stating that objection, within that period of time, shall be
deemed to have waived his right to so object.
12. Grounds for challenge.— [(1) When a person is approached in
connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in
writing any circumstances,—
(a) such as the existence either direct or indirect, of any past or present
relationship with or interest in any of the parties or in relation to the subjectmatter in dispute, whether financial, business, professional or other kind, which
is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality;
and
(b) which are likely to affect his ability to devote sufficient time to the
arbitration and in particular his ability to complete the entire arbitration within a
period of twelve months.
Explanation1.—The grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule shall guide in
determining whether circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable doubts as
to the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator.
Explanation 2.—The disclosure shall be made by such person in the form
specified in the Sixth Schedule.
(2) An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and throughout the arbitral
proceedings, shall, without delay, disclose to the parties in writing any
circumstances referred to in sub-section (1) unless they have already been
informed of them by him.
(3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if—
(a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
independence or impartiality,
or
(b) he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties.
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
(4) A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by him, or in whose
appointment he has participated, only for reasons of which he becomes aware
after the appointment has been made.
{(5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person whose
relationship, with the parties or counsel or the subject-matter of the dispute,
falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be
ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator:
Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them,
waive the applicability of this sub-section by an express agreement in writing.]
14. Failure or impossibility to act.
(1) 1[The mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate and he shall be substituted
by another arbitrator, if]—
(a) he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions or for other
reasons fails to act without undue delay; and
(b) he withdraws from his office or the parties agree to the termination of his
mandate.
(2) If a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds referred to in
clause (a) of sub-section (1), a party may, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, apply to the Court to decide on the termination of the mandate.
(3) If, under this section or sub-section (3) of section 13, an arbitrator
withdraws from his office or a party agrees to the termination of the mandate of
an arbitrator, it shall not imply acceptance of the validity of any ground referred
to in this section or sub-section (3) of section 12.
16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction.—(1) The
arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any
objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement,
and for that purpose,—
(a) an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an
agreement independent of the other terms of the contract; and
(b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not
entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
(2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised
not later than the submission of the statement of defence; however, a party shall
not be precluded from raising such a plea merely because that he has appointed,
or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator.
(3) A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall
be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is
raised during the arbitral proceedings.
(4) The arbitral tribunal may, in either of the cases referred to in sub-section
(2) or sub-section (3), admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified
(5) The arbitral tribunal shall decide on a plea referred to in sub-section (2) or
sub-section (3) and, where the arbitral tribunal takes a decision rejecting the
plea, continue
with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award.
(6) A party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may make an application for
setting aside such an arbitral award in accordance with section 34.”
17. Seventh Schedule referred to under Section 12 (5) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 reads as under:
“THE SEVENTH SCHEDULE
[See section 12(5)]
Arbitrator’s relationship with the parties or counsel
1. The arbitrator is an employee, consultant, advisor or has any other past or
present business relationship with a party.
2. The arbitrator currently represents or advises one of the parties or an affiliate
of one of the parties
3. The arbitrator currently represents the lawyer or law firm acting as counsel
for one of the parties.
4. The arbitrator is a lawyer in the same law firm which is representing one of
the parties.
5. The arbitrator is a manager, director or part of the management, or has a
similar controlling influence, in an affiliate of one of the parties if the
affiliate is directly involved in the matters in dispute in the arbitration.
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
6. The arbitrator‟s law firm had a previous but terminated involvement in the
case without the arbitrator being involved himself or herself.
7. The arbitrator‟s law firm currently has a significant commercial relationship
with one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties.
8. The arbitrator regularly advises the appointing party or an affiliate of the
appointing party even though neither the arbitrator nor his or her firm
derives a significant financial income therefrom.
9. The arbitrator has a close family relationship with one of the parties and in
the case of companies with the persons in the management and controlling
the company.
10. A close family member of the arbitrator has a significant financial interest in
one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties.
11. The arbitrator is a legal representative of an entity that is a party in the
arbitration.
12. The arbitrator is a manager, director or part of the management, or has a
similar controlling influence in one of the parties.
13. The arbitrator has a significant financial interest in one of the parties or the
outcome of the case.
14. The arbitrator regularly advises the appointing party or an affiliate of the
appointing party, and the arbitrator or his or her firm derives a significant
financial income therefrom.
Relationship of the arbitrator to the dispute
15. The arbitrator has given legal advice or provided an expert opinion on the
dispute to a party or an affiliate of one of the parties.
16. The arbitrator has previous involvement in the case.
Arbitrator’s direct or indirect interest in the dispute
17. The arbitrator holds shares, either directly or indirectly, in one of the parties
or an affiliate of one of the parties that is privately held.
18. A close family member of the arbitrator has a significant financial interest in
the outcome of the dispute.
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
19. The arbitrator or a close family member of the arbitrator has a close
relationship with a third party who may be liable to recourse on the part of
the unsuccessful party in the dispute.
Explanation 1.—The term “close family member” refers to a spouse, sibling,
child, parent or life partner.
Explanation 2.—The term “affiliate” encompasses all companies in one
group of companies including the parent company.
Explanation 3.—For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that it may be the
practice in certain specific kinds of arbitration, such as maritime or
commodities arbitration, to draw arbitrators from a small, specialised pool. If in
such fields it is the custom and practice for parties frequently to appoint the
same arbitrator in different cases, this is a relevant fact to be taken into account
while applying the rules set out above.]”
