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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SHYNA
AJAY
WPS No. 9001 of 2023
SHYNA AJAY
DN: cn=SHYNA
AJAY,
o=PERSONAL,
st=Chhattisgarh,
c=IN
Judgment Reserved On : 22.01.2026
Judgment Delivered On : 28.02.2026
Kamal Kishor Shondilya S/o Late Shri Balaram Shondilya, Aged 50
Years, R/o Bungalow No.31, Dolphin Plaza, Daldalseoni Road, Mowa,
Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 492014.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Food Corporation Of India Through The Chairman Cum-Managing
Director, Head Quarter 16-20, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi- 110001.
2 - Review Committee, through the Chairman Cum-Managing Director,
Food Corporation Of India, 16-20, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi110001.
3 - Representation Committee Through The Chairman Cum-Managing
Director, Food Corporation Of India, 16-20, Barakhamba Road, New
Delhi- 110001.
4 - General Manager (Region) Food Corporation Of India, Vidhan
Sabha Road, Kapa, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 492005.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Sudeep Johri and Mr. JK Gupta,
Advocates
For Respondent(s) : Mr. RS Patel, Advocate
SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
C A V Order
1. The petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 1.5.2023
(Annexure P/1) passed by the Managing Director, Food
Corporation of India, Establishment No.1, Headquarters, New
Delhi. By the impugned order, in exercise of powers conferred
under Regulation 22 (2) of the FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971 (in
short
“the
Regulations,
1971”),
the
Petitioner
was
pre-maturely/compulsory retired from service, with a direction that
he be paid a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay and
allowance for a period of 03 (three) months calculated at the same
same rate at which he was supposed to be drawing them
immediately before his retirement.
2. The Petitioner has sought for the following relief(s) in this
petition :1- That the Hon'ble court may be kind enough to call
the record of the petitioner.
2- That the Hon'ble Court may be kind enough to issue
a writ/ writs, order/orders, direction/directions and to
command the respondents by appropriate writ /order/
direction to quash the premature retirement order
Annexure P-1 & P-2.
3-That the Hon'ble Court may be kind enough to issue
any other writ, order or direction to the respondents to
reinstate the petitioner in his original post with all back
wages and consequential benefits attached to his post.
3- That the Hon'ble Court may be kind enough to issue
any writ/order/ direction as deemed fit in the
circumstances of the case an pass such orders in
accordance with law.
3. The case of the Petitioner, as projected by him, is that he was
selected and appointed on the post of Manager (Trainee) in the
year 2005 through a formal recruitment process.
He was
subsequently confirmed in the post of Manager (Depot) in 2006.
The Petitioner served at various depots of the Food Corporation of
India (in short “the FCI”) and was lastly posted as the Divisional
Manager, FCI, Bareilly (U.P.). During his tenure at the said place,
certain anonymous complaints were lodged against the Petitioner
alleging fake procurement of food grains. The said complaints
were investigated by a Committee headed by the Chief General
Manager (CGM) of the FCI at Noida. In the enquiry, the
Committee found the complaints to be either incorrect or nonverifiable. Despite this, a re-investigation was ordered by
Respondent No.1. This subsequent investigation conducted by
the CGM and the Assistant General Manager (AGM), similarly
concluded that the complaints were frivolous and incorrect.
Respondent
No.1-
Chairman-cum-Managing
Director,
FCI,
nurtured a grudge against the Petitioner. Consequently, instead of
exonerating the Petitioner based on the investigation findings,
Respondent No.1 handed over the matter to the
CBI.
Subsequently, disciplinary proceedings were initiated and a
memorandum of charge sheet dated 15.6.2021 was issued,
alleging
that
the
Petitioner
caused
a
financial
loss
of
Rs.46,05,045/- to the FCI. In the Departmental Enquiry also, the
Enquiry Officer exonerated the Petitioner of all the charges vide a
report dated
5.1.2022.
However, notwithstanding the said
exoneration, the Disciplinary Authority and the Chairman-cumManaging Director (Respondent No.1) disagreed with the Enquiry
Officer’s findings. Ultimately, they passed a penalty order dated
17.6.2022, directing a reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale
of pay by three stages for a period of three years. The order
further stipulated that the Petitioner would not earn increments to
his pay during the said period, however, the reduction would not
have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay. Being
aggrieved by the aforesaid order 17.6.2022, the Petitioner
preferred an appeal, which is pending for consideration before the
Appellate Authority . Furthermore, the CBI filed a Closure Report
before the CBI Court at Lucknow and this report was duly
accepted by the said Court, effectively exonerating the Petitioner.
