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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.37499 of 2026
CNR No.ODHC010884732026
Himansu Sekhar Pradhan
….
Petitioner
Mr. Prabhu Prasad Mohanty, Advocate
-versusState of Odisha & Ors.
….
Opp. Parties
Mr. Saswat Das, AGA
CORAM:
HON’ BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
ORDER
11.11.2026
Order No.
01.
1.
Heard learned counsel for both the Parties.
2.
The petitioner came up before this Court for issuance of a
mandamus upon the Mining Officer to forthwith permit him to
operate the Praharajpur (Ka) Sand Source for remaining unoperated lease period and also to declare the prolonging inaction
of the opposite parties in not taking a decision despite the disposal
of a matter before the National Green Tribunal (NGT) to be
arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
3.
Admittedly, the petitioner was adjudged as a successful
bidder in relation to a sand quarry and a lease deed was also
executed on 3rd October, 2016 for a period of five years. The
petitioner, after fulfilling and/or complying all the terms and
conditions embodied in the said lease deed as well as the statutory
provisions, ensued the operation, but was subsequently prevented
from 5th October, 2018 when interim order was passed till 26th
February, 2021 when the matter was finally decided. Because of
the interdict created in terms of the order of the National Green
Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, the sairat could not be
operated.
4.
Admittedly, the said order creates a brindle in operation of
the sand quarries across the State which remained inoperative till
26th February, 2021, when the said proceeding pending before the
NGT was finally disposed of. Obviously, between the periods
from 5th October, 2018 till the period of expiration of the lease, the
petitioner was prevented from operating the said sand quarry, yet,
in order to ensure his obligation, the statutory amounts were
deposited with the authority. Obviously, the petitioner was
prevented from utilizing the usufructs of the said lease because of
the order of the NGT and approached the authority to extend or
renew the lease for such period when the order of the NGT was
operative. The authority is sitting over the said representation and
has not taken any conscious decision thereupon.
5.
Mr. Prabhu Prasad Mohanty, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner submits that the authority cannot deprive
the petitioner from using and utilizing the resources for the entire
period of lease and in fact, the State has been directed to extend
the period in a slew of litigations filed before this Court.
6.
To buttress the aforesaid submission, reliance is placed
upon a Division Bench order of this Court dated 31st May, 2021
passed in Jayaram Das v. State of Odisha and others (W.P.(C)
No.36099 of 2020) where, in an identical situation, a direction was
passed upon the State to extend the tenure of the lease by a period
of one year eight months and ten days, when the said order of the
NGT was operative.
7.
On the other hand, Mr. Saswat Das, learned Additional
Government Advocate (AGA) appearing on behalf of the State
submits that neither the Rules nor the Act applicable in this regard
contained the provision relating to extension and/or renewal of the
lease which expired by efflux of time. It is further submitted that
after several amendments having brought into the Mines and
Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 as well as the
Odisha Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016, the quarries or
the mines can only be settled through an open auction and not in
the form of an extension or the renewal thereof. Mr. Das further
submits that the Apex Court, in case of Dharmendra Kumar
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2021) 1 SCC 93 held
that the Court cannot compel the State to extend or renew the lease
period in absence of any such rule and, therefore, the contention of
the petitioner is unsustainable.
8.
On the conspectus of the aforesaid facts so unfurled, it is
undeniable that the period of lease could not be enjoyed by the
petitioner because of an order of the NGT operating during the
currency thereof. Even after the disposal of the proceeding by the
NGT, no conscious decision has been taken by the State as on this
date to grant permission in respect of Praharajpur (Ka) sand
quarry. The question, therefore, begging an answer is whether the
Court should direct the authorities to extend the period of lease or
to renew the lease, as the petitioner was deprived of enjoying the
benefits for the entire period of the lease.
9.
We have given our anxious consideration to various
provisions of the Act and our endeavor has failed to find out any
specific provision relating to the extension or the renewal of lease
after the same expired. It is a trite law that the Court should not
issue mandamus commanding the authorities to do an act either
forbidden by law or dehors the law. The authorities shall act
within the precincts of the law and transgression of a boundary is
always viewed zealously by the writ Courts, as the interference
becomes inevitable in this regard. Even in case of a statutory lease,
it is not only guided by the terms and conditions embodied therein
but also the statutory provisions governing the field and the Court
should be slow and circumspect in interfering in this regard.
10.
The decision rendered in Dharmendra Kumar Singh
(supra) appears to us having taken note of the aforesaid notion of
law in a somewhat identical situation. The said case originated
from the State of Uttar Pradesh, where the operation of several
mining leases was kept at halt by the same order of the NGT. The
Apex Court noticed the distinguishing features as several mining
leaseholders approached the Supreme Court. Some of the mining
areas were falling within the purview of the Forest Act and some
beyond the same. The applicability of Section 4 of the Forest Act,
1927 was taken into consideration and the Supreme Court took
note of the fact that they were prevented from operating the lease
because of the order of the NGT. The Apex Court in unequivocal
terms held that if the mining policy or the applicable statute does
not permit any extension or the renewal, it would not be proper on
the part of the Court to issue a mandamus in the following:
“37. We do find ourselves in agreement with the submission of
the learned counsel for the State that the right to extension of
lease either flows from a statutory provision or from the terms
of the lease between the parties concerned. If there has been
an obstructed period by reason of a judicial interdict, that
itself will not give window to extend the lease by not following
the statutory provisions, especially when the terms of the lease
do not provide for any consequences thereof.”
