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Serial No. 02
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.A. No. 24 of 2019 with
Crl. M.C. No. 58 of 2019
Date of order: 31.03.2022
Hiralal Reang
vs.
The Union of India
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
:
Mr. A.S. Siddiqui, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S. Pandit, Adv.
Ms. M.K. Sah, Adv.
For the Respondents
:
Dr. N. Mozika, ASG with
Ms. L. Jana, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
The appellant herein has been convicted for the commission of an
offence under Section 8 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 and punished under Section 21(c) thereof to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rs. 1 lakh. The
judgment of conviction was pronounced on September 5, 2019 and the
sentence was also passed on the same date.
2.
According to the Customs authorities, following an intelligence
report that a truck apparently transporting rice from a Food Corporation
of India (FCI) railway siding in Guwahati and travelling to Agartala may
also be ferrying drugs, appropriate orders were issued in compliance with
the relevant provisions for a search team to be put in place to intercept
the vehicle. In the early hours of October 29, 2014, the relevant vehicle
was intercepted some 40 km outside Shillong. The case made out by the
Customs authorities was that since the vehicle had been stopped in the
middle of the highway and it may have not been prudent to conduct a
search at the spot, particularly considering the hour of the day, the vehicle
was escorted to the Customs office in Shillong while it continued to be
driven by the appellant herein.
3.
From the evidence adduced before the trial court, it appears that
one Andrew Swer of Laban and another Naresh Thakur of Keating Road
were called as independent witnesses while the unloading and search
operations were conducted and, in the presence of the two witnesses, the
unloading of the truck was completed and it was discovered that instead
of the full consignment complement of 310 bags of rice that was loaded
in the truck at Guwahati as per the consignment note carried on the truck,
only 257 bags of rice were on board the vehicle and, in addition, 81 HDPE
bags of Phensedyl cough syrup were discovered. Samples were drawn in
more than one lot in the presence of the witnesses, they were sealed and
signatures of the witnesses obtained on the bags containing the samples.
The other bags containing the contraband were also sealed and the
signatures of the seizure witnesses were appended thereto. The witnesses
proved their signatures in court and testified that they had been called in
the early hours of October 29, 2014 and required to be present during the
time that the search and seizure operations continued.
4.
One of the seizure witnesses did indicate that the unloading
operations had commenced by the time he arrived at the spot, but the
other seizure witness did not refer to the unloading having commenced
before his arrival. On an overall reading of the testimonies of the seizure
witnesses, no anomaly is found and the suggestions to the contrary put
forth on behalf of the defence were robustly repelled. There is no doubt
that some of the tags bearing the signatures of the seizure witnesses were
missing, but there is equally no doubt that the relevant bags said to
contain the contraband were produced in court and even the bags
containing the samples that had been kept in the court’s custody were
produced at the time of the trial. Since the seizure was of a total amount
of 24,000 bottles each containing 100 ml of Phensedyl, the bags
containing such goods could not be conveniently housed in any place
under the court’s custody and were kept deposited in the Customs
warehouse or godown. The person in charge of the godown was called as
a witness and examined. Such witness testified that both the 257 bags of
rice and the 81 bags containing the contraband were deposited but,
subsequently, the 257 bags of rice were made over to a representative of
the transporter who had been authorised to receive such material. Even
such representative of the transporter was examined as witness. There
seems little scope for the goods to have been tampered with.
5.
An FCI employee was also called as a witness so as to indicate
that as per the consignment note, 310 bags of rice had been loaded in the
relevant truck at the railway siding in Guwahati and they were to be
delivered at an FCI facility in Agartala. Though the elaborate crossexamination of the FCI witness by the defence seems rather humorous, it
merely shows the extent of desperation to try and discredit the case of the
prosecution by seeking to even take apart such witnesses, who was
merely a formal witness called only to prove the FCI documents and no
more.
6.
It is also not in dispute that the appellant herein rendered a
statement before the investigating officer and a copy of the statement was
marked as Exhibit 7 in course of the trial. One particular paragraph from
such statement of the appellant stands out:
“On enquiry, I told the officers that I loaded the FCI Rice at
Changsari and came to Boragaon, Guwahati where I contacted
the owner of the said truck Shri Bittu for the expenditures to be
incurred on the journey to Agartala. As directed by him, I went
to Maligaon to meet the owner of the truck and after collecting
some money from him I went to back to Boragaon, where I had
parked the truck. But, to my surprise, the truck was not at the
place where I parked. So, I contacted the said owner and he told
me that the truck is lying at a little distance ahead from where I
initially parked. As per his direction, I went ahead and found the
truck with no one around but the key was inside the truck. I then
proceeded for my onward journey to Agartala along the National
Highway(NH-40). I further state that the detected/recovered
Phensedyl Cough Linctus was loaded during my absence when
I went to Maligaon to meet the said owner of the truck. The
owner of the truck may be aware of the recovered Phensedyl. I
also stated that I do not have any documents for the recovered
Phensedyl.”
