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SYED
ROSHAN
ZAMIR
ALI
Digitally
signed by
SYED
ROSHAN
ZAMIR ALI
2026:CGHC:22406-DB
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MA No. 227 of 2025
1. Jagannath Chaturvedi S/o Late Rajulal Aged About 58 Years
R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
2. Punam Singh Sahu S/o Ganesh Ram Sahu Aged About 40
Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg
(C.G.)
3. Kunjlal S/o Ganesh Ram Sahu Aged About 49 Years R/o
Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
4. Premlal S/o Late Samaru Aged About 55 Years R/o Ward No.
50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
5. Mohan Kherde S/o Late Budharu Aged About 63 Years R/o
Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
6. Sugriv Vishwakarma S/o Late Sahdev Aged About 76 Years
R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
7. Smt. Dulari Bai Banjare W/o Keshav Banjare Aged About 59
Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg
(C.G.)
8. Rohit Kumar Vishwakarma S/o Sugriv Vishwakarma Aged
About 36 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District
Durg (C.G.)
9. Khomlal S/o Late Saradhu Aged About 43 Years R/o Ward
No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
10. Mohan Kherde S/o Late Budharu Aged About 63 Years R/o
Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
11.Smt. Budhiya Bai W/o Late Saradhu Aged About 62 Years R/o
Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
12. Smt. Lalita Banjare W/o Late Dinesh Kumar Banjare Aged
About 45 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District
Durg (C.G.)
13. Smt. Gangabai Banjare W/o Late Ramulal Banjare Aged
About 71 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District
Durg (C.G.)
14. Smt. Kumari Banjare W/o Late Ramru Aged About 60 Years
R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
15. Smt. Meerabai W/o Late Yashwant Aged About 65 Years R/o
Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
16. Smt. Asha Sahu W/o Late Hemant Sahu Aged About 43 Years
R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
17. Nandkali D/o Mahettar Aged About 50 Years R/o Ward No.
50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
18. Smt. Geeta Banjare W/o Late Punaram Banjare Aged About
53 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg
(C.G.)
19. Smt. Geeta Joshi W/o Late Khemraj Aged About 52 Years R/o
Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.)
20. Smt. Ritu Markandey W/o Late Durgesh Markandey Aged
About 34 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District
Durg (C.G.)
... Petitioners
versus
1. Smt. Suman Nadesan Unni (In Person) W/o K. Krishnan Unni
Aged About 56 Years R/o Quarter No. 4/a, Street No. 35,
Sector- 10, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) (Applicant)
2. Abhijeet
Singh
Collector,
(Respondent No. 1)
Durg,
District
Durg
(C.G.)
3. Sumit Agrawal Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Durg,
District Durg (C.G.) (Respondent No. 2)
... Respondents
MA No. 223 of 2025
1. Domar Banjare S/o Aamir Banjare Aged About 58 Years R/o
Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
versus
1. Smt. Suman Nadesan Unni (In Person) W/o K. Krishnan Unni
Aged About 56 Years R/o Quarter No. 4 / A, Street No. 35,
Sector-10, Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
2. Abhijeet Singh Collector, Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
3. Sumit Agrawal Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Durg,
District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
For Petitioners
: Mr. T.K. Jha, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr.
Parth Kumar Jha, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1
: Respondent No.1 in person.
DB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu,J
& Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sachin Singh Rajput, j
Order on Board
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J
12.05.2026
1. These two miscellaneous appeals under Section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 arise out of a common order
dated 07.11.2025 passed by learned Single Judge in
Contempt Case (C) No.737/2025, therefore, the same are
heard together and are being decided by this common order.
2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that respondent No.1 herein
filed a contempt petition seeking willful non-compliance of the
order dated 24.2.2025 passed in WPC No.1035/2025 by
which learned writ Court directed the Collector District Durg to
take necessary steps if any illegal encroachment over grass
land bearing Khasra No.194/1 situated in village Borsi is
found. In compliance of aforesaid direction, necessary steps
were taken and even after coming to know that there is
encroachment on government land, effective steps are not
taken to remove such encroachments.
issued,
the
response.
contemnor
appeared
Pursuant to notice
and
submitted
their
Considering that no proper compliance of the
order passed by the Court has been made by contemnor, vide
order dated 07.11.2025 the Superintendent of Police
concerned is directed to provide police force to the authorities
involved in removing the encroachment. Aggrieved with this
order, the appellants, who are dwellers on the land in
question, have preferred these two appeals.
