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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
WP(C) 3166/2025
Reserved on: 26.09.2026
Pronounced on: 28.09.2026
Uploaded on: 29.09.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
…Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s).
Mrs. Kareena Jamwal, (Alias Zulikha
Hussain)
D/o: Late Sh. Raghbeer Singh
R/o: House No. 222-A, Lal Nagar,
Chanapora, Srinagar, Aged 71 years
Through:
Mr. Mohammad Amin Bhat, Advocate
Vs.
1. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir
through Financial Commissioner
(Revenue), J&K, Srinagar.
...Respondent(s).
2. Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir,
Srinagar
3. Additional Divisional Commissioner,
Kashmir, Srinagar.
4. Deputy Commissioner, District
Bandipora.
5. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sumbal,
District Bandipora
6. Tehsildar, Sumbal, District Bandipora.
7. Dr. Urmila Jamwal
W/o: Lt. Sh. Surjeet Singh Jamwal
R/o: H. No. 74-A, Dream City Muthi
Tehsil and District Jammu.
8. Mr. Raman Jamwal
S/o: Lt. Sh. Surjeet Singh Jamwal
R/o: H. No. 74-A, Dream City Muthi
Tehsil and District Jammu.
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9. Mr. Rajat Jamwal
S/o: Lt. Sh. Surjeet Singh Jamwal
R/o: H. No. 74-A, Dream City Muthi
Tehsil and District Jammu.
10.Smt. Aruna Jamwal
S/o: Sh. Janmej Singh Jamwal
R/o: H. No. 74-A, Dream City, Muthi
Tehsil and District Jammu.
11.Sh. Suneet Singh Jamwal
S/o: Lt. Sh. Raghbeer Singh
R/o: H. No. 74-A, Dream City, Muthi
Tehsil and District Jammu.
Through:
Mr. G.N. Sofi, Dy. AG for R- 1 to 6
Mr. Farhat Zia Soharwardy, Advocate for R- 7 to 9
CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
JUDGEMENT
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India seeking, inter alia, issuance of a writ of
certiorari for quashing of order dated 29.08.2025 passed by the learned
Financial Commissioner (Revenue), J&K, in Revision Petition titled “Dr
Urmila Jamwal & Ors. v. Smt. Aruna Jamwal & Ors., File No. 906/FC-AP.
A further prayer has been made for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing
the official respondents to attest the mutation afresh in favour of all the legal
heirs of late Raghbeer Singh Jamwal and for maintaining status quo with
respect to the property in question.
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FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The case set up by the petitioner is that she and the private respondents are the
legal heirs of a common ancestor, namely, late Thakur Raghbeer Singh, who
left behind two sons, three daughters and his widow, Bimla Devi. One of his
sons, namely, Surjeet Singh Jamwal, subsequently died leaving behind his
widow, Mrs. Urmilla Jamwal, and two sons.
3. According to the petitioner, the parties are governed by the Hindu Succession
Act and not by any customary law. It is her case that, upon the death of late
Raghbeer Singh, his estate was required to devolve upon all his legal heirs in
accordance with the applicable law of succession.
4. The petitioner alleges that mutation No. 488 dated 07.12.1970 was attested in
favour of some of the private respondents, excluding her from the estate left
behind by her deceased father. According to the petitioner, the said mutation
was attested behind her back and without notice to her.
5. The petitioner further claims that at the time of attestation of the mutation she
was a minor, her date of birth being 04.09.1954. She has relied upon a date of
birth certificate in support of the said assertion. It is further pleaded that she
was residing outside the Union Territory for a considerable period and had no
knowledge of the mutation.
6. The petitioner claims to have acquired knowledge of mutation No. 488 only in
the year 2022, when she approached the revenue authorities for mutation of
her share and partition of the property. She thereafter obtained a certified copy
of the mutation and challenged the same before the learned Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Sumbal, along with an application seeking condonation of delay.
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7. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sumbal, after issuing notice to the
concerned parties and considering the rival submissions, allowed the
application for condonation of delay. The petitioner asserts that the learned
authority took into consideration the judgments of the Supreme Court
concerning condonation of delay and held that refusal to condone the delay
would result in denial of an opportunity to the petitioner to have her claim
considered on merits.
8. The said order was assailed by the private respondents before the Divisional
Commissioner, Kashmir, and the matter came to be transferred to the learned
Additional Commissioner, Kashmir. The learned Additional Commissioner,
after considering the matter, upheld the order passed by the learned SubDivisional Magistrate.