The CBI Court observed that no criminality was established and
subsequently closed the investigation.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned
order of premature retirement/compulsory retirement is ex-facie
illegal and arbitrary, as it was passed in violation of Rule 56(j) of
the Fundamental Rules. Pursuant to Rule 56(j), as amended in
accordance with the guidelines and amendments by the Ministry
of
Personnel,
Public
Grievances
and
Pensions
(Office
Memorandum dated 28.8.2020), it is mandatory to serve a three
month prior notice or pay three months pay and allowances in lieu
thereof, to the concerned officer before passing an order of
premature/compulsory retirement. Due to non-compliance with
this statutory requirement, the impugned order dated 1.5.2023 as
well as the subsequent rejection order (representation) dated
6.7.2023, are vitiated and non-est in the eyes of the law. Since
these orders are contrary to the express statutory rules governing
the Petitioner’s service, they are liable to be quashed on this
ground alone. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits
that for officers in Group ‘A’ and Group ‘B’ services, the power to
invoke premature/compulsory retirement cannot be exercised until
the officer has attained the age of 50 years. The Petitioner’s date
of birth is
17.5.1973, as such on 1.5.2023 i..e the date of
issuance of the impugned order, the Petitioner has not reached
the mandatory age threshold.
Under Rule 22(2) of the
Regulations, 1971 and Fundamental Rule 56(j), the completion of
50 years of age is a condition precedent for exercise of such
power. Since the Petitioner has not attained the requisite age on
the date of the impugned order and was furthermore not served
with the mandatory three-month prior notice, the impugned order
is illegal and contrary to the statutory Rules.
5. The petitioner is having an unblemished service record of 18
years. His Annual Confidential Appraisal Reports (APAR) have
been consistently rated as “Very Good” or “Outstanding” from
2005 to 2022. He was granted two special increments in
additional to this regular salary as performance awards and
received a letter of appreciation for his work. While the concerned
respondent authority
issued 13 charge-sheets against the
Petitioner during his service period,
none of these instances
necessitated a Departmental Enquiry; they pertained to a minor
conduct where no such enquiry was required. After submission of
replies by the Petitioner, several penalties were imposed vide
orders
dated
29.6.2013,
28.6.2014,
21.7.2014,
16.7.2014,
18.7.2014, 20.8.2014, 27.8.2014, 27.8.2014, 5.9.2014, 16.9.2014,
16.9.2014, 16.9.2014 and 18.9.2014.
All the aforementioned
orders were duly challenged by the Petitioner before the
competent higher authorities. Upon review, these penalties were
either reduced, modified or set-aside. Subsequently, vide order
dated 09.12.2015, the Petitioner was promoted from the post of
Manager to Assistant General Manager. After promotion, the
Petitioner was transferred from Raipur to the Regional Office of
the FCI in Lucknow and subsequently posted as the Divisional
Manager of the FCI, Barelli Division. His service continued with
successive transfers to Aligarh to Kapurthala and again to
Motihari (Bihar). Throughout the eight year period, not a single
charge sheet or punishment order was issued; conspicuously,
none of these transfers were punitive in nature. A perusal of the
Petitioner’s
Annual
Confidential
Appraisal
Reports
clearly
demonstrate that he has consistently been an efficient officer and
at no point he was considered ‘deadwood’ by the Department.
Since the Petitioner was prematurely/compulsory retired vide the
impugned order, he submitted a representation dated 29.4.2023.
However, without addressing the merits or the specific grounds
therein, the concerned respondent authority summarily rejected
the representation vide order dated 6.7.2023 (Annexure P/2),
while affirming the order of pre-mature/compulsory retirement.
