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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
REV PET NO.7 OF 2023
Indian Oil Corporation Limited(IOCL),
A Central Govt. Undertaking,
Having its registered office at,
G-9, Ali Yaburjang Marg,
Bandra East, Mumbai-400051.
……… Petitioner(s)
Vs.
1. Tripur India Pvt. Ltd.,
Madhya Banamalipur, East Thana Road,
Agartala, West Tripura-799001
……. Respondent(s)
For the Petitioner(s)
: Mr. S.S. Dey, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. S.S. Debnath, Advocate.
Ms. A. Chakraborty, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, Sr. Advocate.
Mrs. A. Pal, Advocate.
Date of hearing
:
19.04.2023
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
: 03.05.2023.
Whether fit for reporting : YES.
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
This present revision application is filed aggrieved
by the order dated 14.12.2022 passed in CRP No.94 of 2022.
The said CRP No.94 of 2022 has been filed under Article 227 of
the
Constitution
of
India
aggrieved
by
the
order
dated
06.09.2022 passed by the Civil Judge(Sr. Div), West Tripura,
Agartala, Court No.1 in case No.CM(J)31 of 2022 arising out of
T.S. No.59 of 2003. By the impugned order, the learned trial
court rejected an application filed by the petitioner under Order
IX, Rule 7 CPC on the ground that it was filed belatedly and the
delay was not explained.
2.
The facts which fell for consideration in the said
CRP is that the trial Court rejected the application of the
petitioner of the said CRP i.e., the respondent in the review
petition under Order IX, Rule 7 CPC viewing that if at this
belated stage, he is allowed to enter into the proceeding, the
entire proceeding would start from the very beginning causing
further delay in the disposal of the case which is pending from
2003. For a better appreciation of the case, it would be
appropriate to reproduce the following extract of the order of
the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div):“………………………..Thus, from the above, it is evident
that numerous dates passed by and the case reached the advanced
stage of trial and it was at this stage, the instant petition was filed by
the defendant petitioner. No reason for the delay of more than seven
years is properly explained by the petitioner. In the cause list, in normal
course the details of each days order is not mentioned. Only the next
date is mentioned and the reason for fixing the next date. It was the
duty of the petitioner to check as to what order was passed in the case.
But the petitioner failed to do so and file the petition at an earlier stage.
Moreover, even if it is assumed that on 14.03.20214 the defendant –
petitioner did not have knowledge about the ex parte order passed by
my Ld. Predecessor against him, but this does not explain the reason
behind his lack of knowledge about the order dated 14.03.2014 on
27.09.2014 when written objection filed by him was rejected and,
thereafter, on 18.032.2021 when OP was prevented from crossexamining the plaintiff‟s witnesses. But at that stage also the defendant
petitioner did not file any petition for setting aside the exparte order
dated 14.03.2014. Rather he waited till 29.01.2022 to file the instant
petition. This shows that the delay in filing this petition by the defendant
petitioner was intentional and no reason has been cited by the petitioner
for his failure to file the instant petition at an earlier occasion when
repeatedly he was prevented at various stages firstly from filling written
objection and thereafter from cross-examining the Pws. In no manner
this intentional delay and failure of the petitioner can be condoned. If
the petition is allowed at this final stages of the case, then severe
prejudice will be caused to the OP as well as the other parties to the
suit. Situated thus, I am of the reasoned opinion that the petitioner has
failed to assign good cause for previous non appearance. So the petition
filed by the petitioner is hereby rejected.…………………………………………….”
3.
Thereafter the petitioner in the CRP i.e. the
respondent in the review petition approached this Court for
setting aside the impugned order dated 06.09.2022 passed by
the Trial Court [Civil Judge, Sr. Div. West Tripura(Court No.01)]
in case No.CM(J)31 of 2022. The Court vide order dated 14 th
December 2022 disposed of the said CRP No.94 of 2022 in the
following terms:“[14] The trial court is directed to allow the petitioner
(defendant No.11) to cross-examine the witnesses whose evidence has
already been recorded. He will also be allowed opportunity to adduce
evidence, if he so desires. However, towards expenses to be incurred for
reproducing the witnesses already examined for cross examination by the
petitioner, this Court is of the view that it would not be unfair to ask the
petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.7,000/- (Rupees seven thousand) as
cost before the trial court within a period of 10 (ten) days from today
which shall be given to the plaintiff through their counsel. The trial court
shall make endeavour to dispose the case as expeditiously as possible,
preferably within a period of 6(six) months from today. The parties are
directed to cooperate for such time bound disposal of the case.”
