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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
DATED : 8th NOVEMBER, 2016
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------S.B. : HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crl.A. No.11 of 2015
Appellant
KAIL Limited,
previously known as Kitchen Appliances India Ltd.,
Registered Office C-6, Ashok Steel Compound,
159, C.S.T. Road, Kalina Santacruz (E),
Mumbai – 400 098
Registered Branch Office at
3, Sarat Bose Road, Hakim Para,
WBSC Card Bank Ltd., 2nd Floor,
Siliguri – 734 001,
through its Constituted Power of Attorney Holder
Mr. Manoj Bhattacharyya,
R/o Block – BP, Sector V,
Salt Lake City, Kolkata – 700 091.
:
versus
Respondent
:
1.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar,
S/o Abdul Aziz,
Proprietor of M/s. New Alpha Electronics,
Central Bank Building, Ground Floor,
Gyalshing, West Sikkim,
Resident of House No.59,
Village and Street Gyalshing,
P.S. Gyalshing,
District West Sikkim.
2.
State of Sikkim
through the Chief Secretary,
Government of Sikkim,
Gangtok.
Application under Section 378(4) read with Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Manish Jain, Advocate for the Appellant.
Mr. Ajay Rathi, Ms. Phurba Diki Sherpa and Mr. Rahul Rathi,
Advocates for Respondent No.1.
Mr. S. K. Chettri, Assistant Government Advocate for Respondent
No.2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crl.A.No.11 of 2015
KAIL Limited
vs.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar and Another
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
Assailing the Order of the Learned Judicial Magistrate
(West), Sikkim at Gyalshing, in Private Complaint Case No.1 of
2015 dated 20-04-2015, in which the Learned Trial Court
discharged the Respondent No.1 under Section 138 of The
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short ―the Act of 1881‖), the
instant Appeal has been preferred.
2.
The Appellant‘s case briefly stated is that, it is a Public
Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956,
under the name and style ―KAIL LIMITED‖, on a Certificate issued
by the Deputy Registrar of Companies, Mumbai on 21-01-2008.
Formerly it was known as ―Kitchen Appliances India Limited‖ but
the change in name does not preclude it from initiating and
continuing legal proceedings in its new name.
The Company is
engaged in the sale and purchase of electronic items, such as,
colour TV, VCD, DVD through its Branch Offices, which include
Asansol, Siliguri and other places. The Respondent No.1/Accused
is the Proprietor of a Firm known as ―M/s. New Alpha Electronics‖
also doing business in electronic products and is run by the
Respondent
No.1.
The
Respondent
No.1
entered
into
a
Dealership Agreement with the Appellant Company and also
opened a Credit Account with the Lucknow Branch of the
Appellant Company, in the name of its Firm and obtained various
electronic items from time to time on credit from the Appellant
Company. Consequently, a sum of Rs.5,54,037/- (Rupees five
Crl.A.No.11 of 2015
KAIL Limited
vs.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar and Another
lakhs fifty four thousand and thirty seven) only, was due and
payable by the Respondent No.1 to the Appellant Company, for
which he issued a Cheque bearing No.359607 dated 16-12-2010
for a sum of Rs.5,54,037/- (Rupees five lakhs fifty four thousand
and thirty seven) only, drawn on the State Bank of India, Pelling
Branch in favour of ―Kitchen Appliances India Ltd.‖ as payment.
The said Cheque was duly signed by the Respondent No.1 as the
Proprietor of his Firm. The Appellant Company deposited the said
cheque on 12-01-2011 for realisation before its Banker HDFC
Bank Limited, Aurangabad Branch, but was dishonoured with the
remark
―insufficient
funds‖
vide
Memo
dated
09-02-2011,
information of which was given by the bank and received by the
Appellant on 23-02-2011.
The Appellant then issued a legal
Notice dated 18-03-2011 to the Respondent No.1 calling upon
him to pay the amount of the dishonoured Cheque as per the
statutory period of fifteen days, from the date of service of Notice
on him. The Notice was sent through Registered AD at the usual
place of business of the Respondent No.1, but was returned with
the remarks “addressee out of station hence rtd to sender”. That,
the Notice is deemed to have been served.
3.
The
Appellant
duly
appointed
Mr.
Manoj
Bhattacharyya on 15-01-2013 as its Constituted Attorney and
authorised him to file, defend and depose on behalf of the
Company being conversant with the transactions of the various
debtors and dealers of the Company.
It was also averred that
earlier the matter was filed before the Court of the 9 th Judicial
Crl.A.No.11 of 2015
KAIL Limited
vs.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar and Another
Magistrate, First Class, Aurangabad, who vide his Order dated 1612-2014 relying on the Judgment of Dashrath Roopsing Rathod vs.
State
of
Maharashtra
and
Another1
held
that
the
territorial
jurisdiction of the case did not vest in his Court, the Cheque being
dishonoured in Pelling Branch, hence, the Complaint before the
Court
of
the
Learned
Judicial
Magistrate,
West
Sikkim
at
Gyalshing. In view of all of the above, the Respondent No.1 has
committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881.
4.
