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R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026)
ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 1867 of 2026
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JIGAR PRAKASHBHAI RAJAI
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR VILAV K BHATIA(5338) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 08/09/2026
ORAL ORDER
1. The present appeal is filed by the appellant – original
complainant under Section 413 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha
Sanhita of 2023 (hereinafter be referred to as the “BNSS”)
against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 15.07.2026
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar (hereinafter
be referred to as “the Appellate Court) in Criminal Appeal
No.201 of 2025 whereby the Appellate Court has quashed and
set aside the judgment and order of conviction dated 8.9.2025
passed by the learned 2 nd Additional Senior Civil Judge and
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar (hereinafter
be referred to as “the Trial Court”) and acquitted the
respondent - accused for the offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as
“NI Act” for short).
2. The facts giving rise to present appeal are that the
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ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
complainant is engaged in the business of purchase and sale
of four-wheeler vehicles under the name and style of Mahadev
Consultant, Bhavnagar. The respondent-accused approached
the appellant through one P.M. Patel for the sale of an Ertiga
motor car bearing Registration No. GJ-03-JC-5985, owned by
the father of the accused. The appellant inspected the vehicle,
negotiated the transaction, and the sale consideration was
finally settled at Rs. 4,38,000/-.
2.1 Pursuant to the said transaction, the appellant made
various payments towards the sale consideration, including an
amount of Rs. 20,000/- through G-Pay directly to the
respondent-accused and other amounts as instructed by the
respondent
through
intermediaries
connected
with
the
transaction. Subsequently, further payments were also made
towards completion of the transaction.
2.2 Upon disputes arising regarding completion of the sale
transaction,
the
respondent-accused
acknowledged
his
liability and, towards discharge of the amount payable to the
appellant, voluntarily issued Cheque No. 030619 dated
01.08.2023, drawn on the Bank of India, Ghatiya Prachi
Branch, for a sum of Rs. 2,20,600/- in favour of the appellant.
4.4 The appellant presented the said cheque for encashment
within its period of validity. However, the cheque was
dishonoured and returned unpaid with the endorsement
“Payment Stopped by Drawer.”
2.3 Thereafter, the appellant issued a statutory demand notice
dated 21.08.2023, calling upon the respondent-accused to
make payment of the cheque amount within the prescribed
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ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
period. The said notice was duly served upon the respondent.
However, despite service of the notice, the respondent neither
replied thereto nor complied with the demand by making
payment within the statutory period. Consequently, the
appellant instituted Criminal Case No. 12844 of 2023 under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the
learned 2nd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar.
The respondent-accused appeared before the Trial Court,
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To prove his case
the appellant has examined himself at Exh.22 and led five
documentary evidence.
2.4 Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary
evidence and after considering the statutory presumptions
under the NI Act, the Trial Court, by judgment and order
dated 08.09.2025, held the respondent guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced
him to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay
fine/compensation in accordance with law.
2.5 Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction, the
respondent preferred Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 2025 before
the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court after going through
the record and after hearing both the parties, passed an order
dated 15.07.2026 acquitting the respondent accused from the
charges under Section 138 of the NI Act. Against the said of
acquittal order passed by the Appellate Court, the appellantoriginal complainant has preferred present appeal.
3. Heard Mr.Vilav K. Bhatia, learned counsel for the appellant
and Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned APP for the respondent State.
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ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
Today, learned counsel for the appellant has produced on
record the paper book which is taken on record.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
impugned judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court
is contrary to law, contrary to the evidence on record and
contrary to the settled principles governing prosecutions
under Section 138 of the NI Act. He has submitted that the
Appellate Court failed to appreciate that the respondentaccused had never disputed his signature on the cheque. Once
the execution of the cheque is admitted, the statutory
presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act
arise in favour of the complainant. The Appellate Court has
completely ignored the mandatory statutory presumptions.