Hence, this petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner
the Petitioner has a
submits that even on merits,
good case. His Annual Performance
Appraisal Reports are exemplary and on that basis alone, the
Petitioner cannot be prematurely/compulsorily retired, as there is
absolutely no adverse material on record against him. Though
certain enquiries were previously initiated against the Petitioner,
however, he was not found guilty of any charges in any of those
proceedings. Furthermore, even in the investigation initiated by
the CBI, no criminality or misconduct was established against the
Petitioner. Hence, the order of premature retirement has no
factual basis and stands in direct contravention of the settled
principles of law regarding compulsory retirement. He also
submits that there is nothing material on record to suggest that the
Petitioner’s continued service was detrimental to the interests of
the Department or that his professional efficiency had diminished.
The impugned order of premature retirement disregards an entire
unblemished career and was passed without any justifiable cause,
thereby suffering from the vices of bias and arbitrariness.
Furthermore, the respondent authority has failed to produce any
evidence to demonstrate that the Petitioner has become
‘deadwood’ or that his utility to the Department has been
exhausted. Since the impugned order is per se illegal and
contrary to both the Regulations, 1971 and Fundamental Rule
56(j), it deserves to be quashed and the Petitioner is liable to be
reinstated in service.
7. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent-FCI submits that
the order of premature retirement was passed in consonance with
the Fundamental Rules and the Regulations, 1971. He submits
that several enquiries were previously also conducted resulting in
various penalties. While some of these were modified in appeal to
the punishment of ‘Censure’, one instance included a recovery of
Rs.1,50,000/- from the Petitioner. He further submits that the
Petitioner was involved in multiple instances of misconduct
throughout his service period. Lastly, some irregularity was
discovered during the procurement process while the Petitioner
was serving as Divisional Manager at FC Bareilly. Consequently, a
penalty was imposed vide order dated 1.6.2021, which led to
reduction of one increment in the time-scale of pay for a period of
one year, without cumulative effect and without adversely affecting
his pension. Subsequently, during his tenure as the Area
Manager, Bareilly, the Petitioner was issued a charge sheet dated
15.6.2021, which detailed the following charges :
Article
I
– Anomalies
observed
in
operating
Paddy
Procurement Centers (PPCs) and in appointment of Handling
and Transport Contractors (HTCs): irrational allocation of
paddy and settlement of transportation charges against the
conditions of HTC during KMS 2017-18 and irregularities in
obtaining and processing undertakings from the rice miller.
Article II-
Fake paddy procurement in connivance with
HTCS/Rice Millers during KMS 2017-18 in Bareilly Division of
FCI.
On the basis of the aforesaid charges, a penalty was imposed
vide order dated 17.6.2022, directing a reduction to a lower stage
in the time-scale of pay by three stages for a period of three
years. The said punishment
order was challenged by the
Petitioner, however, the appeal is pending for final adjudication.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the
impugned order of pre-mature/compulsory retirement is not a
punishment order. According to Fundamental Rule 56(j), the FCI
is empowered to review the performance of its employees and in
appropriate cases, issue orders for premature retirement. Since
an order for premature/compulsory retirement is not a punishment
but is based on the subjective satisfaction of the employer, the
scope of judicial interference is limited. Judicial interference in
such orders is permissible only upon showing of non-application
of mind, malafide, perversity or arbitrariness, however, none of
these elements is present in the instant case. He submits that the
in the case of the Petitioner, the mandatory provisions were duly
followed and the order of premature/compulsory retirement was
passed in accordance with law. Such an order does not warrant
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as
judicial review in such orders is very minimal and normally, the
Courts are reluctant to interfere with the employer’s subjective
satisfaction. He further submits that so far as the Petitioner’s age
is concerned, he had completed 50 years at the time of issuance
of the impugned order, rendering that challenge meritless.
Furthermore, the requirement for notice was fully satisfied; the
rules provide for either three months’ notice or three months pay
in lieu thereof. He submits that as the Petitioner was granted three
months salary vide the impugned order, this ground of challenge
is also inapplicable. Accordingly, the petition devoid of merits is
liable to be dismissed at threshold.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the
documents annexed with the petition with utmost circumspection.