7.
Upon referring to the oral evidence of all the witnesses called at
the trial and the material exhibits that were produced, the trial court found
that though an additional charge of conspiracy had been levelled against
the appellant herein, in the absence of any other being charged, such
charge of conspiracy could not be sustained. However, on the basis of
evidence before the trial court, the commission of the offence under
Section 8 of the Act was found to have been made out, which culminated
in the sentence being awarded.
8.
The appellant raises several issues. For a start, the appellant refers
to Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and says that the
provisions therein, particularly in sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) were not
complied with in this case. The appellant submits that the provisions of
the Code, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the Act of 1985, have
to be adhered to even in terms of Section 51 of the Act of 1985. The
appellant refers to Section 52A of the Act of 1985 and Standing Order
No. 1 of 1989 issued as to how the seized contraband has to be preserved,
dealt with and disposed of.
9.
According to the appellant, if the contraband is not preserved by
ensuring that it is insulated against any kind of tampering or if the
contraband, which is the primary evidence, is not produced in court at the
trial or if the manner in dealing with the contraband is found to be at
variance with the said Standing Order, the resultant procedural
irregularity that would have occurred would invariably give the accused
the benefit of the doubt in certain circumstances. The appellant asserts
that as the driver of a truck of a contractor engaged in the transportation
of FCI goods, it was his duty to merely drive the truck, upon the goods
being loaded at the place of loading, to the place of discharge; and he
could have not been held responsible for the contents of the vehicle.
10.
The appellant has referred to a judgment reported at (2008) 16
SCC 417 (Noor Aga v. State of Punjab) for the principle enunciated
therein that if physical evidence of the material seized is not available or
the relevant material is not produced at the trial, an adverse inference
would be drawn. A further judgment, reported at (2011) 5 SCC 123
(Ashok Alias Dangra Jaiswal v. State of Madhya Pradesh), has also been
placed for the proposition laid down therein that when the seized goods
were not produced before the court, the mere reliance on a report rendered
by a forensic science laboratory would not suffice since the link between
the goods seized and the report would be lost in the absence of the seized
goods being produced or accounted for.
11.
In the case of Noor Aga, the appellant has relied on the part of the
judgment dealing with non-production of physical evidence covered by
paragraphs 85 to 108 of the report. In that case, 1.4 kg of heroin was
alleged to have been concealed in a cardboard container otherwise
designed for carrying grapes and such container was allegedly recovered
from the appellant before the Supreme Court at Raja Sansi Airport in
Amritsar. The cardboard carton from which the recovery was allegedly
made was not produced in court and, it is in such context, that the
Supreme Court found that the primary evidence in support of the case
was missing and had not been produced and it could not be said that the
case against the appellant before the Supreme Court had been
affirmatively established. In the case of Ashok, three packets of heroin
were seized from the pockets of the kurta that the appellant before the
Supreme Court was alleged to have been wearing. However, the seizure
witnesses turned hostile as would be evident from paragraph 9 of the
report and it is evident that the samples said to have been drawn remained
uncared for during a period of four or five days when they were
susceptible to have been tampered with. Upon noticing such facts at
paragraph 10 of the report, the Supreme Court observed, at paragraph 12
thereof, that there was no evidence, connecting the forensic report with
the substance that was seized from the possession of the appellant.
12.
Apart from the fact that the quantities involved in the two cases
were such as could have been conveniently produced in court and
examined, in the present case 24,000 bottles of codeine mixture in the
form of Phensedyl in 100 ml bottles were seized. It also appears that the
bags containing the bottles were produced in court and the seizure
witnesses testified to their signatures appearing in the tags appended to
the overwhelming majority of the bags. However, the bags may have not
been opened to peer into them to ascertain whether they, indeed,
contained the Phensedyl bottles alleged to have been seized in this case.
13.
This is not a case where the seized contraband was not produced
before the court or was not available, but only that the seized contraband
that was preserved in bags was not taken out of the bags and formally
displayed in course of the trial and no attempt may have been made to
open the bags to inspect the contents thereof. Indeed, if the appellant
harboured any doubt in such regard, it was incumbent on the appellant,
who was present in course of the trial, to ask for all or any of the bags to
be opened and checked. Though the appellant’s refrain at this stage is that
it is not for the accused to do anything, but for the prosecution to prove
its case beyond any reasonable doubt, the facts of the present case would
not attract the principles laid down in the two reported judgments cited
on behalf of the appellant.
14.
