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2026:CGHC:1128
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 4 of 2026
•
Kamleshwar Singh Thakur S/o Late Shri Resham Singh Thakur Aged
About 70 Years R/o Purani Basti Korba, Tahsil- Korba, District Korba
C.G.
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Revenue
And Disaster Management, Mahanadi Bhawan, Capital Complex, Mantralaya,
Naya Raipur, District Raipur C.G.
2 - Collector, Korba, Distt. Korba C.G.
3 - Superintendent Of Land Records (Diversion Land Branch) Korba, Distt.
Korba C.G.
4 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Korba, Distt. Korba C.G.
5 - Tehsildar, Korba, Distt. Korba C.G.
... Respondents
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Sunil Sahu, Advocate
For State
:
Mr. Rishabh Bisen, Panel Lawyer
Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas
Order on Board
08.01.2026
1.
Heard on admission and also on the objection raised by the State with
regard to availability of alternate and efficacious remedy to the
petitioner.
2.
The petitioner has filed this petition assailing the order dated
05.10.2023 passed by the Collector, Korba by which the petitioner's
Digitally
signed by
BHUMIKA
BHUMIKA ANGARE
ANGARE Date:
2026.01.13
11:24:02
+0530
application for paying additional Court fees as per market rate
prevailing at the relevant time has been rejected on the count that the
application has been filed after lapse of 03 years.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that under Section
165(6) of the Land Revenue Code the order passed by the Collector is
final, therefore, there is no alternate and efficacious remedy available
to the petitioner under the Land Revenue Code as such the instant
petition is very much maintainable before this Court.
4.
On the other hand learned counsel for the State would submit Section
44(1) of the Land Revenue Code provides that Save as otherwise
provided, an appeal shall lie from every original order passed under
this Code or rules made thereunder and Section 44(1)(f) provides that
if such order is passed by the Collector to the Commissioner thereafter
Section 50 also provides for filing of the revision petition, as such,
various efficacious remedies are available to the petitioner, therefore,
the instant writ petition is not maintainable.
5.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record
with utmost circumspection.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that from perusal of
Section 165(6) it is quite vivid that the order passed by the Collector is
final order, as such the appellate forums are not available, therefore,
the writ petition is maintainable which was vehemently objected by
learned counsel for the State.
7.
To consider the rival submission, it is expedient for this Court to extract
Section 44(1) and Section 50 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 which
reads as under:
"Section 44-
Appeal and appellate authorities. (1) Save
where it has been otherwise provided, an appeal shall lie from
every original order under this Code or the rules made
thereunder(a) if such order is passed by any Revenue Officer subordinate
to the Sub-Divisional Officer, whether or not the officer passing
the order is invested with the powers of the Collector-to the SubDivisional Officer;
(b) if such order is passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, whether
or not invested with the powers of the Collector-to the Collector;
(c) if such order is passed by any Revenue Officer subordinate
to the Settlement Officer-to the Settlement Officer;
(d) if such order is passed by any Revenue Officer in respect of
whom a direction has been issued under sub-section (3) of
Section 12 or sub-section (2) of Section 21-to such Revenue
Officer as the State Government may direct;
(e) if such order is passed by a Collector whether exercising the
powers of Collector or Settlement Officer, during the currency of
the term of settlement-to the [Board of Revenue] [Substituted by
Act No. 17 of 2008];
(f) if such order is passed by a Settlement Officer, whether
exercising the powers of Settlement Officer or the powers of a
Collector in connection with any settlement operation unless
otherwise expressly provided-to the Settlement Commissioner;
(g) if such order is passed by the [Commissioner or the]
[Inserted by Act No. 17 of 2008] Settlement Commissioner-to
the Board.
(2) [ Save as otherwise provided a second appeal shall lie
against every order passed in first appeal under this Code or the
rules made thereunder(i) by the Sub-Divisional Officer or the Collector to the
Commissioner;
(ii) by the Settlement Officer to the Settlement Commissioner;
(iii) by the Commissioner to the Board (a) if the original order has in the first appeal been varied or
reversed otherwise than in a matter of cost; or
(b) on any of the following grounds and no other, namely, (i) that the order is contrary to law or usage having the force of
law; or
(ii) that the order has failed to determine some material issue of
law or usage having force of law; or
(iii) that there has been a substantial error or defect in the
procedure as prescribed by this Code, which may have
produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon
merits.]
Section 50- Revision- The Board [or the Commissioner] or the
[Commissioner, Land Records] or the Collector or the [District
Survey Officer] may at any time on its/his motion or on the
application made by any party for the purpose of satisfying
itself/himself as to legality or propriety of any order passed by or
as to the regularity of the proceedings of any Revenue Officer
subordinate to it/him call for, and examine the record of any
case pending before, or disposed of by such officer, and may
pass such order in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit:
Provided that(i) no application for revision shall be entertained(a)against an order appealable under this Code;
(b)against an order of the Settlement Commissioner under
Section 210;
(c)against an order passed in revision by the [Commissioner or]
[Inserted by Act No. 17 of 2008] the Settlement Commissioner in
respect of cases under Section 170-B, nor shall any such order
be revised by the Board on its own motion;
(ii)no such application shall be entertained unless presented
within sixty days to the [Commissioner or] [Inserted by Act No.
