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GAHC010273262025
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WA/403/2025
JOY BRATA KUNDU
DIST. DHUBRI
2: DEBABRATA KUNDU
BOTH ARE SONS OF JIBAN KRISHNA KUNDU AND RESIDENTS OF T.R.
PHUKAN ROAD
WARD NO. 2
DHUBRI TOWN
P.O. AND P.S. DHUBRI
DIST. DHUBRI
ASSAM
PIN 78330
VERSUS
STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
AND EMPOWERMENT, PIN 781006, ASSAM
2:JIBAN KRISHNA KUNDU
S/O LATE JANENDRA CHANDRA KUNDU R/O T.R. PHUKAN ROAD
WARD NO. 2
DHUBRI TOWN
P.O. AND P.S. DHUBRI
DIST. DHUBRI
ASSAM
PIN 78330
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MR. S SAHU, MS A ROY,MS. R BHARGAV,T BHARALI
Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, MR. Z. HUSSAIN(R2),MS. R CHOUDHURY (R2)
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BEFORE
HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. ASHUTOSH KUMAR
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
For the Appellants
: Mr T. Bharali, Adv.
For the Respondents
: Ms R. Choudhury, Sr. Adv.
: Ms. S.E.Murtaza, Adv.
: Ms P. Chakraborty, Adv.
Date on which judgment was reserved
: 05.05.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 19.05.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
operative part of the judgment?
: NA
Whether the judgment has been pronounced?
: Yes
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
(Arun Dev Choudhury, J)
1.
Heard Mr. T. Bharali, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants.
Also heard Ms. P. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1,
and Ms R. Choudhury, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. S.E.Murtaza,
learned counsel for the respondent No. 2.
2.
The present intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment and order
(CAV) dated 18.11.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge, in WP(C) No.
3504/2025, whereby the writ petition preferred by the present appellants
came to be dismissed and the order dated 30.05.2025, passed by the
Maintenance Tribunal, Dhubri directing eviction of the appellants from the
self-acquired property of their father, namely, respondent No. 2 herein, was
upheld.
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3.
The facts are in a narrow compass.
4.
The respondent No.2 is a senior citizen and the father of the present
appellants. He is the admitted owner of the property in question, being a
residential building, standing on his self-acquired land situated at Dhubri
Town.
5.
The appellants, who are two sons, along with their respective family
members, including their wives, were residing in a portion of the said
premises with the permission of the respondent No.2.
6.
Alleging neglect,
harassment
and interference with his peaceful
enjoyment of the property at the hands of the appellants and their family
members, the respondent No. 2 approached the Maintenance Tribunal,
Dhubri, seeking eviction of the appellants from the premises.
7.
The pleadings of the respondent No. 2, before the learned Tribunal, disclose
that the dispute was not projected merely as a claim for monetary
maintenance, but as a grievance of prolonged physical, mental and
emotional harassment, coupled with deprivation of the peaceful enjoyment
of his self-acquired property. The respondent No. 2 specifically pleaded that
after permitting the appellants and their family members to reside on the 1 st
floor of the building out of parental affection, the relationship subsequently
deteriorated and the appellants allegedly subjected him to sustained neglect
and harassment.
8.
The respondent No.2 further pleaded before the Tribunal that the dispute
had arisen concerning a financial transaction and certain fraudulent property
dealings belonging to the respondent No. 2 behind his back, allegedly
undertaken by the appellants in collusion with a third party, by forging the
signature of the respondent No.2, which, according to him, caused serious
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mental agony and insecurity in his old age. The pleadings also refer to
several criminal proceedings, complaints before the police authorities and
proceedings before other forums arising out of the dispute between the
parties over a prolonged period of time.
9.
The respondent No. 2 further alleged that despite his advanced age and
illness, the appellants neglected to maintain or properly look after him and
that he was compelled to live separately, even within the same premises,
with a separate kitchen.
10.
The respondent No.2 also specifically pleaded that he no longer desired the
appellants and their family members to continue occupying the premises,
and that he had publicly declared the severance of his relationship with
them (by declaring them “Tejya Putra”). He accordingly, sought eviction of
the appellants and their family members from the 1 st floor portion of the
self-acquired property so as to enable him to peacefully enjoy the premises
during the evening of his life.