9. The private respondents thereafter approached the learned Financial
Commissioner (Revenue), J&K, by way of revision. The petitioner contested
the revision petition and reiterated that the parties were governed by the
Hindu Succession Act, that she was a minor when the mutation was attested,
and that the mutation had been attested without notice to her.
10. The learned Financial Commissioner, by order dated 29.08.2025, allowed the
revision petition and set aside the orders passed by the learned Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Sumbal and learned Additional Commissioner, Kashmir. The said
order has been assailed in the present writ petition.
GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE
11.The principal grounds urged by the petitioner are that the impugned order is
non-speaking; that the learned Financial Commissioner failed to consider the
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petitioner’s submissions; that the mutation was attested behind her back; that
she was a minor at the relevant time; that the mutation was allegedly attested
in violation of Standing Order No. 23-A; that she acquired knowledge of the
mutation only in 2022; and that the delay in challenging the mutation was,
therefore, liable to be condoned.
12.The petitioner has also relied upon the principles laid down by the Supreme
Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy & Ors. It has been contended that while considering an
application for condonation of delay, the Court should adopt a liberal,
pragmatic and justice-oriented approach and that substantial justice ought not
to be defeated by technical considerations. The Supreme Court has indeed
emphasized that “sufficient cause” must be considered in the factual setting of
each case, while also cautioning that an inordinate delay requires stricter
scrutiny.
13.The petitioner has further pleaded that the property was ancestral property and
that the other co-sharers could not acquire an exclusive right against her
merely by virtue of possession. It has also been urged that the alleged
conversion of the petitioner could not, by itself, deprive her of rights claimed
by her in the estate.
STAND OF THE RESPONDENTS
14.The respondents have opposed the writ petition. Their preliminary objection is
that no grave injustice or failure of justice has been occasioned to the
petitioner by the order passed by the learned Financial Commissioner.
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According to them, the Financial Commissioner rightly exercised revisional
jurisdiction and set aside the orders passed by the authorities below.
15.It is further contended that the petition raises disputed questions of fact and
that no cause of action has accrued in favour of the petitioner so as to warrant
exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
16.The respondents have also alleged suppression and concealment of material
facts. They have particularly relied upon the discrepancy between the name
“Karuna Jamwal” appearing in the date of birth certificate and the name
“Kareena Jamwal alias Zulikha Hussain” stated in the writ petition. They have
further contended that the petitioner has not placed the entire relevant record
before this Court.
17.An objection has also been raised regarding non-joinder of necessary parties.
According to the respondents, Swarn Jamwal, another sister of the parties, had
died and her legal heirs were neither impleaded before the revenue authorities
nor arrayed as respondents in the present writ petition.
REPLY OF THE RESPONDENTS TO THE PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS
18. With regard to the petitioner’s contention that the impugned order is nonspeaking and that the learned Financial Commissioner failed to consider the
submissions raised by her, the respondents have submitted that the learned
Financial Commissioner passed a reasoned and speaking order after
considering the pleadings and the material available on record and rightly set
aside the orders passed by the authorities below.
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19.As regards the petitioner’s challenge to the order of the learned Financial
Commissioner on the question of condonation of delay, the respondents have
submitted that the learned Financial Commissioner examined the legality of
the orders passed by the authorities below. According to the respondents, the
learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate had condoned the delay without sufficient
or legally sustainable cause, while the learned Additional Commissioner erred
in upholding the said order without properly recording findings on the
grounds raised before him.
20.The respondents have further submitted that the learned Additional
Commissioner did not properly deal with the contentions raised in the revision
and merely observed that the order dated 02.01.2024 passed by the learned
Sub-Divisional Magistrate was correct.
21.With regard to the petitioner’s assertion that the mutation was attested behind
her back and that she was a minor at the relevant time, the respondents have
relied upon the discrepancy in the name appearing in the date of birth
certificate and the name used by the petitioner in the writ petition. They have
further contended that the learned Financial Commissioner considered the
issue of delay and rightly noticed the prolonged silence after attestation of the
mutation in the year 1970.
22.The respondents have submitted that the petitioner is seeking adjudication
upon substantive rights arising out of the mutation, whereas the proceedings
before the authorities below principally concerned the question of limitation
and condonation of delay.
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23.The respondents have further maintained that the pleadings and material
available on record were duly considered by the learned Financial
Commissioner and that the impugned order is a speaking and reasoned order.
24.As regards the petitioner’s explanation for the delay, the respondents contend
that she failed to establish sufficient cause for the extraordinary delay in
challenging the mutation and that the authorities below failed to properly
appreciate the explanation offered by her.