18. The law on the aforesaid points of appointment of an Arbitrator
unilaterally and waiver of an objection to such appointment is not res integra.
The same has been well settled.
19. In Perkins Eastman Architects DPC (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex
Court after considering TRF Ltd. (supra), held as under in paragraph Nos.17 to
21:
“17. In TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC
377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] , the agreement was entered into before the
provisions of the Amending Act (3 of 2016) came into force. It was submitted
by the appellant that by virtue of the provisions of the Amending Act and
insertion of the Fifth and Seventh Schedules in the Act, the Managing Director
of the respondent would be a person having direct interest in the dispute and as
such could not act as an arbitrator. The extension of the submission was that a
person who himself was disqualified and disentitled could also not nominate
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
any other person to act as an arbitrator. The submission countered by the
respondent therein was as under : (SCC p. 385, para 7.1)
“7.1. The submission to the effect that since the Managing Director of the
respondent has become ineligible to act as an arbitrator subsequent to the
amendment in the Act, he could also not have nominated any other person as
arbitrator is absolutely unsustainable, for the Fifth and the Seventh Schedules
fundamentally guide in determining whether circumstances exist which give
rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the
arbitrator. To elaborate, if any person whose relationship with the parties or the
counsel or the subject-matter of dispute falls under any of the categories
specified in the Seventh Schedule, he is ineligible to be appointed as an
arbitrator but not otherwise.”
18. The issue was discussed and decided by this Court as under : (TRF
case [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4
SCC (Civ) 72] , SCC pp. 403-04, paras 50-54)
“50. First, we shall deal with clause (d). There is no quarrel that by virtue of
Section 12(5) of the Act, if any person who falls under any of the categories
specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as the
arbitrator. There is no doubt and cannot be, for the language employed in the
Seventh Schedule, the Managing Director of the Corporation has become
ineligible by operation of law. It is the stand of the learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant that once the Managing Director becomes ineligible, he also
becomes ineligible to nominate. Refuting the said stand, it is canvassed by the
learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that the ineligibility cannot extend to
a nominee if he is not from the Corporation and more so when there is apposite
and requisite disclosure. We think it appropriate to make it clear that in the case
at hand we are neither concerned with the disclosure nor objectivity nor
impartiality nor any such other circumstance. We are singularly concerned
with the issue, whether the Managing Director, after becoming ineligible
by operation of law, is he still eligible to nominate an arbitrator. At the cost
of repetition, we may state that when there are two parties, one may nominate
an arbitrator and the other may appoint another. That is altogether a different
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
situation. If there is a clause requiring the parties to nominate their respective
arbitrator, their authority to nominate cannot be questioned. What really in that
circumstance can be called in question is the procedural compliance and the
eligibility of their arbitrator depending upon the norms provided under the Act
and the Schedules appended thereto. But, here is a case where the Managing
Director is the “named sole arbitrator” and he has also been conferred with the
power to nominate one who can be the arbitrator in his place. Thus, there is
subtle distinction. In this regard, our attention has been drawn to a two-Judge
Bench
decision
in State
of
Orissa v. Commr.
of
Land
Records
&
Settlement [State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records & Settlement, (1998) 7
SCC 162] . In the said case, the question arose, can the Board of Revenue revise
the order passed by its delegate. Dwelling upon the said proposition, the Court
held : (SCC p. 173, para 25)
„25. We have to note that the Commissioner when he exercises power of the
Board delegated to him under Section 33 of the Settlement Act, 1958, the order
passed by him is to be treated as an order of the Board of Revenue and not as
that of the Commissioner in his capacity as Commissioner. This position is
clear from two rulings of this Court to which we shall presently refer. The first
of the said rulings is the one decided by the Constitution Bench of this Court
in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab [Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963
SC 1503] . In that case, it was held by the majority that where the State
Government had, under Section 41(1) of the East Punjab Holdings
(Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, delegated its
appellate powers vested in it under Section 21(4) to an “officer”, an order
passed by such an officer was an order passed by the State Government itself
and “not an order passed by any officer under this Act” within Section 42 and
was not revisable by the State Government. It was pointed out that for the
purpose of exercise of powers of revision by the State under Section 42 of that
Act, the order sought to be revised must be an order passed by an officer in his
own right and not as a delegate of the State. The State Government was,
therefore, not entitled under Section 42 to call for the records of the case which
was disposed of by an officer acting as its delegate.‟
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
(emphasis in original)
51. Be it noted in the said case, reference was made to Behari Kunj Sahkari
Awas Samiti v. State of U.P. [Behari Kunj Sahkari Awas Samiti v. State of U.P.,
(1997) 7 SCC 37] , which followed the decision in Roop Chand v. State of
Punjab [Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503] . It is seemly to
note here that the said principle has been followed in Indore Vikas
Pradhikaran [Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals
Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 705] .
