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2026:CGHC:21103
YOGESH YOGESH TIWARI
2026.05.06
TIWARI Date:
17:41:24 +0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 4700 of 2022
Jadhav Sagar Ramchandra S/o Shri Jadhav Ramchandra Nagnath
Aged About 35 Years Presently Working As Divisional Forest Officer,
Forest Divsion Sukma, District Sukam
... Petitioner
versus
-
Chhattisgarh
State
Information
Commission Through The
Commissioner, Sector -19, North Block, Atal Nawa Raipur Chhattisgarh.
2 - Shri Sharad Singh R/o. Flat Number 17, 18, Block -1, Lalbaug
Houseing Board Colony, Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner
: Mr. N. Naha Roy, Advocate
For Respondent No.1
: Mr. Shyam Sunder Lal Tekchandani,
Advocate
: None
For Respondent No.2
Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
Order on Board
06.05.2026
1.
By way of the present petition, the petitioner assails the impugned
order
dated
07.09.2022
passed
in
Second
Appeal
No.A/3354/2021 (Annexure P/1), whereby the appeal preferred by
respondent No. 2 under Section 19(3) of the Right to Information
Act, 2005 (for short, ‘RTI Act, 2005’) has been allowed without
affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner or
considering his reply, and he has been held guilty of denial of
information with a direction to furnish the same within 30 days at
his own cost. The petitioner further challenges the initiation of
proceedings under Sections 20(1) and 20(2) of the RTI Act, 2005,
including issuance of show cause notice proposing imposition of
maximum penalty and recommendation for disciplinary action,
contending
that
such
proceedings
have
been
initiated
mechanically without any prior determination of misconduct. It is
submitted that the matter now being fixed only for penalty
proceedings on 14.11.2022 is arbitrary and unsustainable,
warranting interference by this Court. The petitioner has prayed
for following reliefs :“10.1 Issue an appropriate writ and set aside
the order dated 07.09.2022 (Annexure P/1),
whereby the second appeal preferred by the
respondent No.: 2 under Section 19(3) of the
RTI Act, 2005, has been allowed without
affording minimum opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner in utter violation of provisions of the
RTI Act, 2005 and of natural justice.
10.2 Grant any other relief, which is deemed fit
in the circumstances of the case.”
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
order dated 07.09.2022 passed by the Chhattisgarh State
Information Commission is wholly arbitrary, illegal, and in gross
violation of the settled principles of natural justice. It is contended
that the petitioner, being a Public Information Officer, had duly
furnished a reasoned reply dated 05.07.2021 to the RTI
application dated 24.06.2021, clearly stating that the information
sought was vague and non-specific, as no particular work or
transaction was identified, and therefore, in terms of Section 2(f)
read with Section 6(1)(b) of the RTI Act, 2005, the same could not
be
supplied.
The
First
Appellate
Authority,
upon
due
consideration, had also upheld the said position by a speaking
order dated 22.10.2021. It is further submitted that despite the
above, in the second appeal, the State Information Commission,
on the very first date of hearing i.e., 07.09.2022, proceeded to
pass the impugned order directing the petitioner to furnish the
information within 30 days, fastened financial liability upon him,
and simultaneously initiated proceedings under Sections 20(1)
and 20(2) of the RTI Act, 2005, without affording any opportunity
of hearing to the petitioner. Such action, it is urged, is in flagrant
violation of the doctrine of audi alteram partem, as no notice or
effective opportunity was granted before recording adverse
findings entailing serious civil consequences.
3.
Learned counsel further submits that the direction to disclose the
cheque drawn register is itself unsustainable, as the information
sought is not only vague but also falls within the ambit of
exempted information under Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI Act, 2005,
involving commercial confidence and third-party interests, and no
larger public interest has been demonstrated by respondent No.2.
It is also contended that initiation of penalty proceedings under
Sections 20(1) and (2) of the RTI Act, 2005 is premature and
without jurisdiction, as such proceedings can be undertaken only
upon a definitive finding of malafide denial or misconduct after
due consideration of the explanation of the Public Information
Officer. It is further argued that respondent No. 2 has been
repeatedly filing similar RTI applications for different financial
years without specifying the requisite particulars, thereby
misusing the provisions of the RTI Act, 2005. In these
circumstances, the impugned order reflects complete nonapplication of mind, mechanical exercise of power, and abuse of
process, warranting interference by this Court.
4.
Reliance has further been placed upon the judgment rendered by
the Division Bench of this Court in Nitin Singhvi v. Chhattisgarh
State Information Commission (WA No.215/2020 decided on
12.06.2023), wherein it has been categorically held that imposition
of penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act is not automatic and
can be sustained only upon a clear finding of malafide denial or
unreasonable delay without sufficient cause. It is submitted that
the said judgment fortifies the petitioner’s case inasmuch as, in
the present matter, there is neither any deliberate withholding of
information nor any contumacious conduct attributable to the
petitioner, and therefore, the impugned penalty is wholly
unsustainable in law.
5.
