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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 455 of 2018
Date of Decision: 16.11.2023
Shri. Ibringstar Mawlong
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Mr. S.K. Roy, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. S. Sengupta, Addl. Sr. GA
Mr. H. Kharmih, Addl. Sr. GA.
Mrs. S. Bhattacharjee, GA (For R 1-4)
Mr. S. Wahlang, Adv. (For R-5)
Mr. B. Khyriem, Adv. (For R-7)
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT
1.
Heard Mr. S.K. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner who has
submitted that this petition has been preferred being aggrieved by the
action of the respondent No. 5 who has passed the impugned order dated
25.01.2017 whereby the service of the petitioner as an Asst. Teacher of
Nonglyer L.P. School was terminated.
2.
The learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner was
recommended for appointment as Asst. Teacher in the said Nonglyer
L.P. School, Nongthliew, Mairang, West Khasi Hills District by the
Managing Committee of the School and the same received the approval
of the competent authority, that is, the Office of the Deputy Inspector of
School, Mairang Civil Sub-Division with the issuance of the Order dated
13.09.2010.
3.
It is also mentioned that the appointment of the petitioner in the
said school was necessitated upon the removal of the respondent No. 6 as
teacher of the said school due to his conviction in a criminal case. This
fact was informed by the Managing Committee in its letter dated
08.09.2010
to
the
Inspector
of
School,
West
Khasi
Hills
Nongstoin/respondent No. 3 whereupon vide order dated 13.09.2010 the
Deputy Inspector of School, Mairang Civil Sub-Division has confirmed
the termination of the respondent No. 6.
4.
Following the termination from service of the respondent No. 6,
the Managing Committee of the School vide order dated 08.09.2010 has
appointed the petitioner in his place. The approval of such appointment
was made by the Deputy Inspector of School, Mairang vide order dated
13.09.2010.
5.
The learned counsel has further submitted that the petitioner
was performing his duty as teacher of the said school diligently without
any complaint from any quarters. However, after seven years of serving
in the said school, he was surprised to receive the order dated 25.01.2017
issued by the respondent No. 4/Sub-Divisional School Education
Officer, Mairang whereby by such order the appointment made by the
Managing Committee, Nonglyer L.P. School vide order dated
19.01.2017 to reinstate Shri. Dwik Lyngdoh/respondent No. 6 as teacher
of the said school was approved. In the selfsame order, the service of the
petitioner was terminated with effect from the date of joining of the said
respondent No. 6.
6.
The petitioner being aggrieved with the passing of the said
order dated 25.01.2017 whereby his service as Asst. Teacher was
terminated, he has accordingly filed a representation dated 29.06.2017
and 21.11.2017 before the I/c Sub-Divisional School Education Officer,
Mairang with a prayer to revoke the impugned order but till the time
when this petition was filed no response was received in regard thereto.
7.
It is also the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner
that the Managing Committee had recommended the reinstatement of the
petitioner as a teacher of the said school but the same was not approved
by the respondent No. 4.
8.
The action of the respondents authorities is clearly a case of
violation of the principle of natural justice as the petitioner was never
given any opportunity to be heard or to file a show cause against the said
impugned termination order, even the provision of Rule 5 of the „Service
Rule for Employees of Government Aided Schools‟ under the
„Meghalaya Education Code‟ was not followed, which rule speaks of
penalties which may be imposed on an employee of an aided school by
the Managing Committee for good and sufficient reasons, but as per
proviso 1 of the same, what is provided is that:
„(1) None of these penalties shall be imposed on an employee of
an aided school until he has been given a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be
taken in regard to him;‟
9.
To further stress on the fact that the termination of the petitioner
was done without following due procedure as has been pointed out
above, that is, that it was not done in accordance with the provision of
rule 5 of the „Service Rule for Employees of Government Aided
Schools‟, the learned counsel has cited the case of „State of Jharkhand
& Ors. v. Ambay Cements & Anr., (2005) 1 SCC, 369‟, para 26 and
the case of „Captain Sube Singh & Ors v. Lt. Governor of Delhi &
Ors., (2004) 6 SCC 440‟, para 29.
10.
The learned counsel has submitted that in the meantime the
respondent No. 6 has since retired from service on 31.03.2018 and the
said post vacated by him is being manned by a teacher appointed on
officiating basis with no regular appointment being made till the date of
filing of this petition.
11.
In course of the proceeding before this Court, the petitioner
came to know that the respondent No. 7 was appointed as Asst. Teacher
of the said Nonglyer L.P. School following an advertisement brought out
by the respondent No. 5/Managing Committee, however, the said
advertisement was never widely published to allow all eligible
candidates to participate in the selection process, but was only hanged in
the school premises. Such action of the respondent/Managing Committee
was only done with the purpose to accommodate the respondent No. 7
who was appointed in haste to justify the termination of the petitioner. In
this regard, the case of „State of Orissa & Anr. v. Mamata Mohanty’,
(2011) 3 SCC 436‟, para 36 was cited by the petitioner to support this
contention.