52. Mr Sundaram has strongly relied on Pratapchand Nopaji [Pratapchand
Nopaji v. Kotrike Venkata Setty & Sons, (1975) 2 SCC 208] . In the said case,
the three-Judge Bench applied the maxim “qui facit per alium facit per se”. We
may profitably reproduce the passage : (SCC p. 214, para 9)
„9. … The principle which would apply, if the objects are struck by Section
23 of the Contract Act, is embodied in the maxim:“qui facit per alium facit per
se” (what one does through another is done by oneself). To put it in another
form, that which cannot be done directly may not be done indirectly by
engaging another outside the prohibited area to do the illegal act within the
prohibited area. It is immaterial whether, for the doing of such an illegal act, the
agent employed is given the wider powers or authority of the “pucca adatia”, or,
as the High Court had held, he is clothed with the powers of an ordinary
commission agent only.‟
53. The aforesaid authorities have been commended to us to establish the
proposition that if the nomination of an arbitrator by an ineligible arbitrator is
allowed, it would tantamount to carrying on the proceeding of arbitration by
himself. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, ineligibility strikes
at the root of his power to arbitrate or get it arbitrated upon by a nominee.
54. In such a context, the fulcrum of the controversy would be, can an
ineligible arbitrator, like the Managing Director, nominate an arbitrator,
who may be otherwise eligible and a respectable person. As stated earlier,
we are neither concerned with the objectivity nor the individual respectability.
We are only concerned with the authority or the power of the Managing
Director. By our analysis, we are obligated to arrive at the conclusion that
RNT, J & BM, J
CRP Nos.2345/2022 & 419/2026
once the arbitrator has become ineligible by operation of law, he cannot
nominate another as an arbitrator. The arbitrator becomes ineligible as
per prescription contained in Section 12(5) of the Act. It is inconceivable in
law that person who is statutorily ineligible can nominate a person.
Needless to say, once the infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is
bound to collapse. One cannot have a building without the plinth. Or to put
it differently, once the identity of the Managing Director as the sole
arbitrator is lost, the power to nominate someone else as an arbitrator is
obliterated. Therefore, the view [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., 2016
SCC OnLine Del 2532] expressed by the High Court is not sustainable and we
say so.”
19. It was thus held that as the Managing Director became ineligible by
operation of law to act as an arbitrator, he could not nominate another person to
act as an arbitrator and that once the identity of the Managing Director as the
sole arbitrator was lost, the power to nominate someone else as an arbitrator
was also obliterated. The relevant clause in said case had nominated the
Managing Director himself to be the sole arbitrator and also empowered said
Managing Director to nominate another person to act as an arbitrator. The
Managing Director thus had two capacities under said clause, the first as an
arbitrator and the second as an appointing authority. In the present case we are
concerned with only one capacity of the Chairman and Managing Director and
that is as an appointing authority.
20. We thus have two categories of cases. The first, similar to the one dealt
with in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 :
(2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] where the Managing Director himself is named as an
arbitrator with an additional power to appoint any other person as an arbitrator.
In the second category, the Managing Director is not to act as an arbitrator
himself but is empowered or authorised to appoint any other person of his
choice or discretion as an arbitrator. If, in the first category of cases, the
Managing Director was found incompetent, it was because of the interest
that he would be said to be having in the outcome or result of the dispute.
The element of invalidity would thus be directly relatable to and arise from
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the interest that he would be having in such outcome or decision. If that be
the test, similar invalidity would always arise and spring even in the second
category of cases. If the interest that he has in the outcome of the dispute, is
taken to be the basis for the possibility of bias, it will always be present
irrespective of whether the matter stands under the first or second
category of cases. We are conscious that if such deduction is drawn from
the decision of this Court in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects
Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] , all cases having clauses
similar to that with which we are presently concerned, a party to the
agreement would be disentitled to make any appointment of an arbitrator
on its own and it would always be available to argue that a party or an
official or an authority having interest in the dispute would be disentitled
to make appointment of an arbitrator.
21. But, in our view that has to be the logical deduction from TRF
Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4
SCC (Civ) 72] Para 50 of the decision shows that this Court was concerned
with the issue, “whether the Managing Director, after becoming ineligible by
operation of law, is he still eligible to nominate an arbitrator” The ineligibility
referred to therein, was as a result of operation of law, in that a person having
an interest in the dispute or in the outcome or decision thereof, must not only be
ineligible to act as an arbitrator but must also not be eligible to appoint anyone
else as an arbitrator and that such person cannot and should not have any role in
charting out any course to the dispute resolution by having the power to appoint
an arbitrator. The next sentences in the paragraph, further show that cases
where both the parties could nominate respective arbitrators of their choice
were found to be completely a different situation. The reason is clear that
whatever advantage a party may derive by nominating an arbitrator of its choice
would get counter-balanced by equal power with the other party. But, in a case
where only one party has a right to appoint a sole arbitrator, its choice will
always have an element of exclusivity in determining or charting the course
for dispute resolution. Naturally, the person who has an interest in the
outcome or decision of the dispute must not have the power to appoint a
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sole arbitrator. That has to be taken as the essence of the amendments
brought in by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3
of 2016) and recognised by the decision of this Court in TRF Ltd. [TRF
Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ)
72].”