11.
In substance, it was the case of the respondent No.2 that he desired to live
peacefully in his own residence with serious allegations, such as, the three
families are residing in the same complex, the respondent No. 2, a 86 years
old retired bank employee, is compelled to have a separate kitchen and he
has been thoroughly neglected by the appellants; they even refused to give
him food and treatment at a time when he was ill, fell down inside his
bathroom and got injured; they fradulently transferred/mortgaged his
property; tortured him physically and mentally.
12.
Before the learned Tribunal, the appellants filed a joint written statement.
13.
In the said written statement, the appellants admitted that the respondent No.
2 is the absolute owner of the scheduled property and that they are residing
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therein.
14.
The specific defence of the appellants, however, was that the respondent No.
2 had instituted the proceeding under the influence of one of his daughters
and that the allegations of harassment and neglect were false, fabricated and
exaggerated.
15.
The appellants contended that they had throughout maintained and looked
after the respondent No. 2, and several criminal proceedings instituted by
the respondent No. 2 had either been withdrawn or had resulted in their
acquittal.
16.
The appellants further pleaded that certain disputed transactions relating to
the sale of a portion of property had been undertaken by the respondent No.
2, himself and that the appellants had merely signed as witnesses in good
faith and upon instruction of their father. The appellants also asserted that
they had repaid the bank liabilities incurred by mortgaging the property.
17.
Thus, the defence before the learned Tribunal was not a denial of the title of
the respondent No.2 over the property, nor a claim of any independent
proprietary right in favour of the appellants, but was, in substance, a denial
of the allegations of neglect, harassment and misconduct leveled against
them.
18.
The appellants have not disputed the possession of the property. However,
they contend that, even though they desire it, their father has
never expressed his intention to take support from them.
19.
The learned Tribunal, upon consideration of the pleadings, documents and
rival contentions of the parties, recorded a categorical finding that the
respondent No. 2 is a senior citizen and the admitted owner of the selfacquired property in question and that the appellants were occupying the
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premises only by virtue of permission granted by him.
20.
The learned Tribunal, further noticed the multiple complaints and
proceedings referred to by the respondent No.2 and came to a factual
conclusion that the relationship between the parties had irretrievably
deteriorated and that continuance of the appellants in the premises was
resulting in harassment and disturbance to the peaceful living of the
respondent No. 2. The learned Tribunal accordingly, held that the eviction
was necessary for securing the safety, dignity and peaceful residence of the
senior citizen.
21.
Significantly, the learned Tribunal also recorded that the appellants failed to
establish any independent legal right in the property adverse to the wishes of
the respondent No. 2 and therefore, directed the eviction of the appellants
and their family members from the 1st floor portion of the premises.
22.
Before us, the principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is
that the respondent No. 2 admittedly receives a pension and possesses
sufficient means to maintain himself and therefore, according to the
appellants, the provisions of the Maintenance & Welfare of Parents and
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 2007) could not
have been invoked.
23.
It has further been contended that Section 23 of the Act, 2007 would apply
only in cases where there is a formal transfer of property subject to a
condition of failure of maintenance and that in the absence of such transfer,
the learned Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to direct eviction of the appellants
from the property in question inasmuch as the respondent No.2 neither
demanded any maintenance nor it is required for having sufficient
pensionary income.
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24.
An additional issue has been raised in the present proceeding, though it was
not pleaded or raised either before the Tribunal or before the learned Single
Judge, that at least the daughters-in-law have right to continue in occupation
of the property for the reason that the premises constitute a shared
household within the meaning of the provisions of the protection of women
from the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Act,
2005).
25.
The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the statutory provisions as
well as the precedents governing the field, rejected the contentions raised
and held that the Act, 2007, is a welfare legislation enacted for the
protection of the life and property of senior citizens and therefore, deserves
a purposive and liberal construction.
26.
The learned Single Judge further held that the right to maintenance under
the Act, 2007, is not confined merely to monetary assistance, but includes
the right of a senior citizen to reside peacefully and with dignity in his own
property and that eviction, in an appropriate case, would be an incident of
such right.
27.
