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CGHC010361362026
2026:CGHC:41081
NAFR
ALOK SHARMA
Date: 2026.09.23
13:29:20 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 1226 of 2026
Kamta Prasad Sahu S/o Shri Beersingh Sahu, Aged About 34 Years Through
Power Of Attorney And His Father Beersingh Sahu, R/o Plot No. 02, Street
No. 11, Aashish Nagar Vest, Risali Civic Centre Bhilai, District Durg
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Kamalnarayan Sahu S/o Shri Shankar Lal Sahu, Aged About 62 Years R/o
Ward No. 05, Village And Post Bhurka, Tahsil Gobra Nawapara, District
Raipur Chhattisgarh
2 - Branch Manager, Bank Of Baroda, Branch Mahavir Goushala Complex
Maudhapara, Raipur Chhattisgarh
3 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Raipur District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. C. R. Sahu, Advocate.
For Respondent No. 2
:
Mr. Vinod Deshmukh, Advocate.
For State
:
Mr. Ashutosh Trivedi, Panel Lawyer.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
Order on Board
21/09/2026
Heard.
1.
The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article
227 of the Constitution of India against the impugned order dated
27.08.2026 passed by the learned 8th District Judge, Raipur in Misc.
Civil Appeal Case No. 85/2025, whereby the Misc. Appeal filed by the
petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated 05.12.2025 passed
by the learned 6th Civil Judge, Junior Division, District Raipur in Civil
Suit No. 224-A/2025 has been affirmed.
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is
the plaintiff before the learned trial Court, who is prosecuting a suit for
declaration of title and permanent injunction, and the defendants are
claiming rights over the suit property having total area of 2.660
hectares, out of which the plaintiff has purchased the land bearing
Khasra Nos. 149/1 and 150/1, admeasuring 0.780 hectare and 0.040
hectare, respectively, total admeasuring 0.82 hectare, through
registered sale deed dated 25.07.2017, situated at Village Bhurka,
Tehsil Abhanpur, District Raipur. The claim of the plaintiff is that he
purchased the suit property through registered sale deed dated
25.07.2017 from defendant No. 1 and came into possession of the
same, and his name has also been mutated in the revenue records.
However, subsequently, the plaintiff came to know that defendant No. 1
had mortgaged the subject property with defendant No. 2 and, in a loan
transaction, his name has been mutated and he is in possession of the
same since then. Subsequently, he came to know that the subject
property was mortgaged by defendant No. 1 with defendant No. 2 in a
loan transaction and, since the loan account was declared NPA,
respondent No. 2 initiated proceedings against defendant No. 1, in
which an order has been passed in favour of defendant No. 2/bank.
Since the petitioner/plaintiff had purchased the suit property through a
registered sale deed and is in possession of the same, his possession
may be protected during the pendency of the suit, for which he made
an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC before the
learned trial Court. The learned trial Court has rejected the application
filed by the plaintiff vide order dated 05.12.2025, holding that it was a
loan transaction between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 and the
petitioner/plaintiff has failed to prove that a prima facie case exists in
his favour and that the balance of convenience and irreparable loss are
not in favour of the plaintiff. He would further submit that the learned
appellate Court has also dismissed the Misc. Appeal mechanically
without considering the dispute between the parties. Therefore, the
impugned order may be set aside and the possession of the
petitioner/plaintiff may be protected till final adjudication of the suit.
3.
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 on
advance copy would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel
for the petitioner and would submit that, since the loan account of
respondent No. 1 was declared NPA, a proceeding was initiated by
respondent No. 2 before the DRT, which is pending, and in pursuance
of the orders passed by the DRT, auction proceedings were initiated by
respondent No. 2/bank, which were completed on 01.12.2025, and a
certificate was also issued in favour of Mr. Yogesh Kela, who was the
auction purchaser of the subject property, on 17.02.2026. The sale in
favour of the auction purchaser has been confirmed and the sale
certificate has been issued in his favour. The petitioner is claiming title
over the suit property through the registered sale deed dated
25.07.2017; however, the seller was not having absolute right to
alienate the property on that day, as it was a mortgaged property,
which was ultimately auctioned under the supervision of the DRT.