20. In Perkins Eastman Architects DPC (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex
Court thus held that the Managing Director of the respondent has become
ineligible to act as an arbitrator, he could also not have nominated any other
person to act as arbitrator and that once the identity of the Managing Director
as the sole arbitrator is lost, the power to nominate someone else as an
arbitrator is obliterated. The Hon‟ble Apex Court clearly observed that there are
two categories of cases. The first, similar to the one dealt with in TRF
Ltd.(supra) where the Managing Director himself is named as an arbitrator with
an additional power to appoint any other person as an arbitrator. In the second
category, the Managing Director is not to act as an arbitrator himself but is
empowered or authorized to appoint any other person of his choice or
discretion as an arbitrator. The Hon‟ble Apex Court laid down that in the first
category of cases, the Managing Director was found incompetent, it was
because of the interest that he would be said to be having in the outcome or
result of the dispute and the same is taken to be the basis for the possibility of
bias, it will always be present irrespective of whether the matter stands under
the first or second category of cases. It was held that the person who has an
interest in the outcome or decision of the dispute must not have the power to
appoint a sole arbitrator and that has to be taken as the essence of the
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amendments brought in by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,
2015 and recognized by the decision of the Apex Court in TRF Ltd.(supra)
21. In Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (supra), the
Constitution Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court, by majority, held inter alia that
the principle of equal treatment of parties applies at all stages of arbitration
proceedings, including the stage of appointment of arbitrators. It was held that
a clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator gives rise
to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator.
Such a unilateral clause is exclusive and hinders equal participation of the other
party in the appointment process of arbitrators. Unilateral appointment clauses
in public private contracts are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. With
respect to the principle of waiver, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the principle
of express waiver contained under the proviso to Section 12 (5) also applies to
situations where the parties seek to waive the allegation of bias against an
arbitrator appointed unilaterally by one of the parties. After the disputes have
arisen, the parties can determine whether there was a necessity to waive
the nemo judex rule, which is based on the precept that justice should not only
be done but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.
22. The Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the law as laid down in Central
Organisation for Railway Electrification (supra) will apply prospectively to
arbitrator appointments to be made after the date of the judgment, but this
direction was made applicable to three-member arbitral tribunals.
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23. The law is well settled that the judgment of the Court laying down
the law applies retrospectively unless expressly given a prospective effect. The
judgment in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (supra) was
made specifically prospective for the arbitrator appointments, as the direction
only applies to three-member arbitral tribunals. So far as the appointment of
the sole Arbitrator unilaterally is concerned, the law laid down has not been
made prospective. Consequently, the principles of law as laid down in Central
Organisation for Railway Electrification (supra) shall apply retrospectively
to the appointment of the sole arbitrator unilaterally.
24. Paragraphs No.169 and 170 of Central Organisation for Railway
Electrification (supra) read as under:
“169. In the present reference, we have upheld the decisions of this Court
in TRF [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4
SCC (Civ) 72] and Perkins [Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India)
Ltd., (2020) 20 SCC 760] which dealt with situations dealing with sole
arbitrators. Thus, TRF [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC
377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] and Perkins [Perkins Eastman Architects
DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd., (2020) 20 SCC 760] have held the field for years
now. However, we have disagreed with Voestalpine [Voestalpine Schienen
GmbH v. DMRC Ltd., (2017) 4 SCC 665 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 607]
and CORE [Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPICSMO-MCML (JV), (2020) 14 SCC 712] which dealt with the appointment of a
three-member Arbitral Tribunal. We are aware of the fact that giving
retrospective effect to the law laid down in the present case may possibly lead
to the nullification of innumerable completed and ongoing arbitration
proceedings involving three-member tribunals. This will disturb the commercial
bargains entered into by both the government and private entities. Therefore, we
hold that the law laid down in the present reference will apply prospectively to
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arbitrator appointments to be made after the date of this judgment. This
direction only applies to three-member tribunals.
J. Conclusion
170. In view of the above discussion, we conclude that:
170.1. The principle of equal treatment of parties applies at all stages of
arbitration proceedings, including the stage of appointment of arbitrators;
170.2. The Arbitration Act does not prohibit PSUs from empanelling potential
arbitrators. However, an arbitration clause cannot mandate the other party to
select its arbitrator from the panel curated by PSUs;
170.3. A clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator
gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the
arbitrator. Further, such a unilateral clause is exclusive and hinders equal
participation of the other party in the appointment process of arbitrators;
170.4. In the appointment of a three-member panel, mandating the other party
to select its arbitrator from a curated panel of potential arbitrators is against the
principle of equal treatment of parties. In this situation, there is no effective
counterbalance because parties do not participate equally in the process of
appointing arbitrators. The process of appointing arbitrators in CORE [Central
Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV),
(2020) 14 SCC 712] is unequal and prejudiced in favour of the Railways;
170.5. Unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts are violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution;
170.6. The principle of express waiver contained under the proviso to Section
12(5) also applies to situations where the parties seek to waive the allegation of
bias against an arbitrator appointed unilaterally by one of the parties. After the
disputes have arisen, the parties can determine whether there is a necessity to
waive the nemo judex rule; and
170.7. The law laid down in the present reference will apply prospectively to
arbitrator appointments to be made after the date of this judgment. This
direction applies to three-member tribunals.”
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25. In Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon‟ble
Apex Court held that Section 12 (5) of the Act 1996 provides that any person
whose relationship with the parties or counsel, or the dispute, whether direct or
indirect, falls within any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule
would be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. The Hon‟ble Apex Court
held that since, the ineligibility stems from the operation of law, not only is a
person having an interest in the dispute or its outcome ineligible to act as an
arbitrator, but appointment by such a person would be ex facie invalid. The
Hon‟ble Apex Court further held that the words “an express agreement in
writing” in the proviso to Section 12 (5) means that the right to object to the
appointment of an ineligible arbitrator cannot be taken away by mere
implication. The agreement referred to in the proviso must be a clear,
unequivocal written agreement.