25.With regard to the petitioner’s reliance upon the judgments concerning
condonation of delay, the respondents contend that the said judgments do not
justify condonation of an unexplained delay of about 52 years. According to
them, the law requires a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate. The
respondents have relied upon judgments dealing with belated proceedings and
have referred to Wali Mohammad Magray & Anr. v. Ali Mohammad Gujree
& Ors., stated to be reported as 2022 JKJ(HC) 307.
26. The respondents have further submitted that third-party interests had
allegedly been created in the year 2003 by sale of the property in favour of
Mst. Fareeda Begum and that settled transactions could not, according to
them, be unsettled after such a long period.
27.As regards the petitioner’s plea alleging violation of the principles of natural
justice at the time of attestation of the mutation, the respondents have
submitted that the mutation itself is not the subject matter of adjudication in
the present writ petition and, therefore, the said plea is misconceived.
28.With regard to the petitioner’s plea concerning her alleged conversion and the
effect thereof upon her succession rights, the respondents have submitted that
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the impugned order does not deal with the question of conversion under
Hindu law and, therefore, the said contention proceeds on a misconception of
the controversy involved in the present proceedings.
29.As regards the petitioner’s assertion that the learned Sub-Divisional
Magistrate and the learned Additional Commissioner had set aside the
mutation itself, the respondents have disputed the said assertion. According to
them, the said authorities were dealing with the question of limitation and
condonation of delay and the mutation itself had not been set aside by them.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
30.Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, when confronted with the
considerable delay in assailing the mutation, submitted that the petitioner was
a minor at the time of attestation of the mutation and, therefore, could not
have effectively challenged the same at the relevant time. It was further
submitted that thereafter the petitioner had been residing outside the Valley
and, on account of the prevailing circumstances, could not challenge the
mutation within the prescribed period. According to learned counsel, the
circumstances which prevented the petitioner from approaching the competent
authority within time were beyond her control and this aspect had not been
accorded due consideration by the learned revisional court.
31. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents submitted
that no sufficient cause had been pleaded or established by the petitioner to
explain the enormous delay. It was contended that the learned revisional court
had rightly examined the matter and set aside the orders passed by the
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authorities below, which, according to learned counsel, were not sustainable
in law.
32. Learned counsel for the private respondents further submitted that
condonation of delay is not a mere formality and cannot be granted merely on
the asking of a party, particularly when the challenge is brought after more
than five decades and the record indicates creation of third-party interests in
the property. It was argued that, before proceeding to examine the matter on
merits, the competent authorities were required to first determine whether the
petitioner had furnished sufficient cause for the extraordinary delay in
assailing the mutation. According to learned counsel, the learned revisional
court has considered the material facts and the record in their proper
perspective and has passed a legally sustainable order. It was, accordingly,
urged that no interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction is
warranted and that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
CONSIDERATION
33.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings
available on record.
34. From a bare perusal of the record, it is apparent that mutation No. 488 was
attested as far back as on 07.12.1970, whereas the appeal challenging the said
mutation was filed on 01.03.2023, after a lapse of more than five decades.
Thus, the issue of limitation was of considerable significance and required
consideration at the threshold. The application seeking condonation of delay
filed before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sumbal, proceeded
primarily on the ground that the petitioner and other appellants had been
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residing outside the Valley for decades on account of the prevailing law and
order situation and, therefore, had no knowledge about the attestation of the
mutation.
35.The record further shows that the date of knowledge was stated to be
05.11.2022, when the petitioner allegedly approached the concerned revenue
authorities for having the landed property partitioned according to the
respective shares of the legal heirs and came to know that the estate had been
mutated in favour of the sons of the deceased estate-holder.
36.The learned revisional court, while passing the impugned order, examined the
explanation furnished for the enormous delay and, inter alia, noticed that the
petitioner and the other appellants were sisters of the beneficiaries under the
impugned mutation and were claiming ignorance of the mutation for more
than five decades. The learned revisional court observed that the death of the
estate-holder and consequent devolution of his estate were matters which
could not reasonably remain unknown to the legal heirs for such an extended
period.
37.The learned revisional court further considered the plea regarding the
prevailing law and order situation in the Valley and observed that, even if
such explanation were accepted, it could possibly justify the period
subsequent to 1989 and the years during which the conditions in the Valley
remained disturbed. However, according to the revisional court, no
explanation had been furnished for the period from 1970 till 1989, or for the
subsequent period when the situation had considerably improved. On such
consideration, the revisional court found the explanation furnished by the
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petitioner for the delay to be lacking in plausibility and not sufficient to
inspire confidence.