12.
On the production of the Notification dated 23.08.2010, by the
respondent No. 5, which notification speaks about the norms of National
Council for Teacher Education (NCTE), wherein the prescribed
qualifications for the post of teacher was laid down, the petitioner has
submitted that the same will not be applicable to the case of the petitioner
as he was terminated not on the ground of qualifications but on the
ground of reinstatement of the respondent No. 6 into service. It is also the
submission of the petitioner that the respondent cannot improve its case at
the fag end of the proceeding. The case of „East Coast Railway & Anr.
v. Mahadev Appa Rao & Ors., (2010) 7 SCC 678‟, paras 9 & 10 was
referred in support of this contention.
13.
Mr. S. Sengupta, learned Addl. Sr. GA submitting on behalf of
the respondents No. 1-4 respectively has submitted that the petitioner has
not been able to make out a case for reinstatement of his service being
terminated vide the impugned order dated 25.01.2017.
14.
The learned Addl. Sr. GA has, however, admitted that the
earlier incumbent to the said post was Shri. Dwik Lyngdoh/respondent
No. 6 whose service has been terminated by the Managing Committee
since 28.07.2010 on his being convicted in connection with a criminal
case No. FTC(S)2J/2006 under Section 302/334 IPC. The said
termination action was approved by the Deputy Inspector of School,
Mairang vide order dated 13.09.2010.
15.
It is also not disputed that the petitioner on being recommended
by the Managing Committee, his appointment as Asst. Teacher was
approved by the Deputy Inspector of School, Mairang vide order dated
13.10.2010. It is, however, submitted that a perusal of the said order
would show that firstly, his appointment was necessitated by the
termination of the service of the respondent No. 6 and secondly, that the
appointment is purely temporary and will remain in force only until
further orders.
16.
On the recommendation of the Managing Committee to
reinstate into service the respondent No. 6, apparently on his being
acquitted in the criminal case by the relevant order of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court dated 27.05.2016, the Sub-Divisional School Education
Officer, Mairang had passed the necessary order vide the impugned order
dated 25.01.2017 reinstating the respondent No. 6 as Asst. Teacher of the
said school. Here too, the learned Addl. Sr. GA has submitted that the
wordings of the said order are very clear when it was stated that „the
service of Shri. Ibringstar Mawlong (petitioner) stand terminated w.e.f.
the date of joining of Shri. Dwik Lyngdoh (respondent No. 6)‟.
Therefore, the termination of the service of the petitioner is justified and
there is no illegality or infirmity in the passing of the said impugned
order.
17.
The challenge of the petitioner to the appointment of the
respondent No. 7 as Asst. Teacher of the said Nonglyer L.P. School was
also refuted by the State respondents No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 when the learned
Addl. Sr. GA has submitted that on the retirement from service of the
respondent No. 6, the service of the petitioner having been terminated, the
Managing Committee/respondent No. 5 had issued an advertisement for
filing up of the said post citing the required qualifications for the same.
The petitioner not having participated in the selection process and
admittedly not being qualified to apply for the same, could not have come
before this Court at this juncture to challenge the selection process and
the selection of the respondent No. 7 who has since been issued with the
relevant appointment order and who has also joined service.
18.
Mr. S. Wahlang, learned counsel for the respondent No.
5/Managing Committee while countering the submission and contention
raised by the petitioner in this case has submitted that reference to the
order dated 13.09.2010 issued by the Deputy Inspector of School,
Mairang, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-3 in the writ
petition would show that the respondent No. 6, that is, Shri. Dwik
Lyngdoh‟s termination from service has been approved with effect from
the date of the final order in the said FTC(S)2J/2006, that is, 28.07.2010.
However, it is also stated that the order will remain in force until further
orders which means that the termination is only temporary in nature.
19.
Similarly, a reference to the order dated 13.09.2010 issued by
the Deputy Inspector of School, Mairang copy of which has been annexed
as Annexure-4 to the writ petition whereby the petitioner was appointed
as Asst. Teacher in place of Shri. Dwik Lyngdoh/respondent No. 6, the
same order also states that the appointment will remain in force until
further orders. This too, means that the nature of appointment of the
petitioner is not permanent but temporary and as such, on the respondent
No. 6 being reinstated into service, the termination of the service of the
petitioner as Asst. Teacher of the said school cannot be faulted, submits
the learned counsel.
20.
The learned counsel has also submitted that it is not a fact that
the petitioner was not given an opportunity to be reinstated in the school.
The Managing Committee had, in fact, approached the respondent No.