26. In Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the Hon‟ble
Apex Court further observed and held that where an arbitrator is found to be
ineligible by virtue of Section 12 (5) read with the Seventh Schedule, his
mandate is automatically terminated. In such circumstance, an aggrieved party
may approach the Court under Section 14 read with Section 15 for appointment
of a substitute arbitrator. Whereas, when an award has been passed by such an
arbitrator, an aggrieved party may approach the Court under Section 34 for
setting aside the award.
27. The aforesaid law as laid down in para-123 (iv) of Bhadra
International (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is that even where the award has
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already been passed by a sole arbitrator appointed unilaterally, the aggrieved
person can challenge under Section 34 of the Act 1996.
The Hon‟ble Apex
Court further held that an Arbitrator who lacks the jurisdiction cannot make an
award on the merits and an objection of inherent jurisdiction can be taken at
any stage of the proceedings.
28. Paragraph No.123 of Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd.
(supra) reads as under:
“123. A conspectus of the aforesaid detailed discussion on the position of
law as regards Section 12 of the Act, 1996, is as follows:—
i. The principle of equal treatment of parties provided in Section 18 of the Act,
1996, applies not only to the arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for
appointment of arbitrators. Equal treatment of the parties entails that the parties
must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
ii. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 provides that any person whose relationship with
the parties or counsel, or the dispute, whether direct or indirect, falls within any
of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule would be ineligible to be
appointed as an arbitrator. Since, the ineligibility stems from the operation of
law, not only is a person having an interest in the dispute or its outcome
ineligible to act as an arbitrator, but appointment by such a person would be ex
facie invalid.
iii. The words “an express agreement in writing” in the proviso to Section 12(5)
means that the right to object to the appointment of an ineligible arbitrator
cannot be taken away by mere implication. The agreement referred to in
the proviso must be a clear, unequivocal written agreement.
iv. When an arbitrator is found to be ineligible by virtue of Section 12(5) read with
the Seventh Schedule, his mandate is automatically terminated. In such
circumstance, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14 read
with Section 15 for appointment of a substitute arbitrator. Whereas, when an
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award has been passed by such an arbitrator, an aggrieved party may approach
the court under Section 34 for setting aside the award.
v. In arbitration, the parties vest jurisdiction in the tribunal by exercising their
consent in furtherance of a valid arbitration agreement. An arbitrator who lacks
jurisdiction cannot make an award on the merits. Hence, an objection to the
inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the proceedings.”
29. In L & T Finance Ltd. (supra), on consideration of the aforesaid
judgments in Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra), TRF Ltd.
(supra), Perkins Eastman (supra), the Bombay High Court reached to a
conclusion that the award by the unilaterally appointed sole Arbitrator deserved
to be set aside, which was accordingly set aside and the Commercial Execution
Application was dismissed, however, it was kept open to initiate fresh
arbitration proceedings, in accordance with law.
30. There is no dispute that the sole Arbitrator was appointed unilaterally
by the Finance Company pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Arbitration
Agreement.
31. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the person
appointing the sole arbitrator is the Legal Manager of the 1st respondent
Company. He submitted that the Legal Manager who has appointed the sole
arbitrator vide the said letter certainly falls under the categories specified in the
Seventh Schedule. He referred to in particular Category-1 the arbitrator as an
employee, consultant, Advisor or has any other past or present business
relationship with a party, Category-2, the Arbitrator currently represents or
advises one of the parties or affiliate of one of the parties, as also the Category-
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3, the arbitrator currently represents the lawyer or law firm acting as counsel
for one of the parties, Category-5, the arbitrator is a manager, director or part
of the management, or has a similar controlling influence, in an affiliate of one
of the parties if the affiliate is directly involved in the matters in dispute in the
arbitration, as also category-12, The arbitrator is a manager, director or part of
the management, or has a similar controlling influence in one of the parties.
32. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Legal Manager
of the Finance Company 1st respondent, cannot act as an Arbitrator.
He is
ineligible under the Seventh Schedule to be appointed as an arbitrator and
consequently, in view of the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Perkins
Eastman Architects DPC (supra), the Legal Manager could also not nominate
or appoint any other person as a sole Arbitrator. Consequently, the submission
is that on the admitted fact that the sole arbitrator was appointed unilaterally
by the Legal Manager of the 1st respondent and in view of the legal provisions,
the Legal Manager himself being ineligible to be appointed as an Arbitrator
could also not nominate or appoint the 2nd respondent as an Arbitrator by virtue
of the provisions of Section 12 (5) read with Seventh Schedule, the sole
arbitrator had no jurisdiction or authority to pass the Award.
33. The aforesaid categories in Seventh Schedule, clearly show that the
legal manager of the 1st respondent Finance Company would be covered under
more than one category.
So, legally ineligible to be arbitrator and for that
reason also ineligible to appoint/nominate 2nd respondent as arbitrator, in view
of the law laid down in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC (supra).
The
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submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners has the force and the 2 nd
respondent arbitrator has no jurisdiction to arbitrate or pass an Award.
34. At this stage we may reproduce at the cost of repetition from
Perkins Eastman Architects DPC (supra):
“20…..We are conscious that if such deduction is drawn from the
decision of this Court in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd.,
(2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] , all cases having clauses similar
to that with which we are presently concerned, a party to the agreement
would be disentitled to make any appointment of an arbitrator on its own
and it would always be available to argue that a party or an official or an
authority having interest in the dispute would be disentitled to make
appointment of an arbitrator.