4.
Aggrieved thereby the present review application
has been filed by the petitioner-IOCL i.e the respondent in the
said CRP on the following pleaded grounds:-
“ i. For that the Hon‟ble Court perhaps failed to notice that
there are many parties in the case, and in a civil proceeding all the
necessary/formal parties in subsequent proceedings , but the petitioner
dropped others from being parties. This way of course a basic defect not
pointed out at the hearing, however a defect in form can be pointed out
now also.
ii. For that Hon‟ble Court was remiss to note that the application
was under Article 227 of the Constitution, High Court‟s power under which
has been repeatedly reminded by the hon‟ble Supreme Court that it is “
limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its
authority. The principal grounds for interference would bei. want or excess of jurisdiction.
ii. failure to exercise jurisdiction.
iii. violation of procedure or dis-regard of principles of
natural justice.”
iii. For that the power of Superintendence under Article
227 is of an administrative as well as Judicial Nature. But, this power of
Superintendence is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate
cases” in order to keep the sub-ordinate courts within the bounds of their
authority and not for correcting errors” because the law declared by the
High Court shall bind its sub-ordinate Court as well as the administrative
tribunals of the State.”
5.
Heard Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Sr. counsel assisted by
Mr. S.S. Debnath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
as well as Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned Sr. counsel assisted by
Mrs. A. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
6.
Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr.
S.S. Debnath appearing for the petitioner contended that this
Court should consider the present matter under Article 215 of
the Constitution of India being the „Court of record‟.
The said
CRP was not filed under Section 115 of CPC as revision but it
was filed under 227 of the Constitution of India to exercise
superintendence jurisdiction in respect of the orders passed by
the Court below. Further, there was an inordinate delay in filing
the written statement and no application has been filed seeking
for condoning the inordinate delay in accepting the written
statement. He also contended that no application has been filed
for setting aside the ex-parte order.
To support his argument, learned Sr. counsel
placed reliance on the following judgment and the Apex Court:-
6.1.
Para-6 of the Hon‟ble Apex
Court Judgment
reported in (2001) 8 SCC 97 titled as Estralla Rubber Vs.
Dass Estate(P) Ltd:“6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and
jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court.
The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High
Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their
authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them
in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited
prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or
tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the
courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty
and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice,
where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains
uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting
under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or
substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court
to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record.
The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior
court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding
is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a
conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to.
6.2.
Paras 14,15,16,20 and 21 of the Hon‟ble Apex
Court Judgment reported in 2005(6) SCC 344 titled as Salem
Advocate Bar Association T.N. Vs. Union of India:“14. Order 8 Rule 1 Order VIII Rule 1, as amended by
Act 46 of 1999 provides that the defendant shall within 30 days from the
date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his
defence. The rigour of this provision was reduced by Amendment Act 22
of 2002 which enables the Court to extend time for filing written
statement, on recording sufficient reasons therefore, but the extension
can be maximum for 90 days.
15. The question is whether the Court has any power
or jurisdiction to extend the period beyond 90 days. The maximum
period of 90 days to file written statement has been provided but the
consequences on failure to file written statement within the said period
have not been provided for in Order VIII Rule 1. The point for
consideration is whether the provision providing for maximum period of
ninety days is mandatory and, therefore, the Court is altogether
powerless to extend the time even in an exceptionally hard case
16. It has been common practice for the parties to take
long adjournments for filing written statements. The legislature with a
view to curb this practice and to avoid unnecessary delay and
adjournments, has provided for the maximum period within which the
written statement is required to be filed. The mandatory or directory
nature of Order VIII Rule 1 shall have to be determined by having
regard to the object sought to be achieved by the amendment. It is,
thus, necessary to find out the intention of the legislature. The
consequences which may follow and whether the same were intended by
the legislature have also to be kept in view.
20. The use of the word 'shall' in Order VIII Rule 1 by
itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory
or directory. We have to ascertain the object which is required to be
served by this provision and its design and context in which it is
enacted. The use of the word 'shall' is ordinarily indicative of mandatory
nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is
used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can
be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause
of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to
advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the
rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has
to be preferred. The rules or procedure are handmaid of justice and not
its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would
defeat justice.