3. Learned counsel for appellants in both the appeals would
submit that the appellants are legally settled on a part of land
bearing Khasra No.194/1, which is given on Patta, by
constructing a house thereon. Appellants are regularly paying
property tax, water tax and electricity bills for last more than
four decades. Pursuant to the order dated 24.2.2025 passed
by the High Court, the Tahsildar, Durg vide order dated
28.10.2025 initiated proceeding for removal of alleged
encroachment from Khasra No.194/1 and in that proceeding,
the Tahsildar after wrongly recording that in the course of
proceeding, appellants herein have not produced any
documentary evidence establishing that the land in their use
is their personal land or leased out to them by the
government, directed for removal of possession of appellants
as also imposed fine of Rs.2,000/-. Aggrieved therewith
appellants have preferred separate appeals before the SubDivisional Officer (R) Durg, however, in light of the order
impugned dated 7.11.2025, the SDO has refused to hear or
admit the appeals.
He submits that any person if having
grievance that his right is being affected, must have a remedy.
Section 44 (1) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959
provides for filing of appeal against the order passed in the
proceeding under Section 248 of the Code of 1959. Thus, the
appellants are not left remediless as the statute provides
them a chance of appeal.
However, by virtue of order
impugned, appellants are being deprived of their substantive
as well as procedural remedy guaranteed under the statute
and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be interfered
with.
4. On the other hand, respondent No.1, who appears in person,
opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for
appellants and submits that the order impugned is an
interlocutory order and not a final order of punishment
imposed under the Act of 1971, therefore, both the appeals
are not maintainable. She further submits that claim of
appellants based on alleged patta is false and contrary to the
official record. She submits that during pendency of
proceedings before the High Court and even at the time when
order of removal of encroachment from government land was
passed, appellants have not produced any patta alleged
issued in their favour. However, as a bold from blue, during
pendency of contempt proceeding, the appellants have, for
the first time, produced the Pattas. In order to verify the claim
of appellants, respondent No.1 sought information under the
Right to Information Act, 2005 and according to information
supplied to her, no such patta was issued in the name of
appellants. Thus, it is apparent that Pattas produced by
appellants are forged and fabricated documents.
In support
of her contention, she places reliance on the decision of the
Full Bench of this High Court dated 25.1.2017 in MA
No.45/2016, parties being Anil Kumar Pandey vs. Pradeep
Kumar Shukla.
5. Heard learned counsel for the appellants as also respondent
No.1, who appears in person.
6. Before we proceed with the matter, it would be fit and proper
for us to state the nature of the order passed by the learned
Judge in contempt petition, which is under challenge in this
appeal. The material portion of the impugned order reads as
under : “From the submission it is reflected that the area of
land which has been encroached i.e. 1.76 lakhs sq
feet lands whereas the respondents have identified
encroachment of about 33,000 Sq feet land which
that no proper compliance of the order passed by this
Court has been made by the respondents.
Let the respondents file affidavit on the next
date of hearing. The contemnor shall also place on
record what action they have taken to remove the
illegal encroachment of the entire land, therefore, It is
directed that concerned Superintendent of Police,
shall provide Police force to the contemnor without
any
failure
on
demand
made
by
the
contemnor/Collector, Durg or the Revenue Authority
and the machinery who are involved in removing the
encroachment.
List this case on 25.11.2025 in the fresh matter
list.
Petitioner in person would submit that the
encroachers are creating pressure and threatening
her for life.
Considering the submission, it is also directed
that the petitioner will inform the incident to the
concerned Superintendent of Police who will take
decision in accordance with the law on the complaint
and take suitable action.”
7. From a perusal of the impugned order, as noted herein above,
it is evident that the impugned order does not indicate any
imposition of punishment contemplated by Section 12 of the
Act of 1971, but it can be deduced from reading of the order
passed on the contempt petition that contemnor therein
directed to file affidavit explaining the action taken to remove
the illegal encroachment of the entire land and thereafter the
Superintendent of Police concerned was directed to provide
police force to the contemnor/authorities involved in removing
of encroachment, if demanded. The Superintendent of Police
was also directed to take decision in respect of incident
happened with petitioner, if reported by her, in accordance
with law.
8. Now, let us have a look at the relevant provisions of the Act of
1971, which are material for the purpose of deciding these
appeals.
9. Section 2 (a) of the Act of 1971 defines ‘Contempt of Courts’
to mean ‘civil contempt’ or ‘criminal contempt’. 'Civil contempt'
is defined in Section 2 (b) which means, willful disobedience
to any judgment decree, direction, order, writ or other process
of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court.
10. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides
for the punishment which shall ordinarily be imposed by the
High Court in the case of an established contempt. Section
12 is extracted herein below for ready reference:“12. Punishment for Contempt of court.- (1) Save as
otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any
other law, a contempt of court may be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to
six months, or with fine which may extend to two
thousand rupees, or with both:
Provided that the accused may be discharged
or the punishment awarded may be remitted on
apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.