21. But, in our view that has to be the logical deduction from TRF
Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4
SCC (Civ) 72] Para 50 of the decision shows that this Court was concerned
with the issue, “whether the Managing Director, after becoming ineligible by
operation of law, is he still eligible to nominate an arbitrator” The ineligibility
referred to therein, was as a result of operation of law, in that a person having
an interest in the dispute or in the outcome or decision thereof, must not only be
ineligible to act as an arbitrator but must also not be eligible to appoint anyone
else as an arbitrator and that such person cannot and should not have any role in
charting out any course to the dispute resolution by having the power to appoint
an arbitrator…….”
35. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent referred to the letter/notice
dated 23.11.2019 by the 1st respondent Finance Company to the petitioners as
also the letter/notice dated 18.12.2019 of the 1st respondent Finance Company
appointing the sole arbitrator (annexed as P2 to the counter affidavit) and
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submitted that the petitioners never raised objection to such appointment nor
replied the notices and so there was waiver under Section 4 of the Act 1996.
36. So far as the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent
Finance Company is concerned that there was waiver under Section 4 of the Act
1996, the same deserves rejection. The reason is firstly that the waiver with
respect to the appointment of the sole Arbitrator unilaterally has been
specifically dealt with in Section 12 (5) of the Act 1996. So, the waiver on the
part of the party/petitioner could only be as per those provisions. There is no
dispute raised that, there was no express agreement in writing as contemplated
under the proviso to Section 12 (5). Consequently, the conditions under the
proviso not being attracted, there would be no waiver.
37. Secondly, Section 4 deals with different kind of waiver i.e., waiver of
right to object. According to the Section 4, a party who knows that, (a) any
provision of Part-I of the Act 1996 from which the parties may derogate, or (b)
any requirement under the arbitration agreement has not been applied with
and yet proceeds with the arbitration without stating his objection to such noncompliance without undue delay or, if a time limit is provided for stating that
the objection, within that period of time, shall be deemed to have waived his
right to so object.
38. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Central Organisation for Railway
Electrification (supra) also held on Section 4 that, it implies a waiver of this
right under certain conditions based on principle of waiver or estoppel that a
party to arbitration has a right to object to any non-compliance with procedural
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requirements. The procedural default at issue must be stipulated either in the
arbitration agreement or in non-mandatory provision in part-1 of the Arbitration
Act. If the arbitration agreement is silent on a procedural point, the provisions
of the Arbitration Act take effect.
39. Paragraph Nos.26 to 28 of Central Organisation for Railway
Electrification (supra) are reproduced as under:
“(ii) Mandatory provisions
26. Part I of the Arbitration Act applies where the place of arbitration is in
India. [ Section 2(2), Arbitration Act.] Section 4 deals with a waiver of the right
of a party to object in the following terms:
“4. Waiver of right to object.—A party who knows that—
(a) any provision of this Part from which the parties may derogate, or
(b) any requirement under the arbitration agreement,
has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without stating
his objection to such non-compliance without undue delay or, if a time-limit is
provided for stating that objection, within that period of time, shall be deemed
to have waived his right to so object.”
27. Section 4 is a deeming provision. [Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics (P)
Ltd. v. Chand Mal Baradia, (2005) 10 SCC 704 : (2005) 124 Comp Cas 811,
para 9] It deems that a party has waived its right to object if it proceeds with the
arbitration without stating its objection to non-compliance of any provisions
from which the parties may derogate or of any requirement under the arbitration
agreement. [BSNL v. Motorola India (P) Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 337, p. 349, para
39 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 524“39. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, a party which knows that a requirement under the
arbitration agreement has not been complied with and still proceeds with the
arbitration without raising an objection, as soon as possible, waives their right
to object.”] Importantly, Section 4 distinguishes between derogable (nonmandatory) and mandatory provisions. [ A/CN.9/246 (44)]
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28. Section 4 is based on Article 4 of the Model Law. [ Article 4, Model Law.
It reads:“4. Waiver of right to object.—A party who knows that any provision
of this Law from which the parties may derogate or any requirement under the
arbitration agreement has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the
arbitration without stating his objection to such non-compliance without undue
delay or, if a time-limit is provided therefor, within such period of time, shall be
deemed to have waived his right to object.”] The purpose of incorporating
Section 4 is to inform the arbitrators of the principle of waiver. [ Howard
Holtzmann and Joseph Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, p. 196.] Peter Binder suggests that
Article 4 aims to prohibit the adoption of delay tactics by parties and contribute
to the fluency of the proceedings. [ Peter Binder, International Commercial
Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdiction, (2nd Edn.,
2005) p. 49.] A party to arbitration has a right to object to any non-compliance
with procedural requirements. Section 4 implies a waiver of this right under
certain conditions based on the principle of waiver or estoppel. [ A/CN.9/264
(17)] The procedural default at issue must be stipulated either in the arbitration
agreement or a non-mandatory provision under Part I of the Arbitration Act. If
the arbitration agreement is silent on a procedural point, the provisions of the
Arbitration Act take effect. According to Section 4, a party cannot insist on
compliance with non-mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act if it fails to
make a timely objection. [ Howard Holtzmann and Joseph Neuhaus, A Guide to
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer
Law) p. 197.] Section 4 of the Arbitration Act necessarily implies that the
parties cannot proceed with arbitration in derogation of a mandatory provision.”