4/Sub-Divisional School Education Officer, Mairang in this regard but
the approval was not forthcoming and accordingly in the interest of the
students of the school, the appointment of a teacher in an officiating
capacity was necessitated. In due course, the Managing Committee had
issued the advertisement calling for eligible candidates to apply for the
post of Asst. Teacher in the said school however, only the respondent No.
7 was found suitable and accordingly, she was appointed as Asst. Teacher
of the said school.
21.
It is reiterated that the petitioner having failed to take part in the
selection process, and also not being qualified, having passed only ClassXII as his educational qualifications, therefore, he could not have been
considered for selection to the said post. The learned counsel has also
drawn the attention of this Court to the communication dated 01.04.2015
issued by the Director of School Education and Literacy, Meghalaya,
informing all the District School Education Officers and Sub-Divisional
School Education Officers to abide by the norms prescribed by the
National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) as far as appointment of
teachers in Lower Primary and Upper Primary Schools are concerned.
The required qualifications for appointment in L.P. Schools are HSSLC
passed with 45% and 2 year Diploma in Elementary Education
(D.El.Ed.)/4 year Bachelor in Elementary Education (B.EE)/2 year
Diploma in Education (Special Education). The case of „Shri.
Daiamonlang M. Skhemlon & Ors. v. State of Meghalaya & Ors.‟
wherein this Court vide order dated 25.03.2019 passed in WP(C) No. 114
of 2018 has referred to the Notification dated 23.08.2010 wherein is
found the prescribed norms issued by the NCTE for
the required
minimum qualifications for a person to be eligible for appointment as a
teacher for various levels of classes and has held that the said prescribed
norms are applicable to those teachers who are appointed after
23.08.2010, was referred to by the learned counsel in this regard.
22.
The learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner has failed
to make out a case for interference by this Court as far as the impugned
order is concerned, this petition is liable to be dismissed.
23.
Mr. B. Khyriem, learned counsel for the respondent No. 7 in his
argument before this Court has submitted that the only stand of this
respondent is that she has responded to the advertisement issued by the
Managing Committee/respondent No.5 and has appeared for the interview
held. On being found duly qualified, therefore, on her name being sent to
the concerned authorities, she was accordingly found fit for appointment
as Asst. Teacher in the said Nonglyer L.P. School. Though at present she
is performing her duty as a teacher in an officiating capacity, the fact that
she has not be notified as a permanent teacher is only due to the pendency
of this instant writ petition.
24.
On what has been submitted by the counsels of the respective
parties, this Court is made to understand that the petitioner has sought for
reinstatement into service on the same being terminated by virtue of the
impugned order dated 25.01.2017 resulting on his being ousted as a
teacher of the Nonglyer L.P. School, Nongthliew under Mairang SubDivision.
25.
On perusal of this petition what is seen is that the petitioner
being aggrieved by the reinstatement into service of the respondent No. 6,
he has accordingly approached this Court with a prayer to set aside and
quash the said reinstatement order as well as the termination of his
service, which order figures in the same impugned order which included
both the fact of reinstatement of the respondent No. 6 and the
consequential termination of his service as teacher of the said Nonglyer
L.P. School.
26.
What is also noticed is that in this petition which was filed on
26.11.2018 the petitioner has made an averment at paragraph 11 stating
that the respondent No. 6 has since retired from service on 31.03.2018
and the concerned authorities has appointed a teacher on officiating
capacity with no regular appointment being made till then. Therefore, at
the time of filing of this petition no cause of action survives against the
respondent No. 6.
27.
In course of this proceeding, the petitioner has orally submitted
that the concerned authorities have since appointed respondent No. 7 as
the Asst. Teacher in the said school which post refers to the same post
wherewith the petitioner was terminated from and accordingly, prayer is
made to implead the said respondent No. 7 in the proceeding which was
allowed by this Court vide order dated 13.06.2022 in MC[WP(C)] No. 96
of 2022.
28.
However, it is further noticed that the petitioner after being
allowed to implead the respondent No. 7 in this proceeding has failed or
rather chose not to amend the instant writ petition to include specific
pleadings against the appointment of the respondent No. 7 to the said post
of Asst. Teacher. What is seen from the records is that the fact that the
said post left vacant upon the retirement from service of the respondent
No. 6, Smti. Ailindalis Jarain was temporarily appointed to officiate as
Asst. Teacher of the Nonglyer L.P. School with effect from 04.07.2018
vice Shri. Dwik Lyngdoh retired. This is reflected in the order dated
03.07.2018 passed by the I/C Sub-Divisional School Education Officer,
Mairang.
29.
It is also reflected in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the
respondent No. 5/Managing Committee that due to urgent requirement of
a teacher in the said school, the matter was informed to the respondent
No. 4 whereupon the process of recruitment of an Asst. Teacher was
launched with the advertisement being issued finally resulting in the
selection and appointment of the respondent No. 7.