Explanation.--An apology shall not be rejected
merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional
if the accused makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for
the time being in force, no court shall impose a
sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1)
for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court
subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section,
where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the
court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends
of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is
necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple
imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil
prison for such period not exceeding six months as it
may think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of
court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is
a company, every person who, at the time the
contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was
responsible to, the company for the conduct of
business of the company, as well as the company,
shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the
punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the
court, by the detention in civil prison of each such
person:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section
shall render any such person liable to such
punishment if he proves that the contempt was
committed without his knowledge or that he exercised
all due diligence to prevent its commission.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(4), where the contempt of court referred to therein
has been committed by a company and it is proved
that the contempt has been committed with the
consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any
neglect on the part of, any director, manager,
secretary or other officer of the company, such
director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also
be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the
punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the
court, by the detention in civil prison of such director,
manager, secretary or other officer.”
11. From perusal of above quoted provision contained in Section
12 of the Act of 1971, it is appearing that the contemnor may
be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may
extend to six months or with fine which may extend to two
thousand rupees, or with both.
12. Section 19 of the Act of 1971 provides that an appeal shall lie
as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Section 19
of the Act of 1971 reads thus:"19. Appeals.--(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from
any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of
its jurisdiction to punish for contempt-(a) where the order or decision is that of a single
Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the
Court;
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to
the Supreme Court:"
A bare reading of above quoted provision makes it clear that
only in the case of punishment, the affected party has right to
file an appeal, if it is by a Single Judge before a Bench of two
Judges, and if it is by a Division Bench, before Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
13.
In case of D.N. Taneja vs Bhajan Lal, reported in (1988) 3
SCC 26, the three judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held that "an appeal will lie under Section 19 (1) of the
Act only when the High Court makes an order or decision in
exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The High
Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by
Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment
for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any
punishment on the alleged contemnor, it does not exercise its
jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215.
The aggrieved party under section 19 (1) can only be the
contemnor who has been punished for contempt of court."
14. In case of State of Maharashtra vs. Mahboob S. Alibhoy,
reported in (1996) 4 SCC 411, Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that "words 'any order' must be read with 'decision' so as
to exclude any interlocutory order of the High Court from
scope of appeal. Unless by the order High Court imposes
punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for
contempt, no appeal will lie against it."
15. In J. S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and other, (1996) 6 SCC
291, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows :
“"Therefore, an appeal would lie under Section 19
when an order in exercise of the jurisdiction of the
High Court punishing the contemnor has been
passed. In this case, the finding was that the
respondent had not willfully disobeyed the order. So,
there is no order punishing the respondent for
violation
of
the
orders
of
the
High
Court,
Accordingly, an appeal under Section 19 would not
lie."
16. The Full Bench of this High Court in case of Anil Kumar
Dubey (supra) had the occasion to deal with the issue issue
of maintainability of an appeal under Section 19 of the Act of
1971 and it was observed in the majority judgment thus:“39. A close analysis of the law laid down by the Apex
Court and the High Courts as well as the provisions
of Section 19 of the Act, 1971, we are clearly of the
view that any order which is not an interlocutory order
but by which the High Court proceeds to exercise its
jurisdiction for contempt, would be appealable.
45…..In our view, an appeal under Section 19 of the
Act, 1971 would lie against such an order as it is
passed in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for
contempt. As held by the Apex Court, it would not be
appropriate to make a list of such orders. Each case
will have to be decided on its own facts.
47.In view of above discussion, we answer the
question referred to this Court by holding that an
appeal shall lie under Section 19 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 against an order framing charge in
contempt proceedings.”
17. When the impugned order dated 7.11.2025 is tested on the
anvil of above rulings of Hon’ble Supreme Court and also Full
Bench of this Court, it is clear as day light that by the order
impugned, any charge of contempt has not been framed or
punishment has not been imposed on the appellants for
contempt. The learned Single Judge has merely called the
respondents therein to explain by way of an affidavit as to
what action have been taken for compliance of the order
under contempt and further directed the Superintendent of
Police to provide police force to the authorities taking steps
for compliance of the order under contempt. Any order or
direction on the merits of the dispute, which is incidental to or
inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt
or deciding an issue relating to the merits of the dispute
between the parties, creating cause of action in favour of
appellants for filing this appeal, has not been issued by the
order impugned. Therefore, this Court has no manner of
doubt that the appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Act of 1971
against the impugned order is not at all maintainable in
absence of any cause of action available to appellants.
18. From the order sheet dated 28.1.2026 it is appearing that this
Bench relying on the interpretation of the provision contained
in Section 19 of the Act of 1971 made by Hon’ble Apex Court
in case of Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd.
and
others v. Chunilal Nanda and others, reported in (2006) 5
SCC 399, had admitted this appeal.