40. In the aforesaid case, Central Organisation for Railway
Electrification (supra), on the aspect of Section 12, inter alia, the paragraphs
No.42, 47 and 48 deal which are also reproduced as under:
“(iv) Independence and impartiality of arbitrators
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42. Section 12 provides the grounds to challenge the appointment of
arbitrators. [ Section 12, Arbitration Act. It reads:“12. Grounds for
challenge.—(1) When a person is approached in connection with his possible
appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any circumstances—
(a) such as the existence either direct or indirect, of any past or present
relationship with or interest in any of the parties or in relation to the subjectmatter in dispute, whether financial, business, professional or other kind, which
is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality;
and(b) which are likely to affect his ability to devote sufficient time to the
arbitration and in particular his ability to complete the entire arbitration within a
period of twelve months.Explanation 1.—The grounds stated in the Fifth
Schedule shall guide in determining whether circumstances exist which give
rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of an
arbitrator.Explanation 2.—The disclosure shall be made by such person in the
form specified in the Sixth Schedule.(2) An arbitrator, from the time of his
appointment and throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall, without delay,
disclose to the parties in writing any circumstances referred to in sub-section (1)
unless they have already been informed of them by him.(3) An arbitrator may
be challenged only if—(a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his independence or impartiality; or(b) he does not possess the
qualifications agreed to by the parties.(4) A party may challenge an arbitrator
appointed by him, or in whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons
of which he becomes aware after the appointment has been made.(5)
Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person whose
relationship, with the parties or counsel or the subject-matter of the dispute,
falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be
ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator:Provided that parties may, subsequent
to disputes having arisen between them, waive the applicability of this subsection by an express agreement in writing.”] Section 12(1) mandates that a
person who has been approached to be appointed as an arbitrator must disclose
in writing any circumstances that are likely to give rise to “justifiable doubts as
to his independence or impartiality”. The Fifth Schedule to the Arbitration Act
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specifies circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the
independence or impartiality of arbitrators. Section 12(1) also mandates an
arbitrator to disclose in writing any circumstances that are likely to affect the
ability to devote sufficient time to the arbitration and in particular the ability to
complete the entire arbitration within twelve months. The duty of disclosure is a
continuing duty. Section 12(3) provides that an arbitrator may be challenged
only if : (i) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to
independence or impartiality; or (ii) the arbitrator does not possess the
qualifications agreed to by the parties.
47. Section 12(5) overrides any prior procedure for appointing the
arbitrators agreed upon between the parties under Section 11(2) due to the
non obstante clause. However, the proviso to Section 12(5) allows parties to
waive the applicability of that provision after the dispute has arisen. The
proviso secures “real and genuine party autonomy” by allowing parties to waive
the applicability of Section 12(5). [ Law Commission of India, Amendments to
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Report No. 246 (August 2014)“60.
The Commission, however, feels that real and genuine party autonomy must be
respected, and, in certain situations, parties should be allowed to waive even the
categories of ineligibility as set in the proposed Fifth Schedule. This could be in
situations of family arbitrations or other arbitrations where a person commands
the blind faith and trust of the parties to the dispute, despite the existence of
objective “justifiable doubts” regarding his independence and impartiality. To
deal with such situations, the Commission has proposed the proviso to Section
12(5), where parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them,
waive the applicability of the proposed Section 12(5) by an express agreement
in writing. In all other cases, the general rule in the proposed Section 12(5)
must be followed.”(emphasis in original)]
48. Section 12(5) does not prescribe a method to challenge the
appointment of an ineligible person. Section 14 deals with the termination
of the mandate of an arbitrator who is unable to perform their functions. [
Section 14, Arbitration Act. It reads:“14. Failure or impossibility to act.—(1)
The mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate and he shall be substituted by
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another arbitrator, if—(a) he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his
functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay; and(b) he
withdraws from his office or the parties agree to the termination of his
mandate.(2) If a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds referred to
in clause (a) of sub-section (1), a party may, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, apply to the Court to decide on the termination of the mandate.(3) If,
under this section or sub-section of (3) of Section 13, an arbitrator withdraws
from his office or a party agrees to the termination of the mandate of an
arbitrator, it shall not imply acceptance of the validity of any ground referred to
in this section or sub-section (3) of Section 12.”] A person who is ineligible to
be appointed as an arbitrator in terms of Section 12(5) becomes de jure
unable to perform functions according to Section 14. Resultantly, the
mandate of such an ineligible person gets automatically terminated and
they are liable to be substituted by another arbitrator under Section 14.
[Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd., (2019) 5 SCC 755,
p. 769, para 17 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 1“17. The scheme of Sections 12, 13 and
14, therefore, is that where an arbitrator makes a disclosure in writing which is
likely to give justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality, the
appointment of such arbitrator may be challenged under Sections 12(1) to 12(4)
read with Section 13. However, where such person becomes “ineligible” to
be appointed as an arbitrator, there is no question of challenge to such
arbitrator, before such arbitrator. In such a case i.e. a case which falls
under Section 12(5), Section 14(1)(a) of the Act gets attracted inasmuch as
the arbitrator becomes, as a matter of law (i.e. de jure), unable to perform
his functions under Section 12(5), being ineligible to be appointed as an
arbitrator. This being so, his mandate automatically terminates, and he
shall then be substituted by another arbitrator under Section 14(1)
itself.”]”