21. In construing this provision, support can also be
had from Order 8 Rule 10 which provides that where any party from
whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9, fails to
present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the
Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such other order
in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement
under this provision, the Court has been given the discretion either to
pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other order in
relation to suit as it thinks fit. In the context of the provision, despite
use of the word 'shall', the court has been given the discretion to
pronounce or not to pronounce the judgment against the defendant
even if written statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it
may think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision of Order
VIII Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious construction is
required to be applied. The effect would be that under Rule 10 of Order
8, the court in its discretion would have power to allow the defendant to
file written statement even after expiry of period of 90 days provided in
Order 8 Rule 1
Para-15 of the Hon‟ble Apex Court Judgment
6.3.
reported in 2020(2) SCC 708 titled as Desh Raj Vs.
Balkishan(Dead) Through proposed Legal representative
MS Rohini:“ 15. However, it would be gainsaid that
although the unamended Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC is directory, it cannot
be interpreted to bestow a free hand to on any litigant or lawyer to file
written statement at their own sweetwill and/or to prolong the lis. The
legislative objective behind prescription of timelines under the CPC must
be given due weightage so that the disputes are resolved in a timebound
manner. Inherent discretion of Courts, like the ability to condone delays
under Order 8 Rule 1 is a fairly defined concept and its contours have
been shaped through judicial decisions over the ages. Illustratively,
extreme hardship or delays occurring due to factors beyond control of
parties despite proactive diligence, may be just and equitable instances
for condonation of delay.”
6.4.
Para-6 & 11 to 15 of the Hon‟ble Apex Court
Judgment reported in 2007(6) SCC 420 titled as R.N. Jadi &
Brothers and ors. Vs. Subhashchandra:“6. “7. The CPC enacted in 1908 consolidated and
amended the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil
Judicature. It has undergone several amendments by several Acts of
Central and State Legislatures. Under Section 122 CPC the High Courts
have power to amend by rules, the procedure laid down in the Orders. In
exercise of these powers various amendments have been made in the
Orders by various High Courts. Amendments have also been made
keeping in view recommendations of Law Commission. Anxiety of
Parliament as evident from the amendments is to secure an early and
expeditious disposal of civil suits and proceedings without sacrificing the
fairness of trial and the principles of natural justice in-built in any
sustainable procedure. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for
enacting Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (104 of 1976)
(in short '1976 Amendment Act') highlights following basic considerations
in enacting the amendments:5.(i) that a litigant should get a fair trial in accordance with the accepted
principles of natural justice.
(ii) that every effort should be made to expedite the disposal of civil suits
and proceedings, so that justice may not be delayed;
(iii) that the procedure should not be complicated and should, to the
utmost extent possible, ensure fair deal to the poorer sections of the
community who do not have the means to engage a pleader to defend
their cases."
8. By the 1999 Amendment Act the text of Order VIII, Rule 1 was sought
to be substituted in a manner that the power of court to extend the time
for filing the written statement was so circumscribed as would not permit
the time being extended beyond 30 days from the date of service of
summons on the defendant. Due to resistance from the members of the
Bar against enforcing such and similar other provisions sought to be
introduced by way of amendment, the Amendment Act could not be
promptly notified for enforcement. The text of the provision in the present
form has been introduced by the Amendment Act with effect from
1.7.2002. The purpose of such like amendments is stated in the
Statement of Objects and Reasons as "to reduce delay in the disposal of
civil cases".
9. The text of Order VIII, Rule 1, as it stands now, reads as under: "1. Written statement.- The defendant shall, within thirty days from the
date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his
defence:
Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement
within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same
on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be
recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the
date of service of summons."
8. Order 8, Rule 1 after the amendment casts an obligation on the
defendant to file the written statement within 30 days from the date of
service of summons on him and within the extended time falling within 90
days. The provision does not deal with the power of the court and also
does not specifically take away the power of the court to take the written
statement on record though filed beyond the time as provided for.
Further, the nature of the provision contained in Order VIII, Rule 1 is
procedural. It is not a part of the substantive law. Substituted Order VIII,
Rule 1 intends to curb the mischief of unscrupulous defendants adopting
dilatory tactics, delaying the disposal of cases causing inconvenience to
the plaintiffs and petitioners approaching the court for quick relief and
also to the serious inconvenience of the court faced with frequent prayers
for adjournments. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle
the same. While justice delayed may amount to justice denied, justice
hurried may in some cases amount to justice buried.
10. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language
employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent,
but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to
advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should
ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of
justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language
of the Statute, the provisions of the CPC or any other procedural
enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the
court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice.
11. The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a Judge's
conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer.
12. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower
substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that
procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice
compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex
debito justiciae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly
inequitable. - Justice is the goal of jurisprudence-processual, as much as
substantive. [See Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar (1975 (1) SCC 774].
13. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only
the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or
for the Court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament
the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed
according to the altered mode. [See Blyth v. Blyth (1966 (1) All E.R. 524
(HL)]. A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory,
the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any
interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to
be followed. [See Shreenath and Anr. v. Rajesh and Ors. (AIR 1998 SC
1827)].
14. Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction
but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not
the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.
15. It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the
proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII is circumscribed by the words "shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from
non-extension of time are not specifically provided though they may be
read by necessary implication. Merely, because a provision of law is
couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same
is not without exceptions. The courts, when called upon to interpret the
nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which
the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though
worded in the negative form.
16. Challenge to the Constitutional validity of the Amendment Act and
1999 Amendment Act was rejected by this Court in Salem Advocate Bar
Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India (JT 2002 (9) SC 175). However
to work out modalities in respect of certain provisions a Committee was
constituted. After receipt of Committee's report the matter was
considered by a three-Judge Bench in. As regards Order 8 Rule 1
Committee's report is as follows(SCC pp.362-63, paras 15-18):
"15.
The question is whether the Court has any power or
jurisdiction to extend the period beyond 90 days. The maximum period of
90 days to file written statement has been provided but the consequences
on failure to file written statement within the said period have not been
provided for in Order VIII Rule 1. The point for consideration is whether
the provision providing for maximum period of ninety days is mandatory
and, therefore, the Court is altogether powerless to extend the time even
in an exceptionally hard case.
16.
It has been common practice for the parties to take long
adjournments for filing written statements. The legislature with a view to
curb this practice and to avoid unnecessary delay and adjournments, has
provided for the maximum period within which the written statement is
required to be filed. The mandatory or directory nature of Order VIII Rule
1 shall have to be determined by having regard to the object sought to be
achieved by the amendment. It is, thus, necessary to find out the
intention of the legislature. The consequences which may follow and
whether the same were intended by the legislature have also to be kept
in view.
17.
In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. The Municipal
Board, Rampur [AIR 1965 SC 895], a Constitution Bench of this Court
held that the question whether a particular provision is mandatory or
directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and it would
depend upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the
statute in making out the provision is the determining factor. The purpose
for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the
legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or
injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way
or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions
dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise
on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision,
have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a
particular provision is mandatory or directory.
In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah & Anr. [AIR 1955
18.
SC 425], considering the provisions of the Code dealing with the trial of
the suits, it was opined that:
"Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure,
something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a Penal
enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip
people up. Too technical construction of sections that leaves no room for
reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against
(provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means
designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.
Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of
procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires
that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be
reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and
property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be
precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions
and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But
taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure
should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of
that principle. "
16. The position was examined in details in Kailash's case (supra) and
Rani Kusum Kanchan Devi and Sk. Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v.
Kumar, SCC pp. 49-53, paras 7-16.”
6.5.
Para-27 of the Hon‟ble Apex Court Judgment
reported in 2009(5) SCC 791/793 titled as Commissioner of
Customs and Central Excise Vs. Hongo India Private
Limited and anr:“ 27. The other decision relied on by the counsel for the
appellant is M.V. Elisabeth and Others vs. Harwan Investment and
Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, Vasco-De-Gama,
Goa, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433. The learned ASG heavily relied on the
following observations:
"66. The High Courts in India are superior courts of record. They have
original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary
powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the
appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts have
unlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine their own
powers....."
Here again, there is no dispute about the above proposition. The High
Courts in India are having inherent and plenary powers and as a Court
of Record the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction including the
jurisdiction to determine their own powers. However, the said principle
has to be decided with the specific provisions in the enactment and in
the light of the scheme of the Act, particularly in this case, Sections
35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H of the unamended Central Excise Act, it
would not be possible to hold that in spite of the above-mentioned
statutory provisions, the High Court is free to entertain reference
application even after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.