According to the prosecution, it had to establish, first, that the
seized contraband was seized from the possession of the accused;
secondly, that the goods seized were actually contraband; and, finally, as
to whether the quantum of contraband seized amounted to commercial
quantity or not. It is submitted that there is no iota of doubt that the seized
goods in this case were obtained from the vehicle driven by the appellant
herein and there was no other person in the vehicle at the time that it was
intercepted. It is the further submission of the respondent that the FSL
report is quite clear and the relevant person who rendered the report was
examined as PW1 and he proved his report to the effect that each 100 ml
bottle of Phensedyl contained codeine up to 149.10 mg, such that the total
amount of contraband seized was in excess of 3.5 kg, well above the
threshold for being considered as non-commercial.
15.
Some minor matters have been referred to on behalf of the
appellant, including an apparent anomaly in one of the seizure witnesses
referring to the unloading taking place at Keating Road and the other
witness referring to such activity being at MG Road. It has been clarified
on behalf of the respondent that the Customs office in Shillong abuts
Keating Road on one side and MG Road on the other. In such context,
the fact that one of the seizure witnesses referred to Keating Road and the
other referred to MG Road would not amount to much.
16.
A second point which is raised in such regard has also to do with
the seizure witnesses. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that even
though the unloading and searching operations were conducted at the
Customs office in Shillong, a local witness in the form of Naresh Thakur
was obtained as he runs a hair dressing salon in Keating Road, but the
other witness was brought from Laban which is quite some distance
away.
17.
Considering the time of the day when the unloading and search
operations were conducted, it may not have been unusual not to find a
second witness in the locality who would be an appropriate person for the
exercise. It is nobody’s case that Andrew Swer has been used as a regular
witness or is otherwise linked to the Customs officials or the Department
in manner. Indeed, such witness’ testimony comes through as normal,
including the minor inconsistencies that are excusable as a result of the
passage of time.
18.
There is no doubt that it was established in course of the trial and
on the basis of the evidence before the trial court that it was the appellant
herein who was the driver of the vehicle from which a large quantity of
contraband was seized. Indeed, if the consignment note of FCI indicated
310 bags of rice being loaded at the railway siding in Guwahati, an
explanation was warranted from the appellant as to how 53 of 310 bags
of rice went missing and 81 bags of contraband were found in their place.
19.
An attempt at an explanation was made by the appellant herein as
would be apparent from the statement given to the investigating officer.
However, at the time of the trial, the appellant did not endeavour to call
any witness or, at any rate, prove that it was possible that the contraband
may have been loaded into his truck or a part of the FCI goods may have
been unloaded despite his exercise of best diligence. Further, the story
made out before the investigating officer does not ring true. The appellant
claimed that he had visited the place of the owner of the truck to obtain
money for the trip and that he had parked his truck at a particular place,
but later found the truck not to be seen at such spot. That would imply
that the appellant had left the truck unguarded and had taken no steps to
remove the ignition key therefrom. In fact, the appellant asserted that
when he found the truck some distance away from where he had parked
it, there was no one around and the ignition key was in the place.
20.
The final ground urged by the appellant is that the investigating
officer was not examined in this case. This was a case which was led by
Customs officials and the relevant Customs personnel, including the
Superintendent tasked with the duty to intercept the truck, were
examined. It is also elementary that the mere failure to call the
investigating officer as a witness may not be fatal unless there was some
key evidence that was required to be proved by the investigating officer
but was not done. In the present case, there can be no manner of doubt
that the Customs officials intercepted the truck and found the appellant
to be the only person therein. Such truck was brought over from the
highway to the Shillong office of the Customs authorities and the goods
therein were unloaded and searched in the presence of the seizure
witnesses and the huge cache of contraband discovered. The safe-keeping
of the goods has been proved upon the in-charge of the deposit section of
the relevant Customs warehouse being examined. In such circumstances,
the investigating officer could not have added to the prosecution case or
detracted therefrom in any manner for the failure to examine him being
cited as a valid ground of defence by the appellant herein.
21.
The trial court duly considered the evidence of all the witnesses
called at the trial. The trial court referred to the material exhibits that had
been produced in course of the trial and found that there was no doubt
that it was the appellant who drove the vehicle containing the large
quantity of contraband. The circumstances were such that it was for the
appellant herein to indicate how the contraband came to be in the vehicle
that he was driving. The respondent here has appropriately relied on the
presumption of culpability that arises under Section 35 of the Act of 1985.
22.
For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of conviction does not
call for any interference. The punishment awarded to the appellant is in
keeping with the appropriate provisions and is a necessary corollary to
the judgment of conviction.
23.
Crl.A. No. 24 of 2019 and Crl.M.C. No. 58 of 2019 are dismissed.
24.
Let a copy of this judgment be immediately made over to the
appellant free of cost.
(H. S. Thangkhiew)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
31.03.2022
“Sylvana PS”
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