11.
The unreported judgment of this Court relied upon by the
petitioner in case of Jayaram Das (supra) did not notice the
judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Dharmendra Kumar
Singh (supra) at a prior period of time. Apart from the same, if
there is any apparent conflict and/or inconsistency between the
judgment of the High Court and the Apex Court, the judgment of
the apex Court is binding on all the Courts by virtue of Article 141
of the Constitution of India. Any judgment which runs counter to
the ratio and/or the principles of law laid down by the Supreme
Court cannot be said to be a good law and, therefore, the safest
course which the High Court should adopt in this regard is to
follow the mandate of the Supreme Court.
12.
The Supreme Court, in case of Dharmendra Kumar Singh
(supra) in clear and unequivocal words, held that in absence of
any statutory provision, the Court should not pass a direction upon
the authorities to do an act contrary thereto and, therefore, we do
not find that any direction as sought for in the form of mandamus
can be granted. Equally, we have noticed in recent past that in
some of the cases, the Government has taken a conscious decision
based upon a policy to permit the quarry leaseholders to operate.
Whether that is permissible or not is the wisdom of the
administrative authority to ponder upon and no such direction can
be passed by the Court in judicial fiat.
13.
Interestingly, an ancillary point arose in the instant case as
we find from the judgment rendered in Dharmendra Kumar
Singh (supra) that it would be too burdensome on the leaseholder
to continue paying the security deposit and the advance royalties,
despite being prevented by an order passed by the NGT and,
therefore, is entitled to the refund thereof. Mr. Das, the learned
ASC vociferously submits that even the petitioner is not entitled to
any refund and the observations made by the Apex Court in
Dharmendra Kumar Singh (supra) is mere a direction to be
construed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Even
apart, she submits that the Division Bench of this Court in
Narayan Nayak v. State of Odisha (W.P.(C) No. 10384 of 2021),
while disposing of the same on 5th March, 2024, categorically
held that the quarry leaseholder is not entitled to a refund and,
therefore, even the petitioner is not entitled to get the refund of the
security deposit and the advance royalty.
14.
Taking the first plea, we do not find the contention of Ms.
Dash to be correct in the perspective of the observations made by
the apex Court in Dharmendra Kumar Singh (supra). The State
was formidably opposing the prayer of the mining leaseholders
seeking for extension and relying on the separate provision of the
Rules and the statute, including the policy adopted by the
Government of Uttar Pradesh, which dislodged the claim of the
mining leaseholder to have the lease extended or renewed. In
pursuit of the same, though there appears to be a word
"concession" used in paragraph 41 thereof but the same has to be
read in juxtaposition with the other contentions raised by the State
in the said matter. It was all along the stand of the State in the said
report that the prayer for extension and/or renewal of a period in
which the order of the NGT was operative cannot be granted in
absence of any statutory Rules or the policy having taken in this
regard and in pursuit of determining the same, the Apex Court, in
unequivocal terms held that if such a deprivation is shown, which
cannot be attributed to the conduct of a mining leaseholder, the
law permits the refund of the security deposit and the advanced
royalty deposited by him in the following:
“43. We, thus, find that the appropriate course of action to be
adopted in this case cannot be to extend the lease for the
obstructed period but to direct that the security deposit, if not
already refunded, should be refunded and the amount
deposited by the appellants/leaseholders as advance royalties
to the respondent State be also paid back to them along with
something more.”
15.
A distinction can be drawn between an involuntary act and
a voluntary act. In the event, the lessee or the lessor has committed
a fault or committed a breach of the terms and conditions of the
lease or the statutory provisions, the equity does not come to play.
The position would have been different when neither of the
contracting parties is at fault, but the deprivation is by virtue of an
interdict created by an order of the NGT, such involuntary act
cannot be equated with the voluntary act nor the principles
governing such situation should be blurred.
16.
The reliance to an unreported judgment of this Court in
Narayan Nayak (supra) is one of the cases concerning the
voluntary act. In the said case, there was a default or a breach
committed by the mining leaseholder in not submitting the
requisite certificate and in such perspective, the claim for refund
was denied. We have no hesitation nor a dissent to the proposition
laid down therein for the simple reason that if the quarry could not
be operated because of the fault of the lessee in complying with
the terms and conditions of the lease or the statutory provision, he
does not deserve any equitable reliefs in the form of a refund.
However, the position is different when he cannot be blamed for a
breach of any of the terms and conditions or the statutory
provision and, therefore, the judgment rendered in Narayan
Nayak (supra) has no manner of applicability in the instant case.
17.
As indicated hereinabove, we have noticed that in some of
the cases, the Government have taken a decision on the
representation of the mining leaseholder to extend the period and,
therefore, we direct the authorities to consider the said prayer
independently without being swayed by the observations made
hereinabove. In the event, the authorities declined to extend the
period or renew the lease, the security deposit and the advance
royalty paid by the petitioner shall be refunded within two weeks
from the said decision with an interest @ 6% per annum from the
date of the deposit till the payment thereof.
18.
With these observations and directions, the writ petition is
disposed of.
(Harish Tandon)
Chief Justice
(Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
Bijay/Sarbani
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SARBANI DASH
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 11-Nov-2026 18:00:06
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