It is apposite to record herein that taking note of the controversy, during the
present proceeding, this Court on 20.02.2026 interacted with the father and
the two sons in the presence of their respective Advocates, including the
learned Advocate for the State and requested Ms. P. Chakraborty, learned
Advocate for the State and Ms. R. Choudhury, learned Senior Advocate for
the respondent No.2, to mediate between the father and sons so that the
dispute is resolved, even temporarily.
28.
We observed that there is a complete lack of communication between the
father and sons, even though they stay on the same floor. The father has
been unhappy for several years with the conduct of his sons and daughters-
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in-law, who, according to him, have not offered any help when it was
required during his climactic period.
29.
The father is 86 years old and requires constant care and surveillance.
Though before us the sons made a promise that they shall mend their ways
and shall take care of their father, there is a complete trust deficit between
the father and sons. The father does not wish to take even a farthing from
his sons and wants them to vacate the self-acquired property and live
peacefully.
30.
The efforts made by the learned Advocates for the parties and this Court at
reconciliation did not make any headway in improving the relationship
between the father and his two sons; therefore, we proceeded to hear the
matter on merit.
31.
Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and upon careful
consideration of the materials available on record, we find ourselves in
agreement with the view adopted by the learned Single Judge.
32.
At the outset, it would be necessary to examine the object, scheme and
legislative philosophy underlying the enactment.
33.
The statement of objects and reasons of the Act, 2007 reflects the growing
concern of the legislature regarding the conditions of elderly persons in the
changing social structure of the country. The legislature noticed that with the
gradual weakening of the traditional joint family system, a large number of
elderly persons were being left uncared for and were exposed to emotional
neglect, insecurity and lack of physical and financial support.
34.
The legislature further noticed that many senior citizens were compelled to
spend their twilight years in loneliness and distress, despite having children,
relatives and property. In the aforesaid backdrop, the Parliament considered
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it necessary to enact a simple, inexpensive and speedy mechanism for the
protection of parents and senior citizens.
35.
The object of the legislature, therefore, is not merely the recovery of a
monthly maintenance allowance.
36.
The statute is fundamentally social welfare legislation intended to secure
dignity, peace, and emotional security, as well as the protection of the life
and property of senior citizens.
37.
The Act recognises that neglect of elderly parents is not always financial in
nature; emotional harassment, deprivation of peaceful residence, insecurity
within one's own house and interference with independent enjoyment of
property are equally forms of neglect, which the legislature seeks to
remedy.
38.
The scheme of the Act, 2007, clearly reflects the aforesaid legislative intent.
39.
Section 2(b) of the Act, 2007 defines the expression ‘maintenance.’
Significantly, the legislature has employed an inclusive definition and not a
restrictive one. The expression maintenance has been defined to include
provision
for
food,
clothing,
residence,
medical
attendance
and
treatment. The inclusion of residence within the definition is of considerable
significance and cannot be rendered otiose by adopting a narrow
interpretation of financial maintenance.
40.
The legislature was conscious that for an elderly person, a peaceful
residence and the security of shelter are often more important than mere
financial support. Thus, ‘maintenance’ under the Act, 2007 is not confined
to survival alone, but extends to conditions necessary for living with dignity
and security.
41.
Likewise, Section 2 (f) of the Act, 2007 defines ‘property’ in the widest
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possible term by providing that ‘property’ means property of any
kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self-acquired, tangible or
intangible, and further, includes rights and interests in such property.
42.
The legislature, therefore, consciously expanded the meaning of the
expression ‘property’ so as to include not merely title in a strict legal
sense, but also rights of occupation, possession, enjoyment and beneficial
interest.
43.
Section 4 of the Act, 2007, creates the substantive statutory obligation.
44.
Under Sub-section 1 of Section 4, a senior citizen, including a parent, who
is unable to maintain himself from his own earnings or out of the property
owned by him, may seek maintenance.
45.
Sub-section 2 of Section 4 further provides that the obligation of the
children or relatives extends to the needs of a senior citizen, so that such a
senior citizen may lead a normal life. The “normal life” employed by the
Parliament is again of wide import.
46.
The legislative intent is clearly that a senior citizen should be able to live
peacefully, safely, and with dignity, consistent with a normal standard of
living. The concept of “normal life” necessarily includes peaceful
enjoyment of one's own residence without fear, harassment or compulsion to
abandon one's own property.
47.