10. From a bare perusal of record as well as the impugned order, it is
evident that the case of the Petitioner is governed by clause 22(2)
of the Regulations, 1971, which reads as under :
“22. Superannuation and retirement:
(2) (A) (i) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Regulation, the Appropriate Authority shall, if it is of the
opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the
absolute right to retire any Corporation employee by giving
him notice of not less than three months in writing or three
months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice:
(a) If he is, in Category I & II service or post in a substantive,
quasi-permanent or temporary capacity and had entered
Corporation service before attaining the age of 35 years,
after he has attained the age of 50 years;
(b) In any other case after he has attained the age of fiftyfive years;
(ii) If on a review of the case either on a representation from
the Corporation employee retired prematurely or otherwise,
it is decided to, reinstate the Corporation employee in
service, the authority ordering reinstatement may regulate
the intervening period between the date of pre-mature
retirement and the date of reinstatement by the grant of
leave
of
the
kind
due
and
admissible,
including
extraordinary leave or by treating it as dies non depending
upon the facts and circumstances of the case:
Provided that the intervening period shall be treated as a
period spent on duty for all purposes including pay and
allowances, if it is specifically held by the authority ordering
reinstatement that the premature retirement was itself not
justified in the circumstances of the case, or, if the order of
premature retirement is set aside by a Court of Law.
(iii) Where the order of premature retirement is set aside by
a Court of Law with specific directions in regard to regulation
of the period between the date of premature retirement and
the date of reinstatement and no further appeal is proposed
to be filed, the aforesaid period shall be regulated in
accordance with the directions of the Court.
(B) (i) Any Corporation employee may, by giving notice of
not less than three months in writing to the Appropriate
Authority retire from service after he has attained the age of
fifty years, if he is in Category I or II service or post, (and
had entered the Corporation service before attaining the age
of 35 years), and in all other cases after he has attained the
age of 55 years:
(a) It shall be open to the Appropriate Authority to withhold
permission to a Corporation employee under suspension
who seeks to retire under this clause.
(b) A Corporation employee referred to in sub-clause (2)(B)
(i) may make request in writing to the Appointing Authority to
accept notice of less than three months giving reasons
therefor;
(c) On receipt of a request under sub-clause (b), the
Appointing Authority may consider such request for the
curtailment of the period of notice of three months on merits
and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of
notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience, the
Appointing Authority may relax the requirement of notice of
three months on the condition that the Corporation
employee shall not apply for commutation of a part of his
pension before the expiry of the period of notice of three
months.
(B) (ii) A Corporation employee, who has elected to retire
under this rule and has given the necessary intimation to
that effect to the Appointing Authority, shall be precluded
from withdrawing his election subsequently except with the
specific approval of such authority:
Provided that the request for withdrawal shall be within the
intended date of his retirement.
(C) Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (2)(A)(i),
the Appropriate Authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is
in the public interest to do so, have the absolute right to
retire a Corporation employee in Category III & IV service or
posts, after he has completed thirty years‟ service by giving
him notice of not less than three months in writing or three
months‟ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice.
(D) A Corporation employee in Category III or IV service or
posts, may, by giving notice of not less than three months in
writing to the Appropriate Authority, retire from service after
he has completed thirty years‟ service.
Note: In computing the notice period of 3 months referred to
above, the date of serving of the notice and that the date of
its expiry shall be excluded.”
11. Further, the case of the petitioner also governs under Rule 56(j) of
the Fundamental Rules, which reads as follows :
F.R. 56:
(j) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the
Appropriate Authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in
the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire
any Government servant by giving him notice of not less
than three months in writing or three months' pay and
allowances in lieu of such notice:
(i) If he is, in Group 'A' or Group 'B' service or post in a
substantive, quasi-permanent or temporary capacity and
had entered Government service before attaining the age
of 35 years, after he has attained the age of 50 years;
(ii) in any other case after he has attained the age of fiftyfive years;
12. The moot question for consideration is whether, pursuant to the
aforementioned Regulations and Rules, the Petitioner had
attained 50 years of age, thereby enabling the respondents to
invoke the provisions governing premature/compulsory retirement
in the instant case.
13. Admittedly, the date of birth of the Petitioner is 17.5.1973 and as
such, on 1.5.2023, the date the impugned order of premature
retirement was issued, the Petitioner had not yet completed 50
years of age. Since attaining the age of 50 years is a condition
precedent for invoking the power of premature retirement under
the relevant Rules and Regulations, the impugned order is legally
unsustainable on this count alone.
14. Now, the second question for consideration is whether the
Petitioner can be classified as ‘deadwood’ for the Department.
