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Page No.# 1/9
GAHC010286422025
2026:GAU-AS:13740
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : RSA/90/2026
JOYNAL HUSSAIN BARBHUIYA AND ANR
S/O LATE AHMED ALI BARBHUIYA, VILL- BARNAGAD, P.S.- ALGAPUR,
DIST- HAILAKANDI, P.O.- KALIBARI BAZAR, PIN-788150
2: ALI HUSSAIN BARBHUIYA
S/O LATE AHMED ALI BARBHUIYA
VILL- BARNAGAD
P.S.- ALGAPUR
DIST- HAILAKANDI
P.O.- KALIBARI BAZAR
PIN-78815
VERSUS
BASIR UDDIN LASKAR AND ANR
S/O LATE RASHID ALI LASKAR, R/O VILL- ALGAPUR PART-I, P.S.ALGAPUR, P.O.- KALIBARI BAZAR, DIST- HAILAKANDI, PIN-788150
2:MUSSSTT. SUFIA BEGUM LASKAR
W/O BASIR UDDIN LASKAR
R/O VILL- ALGAPUR PART-I
P.S.- ALGAPUR
P.O.- KALIBARI BAZAR
DIST- HAILAKANDI
PIN-78815
Advocate for the Petitioner
MAZUMDER
: MR. A CHOUDHURY, MR. R A CHOUDHURY,MR. R A
Advocate for the Respondent : MR N A MAZARBHUIYA(R1,2), MR. A K AZAD(R1,2),MR M
HUSSAIN(R1,2),MR. N HAQUE(R1,2)
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BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
ORDER
16.09.2026
Heard Mr. A. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. N. Haque,
learned counsel for the respondents.
2.
This appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is directed
against the Judgment and Decree, dated 01.08.2025, passed by the learned
Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Hailakandi (hereinafter, ‘First Appellate Court’), in Title
Appeal No. 08/2024, whereby, the appeal filed by the appellant/defendant has
been dismissed and thereby, upheld the Judgment and Decree, dated
25.04.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) No. 2, Hailakandi
(hereinafter, ‘Trial Court’), in T.S. No. 113/2006.
3.
For the sake of conveyance, the status of parties hereinafter will be referred
to as indicated in the Title Suit No. 113/2006.
4.
Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants submits that
the defendants, being the owner of the suit schedule land, agreed to sell it to
the plaintiffs on a consideration of Rs. 48,000/- and executed an agreement for
sale on 01.10.2003, in favour of the plaintiffs and received a sum of Rs.
25,000/- as advance. They promised to execute a registered sale deed in favour
of the plaintiffs, if the plaintiff pays the remaining sum of Rs. 23,000/- within
one month from the date of execution of the bainanama/agreement.
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Thereafter, the defendants, in need of money, within the period fixed in the
bainanama, i.e., on 30.10.2003, again received Rs. 10,000/- from the plaintiffs
and executed a fresh bainanama/agreement (agreement for sale), extending the
period of the earlier executed bainanama, and also accepted that they have
received Rs. 35,000/- in total on the two dates, and upon receipt of the
remaining amount of Rs. 13,000/- from the plaintiffs within 31.12.2004, they
would execute and register the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. It was also
agreed that in the event of failing to execute the sale deed on their own, the
plaintiffs would be entitled to get it executed and registered through the Court,
and that after expiry of the stipulated period, the plaintiffs will not be entitled to
demand the money paid by them, etc.
Thereafter, being ready with the remaining amount of consideration, the
plaintiffs asked the defendants verbally to execute the sale deed by accepting
the remaining amount of sale consideration. But, when they observed that the
defendants were delaying the process, the plaintiffs had served one legal notice
to the defendants on 20.12.2004, thereby asking them to execute and register
the Sale Deed on 29.12.2004, by appearing before the deed writer, namely,
Samsul Haque Laskar, at Hailakandi Bar, within 10 AM to 4 PM. But, the
defendants failed to turn up on the said date.
Then, being aggrieved, the plaintiffs had instituted a suit, being Title Suit
No. 113/2006, for specific performance of the agreement and for execution of
the Sale Deed, through the Court, in the event of failure of the defendant to
execute the sale deed; and for delivery of khas possession of the title suit.
4.1
Mr. Choudhury further submits that the defendants have filed their joint
Page No.# 4/9
statement, wherein, they have taken a plea of no cause of action and nonmaintainability of the suit and denied the contention of the plaintiffs. They had
stated that the plaintiffs had violated the terms of the bainanama, dated
01.10.2003, and as such, the suit is liable to be dismissed. They also stated that
in order to supress their failure, the plaintiffs had prepared the second
agreement, being in collusion with the witnesses, and have filed the instant suit
against them falsely. They had also stated that they had executed a
bainanama/agreement on 01.10.2003, whereby, they promised to execute and
register the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs, if the plaintiffs pay the
remaining amount of Rs. 23,000/- to them, within one month from the date of
execution of that bainanama. And if the plaintiffs did not pay the remaining
amount within the period of one month, and the sale deed is not executed, the
plaintiffs will not be entitled to receive the amount that they have already paid.
During the period of the said bainanama, they approached the plaintiffs to
execute the sale deed and to get the remaining amount of consideration from
them, but they failed to do so and as such, they did not receive the remaining
amount of consideration from the plaintiffs.
4.2
Upon the aforementioned pleadings, the learned Trial Court has framed
the following issues –
“1.
