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[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17903/2025
Kamlesh W/o Tekchand, Aged About 38 Years, Resident
Of Patel Nagar, 2126/2N/6 R, Gali No. 3, Near Patel Nagar
Railway Station, Central New Delhi, Presently Resident Of
Opposite Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar,
District Jaipur (Raj.)
Kunal Son Of Tekchand, Aged About 17 Years, Minor
Through Natural Guardian Mother, Resident Of Patel
Nagar, 2126/2N/6 R, Gali No. 3, Near Patel Nagar Railway
Station,
Central
New
Delhi,
Presently
Resident
Of
Opposite Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar,
District Jaipur (Raj.)
Kanika D/o Tekchand, Aged About 19 Years, Resident Of
Patel Nagar, 2126/2N/6 R, Gali No. 3, Near Patel Nagar
Railway Station, Central New Delhi, Presently Resident Of
Opposite Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar,
District Jaipur (Raj.)
----Petitioners/Plaintiffs
Versus
Pappu Saini Son Of Dedaram Saini, Resident Of Opposite
Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar, District Jaipur
(Raj.)
Geeta Devi W/o Pappuram Saini, Resident Of Opposite
Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar, District Jaipur
(Raj.)
Smt. Kesari Devi, W/o Chothuram Mali
Lalluram, Son Of Chouthram
Indraj, Son Of Chouthram
Phoolchand, Son Of Chouthram
Jadav, D/o Chouthuram
Para D/o Chouthuram,
Respondent/defendant No. 3 To 8 Are Resident Of
Opposite Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar,
District Jaipur (Raj.)
Sultan Son Of Ghisa, Resident Of Ward No. 5, Teka Ki
Dhani, Viratnagar, Tehsil Viratnagar, District Jaipur (Raj.)
(2 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
[CW-17903/2025]
Sub Registrar, Office Of Sub Registrar, Virat Nagar, District
Jaipur (Raj.)
Tehsildar, Tehsil Virat Nagar, District Jaipur (Raj.)
State Of Rajasthan, Through District Collector, Jaipur
(Raj.)
Assistant Engineer, Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Virat
Nagar, District Jaipur (Raj.)
----Respondents/Defendants
Connected With
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15604/2025
Kamlesh W/o Tekchand, Aged About 38 Years, Resident
Of Patel Nagar, 2126/2N/6 R, Gali No. 3, Near Patel Nagar
Railway Station, Central New Delhi, Presently Resident Of
Opposite Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar,
District Jaipur (Raj .)
Kunal Son Of Tekchand, Aged About 17 Years, Minor
Through Natural Guardian Mother, Resident Of Patel
Nagar, 2126/2N/6 R, Gali No. 3, Near Patel Nagar Railway
Station,
Central
New
Delhi,
Presently
Resident
Of
Opposite Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar,
District Jaipur (Raj .)
Kanika D/o Tekchand, Aged About 19 Years, Resident Of
Patel Nagar, 2126/2N/6 R, Gali No. 3, Near Patel Nagar
Railway Station, Central New Delhi, Presently Resident Of
Opposite Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar,
District Jaipur (Raj .)
----Petitioners/Plaintiffs
Versus
Pappu Saini Son Of Dedaram Saini, Resident Of Opposite
Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar, District Jaipur
(Raj .)
Geeta Devi W/o Pappuram Saini, Resident Of Opposite
Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar, District Jaipur
(Raj.)
Smt. Kesari Devi, W/o Chothuram Mali
Lalluram, Son Of Chouthram
Indraj, Son Of Chouthram
(3 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
[CW-17903/2025]
Phoolchand, Son Of Chouthram
Jadav, D/o Chouthuram
Para D/o Chouthuram,
Respondent/defendant No. 1 And 2 Are Resident Of
Opposite Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 5, Virat Nagar,
District Jaipur (Raj .)
Sultan Son Of Ghisa, Resident Of Ward No. 5, Teka Ki
Dhani, Viratnagar, Tehsil Viratnagar, District Jaipur (Raj .)
Sub Registrar, Office Of Sub Registrar, Virat Nagar, District
Jaipur (Raj.)