On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 opposes
the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner and submits
that the impugned order dated 07.09.2022 has been passed in
accordance with the provisions of the RTI Act, 2005, and does not
call for any interference. It is contended that the information
sought by respondent No. 2 pertains to a cheque drawn register
relating to public funds received from the State CAMPA account
for the financial year 2017–18, which is part of official records and
ought to have been disclosed. It is further submitted that the
petitioner, being the Public Information Officer, failed to discharge
his statutory obligation by not furnishing the information and by
rejecting the application on untenable and hyper-technical
grounds of vagueness. Learned counsel submits that even if the
application was not specific, the petitioner was duty-bound to
assist the information seeker in terms of the RTI Act, 2005 by
guiding him to make a proper request or by facilitating access to
available records, which was not done in the present case. It is
also contended that the petitioner wrongly withheld information
without any justifiable reason and failed to demonstrate that the
information sought was exempt under Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI
Act, 2005 or that any larger public interest was not involved. In
such circumstances, the State Information Commission has rightly
exercised its jurisdiction in directing supply of information and
initiating proceedings under Sections 20(1) and 20(2) of the RTI
Act, 2005 for imposition of penalty on account of dereliction of
duty. Hence, the impugned order is legal, proper, and in
consonance with the scheme of the RTI Act, 2005.
6.
Despite service of notice, none appears on behalf of respondent
No.2 at the time of hearing.
7.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
8.
It is noted that the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, while
considering a similar issue in Nitin Singhvi (supra), has
elaborately examined the scope and ambit of imposition of penalty
under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. The Division Bench has held
that the power to impose penalty is not automatic or mechanical,
but is conditioned upon the existence of cogent material
demonstrating that the Public Information Officer has, without
reasonable cause, either refused to furnish information, caused
undue delay, or acted in a malafide manner. It has been further
held that mere delay or inability to furnish certain information,
particularly when such information is not available on record or
lies with another authority, would not ipso facto attract penal
consequences. The Court has emphasized that before imposing
penalty, the Information Commission is under a statutory
obligation to record a clear and reasoned finding with respect to
the existence of malafide intent or lack of reasonable cause, and
must also afford an effective opportunity of hearing to the
concerned officer. The burden cast upon the Public Information
Officer under the proviso to Section 20(1) is to establish that he
acted reasonably and diligently; however, once such explanation
is furnished and remains uncontroverted, the Commission cannot
proceed to impose penalty in a routine manner.
9.
It has further been observed that where the Public Information
Officer has taken steps in compliance with the provisions of the
Act, such as transferring the application to the concerned
department under Section 6(3) of the RTI Act, 2005 or furnishing
such information as is available on record, the same would
constitute a reasonable and sufficient cause, insulating him from
penal action. The Division Bench has cautioned that the penal
provisions under the Act, being quasi-criminal in nature, must be
invoked with due care and only in cases where the conduct of the
officer is found to be contumacious or deliberately obstructive. In
light of the aforesaid principles, the Division Bench set aside the
penalty imposed therein, holding that in the absence of any
finding of malafide or deliberate lapse, the order of penalty could
not be sustained by observing as follows :“12. The Supreme Court in the matter of
Manohar v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 13
SCC 14 has held that the State Information
Commission has been vested with wide powers
including imposition of penalty or taking of
disciplinary action against the employees and
the provisions relating to penalty or to penal
consequences have to be construed strictly.
While dealing with Section 20(2) of the Act of
2005,
their
Lordships
have
observed
in
paragraph 16 as under :“16. The State Information Commission
has
been
vested
with
wide
powers
including imposition of penalty or taking of
disciplinary action against the employees.
Exercise of such power is bound to
adversely
affect
or
bring
civil
consequences to the delinquent. Thus, the
provisions relating to penalty or to penal
consequences
have
to
be
construed
strictly. It will not be open to the Court to
give them such liberal construction that it
would be beyond the specific language of
the statute or would be in violation to the
principles of natural justice.”
13. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have
further held while dealing with initiation of
departmental proceeding that the case of
default must strictly fall within the specified
grounds of the provisions of Section 20(2). This
provision has to be construed and applied
strictly. Its ambit cannot be permitted to be
enlarged at the whims of the Commission. It
has also been held that “negligence” per se is
not a ground on which proceedings under
Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked and the
Commission must return a finding that such
negligence, delay or default is persistent
(meaning: continuing for a long time or
happening often, especially in a way that is
unpleasant
or
annoying)
and
without
reasonable cause. Paragraphs 31 and 33 of
the report state as under:“31. It appears that the facts have not been
correctly noticed and, in any case, not in
their entirety by the State Information
Commission. It had formed an opinion that
the appellant was negligent and had not
performed the duty cast upon him. The
Commission noticed that there was 73
days delay in informing the applicant and,
thus,
there
was
negligence
while
performing duties. If one examines the
provisions of Section 20(2) in their entirety
then it becomes obvious that every default
on the part of the concerned officer may
not result in issuance of a recommendation
for disciplinary action. The case must fall in
any of the specified defaults and reasoned
finding
has
to
Commission
be
recorded
while
making
by
the
such
recommendations. ‘Negligence’ per se is
not a ground on which proceedings under
Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked.