38. The learned revisional court also took note of the sale agreement stated to
have been executed by the sons of the estate-holder in respect of land
measuring 110 kanals in the year 2003 in favour of one Mst. Farida. After
considering the aforesaid circumstance along with the other material available
on record, the learned revisional court came to the conclusion that the
petitioner had failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the highly belated
challenge to the mutation.
39.The learned revisional court accordingly held that the learned Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Sumbal and the learned Additional Commissioner, Kashmir had
erred in condoning the delay, as such course would have the effect of
unsettling a long-standing mutation and could also give rise to further
litigation, particularly in view of the alleged creation of third-party interests.
The revision petition was, accordingly, allowed, the orders passed by the
authorities below were set aside and mutation No. 488 pertaining to the estate
situated at Asham was upheld.
40. The question that, therefore, falls for consideration before this Court is
whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the learned
Financial Commissioner was justified in interfering with the orders passed by
the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sumbal and the learned Additional
Commissioner, Kashmir, and in declining to condone the delay of more than
five decades in assailing mutation No. 488.
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41.. It is trite that while considering an application for condonation of delay, the
expression “sufficient cause” is required to receive a liberal and justiceoriented interpretation; however, such liberal approach cannot be stretched to
the extent of condoning an inordinate and unexplained delay as a matter of
course. The length of delay, the nature of explanation furnished, the conduct
of the party, the rights that may have accrued in the interregnum and the
prejudice likely to be caused to the opposite parties are all relevant
considerations while exercising such discretion.
42. In the present case, there is no dispute that the mutation sought to be assailed
was attested on 07.12.1970, whereas the challenge thereto came to be
instituted only in the year 2023. The explanation furnished by the petitioner is
essentially founded upon her being minor at the time of attestation, her
residence outside the Valley and the prevailing circumstances. While these
circumstances may constitute relevant considerations, the same cannot, by
themselves, furnish an explanation for the entire period of more than five
decades. The learned Financial Commissioner has specifically noticed the
absence of any satisfactory explanation for substantial periods during which
the petitioner could have taken steps to assert the rights now claimed by her.
43.The contention that the petitioner was a minor on the date of attestation of the
mutation also requires to be considered in the context of the subsequent
conduct. Even assuming the petitioner’s minority to be established, the same
could not, by itself, explain the complete inaction for several decades after she
attained majority. The plea of lack of knowledge, therefore, required a cogent
and convincing explanation covering the entire period of delay, which, as
noticed by the learned Financial Commissioner, was not forthcoming.
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44.Another circumstance which assumes significance is the passage of more than
five decades during which the mutation remained operative. The learned
Financial Commissioner has noticed the alleged transaction in respect of the
property in the year 2003 and the consequent possibility of third-party rights
having been created. At this stage, reopening a revenue entry which has
remained unquestioned for such a prolonged period would necessarily have
consequences for persons who may have altered their position on the basis of
the existing record.
45. The contention that the learned Financial Commissioner failed to consider the
relevant submissions of the petitioner also does not merit acceptance. A
perusal of the impugned order, as noticed hereinabove, shows that the learned
revisional court considered the principal circumstances relied upon by the
petitioner, including the alleged lack of knowledge, her residence outside the
Valley, the prevailing conditions and the considerable lapse of time. The
conclusion arrived at by the revisional court is based upon the material
available on record and cannot be said to be without reasons.
46. In Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India &Anr., reported as AIR 2023 SC
5109, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the issue regarding delay
and laches. It would be profitable to reproduce paragraph 29 of the above
judgment, which reads as under:
“29. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any
quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive
rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the
threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However,
these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of
delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of
discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause
shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length
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of delay being immaterial. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient
cause being shown or an acceptable being proffered, delay of the
shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases,
delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is
satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish
between an „explanation‟ and an „excuse‟. An „explanation‟ is
designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for
something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event
and allows the person to point out that something that has happened
is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be
taken to distinguish an „explanation‟ from an „excuse‟. Although
people tend to see „explanation‟ and „excuse‟ as the same thing and
struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a
distinction which, though fine, is real. An „excuse‟ is often offered
by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under
attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an
„excuse‟ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not
to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations
and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on
existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own
facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and
not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of
long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces
whole sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not
reach the higher courts for adjudication.”
47.. The aforesaid principle makes it clear that although the length of delay by
itself is not determinative, the sufficiency of the cause shown and the
acceptability of the explanation furnished for the delay are matters which
necessarily require consideration. The Court is required to distinguish
between a genuine explanation accounting for the delay and a mere excuse
seeking to overcome the consequences of inaction. In the present case, the
explanation furnished by the petitioner has to be examined in the context of
the fact that the mutation was attested in the year 1970, whereas the challenge
thereto was instituted only in the year 2023.