19. For the sake of better understanding of the true interpretation
of the observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-11 of
its decision in case of Midnapore (supra) and relevant for the
present case, are reproduced herein below:“IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the
High Court on the merits or a dispute between the
parties, will not be in the exercise of "jurisdiction to
punish
for
contempt"
and,
therefore,
not
appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The
only exception is where such direction or decision
is incidental to or inextricably connected with the
order punishing for contempt, in which event the
appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also
encompass
the
incidental
or
inextricably
connected directions.
V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason,
decides an issue or makes any direction, relating
to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in
a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is
not without remedy. Such an order is open to
challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was
of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision
for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special
leave to appeal under
Article 136 of the
Constitution of India (in other cases)."
20. A bare reading of above quoted portion of the decision in
Midnapore’s case (supra) makes it clear that "any direction
issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a
dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of
"jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and, therefore, not
appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
The only exception is where such a direction or decision is
incidental to or inextricably connected with the order
punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under
Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or
inextricably connected directions. However, other orders,
could be challenged in an intra Court appeal, if the order was
of a single Judge and there was a provision for an intra Court
appeal or by Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India to the Supreme Court. (in other cases).
In substance, the purposive interpretation is that if a High
Court decides an issue or makes a direction relating to the
merit of the dispute, the aggrieved person is not remediless
and can challenge the same not by way of an appeal under
Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, but by means
of intra court appeal if there is a provision of such an appeal.
Meaning thereby, in absence of any such provision for intracourt appeal, no appeal would lie.
21. The provision of preferring an intra-court appeal of the
Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006
(for short ‘the Act of 2006’) reads thus:“2.Appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court
from a Judgment or order of one Judge of the High
Court made in exercise of original jurisdiction.- (1) an
appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by
one Judge of the High Court in exercise of original
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, to a Division Bench comprising of two Judges
of the same High Court.
Provided no such appeal shall lie against an
interlocutory order or against any order passed in
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution of India...”
22. On a purposive reading of Section 2 (1) of the Act of 2006, it
becomes clear that an appeal shall lie from a judgment or
order passed by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of
original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, to a Division Bench comprising of two Judges of the
same High Court. No appeal shall lie against an interlocutory
order or against any order passed in exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Thus, according to provision of the Act of 2006 of preferring
an intra court appeal, if the order is passed exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, then
only intra-court appeal lies.
If the order is passed under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, that is to say, in
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, no intra-court appeal lies.
Hence, there is no provision in the Act of 2006 to file an intra
court appeal to the Bench of two Judges against any order
passed in a proceeding other than under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
23. In case at hand, the order impugned passed by learned
Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Section 12 of the
Act of 1971 read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India,
directing the contemnors to place on record as to what action
they have taken to comply with the order under contempt,
cannot be construed to an order passed in exercise of original
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, reliance placed on the decision rendered in case
of Midnapore (supra) is of no help to the appellants.
24.
Ordinarily, it is expected from the counsel, who appears for
the appellant before a particular Court, that, instead of
obtaining a favourable order, he would provide to the Court
correct legal position. We do not know whether the provision
of preferring intra-court appeal contained in the Chhattisgarh
High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006; decision of
the Full Bench of this High Court in Anil Kumar Dubey (supra)
were brought to the notice of the Division Bench or not. From
the order dated 28.01.2026 it is appearing that the order of
the Full Bench in case of Anil Kumar Dubey (supra) is not
brought to the notice of the Court.
25.
Nonetheless, no one can dispute that an appeal is a statutory
remedy created by the Statute. An appeal shall lie to an
appellate forum either under a particular statute or under the
Rules or under the provisions of the Letters Patent. Where
the statute does not confer a right of appeal, mere admission
of appeal does not ipso facto render it maintainable or confer
a statutory right of appeal where none exists. Question of
maintainability of an appeal can also be examined at the final
stage as it goes to the root of the case being a legal issue.
26.
In case at hand, the provisions of the Act of 2006 which deals
with preferring of intra-court appeal does not permit an appeal
arising other than the proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Most importantly, the order admitting
the appeal does not decide any issue but merely entertains
an appeal for hearing. Therefore, the order whereunder
appeal is admitted for consideration could not be taken as a
final order so as to prevent this Court from deciding the
maintainability, particularly when the Act of 2006 does not
permit such an appeal.
27.
For the foregoing discussions and reasons, we do not find
any good ground to entertain these two appeals on merits
being not maintainable and therefore, both the appeals are
dismissed as not maintainable.
Sd/-
Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu)
(Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judge
roshan/-
Judge
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