41. Therefore, in our view, the waiver under Section 4 of the Act 1996 is
different than the waiver contemplated by Section 12. We are of the view that
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the objection or the plea of waiver in terms of Section 4 of the Act 1996 cannot
be connected to the provisions under Section 12 (5). The waiver with respect to
the unilateral appointment of the sole Arbitrator attracting Seventh Schedule, is
dealt by specific provision under sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act 1996.
It is only on fulfillment of the conditions under sub-section (5) of Section 12,
proviso, that a party can be said to have waived the right to object to the
appointment of the sole Arbitrator made unilaterally attracting Schedule Seven
for his ineligibility.
Such ineligibility is a matter of law which automatically
terminates the mandate of an arbitrator, and there is no question of challenge
to such arbitrator before such arbitrator under Section 16 of the Act 1996.
42. In the present case, there is no such written agreement as
contemplated under Section 12 (5) proviso. The conditions under the proviso
are not satisfied and consequently, the plea of waiver raised by the learned
counsel for the respondents has no legs to stand.
The mandate of the
arbitrator in the present case automatically terminated as a matter of law.
V. Conclusions:
43. In view of the aforesaid consideration, we reach to the conclusion
that the appointment of the sole Arbitrator unilaterally appointed by the Finance
Company is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was invalid.
The Arbitrator had no jurisdiction, it lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass the
Award.
The ineligibility under law under Section 12 read with Seventh
Schedule, was attracted with respect to the person legal Manager of the 1st
respondent Finance Company was attracted.
So, he could also not
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appoint/nominate 2nd respondent as the sole arbitrator. There was no express
waiver by any agreement in writing in terms of proviso to Sub-Section (5) of
Section 12 of the Act 1996. Consequently, there was no such waiver to such
appointment on the part of the petitioner. The mandate of the Arbitrator stood
automatically terminated in law and as per the law laid down in the Central
Organisation for Railway Electrification (supra).
The law laid down in
Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (supra) is not prospective
to the appointment of the sole Arbitrator appointed unilaterally. It is prospective
only with respect to the appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three
Members. So, the Award put to execution is not a valid arbitration award; it is
passed without jurisdiction.
The plea of lack of inherent jurisdiction in the
Arbitrator could be raised at any stage and even in collateral proceedings is also
the settled legal position.
Reference in this respect can be made to the
following paragraphs 113 to 116, under the consideration head “C. Challenge to
the ineligibility of the arbitrator at any stage of the proceedings, from Bhadra
International (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
“c. Challenge to the ineligibility of the arbitrator at any stage of the
proceedings
113. A challenge to an arbitrator's ineligibility could be raised at any
stage because an award passed in such circumstance is non-est, i.e., it carries no
enforceability or recognition in law. We say so because an arbitrator does not
possess the jurisdiction to pass an award. In arbitration, the parties vest the
jurisdiction in the tribunal by virtue of a valid arbitration agreement and an
appointment made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1996. This
jurisdiction is grounded in the consent of the parties as explained in the
foregoing paragraphs of this judgment.
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114. In this context, jurisdiction means the authority of an arbitral tribunal to
render a decision affecting the merits of the case. An arbitrator who lacks
jurisdiction cannot make an award on the merits. With a view to dispel any
doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to observe that the jurisdiction of
the arbitral tribunal is distinct from the admissibility of the dispute, i.e., the
arbitrability of the claims.
115. A question pertaining to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
arises when the tribunal is fundamentally incompetent to render any decision at
all. In other words, a question of jurisdiction pertains to the ability of the
tribunal to hear a case, whereas questions of admissibility presuppose that the
tribunal has jurisdiction. An award passed by an arbitrator who does not have
jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the arbitrator.
116. This Court, in catena of decisions, has held that the validity of a
decree can be challenged even in execution proceedings if the court passing
such decree lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. As a decree
passed by a court without jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter. Any
decision passed by a court lacking jurisdiction would be coram non judice,
since a court cannot give itself jurisdiction. No act of the parties can cure an
inherent lack of jurisdiction.”
We also refer to the clause No.v in para 123 of Bhadra International
(India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra), already reproduced (supra).
The Points for consideration (i) to (iv), as framed, are answered as per
paragraph No.43.
VI. Result:
44. The impugned Order dated 30.09.2022 passed in Execution
Proceedings is hereby set aside. Since we have held that the Award itself is
without jurisdiction the arbitrator‟s mandate came to an automatic end by virtue
of Section 12 read with Seventh Schedule, the Award passed by it, is without
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jurisdiction which cannot be executed. Any direction to the learned VIII
Additional District Judge, Vijayawada in the pending proceedings under Section
34 of the Act 1996, to decide those proceedings, would be a futile exercise and
shall unnecessarily prolong and multiply the litigation. The proceedings under
Section 34 of the Act 1996 pending before the learned VIII Additional District
Judge, Vijayawada therefore also stand closed.
45. We allow both the civil revision petitions in the aforesaid terms.
However, it shall be open to the parties to initiate fresh arbitration proceedings,
in accordance with law. No order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, including I.A.No.3 of 2026, shall
stand closed in consequence.
_______________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
Date: 10.04.2026
Dsr
Note:
LR copy to be marked
B/o
Dsr
______________________
BALAJI MEDAMALLI, J
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