Tehsildar, Tehsil Virat Nagar, District Jaipur (Raj .)
State Of Rajasthan, Through District Collector, Jaipur
(Raj.)
Assistant Engineer, Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited Virat
Nagar, District Jaipur (Raj .)
----Respondents/Defendants
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Gajendra Singh Rathore with
Ms. Neetu Mathur
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Z.A. Naqvi, Sr. Adv. assisted by
Mr. Sehban Naqvi,
Ms. Rabiya Mateen
Mr. Sahil Khan
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA
Judgment
Reportable
Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments
01.04.2026
Date on which the judgment was reserved
01.04.2026
Whether the full judgment or only the operative Full Judgment
part is pronounced
Date of pronouncement
1.
10.04.2026
Since the present writ petitions arise from a common suit,
both the petitions have been heard together and are being
decided by this Common Judgment.
(4 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
2.
The
writ
petition
No.15604/2025
has
bearing
been
filed
[CW-17903/2025]
No.
S.B.
Civil
Writ Petition
assailing
the
order
dated
11.02.2025, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Virat Nagar,
District Jaipur (Kotputli-Behror) in Civil Suit No.15/2019, whereby
the
application
permission
to
filed
lead
by
the
secondary
plaintiffs–petitioners
seeking
evidence
of
in
respect
the
agreement to sell dated 12.03.2003, which was only available as a
photocopy, has been rejected.
3.
The
writ
petition
No.17903/2025
has
bearing
been
filed
No.
S.B.
Civil
Writ Petition
assailing
the
order
dated
26.08.2025, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Virat Nagar,
District Jaipur (Kotputli-Behror) in Civil Suit No.15/2019, whereby
the application filed by the plaintiffs–petitioners under Sections 35
and 37 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the Act of 1998’) for impounding the agreement to sell dated
12.03.2003 and for sending the same for payment of appropriate
stamp duty has been dismissed.
4.
The controversy arises from the fact that the suit was filed
by the plaintiffs–petitioners for specific performance of the
agreement to sell dated 12.03.2003. The plaintiffs were neither in
possession of the original document nor any certified copy thereof,
and only had a photocopy of the said document. Accordingly, the
petitioners initially filed an application seeking permission to lead
secondary evidence of the agreement to sell dated 12.03.2003.
The learned Trial Court dismissed the said application, holding that
the plaintiffs were seeking to lead secondary evidence on a
document
which
was
insufficiently
stamped
and,
therefore,
inadmissible in evidence. The plaintiffs–petitioners challenged the
(5 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
[CW-17903/2025]
order dated 11.02.2025 by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
15604/2025.
5.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed an application under Section
35 read with Section 37 of the Act of 1998, seeking a direction
that the agreement to sell dated 12.03.2003 be impounded and
sent to the competent authority for the purpose of payment of
appropriate stamp duty, so as to render it admissible under the
provisions of the Act of 1998. However, the said application was
dismissed by the learned Trial Court on the ground that a
photocopy, in the absence of the original document, cannot be
impounded. Consequently, the application was rejected vide order
dated 26.08.2025, which is under challenge in S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 17903/2025.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioners, making submissions in
both the writ petitions, contends that the petitioners ought to be
permitted to lead secondary evidence of the document, as the
original is not in their possession. It was submitted that the
original document is with the Electricity Department. It was
further submitted that the existence of the document has been
sufficiently established, and therefore, the petitioners should be
allowed to adduce the photocopy in secondary evidence.
7.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that once
the
existence
of
the
document
has
been
established,
the
photocopy thereof can also be impounded and sent to the
competent authority for the purpose of payment of requisite
stamp duty, so as to render it admissible under the provisions of
the Act of 1998. Accordingly, it was prayed that the orders dated
11.02.2025 and 26.08.2025 passed by the learned Trial Court be
(6 of 15)
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[CW-17903/2025]
quashed and set aside, and that the agreement to sell dated
12.03.2003 be permitted to be impounded and sent to the
competent authority for payment of stamp duty. Upon such
payment, the petitioners may be permitted to lead the said
document in secondary evidence.
8.
Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-petitioners relied upon the
following judgments to buttress his arguments:
(i) Ferani Hotels Pvt. Ltd. vs State Information
Commissioner Greater Mumbai & Ors.; 2019 (14)
SCC 504.
(ii) Mr. Katike Bheem Shankar vs Mrs. T. Laxmi @
Punyavathi
&
Ors.;
Civil
Revision
Petition
No.
1944/2022 (Decided on 20.12.2022) {High Court of
Telangana, Bench Hyderabad}.
(iii)
Datti
Kameswari
vs
Singam
Rao
Sarath
Chandra & Anr.; AIR 2016 Hyderabad 112.
9.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that
the agreement to sell dated 12.03.2003 is a forged and fabricated
document, and that no such agreement was ever executed. He
further submits that if the petitioners believe that the original
agreement to sell dated 12.03.2003 is in the custody of the
Electricity Department, they are at liberty to obtain a certified
copy of the same under the Right to Information Act, 2005
(hereinafter referred to as ‘RTI Act’).
10.
Learned counsel for the respondents further contends that, if
necessary, the relevant record may be summoned from the
Electricity Department. He submits that the petitioners’ contention
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
(7 of 15)
[CW-17903/2025]
that the original agreement to sell dated 12.03.2003 is with the
Electricity Department is incorrect.
11.
Learned counsel for the respondents also submits that any
document obtained under the RTI Act, which is itself prepared
from a photocopy, cannot be permitted to be adduced as
secondary evidence. He submits that only such copies obtained
under the RTI Act which are reproduced through a mechanical
process directly from the original document may be admissible as
secondary evidence. Therefore, he contends that the original
document
dated
12.03.2003
is
neither
with
the
Electricity
Department nor with any other authority, and reiterates that the
said agreement to sell is false and fabricated.
12.
Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that it is
a settled principle of law that a mere photocopy of a document,
without proof of the existence and execution of the original,
cannot be admitted as secondary evidence. He also submits that if
a photocopy of a document is insufficiently stamped, the same
cannot be impounded by the Court. It is argued that the power of
impounding under the law applies only to original documents, and
not to photocopies. Accordingly, he submits that the learned Trial
Court has rightly rejected the petitioners’ application for leading
secondary evidence vide order dated 11.02.2025, and has also
rightly dismissed the application for impounding the document
vide order dated 26.08.2025, without committing any illegality.
13.
Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the
learned Trial Court has neither committed any illegality nor any
perversity so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise
(8 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
[CW-17903/2025]
of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India.
14.
Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents
relied
upon
the
following judgments to buttress his arguments:
(i)
Tharammel Peethambaran
and Anr. Vs T.
Ushakrishnan and Anr.; 2026 INSC 134.
(ii)
Shankar
Lal
vs
The
Civil
Judge
(Junior
Division), Shahpura and Ors; 2006 RRD 495.
(iii)
Manorama
Srivastava
and
Ors.
vs
Saroj
Srivastava; AIR 1989 All 17.
(iv) Champa Lal vs Panna Lal; 1951 RLW 258
(v) Gordhan Lal Agarwal vs Mali Ram Modi and
Anr; 2013 (1) DNJ (Raj.) 451
(vi) Nihal Singh vs Singh Ram and Ors.; RLR 1989
(1) 384.
(vii) Ram Pratap vs Nar Singh Lal; RLR 1990 (1)
339.
(viii) Sher Khan vs Jitender and Anr.; Misc. Criminal
Case No.5484 of 2024 (Decided on 26.04.2024){High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench Indore}.
(ix) Durga Shankar Bareth vs Shayam Lal; S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No.5511/2021 (decided on 19.09.2022)
{Rajasthan High Court, Bench Jaipur}.
15.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
16.
The core issue that arises for consideration before this Court
is that whether a photocopy document which is insufficiently
stamped can be impounded under Section 35 of the Act of 1998
(9 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
[CW-17903/2025]
and whether a photocopy document if not sufficiently stamped can
be permitted in secondary evidence.
17.