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48.The question of condonation of delay has also to be considered in the
backdrop of the settled principle that limitation is not a mere technicality, but
a statutory prescription intended to bring finality and certainty to legal
proceedings. The discretion to condone delay is, therefore, required to be
exercised upon a proper consideration of the explanation furnished by the
party seeking such indulgence.
49. In Basawaraj & Anr. V. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported as
(2013) 14 SCC 81, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the statute
prescribes a period of limitation, the same has to be applied with all its rigor
and cannot be extended merely on equitable considerations or on the ground
of hardship. The Court observed as under:
“It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its rigor
when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. „A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore
that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation.‟ The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but
to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim
duralexsedlex, which means „the law is hard but it is the law‟, stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
„inconvenience is not‟ a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute.”
50.The aforesaid judgment, therefore, reinforces the principle that equitable
considerations or mere hardship cannot, in themselves, furnish a ground for
extending a statutorily prescribed period of limitation. The explanation for
delay must nevertheless satisfy the legal requirement of “sufficient cause”.
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51. This Court, in Mohd Bashir v. Union Territory of J&K and Others,
bearing WP(C) No. 551/2025, decided on 10.03.2026, has also considered
the significance of limitation and observed as under:
“Rules of limitation are prima facie rules of procedure and do not
create any rights in favour of any person nor do they define or
create cause of action but simply prescribe that the remedy could be
exercised only upto a certain period and not beyond it. The Rules of
Limitation are not superfluous or vestigial but are to be interpreted
in a meaningful manner so as to save the system from anarchy. Law
of Limitation fixes a life span for every legal remedy. Time is
precious and the wasted time would never resist. So, a life span must
be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the
remedy may lead to an uncertainty and consequential anarchy. It is
enshrined in maxim, “Interests reipublicaeut sit finis litium (It is for
the general welfare that a period be put to litigant). Every legal
remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of time. Law
is also clear each day after limitation time, is required to be
explained by cogent means.”
52. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid principles is that while the Court is not
expected to adopt an unduly pedantic approach while considering a plea for
condonation of delay, the discretion cannot be exercised in the absence of a
satisfactory and legally acceptable explanation covering the period of delay.
The longer the period of inaction, the greater is the necessity for the party
seeking condonation to place before the Court a cogent explanation
accounting for the relevant periods of delay.
CONCLUSION
53.In view of the forgoing discussion, the explanation furnished by the petitioner
in the present case does not satisfactorily account for the entire period
intervening between the attestation of mutation No. 488 on 07.12.1970 and
the institution of the challenge in the year 2023. The plea that the petitioner
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was a minor at the time of attestation and thereafter remained outside the
Valley may explain, at best, certain periods of time; however, the same does
not, in the absence of further particulars and supporting material, satisfactorily
explain the prolonged inaction extending over several decades.
54. The learned Financial Commissioner, while exercising revisional jurisdiction,
has considered the explanation furnished by the petitioner in the backdrop of
the entire period of delay and has noticed the absence of any satisfactory
explanation for the period preceding 1989 as well as for the subsequent period
during which, according to the record, the petitioner could have taken steps to
assert the rights now claimed by her. The approach adopted by the learned
revisional court is thus consistent with the principles governing condonation
of delay noticed hereinabove.
55. It is also relevant that the proceedings arising out of mutation No. 488 have to
be viewed in the context of the passage of more than five decades. The
intervening period assumes significance, particularly when the respondents
have placed on record the circumstance of a transaction relating to the
property having taken place in the year 2003. A belated reopening of such a
long-standing revenue entry may have consequences for rights and interests
that have intervened during the period of inaction.
56.Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, this Court finds that the
learned Financial Commissioner has neither acted beyond the jurisdiction
vested in him nor committed any manifest error of law in setting aside the
orders passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sumbal and the
learned Additional Commissioner, Kashmir. The exercise of discretion by the
revisional authority, particularly in the backdrop of an unexplained delay
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extending over more than five decades and the intervening circumstances
noticed hereinabove, does not call for interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
57.Accordingly, the present writ petition devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed.
The order dated 29.08.2025 passed by the learned Financial Commissioner
(Revenue), J&K, in Revision Petition titled “Dr. Urmila Jamwal & Ors. V.
Smt. Aruna Jamwal & Ors., ” File No. 906/FC-AP, is accordingly upheld.
(WASIM SADIQ NARGAL)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR
28.09.2026
“Mubashir “
Whether the judgment is speaking: Yes/No
Whether the judgment is reportable: Yes/No
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