7.
On the other hand Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned
Sr. counsel appearing for the respondent contended that though
the suit i.e
TS No.59 of 2003 was filed way in 2003 only in
2013 his client, the petitioner in CRP has been arrayed as
respondent-defendant in the suit. Accordingly, as per the
amended plaint, he was brought on record as respondent and he
was impleaded. Thereafter, they filed an amended plaint in 2013
and accordingly opportunity was given to file written statement
and he filed the written statement. His right was forfeited when
the Court below decided to proceed ex parte against the
petitioner and declined to accept the written objection. Learned
Sr. counsel has drawn the attention of this Court that the review
is not maintainable against the CRP. To substantiate his
argument, he relied on para-5 the Judgment of the Hon‟ble
Calcutta High Court reported in 1973 AIR(Cal) 302 titled as
Dewan Singh and anr. Vs. Golap Singh ad anr, the same is
reproduced herein under:“……………………….Even if there was a error while
exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the same cannot be taken to be a mistake or an error on the face
of the record. It was held by Mr. Justice Mohammad Ismail in the case of
Thakur Kishun Chand Singh V. Munshi Makund Sarup, reported in AIR 1938,
All 308 that an erroneous view of the law on a debatable point or wrong
exposition of the law or a wrong application of the law cannot be considered
to be a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. A reference
in this context may again be made to a decision of this Court in the case of
Major P. Bardhan V. Dr. B. Sarkar, reported in 53 Cal WN 869, Mr. Justice
Sen, on a consideration of various cases including the decision of the Privy
Council in Chhaju Rams case 26 Cal WN 697: (AIR 1922 PC 112) observed
that a mere error of law therefore also not maintainable.”
7.1.
Further to substantiate his argument, learned Sr.
counsel appearing for the respondent herein referred to Paras4 to 9 of the Hon‟ble Apex Court Judgment reported in (2017)
SCC
titled
as
Sasi(Dead)
Through
Legal
Representatives Vs. Aravindakshan Nair and ors:“5. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
reads as follows:- “1. Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any
person considering himself aggrieved –
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from
which no appeal has been preferred.
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge
or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was
passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason,
desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against
him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the
decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a
decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding
the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the
ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or
when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the
case on which he applies for the review. Explanation.- The fact that the
decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is
based has been reversed or modified by 4 the subsequent decision of a
superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review
of such judgment.
6. The grounds enumerated therein are specific. The principles for
interference in exercise of review jurisdiction are well settled. The
Court passing the order is entitled to review the order, if any of the
grounds specified in the aforesaid provision are satisfied.
7. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.1 , the Court while
dealing with the scope of review had opined:“What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement
in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any
substantial question of law is an „error apparent on the face of the
record‟). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an
identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would
not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be
erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not
follow that it was an „error apparent on the face of the record‟, for
there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be
capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a
decision which could be characterised as vitiated by „error apparent‟. A
review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous
decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.”
8. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi , the Court after referring to
Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (supra), Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari
Choudhury and Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma,
held thus:“Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter
alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process
of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of
the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47
Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be
“reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has
a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise””.
9. The aforesaid authorities clearly spell out the nature, scope and
ambit of power to be exercised. The error has to be self-evident and is
not to be found out by a process of reasoning. We have adverted to
the aforesaid
proceedings.
aspects
only
to
highlight
the
nature
of
review
Para-11 of the Hon‟ble Apex Court Judgment
7.2.
reported in 1964 SC 1372 titled as M/s Thungabhadra
Industries Ltd Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh:11. What, however, we are now concerned with is
whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did
not involve any substantial question of law is an "error apparent on the
face of the record". The fact that on the earlier occasion the court held
on an 'identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose
would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be
erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not
follow that it was an "error apparent on the face of the record", for there
is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of
exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which
could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no
means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard
and corrected. but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that
this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference
exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that
where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and
say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and
there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear
case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out. No
questions of fact were involved in the decision of the High Court in
T.R.Cs. 75 to 77 of 1956. The entire controversy turned on the proper
interpretation of r. 18(1) of the turnover & Assessment Rules and the
other pieces of legislation which are referred to by the High Court in its
order of February 1956 nor could it be doubted or disputed that these
were substantial questions of law. In the circumstances therefore, the
submission of the appellant that the order of September 1959 was
vitiated by "error apparent'' of the kind envisaged by O. XLVII r. 1, Civil
Procedure Code when it stated that "no substantial question of law
arose" appears to us to be clearly well-founded. Indeed, learned Counsel
for the respondent did not seek to argue that the earlier order of
September 1959 was not vitiated by such error.”