Therefore, the petitioner has no prima facie case, balance of
convenience or irreparable loss in his favour, and the same has rightly
been considered by the learned trial Court as well as the learned
appellate Court. In a petition under Article 227, the Court cannot
consider the factual dispute between the parties and substitute its own
view by setting aside the concurrent findings recorded by the learned
trial Court as well as the appellate Court. Therefore, the petitioner has
no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
4.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the document
annexed with the petition.
5.
The petitioner could not dispute that the subject property was
mortgaged with defendant No. 2 by defendant No. 1, which he claims
to have purchased vide sale deed dated 25.07.2017. The petitioner
also could not dispute that a recovery proceeding before the DRT is
pending, which was initiated by respondent No. 2/bank, and in which
auction proceedings were initiated under the orders passed by the
DRT. The auction proceedings were completed on 01.12.2025, in
which one Mr. Yogesh Kela had purchased the subject property, and
the sale certificate has been issued in his favour on 17.02.2026.
6.
From perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Court, it
transpires that the learned trial Court has also considered this aspect
that the subject property has already been auctioned and the auction
sale has been completed. Having considered the facts and
circumstances of the case, the learned trial Court has found that there
is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and there is no
irreparable loss in his favour. The appellate Court has also considered
the factual as well as legal aspects of the case in detail and came to
the conclusion that the order passed by the learned trial Court is in
accordance with law and there is no need to interfere with that order.
The order passed by the learned appellate Court is a well-reasoned
and quite detailed order, after considering the judgments passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court holding the field.
7.
In the case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra
Shankar Patil” 2010 (8) SCC 329, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that:““40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in
Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena [(1991) 3 SCC
141], wherein it has been held that in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or
reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case
where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person
could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or
tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to
this "limited extent" the High Court has no jurisdiction to
interfere with the findings of fact (see SCC pp. 149-50, para
18). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its
previous decision rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao
v. Ashalata S. Guram [(1986) 4 SCC 447]. The decision in
Chandavarkar is based on the principle of the Constitution
Bench judgments in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v.
Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and Nagendra Nath [Nagendra
Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, AIR 1958
SC 398] discussed above.
41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in Laxmikant
Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi
[(1995) 6 SCC 576]. In SCC para 9 at pp. 579-80 of the
Report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court that under
Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to
correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise
must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant
abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice.
42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of
the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in Lonand
Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi [AIR 1968 SC 222] (see
AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the Report) and the decision of this
Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan [(1970) 2 SCC
717]. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam
Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] about the scope of
Article 227 was again followed in Almedabad Mfg. & Calico
Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnandis [(1972 1 SCC 898].
43*. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Surya
Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], a twoJudges Bench of this Court discussed the principles of
interference by the High Court under Article 227. Of course in
Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6
SCC 675], this Court held that a writ of certiorari is
maintainable against the order of a civil court, subordinate to
the High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the Report). The
correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division
Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath [(2009)
5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a
reference to a larger Bench is pending. But insofar as the
principles on the scope of interference by the High Court
under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of
views.
44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the Report, the
following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai
[Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675] and
they are set out:
"38.(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate
courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a
subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it
does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction
which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is
being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted
by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has
occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to
exercise its supervisory jurisdiction."
45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same
lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case [Surya Dev
Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], SCC pp. 69596)
"38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct
mere errors of fact or of law unless the following
*
Ed.: Para 43 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./84/2010 dated 2608-2010.
requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and
apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when
it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the
provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross
failure of justice has occasioned thereby.
(6)
*
*
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the
supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly
and only in appropriate cases where the judicial
conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a
gross failure of justice or grave injustice should
occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be
exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions
is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit
or proceeding in a subordinate court and the error
though calling for correction is yet capable of being
corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an
appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and
entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth
flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings.