Section 35 of the Act of 1998 clearly provides that an
instrument chargeable with duty shall not be admitted in evidence
for any purpose unless it is duly stamped. The bar contained in
the provision is absolute in nature, subject only to the exception
that such a document may be admitted upon payment of proper
duty along with penalty.
18.
In the present case, admittedly, the agreement dated
12.03.2003 which is insufficiently stamped has been sought to be
lead in secondary evidence. The application to impound the
agreement as well as to exhibit the same in evidence was
preferred by the plaintiffs-petitioners. However, it is a settled
position of law that a photocopy of the insufficiently stamped and
unregistered
agreement
cannot
be
permitted
in
secondary
evidence.
19.
It is a settled proposition of law that what cannot be done
directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. If the original
document itself is inadmissible in evidence for want of proper
stamps and is insufficiently stamped, its secondary evidence
cannot
be
admitted
to
circumvent
the
statutory
bar.
The
admissibility of a document is a condition precedent to its mode of
proof. Only after a document is found admissible in law does the
question of proving it, whether by primary or secondary evidence,
arise.
20.
Therefore,
an
insufficiently
stamped
document,
being
inadmissible in evidence, cannot be looked into even in the form
of secondary evidence unless the defect of stamp duty is first
(10 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
[CW-17903/2025]
cured in accordance with law. The said position of law has been
reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hariom
Agrawal vs. Prakash Chand Malviya ; AIR 2008 SC 166,
wherein the Court has categorically held that the bar contained
under Section 35 is absolute in nature and operates at the
threshold stage of admissibility. It has further been held that
unless the defect of stamp duty is cured, the document cannot be
acted upon or admitted in evidence. Further, a Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court, in the case of Narendra Kumar Shrivastava &
Anr. vs Shri Radhakrishna; S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
1612/2014 (decided on 21.08.2017), while relying on the case of
Hariom Agarwal (supra), held as under:
“While in Hariom Agarwal (supra), a Bench of three
Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court considering
admissibility of the document which was not properly
stamped in evidence held that instrument not properly
stamped was not admissible as evidence and that a
photocopy of original instrument cannot be admitted in
evidence. It was a case wherein the appellant and
respondent executed an agreement whereby landlord
tenanted the shop to appellant on payment of advance
amount. Respondent filed suit on the ground of bonafide
requirement.
Appellant
produced
a
photocopy
of
agreement which was admitted as secondary evidence
in the trial court. On appeal, the High Court held that
photocopy
of
agreement
cannot
be
admitted
as
evidence and that such a document can neither be
impounded nor accepted in secondary evidence. In the
(11 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
[CW-17903/2025]
appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, the
Apex
Court
held
that
Photostat
copy
which
was
produced as secondary evidence did not show that on
the original agreement proper stamp duty was paid and
that
copy
of
instrument
cannot
be
validated
by
impounding and this cannot be admitted as secondary
evidence. Referring to Section 35 of the Indian Stamp
Act, 1988 it was held that the document which was not
properly stamped shall not be admitted in evidence and
the appeal was dismissed.”
21.
Keeping in view, the settled position of law, this Court is of
the firm opinion that secondary evidence in respect of a photocopy
of an insufficiently stamped document is not permissible in the
eyes of law.
22.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs-petitioners have sought to rely
upon a photocopy of the agreement, allegedly obtained from the
Electricity Department under the RTI Act. Under Section 65 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, secondary evidence may be given of
the existence, condition, or contents of a document only when
foundational requirements are satisfied, such as:
• existence of the original document,
• its execution, and
• valid reasons for non-production of the original.
23.