8.
Heard both sides and perused the evidence on
record.
9.
Now the question that falls for consideration is
whether the present review petition is maintainable against the
order passed in Civil Revision Petition.
For answering the same, it is necessary to extract
Sections 114 and 115 of CPC and also Article 227 of the
Constitution of India which are reproduced herein-under:9.1
Section 114 of CPC:“Section 114 CPC – Review.
Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this
Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this
Court, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed
the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such
order thereon as it thinks fit.
9.2.
Section 115 of CPC:“1) The High Court may call for the record of a case which has been decided by
any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and
if such subordinate Court appears-
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit:
Provided that the High Court shall no, under this section, vary or reverse any order
made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding,
except where(a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would
have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings, or
(b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause
irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.
(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or
order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court
subordinate thereto.
9.3.
Article 227 of the Constitution of India:“227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High
Court
(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and
tribunals throughout the territories interrelation to which it exercises
jurisdiction
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions,
the High Court may
(a) call for returns from such courts;
(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating
the practice and proceedings of such courts; and
(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept
by the officers of any such courts
(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the
sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys,
advocates and pleaders practising therein: Provided that any rules
made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause ( 2 ) or clause
( 3 ) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the
time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the
Governor
(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court
powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by
or under any law relating to the Armed Forces
10.
It is seen from the record that the impugned
Order passed by this Court which is under challenge i.e. the
order in CRP is not order or judgment in its finality and where
appeal does not lie as contemplated under Section 115 of Civil
Procedure Code. Thus, the matter has been examined under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The CRP has been filed
and the same has been accordingly entertained.
Since the
matter has been dealt with under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India and in so far as the issue for filing the review petition is
concerned under Section 114 of CPC, this Court is of the opinion
that review against the said CRP lies.
11.
So in the light of the above, this Court is of the
opinion that the review petition is maintainable against the CRP.
12.
Now the second issue that falls for consideration is
whether the review petition which is filed fulfills the requirement
or satisfies the requirement contemplated under Section 114 of
the Civil Procedure Code guidelines.
13.
Section 114(b) of CPC contemplates that a person
can file a review if he aggrieved by a decree or Order from
which no appeal is allowed by this Code. Here in the 2nd
paragraph of the affidavit of the review petitioner herein it is
stated that “On perusal of the order contained in 9 pages, the
petitioner finds that the order of disposal is not in order as the
Hon‟ ble Court may have taken the application as one under
Section115 of the CPC, oblivious of the fact that the application
is actually under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Consequently, the jurisdiction being different, the Hon‟ble Court
by its orders commits an “error-apparent”, which can be simply
pointed out without any argument. And hence this application
for changing the order”. According to said contention, the entire
impugned judgment became patent error and this will amount to
re-opening the revision petition in the guise of a review petition.
So the petitioner herein is aggrieved by the findings of this
Court in CRP they should have approached the appropriate Court
and not file a Review petition and reopen the CRP. So in the
opinion of this Court review petition does not fulfill the criteria of
Section 114 (b) of CPC.
14.
Further, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Judgment
passed on 18th August 2022 in SLP(C) Nos.9602-03 of 2022
titled as S. Madhusudhan Reddy Vs. V. Narayana Reddy
and ors., disposed of the SLP with the observation that the
review petitions were nothing short of an abuse of the process
of the Court and ought to have been rejected by the High Court
as not maintainable. The said SLP was directed against the
common judgment and order passed by the Learned Single
Judge of the High Court for the State of Telangana at
Hyderabad, allowing the review petition. In the light of the said
Hon'ble Apex Court Judgment also, this Review petition does not
stand.
15.
In such circumstances, the review petitioner has
not made out a case for reviewing the order passed in the CRP.
Accordingly, the review petition is dismissed.
16.
As a sequel, stay if any stands vacated. Pending
application(s), if any also stands closed.
JUDGE
suhanjit
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