Whether the defendants on receiving another amount of
Rs.10,000/- in advance on 30/10/2003 executed another
bainapatra by enhancing the stipulated period of earlier
bainapatra dated 01/10/2003 ?
2.
Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
Page No.# 5/9
3. To what relief or reliefs plaintiff is entitled to?”
And thereafter, the learned Trial Court has answered all the issues in
affirmative and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs, vide impugned Judgment and
Decree, dated 25.04.2024.
4.3 It is the further submission of Mr. Choudhury that being aggrieved; the
respondents herein have preferred an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 8/2024, on
several grounds and the learned First Appellate Court had formulated the
following points for determinationꟷ
“(1) Whether the defendants on receiving another amount of
Rs.10,000/- in advance on 30.10.2003, executed another
bainapatra by enhancing the stipulated period of earlier
bainapatra dated 01.10.2003?
(2)
Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
(3)
To what relief or reliefs plaintiffs are entitled to?”
And thereafter, hearing the learned counsel for both the parties, the learned
First Appellate Court had decided all the points in affirmative in favour of the
plaintiffs and thereby, upheld the Judgment and Decree, dated 25.04.2024,
passed by the learned Trial Court, in Title Suit No. 113/2006.
4.4
Mr. Choudhury also submits that being aggrieved, the appellants have
approached this Court by filing the present appeal, under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, mainly on the ground that both the learned Courts
below, while deciding the title suit and the title appeal, had not formulated any
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issue on the point of continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the
plaintiffs. And accordingly to Mr. Choudhury, this issue is a vital issue and for
non-framing of any issue on this point, and also due to not directing any
discussion to the issue, and also due to absence of any conclusion to that effect;
the appellants herein suffer serious prejudice and therefore, he has contended
to set aside the impugned Judgment and Decree, passed by the learned First
Appellate Court and to remand the matter, by formulating an issue on the point
of continuous readiness and willingness, as required under Section 16(c) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963.
4.5 In support of his contention, Mr. Choudhury has referred to a decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Vs. Premlata Joshi
and Others, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 704. He submits that in paragraph No.
7 of the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that ꟷ
“7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of
specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief.
The material questions, which are required to be gone into for
grant of the relief of specific performance, are:
7.1. First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract
between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property.
7.2. Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to
perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and
willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract.
7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his
part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in
what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in
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conformity with the terms of the contract;
7.4. Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of
specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in
relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship
to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the
extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff;
7.5. Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any
other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money, etc.
and, if so, on what grounds.”
Thereafter, in paragraph No. 8 of the aforesaid Judgment, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that ꟷ
“8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of the
statutory requirements [Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of Appendices A to C
of the Code of Civil Procedure]. These requirements have to be
properly pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings
and proved with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It
is only then the Court is entitled to exercise its discretion
and accordingly grant or refuse the relief of specific
performance depending upon the case made out by the parties on
facts.”
5.
Mr. Haque, learned counsel for the respondents, also conceded to the
submission of Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellants. Mr. Haque has
referred to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.
Kandasamy
(Since
Dead)
and
Others
Vs.
T.R.K.
Sarawathy
and
Another, reported in (2025) 3 SCC 513, wherein, in paragraph No. 18, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision in the case of Kamal
Page No.# 8/9
Kumar (Supra), in paragraph Nos. 7 & 8; and reaffirmed the said
proposition in the said case.
5.1
Relying upon the aforementioned decision, Mr. Haque also submits that
the learned Courts below ought to have framed one issue on the point of
continuous willingness and readiness on the part of the plaintiffs. And since
none of the Courts below had framed any issue/point for decision/determination
on the aforementioned point, he suggests that an issue may be formulated
under Order 41 Rule 25, and the matter may be remanded to the learned First
Appellate Court for a fresh decision, by allowing the parties to adduce evidence,
if warranted.
6.
Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for both the parties,
this Court has carefully gone through the memo of appeal and the grounds
mentioned therein, and also gone through the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, referred to by the learned counsel for both the parties.
7.
Indisputedly, no issue on the point of continuous readiness and willingness
on the part of the plaintiffs, has been framed by any of the learned Courts
below and it appears from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Kamal Kumar (Supra), that one issue ought to have been framed to
determine the continuous readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs to perform
their part of the contract.
8.
Accordingly, taking note of the submissions of the learned counsel for both
the parties and also taking note of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
on the aforesaid legal proposition, this Court is inclined to remand the matter to
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the learned First Appellate Court for a fresh decision, by exercising jurisdiction
under Order 41 Rule 25 of the CPC; and by formulating the following point for
determination ꟷ
“Whether the plaintiffs were continuously ready and willing to
perform their part of the contract and whether, they are still
ready and willing to perform their part, as mentioned in the
bainanama/agreement?”
9. It is further provided that the parties may be afforded an opportunity to
adduce evidence in support of their case and thereafter, hearing arguments of
both the parties, a fresh decision shall be pronounced.
10. In order to facilitate in carrying out of the aforementioned exercise, the
impugned Judgment and Decree, dated 01.08.2025, passed by the learned First
Appellate Court, in Title Appeal No. 08/2024, stands set aside and quashed.
11. In terms of the above, this RSA stands disposed of, leaving the parties to
bear their own costs. It is also provided that both the parties shall appear
before the learned First Appellate Court, on or before 10.11.2026.
JUDGE
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