A bare perusal of the record reveals that the plaintiffs-
petitioners have failed to establish the existence and execution of
the original agreement in a legally acceptable manner, the custody
and loss or unavailability of the original document, and that the
photocopy is a true and faithful reproduction of the original. The
(12 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
in
the
[CW-17903/2025]
case
of
Tharammel
Peethambaran (supra) has reiterated that mere production of a
photocopy does not ipso facto make it admissible as secondary
evidence. The party must lay proper foundational facts regarding
the existence, execution, and loss or non-availability of the
original document. Further, impounding under the Act of 1899 is
contemplated with respect to an ‘instrument’. A photocopy does
not answer the description of an instrument capable of being
impounded. Therefore, in absence of the original document, the
question of impounding does not arise. The relevant paragraph of
Tharammel Peethambaran (supra) is reproduced as under:
24. The broad parameters summarising the procedure to be
followed for introducing secondary evidence are reiterated and
read thus:
“20.1. The fundamental principle of the Indian Evidence
Act is that facts have to be established by primary
evidence. Section 64 mandates that documents must be
proved by primary evidence, which is considered the
"best evidence". Primary evidence is the rule, while
secondary evidence is an exception admissible only in
the absence of primary evidence. A party is generally
required to produce the best evidence available; so long
as the superior evidence (the original) is within a party's
possession or reach, they cannot introduce inferior proof
(secondary evidence).
20.2. Before secondary evidence can be admitted, the
party relying on it must lay a factual foundation. This
involves two steps: First, the party must prove that the
(13 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
[CW-17903/2025]
original document actually existed and was executed.
Secondly, the party must establish valid reasons as to
why the original cannot be furnished.
20.3. Secondary evidence is inadmissible until the nonproduction of the original is accounted for in a manner
that brings the case within the specific exceptions
provided in Section 65. If the original itself is found to
be inadmissible through failure of the party who files it
to prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to
introduce secondary evidence of its contents.
20.4. Section 65 of the Evidence Act is exhaustive and
states the specific circumstances under which secondary
evidence
is
permissible.
To
introduce
secondary
evidence, a party must satisfy the conditions of one of
the clauses (a) through (g) of Section 65.
20.5. Further, admitting a document as secondary
evidence does not automatically prove its contents. The
secondary
evidence
must
be
authenticated
by
foundational evidence showing that the alleged copy is,
in fact, a true copy of the original. For instance, if a
party wishes to introduce a photostat copy, they must
explain the circumstances under which the copy was
prepared and who possessed the original at the time the
photograph was taken.
20.6. Mere admission of a document or making it an
exhibit does not dispense with the requirement of
proving it in accordance with the law. The court has an
obligation to examine the probative value of the
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
(14 of 15)
[CW-17903/2025]
document and decide the question of admissibility
before making an endorsement on the secondary
evidence. If the foundational facts, such as the loss of
the original or the explanation for its non-production,
are not established, the court cannot legally allow the
party to adduce secondary evidence.
20.7. There is no requirement that an application must
be filed to lead secondary evidence. While a party may
choose to file such an application, secondary evidence
cannot be ousted solely because no application was
filed. It is sufficient if the party lays the necessary
factual foundation for leading secondary evidence either
in the pleadings or during the course of evidence.”
25.
Moreover, a photocopy of a document does not automatically
become admissible merely because it has been obtained through
official channels. The evidentiary value of such a copy remains
subject to strict proof. When the original document itself is neither
produced nor proved to be in existence, and the authority from
which the copy is obtained does not possess the original, such a
photocopy cannot be treated as reliable secondary evidence. A
photocopy of a photocopy, lacking proper foundational proof, does
not satisfy the requirements of admissibility and cannot be
permitted to be lead in secondary evidence.
26.
The contention of the plaintiffs-petitioners that the learned
Trial Court ought to have impounded the document also does not
advance their case. Impounding presupposes the production of an
original instrument or at least a document capable of being acted
upon under the Act of 1998. However, in the present case, what
(15 of 15)
[2026:RJ-JP:15020]
[CW-17903/2025]
has been produced is merely a photocopy. A photocopy cannot be
impounded in the absence of the original instrument.
27.
In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that an insufficiently stamped document is
inadmissible in evidence unless proper stamp duty and penalty are
paid. Such a document cannot be admitted even in the form of
secondary evidence to bypass the statutory bar. Further, the
photocopy document cannot be impounded under the 35 of the
Act of 1998 by the Court.
28.
The learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the legal
position and has not committed any jurisdictional error in passing
the
impugned
orders
dated
11.02.2025
and
26.08.2025.
Consequently, both the present writ petitions being devoid of
merit are hereby dismissed.
29.
Pending applications, if any, stands disposed of.
(BIPIN GUPTA),J
Sudha/
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