While punishment orders were previously issued against the
Petitioner, it is pertinent to note that upon appeal, all such orders
were modified to minor penalty of ‘Censure’. Furthermore, in the
instant matter, the Enquiry Officer initially exonerated the
Petitioner of all the charges and even in the subsequent enquiry,
the Petitioner was found to be innocent and duly exonerated.
Furthermore, even a CBI enquiry directed against the Petitioner
culminated in an exoneration. Despite this, the respondents
proceeded to pass a punishment order, which the Petitioner
subsequently challenged before the Appellate Authority. During
the pendency of the departmental appeal, the impugned
premature/compulsory retirement order was passed on 1.5.2023.
The Petitioner alleges that Respondent No.1 has acted with
malafide intent and personal bias. This is evident from the fact
that when after the initial enquiry, the Petitioner was not found
guilty, Respondent No.1 directed a re-enquiry. When that reenquiry similarly failed to establish guilt, a CBI investigation was
initiated. However, in the CBI enquiry also, when nothing was
found, the concerned respondent authority, without there being
any case, proceeded to pass a punishment order
against the
Petitioner. The said order is presently the subject of an appeal
before the Appellate Authority, which is pending final adjudication.
15. An overall view of these facts shows that the respondents are
intent on penalizing the Petitioner and ensuring his removal from
service by any means necessary. It is evident that the
respondents, anticipating that the pending punishment might be
set-aside by the Appellate Authority, acted with undue haste and
in a preemptive manner. Instead of awaiting the outcome of the
statutory appeal, the respondents chose to issue the order of
premature retirement. It emerges from the record that the service
of the Petitioner has been consistently meritorious. His Annual
Performance Appraisal Reports reflect ‘Outstanding’, ‘Very Good’
and ‘Good’ remarks. When the service record is viewed
cumulatively, it is evident that the the Petitioner does not, by any
stretch of imagination, constitute ‘deadwood’ for the Department
whose removal would be in the public interest.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again held that the
power to order
premature/compulsory retirement must be
exercised with procedural and substantive reasonableness. In a
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Baikuntha Nath Das and another Vs. Chief District Medical
Officer Baripada and another, reported in (1992) 2 SCC 299,
the following was observed in para 12 :
“12. As far back as 1970, a Division Bench of this
court comprising J.C. Shah and K.S. Hegde, JJ.
held in Union of India v. J.N Sinha, [1971] 1 S.C.R.
791, that an order of compulsory retirement made
under F.R. 56 (j) does not involve any civil
consequences,
that
the
employee
retired
thereunder does not lose any of the rights acquired
by him before retirement and that the said rule is
not intended for taking any penal action against the
government servant. It was pointed out that the
said rule embodies one of the facts of the pleasure
doctrine embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution
and that the rule holds the balance between the
rights of the individual Government servant and the
interest of the public. The rule is intended, it was
explained, to enable the Government to energise its
machinery and to make it efficient by compulsory
retiring those who in its opinion should not be there
in public interest. It was also held that rules of
natural justice are not attracted in such a case. If
the appropriate authority forms the requisite opinion
bonafide, it was held, its opinion cannot be
challenged before the courts though it is open to an
aggrieved party to contend that the requisite
opinion has not been formed or that it is based on
collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision.
It is significant to notice that this decision was
rendered after the decisions of this court in State of
Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625 and
A.K.Kraipak v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150.
Indeed, the said decisions were relied upon to
contend that even in such a case the principles of
natural justice required an opportunity to be given
to the government servant to show cause against
the proposed action. The contention, was not
accepted
as
stated
above.
The
principles
enunciated in the decision have been accepted and
followed in many a later decision. There has never
been a dissent - not until 1987.”
17. In a judgment rendered in the the matter of Central Industrial
Security Force Vs. HC (GD) Om Prakash reported in (2022) 5
SCC 100, the following was held in para 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 13 :
4. This Court approved the earlier judgment of this
Court in Union of India v. M.E. Reddy [Union of India
v. M.E. Reddy, (1980) 2 SCC 15 : 1980 SCC (L&S)
179] wherein it was held as under : (SCC p. 22, para
12)
“12. An order of compulsory retirement on one hand
causes no prejudice to the government servant who
is made to lead a restful life enjoying full pensionary
and other benefits and on the other gives a new
animation and equanimity to the services. The
employees should try to understand the true spirit
behind the rule which is not to penalise them but
amounts just to a fruitful incident of the service
made in the larger interest of the country. Even if the
employee feels that he has suffered, he should
derive sufficient solace and consolation from the fact
that this is his small contribution to his country, for
every good cause claims its martyr.”