The
Learned
Trial
Court
after
considering
the
pleadings, documents on record and examining the Power-of
Attorney Holder summoned the Respondent No.1. After hearing
the submissions of Learned Counsel however the Learned Trial
Court discharged him of the offence under Section 138 of the Act
of 1881.
5.
Before this Court, it was argued by Learned Counsel
for the Appellant that although the Notice sent by Registered AD
was returned with the report that the addressee was out of
station, in view of Section 27 of The General Clauses Act, 1897
and Section 114 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is assumed
that the Notice was duly served.
On this count, reliance was
placed on C. C. Alavi Haji vs. Palapetty Muhammed and Another2. It
was further contended that the Power-of-Attorney holder has
been duly authorised by the Company to file the Complaint and,
therefore, the Learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the Complaint
only on the ground that the document was a photocopy. Relying
1.
2.
(2014) 9 SCC 129
(2007) 6 SCC 555
Crl.A.No.11 of 2015
KAIL Limited
vs.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar and Another
only on the ground that the document was a photocopy. Relying
on the decision of A. C. Narayanan vs. State of Maharashtra and
Another3
it was urged that the Power-of-Attorney holder can
appear for the principal.
The Learned Trial Court had also
observed that no prima facie case was found against the
Respondent No.1, but the Cheque itself was sufficient to prove a
It was further argued that ―Kitchen Appliance
prima facie case.
India Limited‖ and ―KAIL‖ are one and the same Company and
there has merely been change in the name of the Company,
hence the impugned Order be set aside.
6.
Per
contra,
the
arguments
put
forth
by
the
Respondent No.1. was that in the first instance the Complaint
does not mention the name of the Power-of-Attorney holder
neither does the signature of the Attorney holder appear in the
photocopy of the “General Power of Attorney” filed before the
Learned Trial Court. That, Annexure 2 which pertains to change
of the name from ―Kitchen Appliances India Limited‖ to ―KAIL
LIMITED‖ allegedly effected in November, 2008, was filed only
before this Court and not before the Learned Trial Court and
therefore,
cannot
be
taken
into
consideration.
Since
the
Agreement, Annexure 4, pertained to the Respondent No.1 and
Kitchen Appliances India Limited and not KAIL and the Cheque in
question is also made out to Kitchen Appliances India Ltd. in the
year 2010, the Respondent No.1 has no lawful debt or liability
towards the Appellant and the Appellant has no locus standi. It
3.
(2014) 11 SCC 790
Crl.A.No.11 of 2015
KAIL Limited
vs.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar and Another
was further contended that the Statement of Accounts showing
the dues as reflected in the Cheque or Way Bills have not been
revealed, this being necessary in view of the fact that the alleged
dues is said to be Rs.5,54,347/- (Rupees five lakhs fifty four
thousand three hundred and forty seven) only, but to the
contrary, the credit limit allowed to the Respondent No.1, in
terms of Annexure 4 extends only Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one
lakh and fifty thousand) only.
It is the specific contention of the
Respondent No.1 that blank Cheques were taken by way of
security by Kitchen Appliances India Limited when the Agreement
was executed which are now being misused by KAIL.
It was also
urged that assuming KAIL came into existence after change of
name, no new Agreement was signed between the Respondent
No.1 and KAIL.
That, although the Appellant alleges that both
―Kitchen Appliances India Limited‖ and ―KAIL‖ are ‗Limited
Companies‘ which prove that they have Equity Shares, but no
evidence has been furnished by the Appellant to reveal that the
Share Holders were informed of the change of name. However,
he admits receipt of Notice. To buttress his submissions, he has
placed reliance on Govind Ram Chanani vs. Latha and Another4, Mrs.
Alka Toraskar vs. The Vaishya Urban Co-op. Credit Society Ltd. and
Another5, Om Shakthi SC/ST and Minority Credit Co-operative Society
Ltd. vs. M. Venkatesh6 and Prasanta Kumar Basu vs. Narendra Kumar
Anchalia and Another7.
It is urged that the Order of the Learned
Judicial Magistrate, West, being a reasoned Order requires no
interference by this Court.
4.
6.
2009 CRI.L.J. 2154 (Karnataka)
2008 CRI.L.J. 998 (Karnataka)
5. 2007 CRI.L.J. 858 (Bombay)
7. 2007 CRI.L.J. 1026 (Calcutta)
Crl.A.No.11 of 2015
KAIL Limited
7.
vs.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar and Another
I have heard the rival contentions of Learned Counsel
for the parties at length and given due consideration. I have also
perused the records of the Learned Trial Court along with the
documents and provisions of the Laws relied on and perused the
impugned Order and the citations made at the Bar.
8.
Bearing in mind the arguments advanced at the Bar,
the question that falls for consideration before this Court is
whether the impugned Order is incorrect or illegal?
9.
Addressing the first argument of the Appellant that
Notice is deemed to be served in terms of Section 27 of The
General Clauses Act, 1887 and Section 114 of The Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, it is pertinent to recall here that Learned
Counsel for the Respondent No.1 fairly conceded receipt of Notice.