4.1 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
Appellate Court committed a serious error in holding that the
statutory presumption stood rebutted merely on the basis of
suggestions put to the complainant in cross-examination and
allegations made against one P.M. Patel. Such suggestions
and allegations, in the absence of cogent evidence, do not
constitute
sufficient
material
to
rebut
the
statutory
presumption. He has submitted that the Appellate Court failed
to appreciate that the accused did not examine himself on
oath, nor did he produce any independent documentary
evidence establishing that no legally enforceable debt or
liability existed.
4.2 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
Appellate Court materially erred in shifting the burden of
proof back upon the complainant without first recording a
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finding that the accused had discharged his initial burden of
rebutting the statutory presumption by cogent and acceptable
evidence. He has submitted that the Appellate Court travelled
beyond the pleadings and evidence on record by relying upon
alleged criminal complaints against P.M. Patel and other
collateral circumstances, although none of such proceedings
determines
or
disproves
the
liability
arising
from
the
dishonoured cheque issued by the accused. He has also
submitted that the Appellate Court completely ignored the
settled proposition of law that, even if there is a dispute
regarding the underlying transaction, the issuance of a signed
cheque gives rise to a statutory presumption that the cheque
was issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, unless such presumption is rebutted by acceptable
and probable evidence.
4.3 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
Appellate Court failed to appreciate that the complainant duly
proved the issuance of the cheque, the cheque dishonour
memo, the statutory notice, service of the notice and failure of
the accused to make payment within the prescribed statutory
period. Thus, all the essential ingredients of Section 138 of
the NI Act stood duly established before the Trial Court. He
has
submitted
that
the
Appellate
Court
erred
in
re-
appreciating the evidence in a manner contrary to settled
principles of law and substituted conjectures and surmises for
proved facts while reversing the well-reasoned judgment of
conviction recorded by the Trial Court. The Appellate Court
further ignored the material admissions of the accused
regarding the transaction and issuance of the cheque, while
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ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
giving undue importance to insignificant discrepancies which
do not go to the root of the complainant's case. He has
submitted that the Appellate Court has failed to appreciate
the material evidence and admissions on record and has given
undue importance to minor discrepancies which do not affect
the core of the complainant's case or dislodge the statutory
presumptions operating in favour of the complainant.
4.4 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
Appellate Court failed to appreciate that the respondentaccused neither initiated any proceedings for cancellation or
recovery of the cheque nor issued any contemporaneous
notice alleging misuse of the cheque prior to its presentation.
Such conduct supports the case of the complainant and is
inconsistent with the defence subsequently raised by the
accused.
4.5 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
Appellate Court failed to appreciate the detailed and cogent
reasoning recorded by the Trial Court while convicting the
accused after proper appreciation of the oral as well as
documentary evidence. There was no perversity, illegality or
material irregularity in the judgment of the Trial Court
warranting interference by the learned Appellate Court.
4.6 It is submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from
errors of law, misapplication of the statutory presumptions
under
the
Negotiable
Instruments
Act
and
improper
appreciation of the evidence on record and, therefore, calls
for interference by this Hon'ble Court in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026)
ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
4.7 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that
impugned judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court
acquitting the respondent-accused is contrary to law and
evidence on record and deserves to be quashed and set aside,
and the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court
deserves to be restored.
4.8 Learned APP appearing for the respondent State has
adopted the argument advanced by learned counsel appellant
and submitted that impugned judgment and order passed by
the Appellate Court is contrary to law and deserves to be
quashed and set aside, and the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the Trial Court deserves to be restored.
5. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order, as well
as the submissions advanced by the learned advocate for the
appellant, the issues that arises for consideration before this
Court are as under:Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal?
Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of
law or fact?
Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
suffers from any illegality or perversity?