In that backdrop, once the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is invoked in relation
to the protection of life and property of a senior citizen and the grievance
pertains to deprivation of peaceful residence, harassment or inability to live
a normal life with dignity, the provisions of the Act, cannot thereafter, be
confined to a narrowly financial sense.
48.
Sub-section 4 of Section 4 is of further importance.
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49.
It provides that any person who is a relative, having sufficient means, and
who is in possession of the property of the senior citizen or who would
inherit such property, shall maintain such senior citizen. Thus, the statute
itself recognises the relevance of a senior citizen's possession and enjoyment
of property. The legislative emphasis is therefore not merely on the formal
transfer of title, but also on possession and the beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
50.
Section 23 of the Act, 2007, which falls under Chapter V, dealing with the
“Protection of Life and Property of Senior Citizens”, is also required to
be understood in the aforesaid statutory context.
51.
The expression ‘transfer,’ employed under Section 23 of the Act 2007, has
not been specifically defined under the Act, 2007. The legislature, while
defining the expressions, such as ‘maintenance’ under Section 2(b) and
‘property’ under Section 2(f), consciously refrains from giving any
restrictive or technical definition of the expression ‘transfer.’
52.
At the same time, Section 2(f) of the Act, 2007 gives an expanded meaning
to the expression ‘property’ by including the rights and interests in such
property. As recorded herein above, the legislative intent, therefore, clearly
appears to be to accord a wider and purposive construction to the provisions
relating to the protection of the life and property of senior citizens.
53.
Therefore, Section 23 of the Act, 2007 cannot be read in isolation, divorced
from the overall scheme of the Act, 2007.
54.
The object of the provision of Section 23 is not merely to regulate formal
conveyance or transfer deeds in the strict sense known in property law, but
to ensure that a senior citizen is not deprived of peaceful possession,
enjoyment and beneficial use of his property at the hands of persons who
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are otherwise under a statutory obligation to maintain him.
55.
At the cost of repetition, it is recorded herein that Section 4 of the Act,
2007, also assumes significance in this context, inasmuch as, the legislature
has imposed an obligation not merely upon the transferee in the strict sense,
but also upon a person who is in possession of the property of a senior
citizen or who would inherit such property.
56.
Thus, the statutory scheme itself recognises possession, occupation and
enjoyment of the property of a senior citizen as legally relevant factors for
the purposes of maintenance and protection under the Act, 2007.
57.
The words ‘gift’ or ‘otherwise’ occurring in Section 23 further indicate that
the Parliament did not intend to confine the operation of the provisions only
to the case of formal transfer by registered instruments. The expression
‘otherwise’ has necessarily to receive a construction consistent with the
object and purpose of legislation.
58.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Smt. S. Vanitha –Vs.- Deputy
Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors. has categorically held
that the expression ‘transfer’ under the Act, 2007 cannot be interpreted in a
narrow or restrictive manner and that the right of ‘maintenance’ under the
Act, 2007 is broader in nature, eviction being an incident of enforcement of
such right of maintenance and protection.
59.
Therefore, in our estimation, the expression ‘transfer’ occurring under
Section 23 of the Act, 2007 cannot be confined only to absolute transfer of
ownership by way of sale, gift or settlement. Where children or relatives are
occupying the property of a senior citizen by virtue of permission or
indulgence granted by such senior citizen and such occupation result in
deprivation of peaceful enjoyment, dignity or security of the senior citizen,
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such permissive occupation would nevertheless fall within the protective
jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal while securing the right of a senior
citizen to peaceful possession, residence and enjoyment of property under
the statutory scheme of the Act, 2007.
60.
In the present case, the appellants themselves admit that their occupation
originated from permission granted by the respondent No. 2, and they do
not assert any independent title adverse to him.
61.
In our considered opinion, the interpretation sought to be advanced by the
appellants is accepted; the object of the legislation would stand frustrated.
Any narrow interpretation to the contrary would substantially defeat the
object and purpose of the welfare legislation.
62.
Such an interpretation would mean that even where a senior citizen is
compelled to live in fear, insecurity or mental distress within his/her own
house because of the conduct of his/her children or relatives, the authorities
under the Act, 2007 would remain powerless unless a formal deed of
transfer exists. Such a construction would reduce the beneficial legislation
into a narrowly technical enactment and defeat the legislative purpose.