In view of this admission, this point does not require a verbose
discussion the admission having given a quietus to this issue.
10.
Now, coming to the matter germane to the issue at
hand is, whether the Power-of-Attorney holder can represent the
Appellant Company, with a photocopy of the said document?
11.
We may firstly refer to the provision of Section 142 of
the Act of 1881, which for the sake of convenience, is being
extracted hereinbelow;
“142. Cognizance of offences.—Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any
offence punishable under section 138
except upon a complaint, in writing, made
Crl.A.No.11 of 2015
KAIL Limited
vs.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar and Another
by the payee or, as the case may be, the
holder in due course of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of
the date on which the cause-of-action
arises under clause (c) of the proviso to
section 138 :
Provided that the cognizance of a
complaint may be taken by the Court after
the prescribed period, if the complainant
satisfies the Court that he had sufficient
cause for not making a complaint within
such period.
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan
Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the
first class shall try any offence punishable
under section 138.”
Thus, in terms of the above provision, no Court shall take
cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Act of 1881, except upon a Complaint, in writing, made by the
payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the
Cheque.
In the light of the above provision, we may now
examine whether the Power-of-Attorney is legally acceptable in
the instant case. It was argued by the Appellant that the Powerof-Attorney did not bear the name of the Power-of-Attorney
holder neither did the Complaint mention his name.
Perusal of
the Complaint before the Learned Judicial Magistrate and perusal
of the “General Power of Attorney” would belie this submission as
both bear the name of ―Manoj Bhattacharyya‖ the Power-ofAttorney holder and therefore, this argument of Learned Counsel
for the Respondent No.1 is no legs to stand. That, having been
said, we may now gainfully refer to the decision in A. C.
Narayanan3 (supra) wherein it was held as follows;
“30. In the light of the discussion, we are of the
view that the power-of-attorney holder may be allowed to
file, appear and depose for the purpose of issue of
process for the offence punishable under Section 138 of
the N.I. Act. An exception to the above is when the
Crl.A.No.11 of 2015
KAIL Limited
vs.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar and Another
power-of-attorney holder of the complainant does not
have a personal knowledge about the transactions then
he cannot be examined. However, where the attorney
holder of the complainant is in charge of the business of
the complainant payee and the attorney holder alone is
personally aware of the transactions, there is no reason
why the attorney holder cannot depose as a witness.
Nevertheless, an explicit assertion as to the knowledge of
the power-of-attorney holder about the transaction in
question must be specified in the complaint. …………….
…………………………………………………………………..
33.3
It is required by the complainant to make
specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power-ofattorney holder in the said transaction explicitly in the
complaint and the power-of-attorney holder who has no
knowledge regarding the transactions cannot be
examined as a witness in the case.”
12.
In the instant case although the Power-of-Attorney
has been filed by the holder of the document, however, as
pointed out in the impugned Order the same is in photocopy. The
document filed before the Learned Trial Court, i.e., the General
Power of Attorney, also does not bear the original signature of
either the person granting the authorisation or the person being
so authorised. Besides, although the General Power of Attorney is
said to have been issued by the Company‘s Director Shri Shankar
S/o Sonaji Khande, his signature has not been identified on the
document. Undoubtedly, the Power-of-Attorney empowers an
agent to affect his principal‘s position by doing acts on his behalf,
the relationship perhaps arising out of an ailment, old age or
other inconveniences of the principal or when the Company as a
juristic person authorises a representative. It is also settled Law
that a Manager or any other person authorised by the Company
can represent it during the course of legal proceedings before the
Court and he can also file a complaint. However, the restriction
that extends to the Power-of-Attorney holder is that he cannot
depose for the principal in respect of facts which are not in his
Crl.A.No.11 of 2015
KAIL Limited
vs.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar and Another
personal knowledge. This has succinctly been laid down in Janki
Vashdeo Bhojwani and Another vs. Indusind Bank Ltd. and Others8
which was referred to in A. C. Narayanan3 (supra).
But when a
document is in photocopy with the signatures also in photocopy, it
is legally not tenable to accept the document and to allow its
contents in evidence and therefore, to allow the Power-ofAttorney holder to represent the Company.
No reasons have
been put forth for non-filing of the original Power-of-Attorney or
for that matter a certified copy of the said document.
13.
With regard to Annexure 2, as pointed out by Learned
Counsel for Respondent No.1 this document has been filed
without the permission of this Court, the same not having been
filed in the Magisterial Court and thus merits no consideration.
Insofar as debt and liability is concerned, Section 139 of the Act
of 1881 comes into play which provides that, it shall be presumed
unless the contrary is proved that the holder of a Cheque received
the Cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 of the Act of
1881 for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other
liability.
Of
course,
the
presumption
is
a
―rebuttable
presumption‖.
14.
In view of the discussions hereinabove, I find no error
in the Order of the Learned Trial Court which therefore, calls for
no interference.
15.
8.
In the result, the Appeal is dismissed.
(2005) 2 SCC 217
Crl.A.No.11 of 2015
KAIL Limited
16.
vs.
Mr. Jamel Akhtar and Another
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
08-11-2016
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