30.
The petitioner, as mentioned above, has chosen not to file the
amended petition to assail the appointment and the process thereof of the
respondent No. 7, but, has, instead filed a rejoinder to the affidavit-inopposition filed by the respondent No. 5 wherein the manner in which the
advertisement was floated was questioned to say that the same was never
published in the newspapers nor was any date mentioned therein. The
qualifications stated in the advertisement for a candidate to be eligible to
apply for the said post has also been set out in the said advertisement only
with the intention to suit the case of the respondent No. 7. It is, however,
stated that the concerned authorities are yet to approve the appointment of
the respondent No. 7. The petitioner however cannot make out a case in
this regard since there is no specific pleading or prayer as far as the
appointment of the respondent No. 7 is concerned.
31.
Again, a look at the appointment order dated 13.09.2010
whereby the petitioner was appointed as Asst. Teacher in the said
Nonglyer L.P. School, it is evident that he was appointed in place of Shri.
Dwik Lyngdoh/respondent No. 6 since terminated. The order further says
that the said appointment will remain in force until further orders. This
clearly indicates that the said appointment is purely temporary in nature.
As is normally the norms, the petitioner has not been appointed to the
said post following a proper selection process, that is, on advertisement
being issued, applications was called for from eligible candidates and
after the process of conduct of a written test or a personal interview, the
meritorious candidate(s) was appointed. Hence his nature of employment
is that of a temporary or casual employee.
32.
The prayer of the petitioner for reinstatement can also be
interpreted as one seeking regularization of service which cannot be
granted to him in view of the settled law in this regard. The case of
„Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors v. Umadevi (3) & Ors.
reported in (2006) 4 SCC, 1‟, more particularly at para 45 of the same
would elucidate this point vis-à-vis the case of the petitioner herein. The
same reads as follows:
“45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be
regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by the
fact that the person concerned has worked for some time and in
some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the
person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual
in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He
accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is
not in a position to bargain—not at arm’s length—since he
might have been searching for some employment so as to eke
out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that
ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the
constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a
person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be
directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be
creating another mode of public appointment which is not
permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment
of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having
equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to
grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such
casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the
exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean
that some people who at least get employment temporarily,
contractually or casually, would not be getting even that
employment when securing of such employment brings at least
some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our
vast country are in search of employment and one is not
compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is
not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that
context that one has to proceed on the basis that the
employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the
consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while
accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the
nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in
the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post
in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post
cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the
giving up of the procedure established, for making regular
appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The
argument that since one has been working for some time in the
post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was
aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up,
is not (sic) one that would enable the jettisoning of the
procedure established by law for public employment and would
have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality
and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution.”
33.
In view of the authority cited hereinabove, it can be said that the
petitioner cannot demand reinstatement in service as of right, his
appointment having been affected vide the said impugned order dated
25.01.2017 resulting in termination of the same. On the appointment of
the respondent No. 7 to the said post, here too, the petitioner is prevented
from challenging the said appointment as he has not taken part in the
selection process and even otherwise, he is not qualified to apply for the
said post in terms of the advertisement (supra).
34.
The NCTE norms has laid down specific qualification criteria
for those who are to be appointed as teachers in Lower Primary and
Upper Primary School level and the petitioner definitely is not qualified
to be so considered or appointed as a teacher of either a L.P. or U.P.
School. The NCTE notification dated 23.08.2010 prescribes minimum
qualifications for appointment as teachers which is as follows: –
i) Classes I-V
a) Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50%
marks and 2 - year Diploma in Elementary Education (by
whatever name known)
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 45%
marks and 2 - year Diploma in Elementary Education (by
whatever name known), in accordance with the NCTE
(Recognition Norms and Procedure), Regulations 2002.
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50%
marks and 4 - year Bachelor of Elementary Education
(B.El.Ed.)
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50%
marks and 2 - year Diploma in Education (Special
Education)
AND
b) Pass in the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), to be conducted
by appropriate Government in accordance with the
Guidelines framed by the NCTE for the purpose.
35.
The reference of the petitioner to the provision of Rule 5 of the
„Service Rule for Employees of Government Aided Schools‟ to say that
the same is application to his case is not well founded inasmuch as firstly,
his employment is that of a contractual or temporary nature, when the rule
would be applicable only to those employees whose service is permanent
in nature. Secondly, that the application of the said rule contemplates a
disciplinary proceeding already initiated against such employee, which is
not found present in the case of the petitioner. Therefore, reliance on this
rule will not help the petitioner and the related authorities cited by him in
this regard are, therefore, not found relevant and applicable to his case.
36.
In the light of the above observations, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the petitioner has not been able to make out a
case which calls for interference thereto. This petition is liable to be
dismissed which is done so herein.
37.
Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
16.11.2023
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