6. In view of the above-stated submissions and upon perusal
of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as well as
the
evidence
recorded
by
the
Appellate
Court,
it
is
appropriate to first examine the facts of the case. The
R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026)
ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
complainant is engaged in the business of purchase and sale
of four-wheelers under the name and style of Mahadev
Consultant, Bhavnagar. The respondent-accused agreed to
sell an Ertiga car bearing Registration No. GJ-03-JC-5985 for
Rs. 4,38,000/-, towards which the complainant made various
payments. Towards the outstanding liability, the accused
issued
Cheque
2,20,600/-.
The
No.
030619
cheque
dated
was
01.08.2023
dishonoured
for
Rs.
with
the
endorsement “Payment Stopped by Drawer.” Despite service
of the statutory notice dated 21.08.2023, the accused failed to
make payment, resulting in the filing of Criminal Case No.
12844 of 2023 under Section 138 of the NI Act. The Trial
Court, by judgment dated 08.09.2025, convicted the accused.
However, in Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 2025, the Appellate
Court, by order dated 15.07.2026, acquitted the accused.
7.
It appears that the documents produced before this
Court by way of paper book were also produced before the
Appellate Court and the Appellate Court has ignored the said
facts though the same were available on record. Even
the
complainant, in his cross-examination, admitted that several
complaints had been lodged against Shri P. M. Patel, who,
according
to
the
complainant
himself,
was
his
consultant/dealer. Despite being aware of such allegations,
the complainant entered into the transaction and paid
Rs.50,000/-
to
Makrani
Aveshkhan
Firozkhan
and
Rs.2,50,000/- to Shri P. M. Patel.
8.
These admissions render the alleged legally enforceable
debt or liability of Rs.2,20,600/- against the accused highly
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ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
improbable. Consequently, the statutory presumptions under
Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act stood rebutted on a
preponderance of probabilities.
9. The Appellate Court referred to and relied upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Basalingappa v.
Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418, and observed that the
accused is not required to enter the witness box and may
rebut
the
statutory
presumption
on
the
basis
of
the
complainant’s own evidence and admissions. Upon evaluating
the evidence on record and undertaking a close scrutiny of the
relevant facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate
Court arrived at the conclusion that the order of conviction
passed by the Trial Court suffered from manifest errors of law
and fact warranting interference. Accordingly, the Appellate
Court rightly interfered with the judgment and order passed
by the Trial Court and reversed the judgment and order of
conviction. No illegality, perversity, or infirmity can be found
in the impugned judgment and order passed by the Appellate
Court.
10. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case,
and considering the fact that the subject cheque was issued
by the respondent under compulsion, no legally enforceable
debt or liability was proved against the respondent. Thus, the
essential ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act, were not
established.
Consequently,
the
Appellate
Court
rightly
reversed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and
acquitted the respondent.
R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026)
ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
11. On perusal of the record of the appeal, it transpires that
the respondent-accused has established his innocence before
the Appellate Court and that, after due appreciation of the
oral as well as documentary evidence and other material
placed on record, the Appellate Court has rightly passed the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The findings
recorded by the Appellate Court are just, proper and in
accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore,
no interference is warranted by this Court.
12.
At this stage, it is appropriate to refer the decision of the
Hon’ble
Apex
Court
in
the
case
of
Dattatraya
vs.
Sharanappa reported in (2024) 8 SCC 573, wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:“33.1 Criminal jurisprudence emphasises on the fundamental
essence of liberty and presumption of innocence unless proven
guilty. This presumption gets emboldened by virtue of concurrent
findings of acquittal. Therefore, this court must be extra-cautious
while dealing with a challenge against acquittal as the said
presumption gets reinforced by virtue of a well-reasoned
favourable outcome. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution
side becomes more burdensome pursuant to the said double
presumption.
33.3 Where two views are possible, then this Court would not
ordinarily interfere and reverse the concurrent findings of
acquittal. However, where the situation is such that the only
conclusion which could be arrived at from a comprehensive
appraisal of evidence, shows that there has been a grave
miscarriage of justice, then, notwithstanding such concurrent view,
this Court would not restrict itself to adopt an oppugnant view.