The Commission must return a finding that
such negligence, delay or default is
persistent and without reasonable cause.
In our considered view, the Commission, in
the present case, has erred in not
recording
such
definite
finding.
The
appellant herein had not failed to receive
any application, had not failed to act within
the period of 30 days (as he had written a
letter calling for information), had not
malafidely
denied
information,
had
the
not
request
for
furnished
any
incorrect or misleading information, had
not destroyed any information and had not
obstructed
the
furnishing
of
the
information. On the contrary, he had taken
steps
to
facilitate
the
providing
of
information by writing the stated letters.
May be the letter dated 11th April, 2007
was not written within the period of 30
days requiring respondent No.2 to furnish
details of the period for which such
information was required but the fact
remained that such letter was written and
respondent No.2 did not even bother to
respond to the said enquiry. He just kept
on filing appeal after appeal. After April 4,
2007, the date when the appellant was
transferred
to
Akola,
he
was
not
responsible for the acts of omissions
and/or commission of the office at Nanded.
14. Their Lordships further held that the word
“shall” appearing in Section 20(2) of the Act of
2005 before 'recommend' has to be read as
“may” and their Lordships observed as under :33. All the attributable defaults of a Central
or State Public Information Officer have to
be without any reasonable cause and
persistently. In other words, besides finding
that any of the stated defaults have been
committed by such officer, the Commission
has to further record its opinion that such
default in relation to receiving of an
application or not furnishing the information
within the specified time was committed
persistently and without a reasonable
cause. Use of such language by the
Legislature
clearly
shows
that
expression
‘shall’
appearing
the
before
‘recommend’ has to be read and construed
as ‘may’. There could be cases where
there is reasonable cause shown and the
officer is able to demonstrate that there
was no persistent default on his part either
in receiving the application or furnishing the
requested
information.
In
such
circumstances, the law does not require
recommendation
for
disciplinary
proceedings to be made. It is not the
legislative mandate that irrespective of the
facts and circumstances of a given case,
whether reasonable cause is shown or not,
the
Commission
must
recommend
disciplinary action merely because the
application was not responded to within 30
days. Every case has to be examined on its
own facts. We would hasten to add here
that wherever reasonable cause is not
shown
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
Commission and the Commission is of the
opinion that there is default in terms of the
Section it must send the recommendation
for disciplinary action in accordance with
law to the concerned authority. In such
circumstances, it will have no choice but to
send recommendatory report. The burden
of forming an opinion in accordance with
the
provisions
of
Section
20(2)
and
principles of natural justice lies upon the
Commission.”
10.
Reverting to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the
impugned order dated 07.09.2022 passed by respondent No. 1
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. A careful consideration of
the record would reveal that the petitioner, while functioning as
Public Information Officer, had furnished a reasoned and speaking
reply dated 05.07.2021, clearly indicating that the information
sought by respondent No. 2 was vague and non-specific, as no
particular transaction or work was identified. The petitioner had
also advised the applicant to file a fresh, specific application so
that the requisite information could be furnished. The First
Appellate Authority, by order dated 22.10.2021, concurred with the
said position and rejected the appeal on the ground of lack of
specificity. Thus, the action of the petitioner was in consonance
with the statutory scheme of the RTI Act, 2005.
11.
It is further evident that the State Information Commission, on the
very first date of hearing, proceeded to pass the impugned order
directing supply of information and simultaneously initiating
proceedings under Sections 20(1) and 20(2) of the RTI Act, 2005,
without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Such
a course of action is in clear violation of the principles of natural
justice, particularly the doctrine of audi alteram partem, as
adverse findings entailing civil consequences have been recorded
without granting the petitioner an opportunity to explain his stand.
12.
In light of the settled legal position, it is manifest that imposition of
penalty under Sections 20(1) and 20(2) of the RTI Act, 2005 is not
automatic and must be preceded by a clear finding of malafide
denial of information or deliberate default without reasonable
cause. In the present case, no such finding has been recorded by
the Commission. The impugned order appears to have been
passed in a mechanical manner, without due consideration of the
reply furnished by the petitioner and the fact that the information
sought itself lacked the necessary particulars as required under
Section 6(1)(b) of the RTI Act, 2005.
13.
This Court is of the considered opinion that the conduct of the
petitioner does not attract the penal provisions of the RTI Act,
2005, as there is no material to suggest that he had intentionally
withheld information or acted in a mala fide manner. On the
contrary, the petitioner acted within the framework of law by
pointing out the vagueness in the application and inviting a proper
request for facilitating disclosure.
14.
The State Information Commission, while exercising quasi-judicial
powers, was required to record specific findings regarding
misconduct and absence of reasonable cause before initiating
penalty proceedings. The failure to adhere to such mandatory
requirements
vitiates
the
impugned
order,
rendering
it
unsustainable in law.
15.
Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby
allowed. The impugned order dated 07.09.2022 passed by
respondent No. 1, including the direction to furnish information,
recovery of cost, and initiation of proceedings under Sections
20(1) and 20(2) of the RTI Act, 2005, is quashed and set aside.
16.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
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