6. After the judgment in Baikuntha Nath Das
[Baikuntha Nath Das v. District Medical Officer,
(1992) 2 SCC 299 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 521] , a threeJudge Bench in a judgment reported as Posts and
Telegraphs Board v. C.S.N. Murthy [Posts and
Telegraphs Board v. C.S.N. Murthy, (1992) 2 SCC
317 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 710] held that the courts
would not interfere with the exercise of the power of
compulsory retirement if arrived at bona fide and on
the basis of material available on record. The Court
held as under : (C.S.N. Murthy case [Posts and
Telegraphs Board v. C.S.N. Murthy, (1992) 2 SCC
317 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 710] , SCC p. 321, para 5)
“5. … Whether the conduct of the employee is such
as to justify such a conclusion is primarily for the
departmental authorities to decide. The nature of the
delinquency and whether it is of such a degree as to
require the compulsory retirement of the employee
are primarily for the Government to decide upon.
The courts will not interfere with the exercise of this
power, if arrived at bona fide and on the basis of
material available on the record. No mala fides have
been
urged
in
the
present
case. The
only
suggestion of the High Court is that the record
discloses no material which would justify the action
taken against the respondent. We are unable to
agree. In our opinion, there was material which
showed that the efficiency of the petitioner was
slackening in the last two years of the period under
review and it is, therefore, not possible for us to fault
the conclusion of the department as being mala fide,
perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable.”
7. A three-Judge Bench of this Court reported as
Union of India v. Dulal Dutt [Union of India v. Dulal
Dutt, (1993) 2 SCC 179 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 406]
examined the order of compulsory retirement of a
Controller of Stores in Indian Railways. It was held
that an order of compulsory retirement is not an
order of punishment. It is a prerogative of the
Government but it should be based on material and
has to be passed on the subjective satisfaction of
the Government and that it is not required to be a
speaking order. This Court held as under : (SCC pp.
184-85, para 18)
“18. It will be noticed that the Tribunal completely
erred in assuming, in the circumstances of the case,
that there ought to have been a speaking order for
compulsory retirement. This Court, has been
repeatedly emphasising right from R.L. Butail v.
Union of India [R.L. Butail v. Union of India, (1970) 2
SCC 876] and Union of India v. J.N. Sinha [Union of
India v. J.N. Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458] that an order
of a compulsory retirement is not an order of
punishment. It is actually a prerogative of the
Government but it should be based on material and
has to be passed on the subjective satisfaction of
the Government. Very often, on enquiry by the Court
the Government may disclose the material but it is
very much different from the saying that the order
should be a speaking order. No order of compulsory
retirement is required to be a speaking order. From
the very order of the Tribunal it is clear that the
Government had, before it, the report of the Review
Committee yet it thought it fit of compulsorily retiring
the respondent. The order cannot be called either
mala fide or arbitrary in law.”
9. In Union of India v. V.P. Seth [Union of India v.
V.P. Seth, 1994 SCC (L&S) 1052] , relying upon
Baikuntha Nath Das [Baikuntha Nath Das v. District
Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299 : 1993 SCC
(L&S) 521] and other judgments, it was held as
under : (V.P. Seth case [Union of India v. V.P. Seth,
1994 SCC (L&S) 1052] , SCC p. 1054, para 3)
“3. These principles were reiterated with approval in
the subsequent decision. It would, therefore, seem
that an order of compulsory retirement can be made
subject to judicial review only on grounds of mala
fides, arbitrariness or perversity and that the rule of
audi alteram partem has no application since the
order of compulsory retirement in such a situation is
not penal in nature. The position of law having thus
been settled by two decisions [Baikuntha Nath Das
v. District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299 : 1993
SCC (L&S) 521] , [Posts and Telegraphs Board v.
C.S.N. Murthy, (1992) 2 SCC 317 : 1993 SCC (L&S)
710] of this Court, we are afraid that the order of the
Tribunal cannot be sustained as the same runs
counter to the principles laid down in the said two
decisions.”
10. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in a judgment
reported as State of Punjab v. Gurdas Singh [State
of Punjab v. Gurdas Singh, (1998) 4 SCC 92 : 1998
SCC (L&S) 1004] considered the argument that the
order of compulsory retirement was based on
material which was non-existent inasmuch as there
were no adverse remarks against him and if there
were any such remarks, it should have been
communicated to him. This Court held as under :
(SCC p. 99, para 11)
“11. … Before the decision to retire a government
servant prematurely is taken the authorities are
required to consider the whole record of service.
Any adverse entry prior to earning of promotion or
crossing of efficiency bar or picking up higher rank is
not wiped out and can be taken into consideration
while considering the overall performance of the
employee during whole of his tenure of service
whether it is in public interest to retain him in the
service. The whole record of service of the
employee will include any uncommunicated adverse
entries as well.”
13. There are numerous other judgments upholding
the orders of premature retirement of judicial officers
inter alia on the ground that the judicial service is
not akin to other services. A person discharging
judicial duties acts on behalf of the State in
discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation of
justice is not only an onerous duty but has been
considered as discharge of a pious duty, therefore, it
is a very serious matter. This Court in Ram Murti
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Ram Murti Yadav v. State of
U.P., (2020) 1 SCC 801 : (2020) 1 SCC (L&S) 245]
held as under : (SCC p. 805, para 6)
“6. … The scope for judicial review of an order of
compulsory retirement based on the subjective
satisfaction of the employer is extremely narrow and
restricted. Only if it is found to be based on arbitrary
or capricious grounds, vitiated by mala fides,
overlooks relevant materials, could there be limited
scope for interference. The court, in judicial review,
cannot sit in judgment over the same as an
appellate authority. Principles of natural justice have
no application in a case of compulsory retirement.”
18. In
the matter of Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj Vs. Union of
India and another, reported in (2023) 11 SCC 466, the following
was held in para 39 :
“42. Dehors the aforesaid allegations of institutional
bias and malice, having perused the material
placed on record, we find merit in the other grounds
taken by the appellant. It is noticed that though FR
56(j) contemplates that the respondents have an
absolute right to retire a government servant in
public interest and such an order could have been
passed against the appellant any time after he had
attained the age of fifty years, the respondents did
not take any such decision till the very fag end of
his career. The impugned order of compulsory
retirement was passed in this case on 27th
September, 2019 whereas the appellant was to
superannuate in ordinary course in January, 2020.
There appears an apparent contradiction in the
approach of the respondents who had till as late as
in July, 2019 continued to grade the appellant as
‘Outstanding’ and had assessed his integrity as
‘Beyond doubt’. But in less than three months
reckoned therefrom, the respondents had turned
turtle to arrive at the conclusion that he deserved to
be compulsorily retired. If the appellant was worthy
of being continued in service for little short of a
decade after he had attained the age of 50 years
and of being granted an overall grade of 9 on the
scale of 1 - 10 on 31st July, 2019 it has not been
shown as to what had transpired thereafter that
made the respondents resort to FR 56(j) and invoke
the public interest doctrine to compulsorily retire
him with just three months of service left for his
retirement, in routine. In such a case, this Court is
inclined to pierce the smoke screen and on doing
so, we are of the firm view that the order of
compulsory retirement in the given facts and
circumstances of the case cannot be sustained.
The said order is punitive in nature and was passed
to short-circuit the disciplinary proceedings pending
against the appellant and ensure his immediate
removal. The impugned order passed by the
respondents does not pass muster as it fails to
satisfy the underlying test of serving the interest of
the public.”
19. Furthermore, in a judgment rendered in the matter of Nand
Kumar Verma Vs. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2012)
SCC 580, the following was held in para 34 & 36 :
34. It is also well settled that the formation of
opinion for compulsory retirement is based on the
subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned
but such satisfaction must be based on a valid
material. It is permissible for the Courts to ascertain
whether a valid material exists or otherwise, on
which
the
subjective
satisfaction
of
the
administrative authority is based. In the present
matter, what we see is that the High Court, while
holding that the track record and service record of
the appellant was unsatisfactory, has selectively
taken into consideration the service record for
certain years only while making extracts of those
contents of the ACR's. There appears to be some
discrepancy. We say so for the reason that the
appellant has produced the copies of the ACR's
which were obtained by him from the High Court
under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and a
comparison of these two would positively indicate
that the High Court has not faithfully extracted the
contents of the ACRs.
