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[2026:RJ-JP:3978]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 15007/2025
Janak Bahadur Kathayat S/o Shri Jagat Bahadur, Aged About 34
Years, R/o Village Kailali Thikapur, Ward No. 23, District Kailali,
Police Station Kailali, Nepal. At Present Tenant At A-18, Nalanda
Vihar, Durgapura, Police Station Shiprapath, District Jaipur
(Raj.). (At Present Confined In Central Jail, District Jaipur).
----Petitioner
Versus
The State Of Rajasthan, Through PP
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Anshuman Saxena, Adv. with
Mr. Prem Prakash Bairwa, Adv.
Mr. Vishal Gurjar, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Amit Punia, PP
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN
Order
28/01/2026
1.
The instant bail application under Section 483 of BNSS has
been filed on behalf of the petitioner, who has been arrested in
connection with FIR No.801/2024 registered at Police Station
Shipra Path, District Jaipur City (South) for offences punishable
under Sections 103(1) and 238(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
(in short ‘BNS’) 2023. After completion of investigation, Police filed
charge-sheet in the matter.
2.
It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the
accused-petitioner has falsely been implicated in this case.
Counsel submits that the deceased, while in a state of severe
intoxication, harassed the petitioner’s daughter and behaved
indecently by exposing himself before her. Counsel submits that
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alleged incident took place in a heat of passion on sudden
provocation. Counsel submits that there was no premeditation to
cause death of the deceased and nothing has come on record
which shows that there was prior enmity between the petitioner
and deceased. Counsel further submits that even if the allegations
are accepted at its face value, the provisions of Section 103 (1)
are not attracted in the present case and at the best, the case
would fall within the ambit of Section 105 of BNS, 2023. Counsel
places reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Vijay @ Vijayakumar versus State
represented by Inspector of Police arising out of criminal
appeal No.1049/2021. Some excerpts from the judgment is being
reproduced below:
“18. Exception one of Section 300 states that a
culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst
deprived of the power of self-control by grave and
sudden provocation, causes death of the person who
gave the provocation or causes the death of any
other person by mistake or accident.
19. It is well established that Exception 1 to Section
300 can apply when the accused is shown to have
deprived of power of self- control by grave and
sudden provocation which is caused by the person
whose death has been caused.
20. It is not each and every provocation that will
reduce the crime from murder to culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. The provocation must be
both grave and sudden. In order to invoke the
benefit of the exception, it must be established that
the
act
committed
by
the
accused
was
a
simultaneous reaction of grave as well as sudden
provocation which deprived him of the power of self
control. If the provocation is grave but not sudden,
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the accused cannot get the benefit of this exception.
Likewise, he cannot invoke the exception where the
provocation though sudden is not grave.
21. In Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions
reported in 1942 A.C. 1, Viscount Simon observed:
“It is not all provocation that will reduce the
crime of murder to manslaughter. Provocation,
to
have
that
result,
must
be
such
as
temporarily deprives the person provoked of
the power of self control, as the result of
which he commits the unlawful act which
causes
death.
“In
deciding
the
question
whether this was or was not the case, regard
must be had to the nature of the act by which
the offender causes death, to the time which
elapsed between the provocation and the act
which caused death, to the offender's conduct
during
that
interval,
and
to
all
other
circumstances tending to show the state of his
mind”: Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law,
art. 317. The test to be applied is that of the
effect of the provocation on a reasonable
man, as was laid down by the Court of
Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Lesbini 7, so that an
unusually excitable or pugnacious individual is
not entitled to rely on provocation which
would not have led an ordinary person to act
as he did. In applying the test, it is of
particular importance (a) to consider whether
a sufficient interval has elapsed since the
provocation to allow a reasonable man time to
cool,
and
instrument
(b)
with
to
take
which
into
the
account
the
homicide
was
effected, for to retort, in the heat of passion
induced by provocation, by a simple blow, is a
very different thing from making use of a
deadly instrument like a concealed dagger. In
short, the mode of resentment must bear a
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reasonable relationship to the provocation if
the offence is to be reduced to manslaughter”
22. In order to bring the case within Exception 1, the
following conditions must be complied with:
(i) 7 The deceased must have given provocation to
the accused;
(ii) The provocation must be grave;
(iii) The provocation must be sudden;
(iv) The offender, by reason of the side provocation,
shall have been deprived of his power of self-control;
(v) He should have killed the deceased during the
continuance of the deprivation of the power of self
control; and
(vi) The offender must have caused the death of the
person who gave the provocation or that of any other
person by mistake or accident.