The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the
error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment,
may become incapable of correction at a later stage
and refusal to intervene b would result in travesty of
justice or where such refusal itself would result in
prolonging of the lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or
supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court
of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of
evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or
correct errors of mere formal or technical character."
49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court,
the following principles on the exercise of High Court's
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be
formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is
different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of
exercise of power by the High Court under these two
articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be
called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of
writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different
from the history of conferment of the power of
superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227
and have been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise
of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the
Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or
courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power,
act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or
tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative
statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that
would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this
power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in
exercise of their power of superintendence have been
repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the
High Court must be guided by the principles laid down
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam
Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215]
and the principles in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v.
Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] have been repeatedly
followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and
various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam
Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215], followed in
subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order
only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it,
"within the bounds of their authority".
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such
tribunals and a courts by exercising jurisdiction which is
vested in them and by not declining to exercise the
jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High
Court can interfere in exercise of its power of
superintendence when there has been
a patent
perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts
subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and
manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of
natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High
Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or
fact or just because another view than the one taken by
the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible
view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very
sparingly exercised.
(i) The High Court's power of superintendence under
Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has
been declared a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC
261 : 1997 (L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a
constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather
cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil
Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code
(Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down
the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At
the same time, it must be remembered that such
statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand
the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under
Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised
on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the
power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered
power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires
that the main object of this article is to keep strict
administrative and judicial control by the High Court on
the administration of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative
and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and
orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in
such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute.
The power of interference under this article is to be kept
to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does
not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains
pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public
confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts
subordinate to the High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial
intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief
in individual cases but should be directed for promotion
of public confidence in the administration of justice in
the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant
for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the
power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its
exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline
pointed out above.
8.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power
will be counterproductive and will divest this
extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.””
Upon consideration of the findings recorded by the learned trial Court
and the material available on record, this Court finds that the learned
trial Court has rightly considered the three essential ingredients for the
grant of temporary injunction, namely, existence of a prima facie case,
balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The registered sale
deed dated 25.07.2017 shows that the petitioner/plaintiff purchased the
suit land from defendant No.1. however, the material placed on record
prima facie indicates that the suit property had already been
mortgaged by defendant No. 1 with defendant No.2/bank in the year
2014, much prior to the execution of the sale deed. The plea that the
plaintiff was not informed about the mortgage and that no
corresponding entry was made in the revenue records are matters
which require adjudication on the basis of evidence and cannot, at this
stage, establish a prima facie superior right in favour of the plaintiff.
Further, no material has been brought on record to demonstrate that
the plaintiff would suffer such an irreparable injury, incapable of being
compensated in terms of money, if the injunction is refused, nor does
the balance of convenience lie in his favour. Thus, the conclusion of the
learned trial Court that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie
case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury does not suffer
from any perversity or patent illegality warranting interference.
9.
Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties
and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds
that the learned trial Court, while considering the application under
Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, has examined the relevant factors,
namely, existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and
likelihood of irreparable injury, and has recorded a finding against the
petitioner. The learned appellate Court has also affirmed the said
finding. The dispute as to the validity and effect of the registered sale
deed dated 25.07.2017, the subsisting mortgage in favour of
respondent No. 2, the rights arising therefrom and the subsequent
auction and issuance of sale certificate in favour of the auction
purchaser are matters which would require adjudication on the basis of
evidence in the pending proceedings. In such circumstances, this
Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution, cannot re-appreciate the factual material or substitute its
own view merely because another view may be possible. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) has held that the
jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate and that
interference is warranted only where the subordinate Court has acted
beyond the bounds of its authority, or where there is patent perversity,
gross failure of justice or violation of the basic principles of natural
justice; a mere error of fact or law, or a possible alternative view, does
not justify interference.
10.
Having gone through the entire material produced in the present writ
petition and after perusal of the impugned orders passed by the
learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court, I do not find any
perversity or jurisdictional error in rejecting the application filed by the
plaintiff by the learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court.
11.
Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Alok
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