63.
The Act, 2007, is to be interpreted with reference to the realities that
compelled the Parliament to enact the legislation. Elderly parents often
permit their children to reside in their house not by executing formal, legal
documents but by virtue of family arrangements, trust, and affection. If such
permissive occupation is later used to deprive the senior citizen of peaceful
enjoyment of his/her own property, the statute cannot be interpreted in a
manner that leaves the senior citizen remediless under such beneficial
legislation, compelling him/her to approach the Civil Court, which
admittedly is not simple or inexpensive. Nor can it be termed as “speedy
remedy”.
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64.
We are also unable to accept the submissions that a senior citizen receiving
a pension is not entitled to invoke the protection of the statute under Section
23 of the Act, 2007. The Act does not require a senior citizen to become
penniless or destitute before approaching the authorities under the Act,
2007. Financial sufficiency, by itself, does not ensure peaceful living,
emotional security, or a dignified residence. The protection contemplated
under the Act, 2007 extends beyond mere economic survival.
65.
The object of the Act, 2007, being the protection of the life, dignity,
residence, and property of senior citizens, the provisions must be given a
liberal and purposive construction consistent with the legislative intent.
66.
In the present case, the factual satisfaction recorded by the learned Tribunal
cannot be said to be either perverse or unsupported by the materials
available on record. The Tribunal considered the rival pleadings of the
parties, including the appellants' defence that they had not neglected the
respondent No. 2 and that the dispute arose out of family discord and a
property transaction.
67.
Upon appreciation of the overall materials, the learned Tribunal concluded
that the respondent No. 2 was unable to peacefully enjoy his own residence
and that the appellants' continued presence in the premises was detrimental
to his security and dignity as a senior citizen. Such findings, being
essentially findings of facts based on appreciation of materials and
concurred by the learned Single Judge, do not warrant interference in intracourt appellate jurisdiction unless shown to be manifestly arbitrary or
wholly unsupported by the record, which is not the case herein.
68.
In the case in hand, the property admittedly belongs to the respondent No.
2. The appellants are occupying the same only because such occupation was
permitted by the respondent No.2. Such permissive occupation cannot
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measure into an enforceable right against the wishes and welfare of the true
owner, more particularly, when the owner is a senior citizen seeking
peaceful enjoyment of his own residence under a beneficial legislation
enacted for his protection, alleging mental and physical torture by the
children.
69.
As regards the arguments on the right of “shared household,” raised for the
first time before us, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. S. Vanitha (supra)
recognised that the competing claims under the Domestic Violence Act,
2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 2005) and the Act, 2007 are
required to be harmoniously constituted. However, in the present case, no
proceeding under the Act, 2005 has been instituted by the daughters-in-law,
at any point in time, claiming any right of residence in the premises in
question. No foundation in fact or in law was therefore laid before the
authorities so as to enable the adjudication of any competing claim arising
under the Act, 2005.
70.
There is no whisper of allegation of any domestic violence by the
daughters-in-law. Therefore, in the absence of any foundational pleadings or
proceedings under the Act, 2005, such a contention cannot be permitted to
be raised for the first time at the appellate stage, to defeat the protection
otherwise available to the respondent No.2 under the Act, 2007.
71.
While so saying, it is clarified that the present adjudication is confined to
the scope of jurisdiction exercisable under the Act, 2007, namely, protection
of life, residence, dignity, and the peaceful enjoyment of property by a
senior citizen. We have not adjudicated upon any independent civil title, if
otherwise available in law, nor upon the validity of any disputed transaction
which may be the subject matter of a separate proceeding before a
competent forum. The present order proceeds on the admitted position that
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the respondent No. 2 is the owner in possession of the property in question
and the appellants are residing therein by permission.
72.
For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no infirmity in the judgment
and order dated 18.11.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C)
No. 3504/2025.
73.
We find no reason warranting our interference in exercise of an Appellate
jurisdiction.
74.
The writ appeal, accordingly, stands dismissed.
75.
Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
76.
However, the appellants are given a liberty to vacate the premises on their
own within a period of 90 (ninety) days from today, and if not vacated
within the period stipulated, the learned Tribunal shall proceed in
accordance with law.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
CHIEF JUSTICE
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