23. In other words, before Exception 1 can be
invoke, the accused must establish the following
circumstances:
(i) there was a provocation which was both grave and
sudden;
(ii) such provocation had deprived the accused of his
power of self-control; and
(iii) whilst the accused was so deprived of his power
of self-control, he had caused the death of the
victim.
24. In order to bring his case under Exception 1 to
Section 300 IPC the following ingredients: (i) The
provocation was sudden; (ii) the provocation was
grave; and (iii) loss of self-control. These three
ingredients may be considered one by one:
(i) Whether the provocation was sudden or not does
not present much difficulty. The word ‘sudden’
involves two 8 elements. First, the provocation must
be unexpected. If an accused plans in advance to
receive
a
provocation
in
order
to
justify
the
subsequent homicide, the provocation cannot be said
to be sudden. Secondly, the interval between the
provocation and the homicide should be brief. If the
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man giving the provocation is killed within a minute
after
the
provocation,
it is
a case
of sudden
provocation. If the man is killed six hours after the
provocation, it is not a case of sudden provocation.
(ii) the main difficulty lies in deciding whether a
certain
provocation
was
grave
or
not.
A
bare
statement by the accused that he regarded the
provocation as grave will not be accepted by the
court. The court has to apply an objective test for
deciding whether the provocation was grave or not. A
good test for deciding whether a certain provocation
was grave or not is this: “Is a reasonable man likely
to lose self-control as a result of such provocation?”
If the answer is in the affirmative, the provocation
will be classed as grave. If the answer is in the
negative, the provocation is not grave. In this
context, the expression ‘reasonable man’ means a
normal or an average person. A reasonable man is
not the ideal man or the perfect being. A normal man
sometimes loses temper. There is, therefore no
inconsistency in saying that, a reasonable man may
lose self-control as a result of grave provocation. A
reasonable or normal or average man is a legal
fiction. The reasonable man will vary from society to
society. A Judge should not impose his personal
standards in this matter. By 9 training, a Judge is a
patient man. But the reasonable man or the normal
man need not have the same standard of behaviour
as the judge himself. The reasonable man under
consideration is a member of the society, in which
the accused was living. So, education and social
conditions of the accused are relevant factors. An
ordinary exchange of abuse is a matter of common
occurrence. A reasonable man does not lose selfcontrol merely on account of an ordinary exchange of
abuses. So, courts do not treat an ordinary exchange
of abuses as a basis for grave provocation. On the
other hand, in most societies, adultery is looked upon
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as a very serious matter. So, quotes are prepared to
treat adultery as a basis for grave provocation.
(iii) the question of loss of self-control comes up
indirectly in deciding whether a particular provocation
was grave or not. So, if it is proved that the accused
did receive grave and sudden provocation, the court
is generally prepared to assume that homicide was
committed while the accused was deprived of the
power of self-control. In some cases, it may be
possible for the prosecution to prove that the
accused committed the murder with a cool head in
spite of grave provocation. But such cases will be
rare. So, when the accused has established grave
and sudden provocation, the court will generally hold
that he has discharged the burden that lay upon him
under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC”.
3.
It is also contended that petitioner is in custody since
19.10.2024 and as such, till date, he has suffered incarceration of
more than one year and three months. He contends that trial is
going at a snail’s pace as till date only 6 witnesses have been
examined out of 20 cited prosecution witnesses. He also contends
that this delay in concluding the trial is a serious violation of the
petitioner's fundamental right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The period of custody
is always relevant consideration for grant of bail. When a trial gets
prolonged, it is not open for the prosecution to oppose bail of the
accused on the ground that the charges are very serious.
4.
Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposes
the prayer for bail. It is submitted that looking to the gravity of
offence as well as the evidence which has come on record so far,
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the petitioner does not deserve indulgence of bail. He, thus,
craves dismissal of the bail application.
5.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Public
Prosecutor. Perused the material available on record.
6.
The Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh versus
Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. reported in (1976) 4 SCC 382,
while drawing a distinction between Section 302 and Section 304
of IPC held as under:
"12.
In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable
homicide' is genus and 'murder' its specie. All
'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa.
Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special
characteristics of murder', is 'culpable homicide not
amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing
punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this
generic offence, the Code practically recognises three
degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may
be called, culpable homicide of the first degree. This
is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is
defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may
be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second
degree'. This is punishable under the 1st part of
Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the
third degree.' This is the lowest type of culpable
homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also,
the lowest among the punishments provided for the
three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is
punishable under the second Part of Section 304.
21.
From the above conspectus, it emerges that
whenever a court is confronted with the question
whether the offence is 'murder' or 'culpable homicide
not amounting to murder,' on the facts of a case, it
will be convenient for it to approach the problem in
three stages. The question to be considered at the
first stage would be, whether the accused has done
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an act by doing which he has caused the death of
another. Proof of such causal connection between the
act of the accused and the death, leads to the second
stage for considering whether that act of the accused
amounts to "culpable homicide" as defined in Section
299. If the answer to this question is prima jade
found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the
operation of Section 300, Penal Code is reached. This
is [the stage at which the Court should determine
whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring
the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses
of the definition of murder' contained in Section 300.
If the answer to this question is in the negative the
offence would be 'culpable homicide not amounting
to murder', punishable under the first or the second
part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on.
whether the second or the third Clause of Section
299 is applicable. If this question is found in the
positive, but the case comes, within any of the
Exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence
would still be 'culpable homicide not amounting to
murder', punishable under the First Part of Section
304, Penal Code.”
7.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chunni Bai versus State of
Chhattisgarh, reported in AIR 2025 SC 2370, has observed that
one of the criteria to determine, in any given case, as to whether
the act amounts to "murder" or "culpable homicide not amounting
to murder," is the presence or absence of intention of the offender.
If the "intention" to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as
is likely to cause death or the knowledge, which obviously has to
be a conscious one, that it is so imminently dangerous that it
must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death and commits such act "without any excuse"
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for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury, comes out
loud and clear in the case, it would be most appropriate to
categorise it as a case of "murder" under Section 300 IPC in which
event, penal provision of Section 302 IPC would be attracted. On
the other hand, if the "intention" in causing the death or to
causing such bodily injury is not so clear, the case will fall under
the less stringent category of "culpable homicide not amounting to
murder" as punishable under Section 304 IPC.
8.
Therefore, it is the well-settled position of law that the
gravity of the offence is determined by the intention or knowledge
with which the act was committed. Only when the intention to
cause death, or the conscious knowledge that the act is so
dangerous that it is likely to cause death, is clearly established,
does the case fall within the ambit of murder under Section 302
IPC. In the absence of such clear intention or knowledge, the act
is treated as culpable homicide not amounting to murder and is
dealt with under Section 304 IPC.
9.
In the present case, the petitioner had no pre-meditation.
There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was armed
or there was prior enmity between the petitioner and the
deceased. The deceased while in a state of severe intoxication,
harassed the petitioner’s daughter and behaved indecently by
exposing himself before her. This action of the deceased flared
temper in which the petitioner inflicted injuries to the deceased.
10.
In backdrop of the aforesaid factual and legal aspect,
especially the fact that the petitioner is in custody since
19.10.2024, as also considering the fact that there is bleak
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chances of culmination of trial in near future as 14 witnesses are
yet to be examined, but without commenting anything on the
merits/demerits of the case, this Court deems it just and proper to
enlarge the petitioner on bail.
11.
Consequently, the bail application is allowed. It is ordered
that the accused-petitioner Janak Bahadur Kathayat S/o Shri
Jagat Bahadur arrested in connection with FIR No.801/2024
registered at Police Station Shipra Path, District Jaipur City
(South) shall be released on bail, if not wanted in any other case,
provided he furnishes a personal bond of Rs.3,00,000/- and two
sureties of Rs.1,50,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned
trial Court with the stipulation to appear before that Court on all
dates of hearing and as and when called upon to do so.
12.
The observations made hereinabove are only for decision of
the bail application and would not have any impact on the trial of
the case in any manner.
(ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J
Manoj Solanki /47
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