33.4 To adjudge whether the concurrent findings of acquittal are
‘perverse’ it is to be seen whether there has been failure of justice.
This Court in Babu v. State of Kerala clarified the ambit of the term
‘perversity’ as:
“20…...if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant/admissible material. The finding may also be said
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ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
to be perverse if it is ‘against the weight of evidence’, or if
the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the
vice of irrationality.”
33.6 Furthermore, such interference is necessitated to safeguard
interests of justice when the acquittal is based on some irrelevant
grounds or fallacies in re- appreciation of any fundamental
evidentiary material or a manifest error of law or in cases of nonadherence to the principles of natural justice or the decision is
manifestly unjust or where an acquittal which is fundamentally
based on an exaggerated adherence to the principle of granting
benefit of doubt to the accused, is liable to be set aside. Say in
cases where the court severed the connection 12 (2023) 10 SCC
148. between accused and criminality committed by him upon a
cursory examination of evidences. [Vide State of Punjab v.
Gurpreet Singh and Others and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar]
34. Upon perusal of the aforementioned principles and applying
them to the facts and circumstances of the present matter, it is
evident that there is no perversity and lack of evidence in the case
of the respondent- accused. The concurrent findings have backing
of detailed appraisal of evidences and facts, therefore, do not
warrant interference in light of above enlisted principles. In a
similar set of facts as in the present case, involving criminal
liability arising out of dishonour of cheque, this Court in M/s Rajco
Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff dejected from reversing the
concurrent findings of acquittal of the accused therein and
underscored the principle of non-interference, unless such findings
are perverse or bereft of evidentiary corroboration or lacks
question of law.”
13. It is appropriate to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of
Rajco Steel Enterprises vs. Kavita
Saraff and another reported in (2024) 9 SCC 390,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:“12. We are dealing with a case where the First Appellate Court
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 374(3) of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, ongoing through the analysis of evidence,
acquitted the accused/respondent no.1. The acquittal was further
upheld by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under
Section 378 of the 1973 Code. The whole question involved in this
proceeding is as to whether the cheques were issued in discharge
of a debt and if it was so, then whether the accused/respondent
no.1 was able to rebut the presumption in terms of Section 118
read with Section 139 of the 1881 Act. In the light of the judgment
of this Court in the case of Narendra Pratap Narain Singh -vsState of U.P. the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the
R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026)
ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
Constitution of India to interfere with concurrent findings of fact is
not in question, when such findings are based on no evidence or
are perverse. The question, we have to address thus, is as to
whether the findings of the First Appellate Court and the High
Court are on no evidence or perverse. Both these Courts have
examined the evidence threadbare and in the opinion of these two
fora, go against the complainant/petitioner.”
14. It is also appropriate to have a glance of the decision of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basalingappa vs.
Mudibasappa reported in (2019) 5 SCC 418, Rangappa
vs. Sri Mohan reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441.
15. Further, in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 =
(2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to
40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings
recorded by the Appellate Court.
16.
It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20
and 21 as under:“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the
general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa
and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power
of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal
against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the evidence before it
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ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact
and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”,
“very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail
extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review
the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that
in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour
of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
available to him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential
for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to
clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the
record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in
order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of
the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal
against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the
High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility
of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High
Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the
Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified
as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of
criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque
approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal,
resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2,
reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of
acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of
doubt, cannot be sustained.”
R/CR.A/1867/2026(GJHC240604722026)
17.
ORDER DATED: 08/09/2026
Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly
appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the
present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on
record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that
the
accused
have
committed
the
alleged
crime.
Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence
on record.
18.
On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it
clearly transpires that the Appellate Court has not committed
any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on
record and in acquitting the accused from the charges
levelled against him. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence,
it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed
to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the Appellate Court is sustainable and the present
appeal is liable to be dismissed.
19.
In view of the above,
the present appeal is devoid of
merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is
dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the Appellate Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond
stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the
concerned Court forthwith.
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
SURESH SOLANKI
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