17 of 2008] the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the
Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or within ninety days to
the Board of Revenue from the date of the order and in
computing the period aforesaid, time requisite for obtaining a
copy of the said order shall be excluded;
(iii)no order shall be varied or reversed in revision unless notice
has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given
to them of being heard.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)(i) where proceedings in respect of any case have been
commenced by the Board under sub-section (1) no action shall
be taken by the [Commissioner or] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of
2008] the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the
Settlement Officer in respect thereof;
(ii) where proceedings in respect of any case have been
commenced by the [Commissioner] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of
2008] the Settlement Commissioner under sub-section (1), no
action shall be taken by the Collector or the Settlement Officer in
respect thereof;
(iii) where proceedings in respect of any such case have been
commenced by the [Commissioner] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of
2008], Settlement Commissioner, Collector or Settlement Officer
under sub-section (1), the Board may either refrain from taking
any action under this section in respect of such case until the
final disposal of such proceedings by [Commissioner] [Inserted
by Act No. 17 of 2008] the Settlement Commissioner or the
Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or may
withdraw such proceedings and pass such order as it may deem
8.
fit;
(iv)where proceedings in respect of any such case have been
commenced by the [the Commissioner or] [Inserted by Act No.
17 of 2008] the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1), the
Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner may either
refrain from taking any action under this section in respect of
such case until the final disposal of such proceedings by the
Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or may
withdraw such proceedings and pass such order as it may deem
fit."
The word "save as otherwise provided under this code or clause in the
statute or act", is always subject matter of examination in various legal
forum including Hon’ble the Supreme Court. Hon’ble the Supreme
Court in case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Noor Mohammad reported
in 1972 (2) SCC 454 has examined the expression “save as otherwise
provided by or under the Act” and has held at paragraph 8 as under:"8. This power under clause (b), however, is subject to certain
limitations. Sub-section (3) begins with the words "A State
Transport Authority shall give effect to any directions issued under
Section 43, and subject to such directions and save as otherwise
provided by or under this Act shall exercise and discharge
throughout the State the following powers and functions, including
those in sub-clause (b). It is clear, therefore, that the functions
under sub-clause (b) could be discharged by the State Transport
Authority subject to directions given to it under Section 43 of the
Act and save as otherwise provided by or under the Act. In the
present case it is urged that directions have been issued by the
State Government under Section 43. We shall deal with this point
in another place. The other limitation is that the State Transport
Authority could perform the duties of the Regional Transport
Authority under sub-clause (b) save as otherwise provided by or
under this Act. It was contended that the Regional Transport
Authority is a separate authority on which the duties referred to in
clause (b) have been imposed by other provisions in Chapter IV,
and since the State Transport Authority is required to act "save as
otherwise provided by or under the Act" it would be disentitled to
take over the functions under sub-clause (b). Such an
interpretation would obviously lead to grave incongruity. Subclause (b), as we have already seen, provides for the exercise of
the powers of the Regional Transport Authority by the State
Transport Authority in certain contingencies. If the expression
"save as otherwise provided by or under the Act" is construed in a
9.
manner to negative the functions permitted to be performed under
sub-clause (b), the very object with which sub-clause (b) has
been enacted will be frustrated. We have, therefore, to construe
the expression "save as otherwise provided by or under the Act"
in a harmonious manner so that sub-clause (b) is not reduced to
a nullity. In our opinion the expression "save as otherwise
provided by or under the Act" would in the context mean, "save as
otherwise expressly barred by or under the Act". If there is a
provision which expressly debars the exercise of the power under
sub-clause (b) in any case then only the State Transport Authority
will not be able to exercise the powers and discharge the
functions given in sub-clause (b). Otherwise there would be no
such bar. It is not shown to us that there is any express provision
which bars the performance by the State Transport Authority of
the duties referred to in sub-clause (b) and, therefore, we are of
the view that the State Transport Authority in this particular case
would not be barred from performing the duties under sub-clause
(b)."
From the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Noor
Mohammad (supra), it is quite vivid that “save as otherwise provided
by or under the Act” cannot be taken in restrictive manner otherwise it
will defeat the the very object of the Section 44 of the Land Revenue
Code, 1959 and it has to be construed in a harmonic manner so that
the sub-clause (e) of Section 44 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 will
not be frustrated and it cannot be reduced to nullity. As such, it means
“save as otherwise provided by or under the Act” would in the contest
mean “save as otherwise expressly barred by or under the Act”,
therefore, if there is a provision which expressly debar the exercise of
power under sub-clause (e) of Section 44, in any case then only there
will be no appeal before the Commissioner and he will not be able to
exercise his power and discharge the function given in sub-clause (e)
of Section 44.
10.
Learned counsel for the petitioner is not able to show this Court that
there any express provision which bars the performance by the
Commissioner to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, therefore, I am of
the view that the appeal against the order under Section 165 (6) of the
Land Revenue Code, the appeal is maintainable before the
Commissioner (Revenue) and thereafter the revision. As such, the writ
petition is not maintainable, deserves to be dismissed on account of
alternate and efficacious remedy of filing of an appeal and thereafter
revision.
11.
However, if the petitioner prefers an appeal within 30 days from the
date of receipt of copy of this order, the appellate authority or
respondents will not take a plea of limitation as this Court has
condoned the delay in preferring the appeal and will decide the case
on its own merit.
12.
With aforesaid observation and direction, the instant writ petition is
disposed of.
Sd/(Narendra Kumar Vyas)
Judge
Bhumika
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