36. The material on which the decision of the
Compulsory retirement was based, as extracted by
the High Court in the impugned judgment, and
material furnished by the appellant would reflect
that
totality
of
relevant
materials
were
not
considered or completely ignored by the High
Court. This leads to only one conclusion that the
subjective satisfaction of the High Court was not
based on the sufficient or relevant material. In this
view of the matter, we cannot say that the service
record of the appellant was unsatisfactory which
would warrant premature retirement from service.
Therefore, there was no justification to retire the
appellant compulsorily from service.”
20. In the matter of Pyare Mohan Lal Vs. State of Jharkhand and
others, reported in 2010 (10) SCC 693, the following was held in
para 22 & 23.
“22.In Vijay Kumar Jain, (supra), this Court held that
the vigour or sting of an entry does not get wiped out,
particularly, while considering the case of employee for
giving him compulsory retirement, as it requires the
examination of the entire service records, including
character rolls and confidential reports. “Vigour or sting
of an adverse entry is not wiped out” merely it relates to
the remote past. There may be a single adverse entry
of integrity which may be sufficient to compulsorily retire
the government servant.
The larger Bench’s judgment
23. In State of U.P. Vs. Ram Chandra Trivedi, AIR 1976
SC 2547, this Court observed that it must be borne in
mind that in cases where there is any conflict between
the views expressed by larger and smaller Bench of
this Court, the court cannot disregard or skirt the views
expressed by the larger Bench. In Triveniben Vs. State
of Gujarat, (1989) 1 SCC 678, this Court considered the
issue and observed as under:
"35.......The practice over the years has been that a
larger bench straightway considers the correctness of
and if necessary overrules the view of a smaller bench.
This practice has been held to be a crystallised rule of
law in a recent decision by a Special Bench of seven
learned Judges. In A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, AIR
1988 SC 1531, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., speaking for
the majority said :
‘The principle that the size of the bench whether
it is comprised of two or three or more judges- does not
matter, was enunciated in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane
Ltd., (1944-2 All ER 293 (CA) (supra) and followed by
Justice Chinnappa Reddy in Javed Ahmad Abdul
Hamid Pawla v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1985 1
SCC 275), where it has been held that a Division Bench
of three judges should not overrule a Division Bench of
two judges, has not been followed by our Courts.
44…... The law laid down by this Court is somewhat
different. There is a hierarchy within the Court itself
here, where larger benches overrule smaller benches.
See the observations of this Court in Mattulal v. Radhe
Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365, Union of India v. K. S.
Subramanian, (1976) 3 SCC 677; and State of U.P. v.
Ram Chandra Trivedi, AIR 1976 SC 2547 at p. 2555.
This is the practice followed by this Court and now it is
a crystallised rule of law.'
36.The answer to the question posed in Javed Ahmad
case, (1985) 1 SCC 275 thus stands concluded and it is
now not open to any one to contend that a bench of two
judges cannot be overruled by a bench of three judges.
We must regard this as a final seal to the controversy."
21. The settled principle governing compulsory retirement is that such
an order must be necessitated by the public interest. To invoke
this power, the concerned authority must establish that the
delinquent's performance has deteriorated to the extent that his
continued service is no longer beneficial to the administration
effectively rendering him ‘deadwood’ for the Department. This is
the sole criteria upon which an employee may be prematurely
retired before reaching the prescribed age of superannuation.
22. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and in light
of the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments, this
Court is of the view that the requisite subjective satisfaction was
not recorded by the respondent authorities before passing the
order of compulsory retirement. On the contrary, the impugned
order was passed in a hurry and haste manner, dehors the settled
principles of law. Such an order, actuated by the whims and
caprices of the officers concerned, is legally unsustainable and
cannot be permitted to operate.
23. For the foregoing, reasons, the impugned order dated 1.5.2023
(Annexure P/1) and the rejection order (representation) dated
6.7.2023 (Annexure P/2) are
hereby quashed/set-aside. The
Respondent Authorities are directed to reinstate the Petitioner in
service with immediate effect, however, such reinstatement shall
be without back wages.
24. With
the aforesaid observations/directions, the Petition is
disposed of.
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Shyna Ajay
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