The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
14. However, it is clarified that in view of the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Vicky @ Vikas versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2020 (3) Scale 40, the benefit of the ‘concurrent running of sentences’ is granted to the petitioner, with regard to the substantive sentence and not the sentence, which has been inflicted, upon him, in default of payment of fine, meaning thereby, substantive sentence ordered by learned Court below in all the present cases shall run concurrently but after completion of the same, petitioner herein shall have to undergo the sentence inflicted upon him in default of payment of fine, if fine has not been deposited.
15. With the aforesaid observation, present petition allowed, pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. March 06, 2026 Rajeev Raturi (Sandeep Sharma), Judge
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2026:HHC:6095
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr.MMO No.1191 of 2025
Date of Decision: 06.03.2026
_______________________________________________________________________
Het Ram
……...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
Coram
…....Respondent
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
__________________________________________________________________________
For the Petitioner:
Ms. Seema Sood, Advocate, as Legal Aid
Counsel.
For the Respondent: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional
Advocates General, with Mr. Anish Banshtu,
Deputy Advocate General, for State.
_______________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of the
BNSS, prayer has been made on behalf of petitioner that the sentences
awarded to him, by the various Courts, under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (in short ‘the Act’) in 2 cases may kindly be
ordered to be run concurrently.
2.
Petitioner stands convicted in 2 cases, as detailed herein
below :
Sr.
No.
1.
Case detail
Convicting Courts
Criminal Appeal No.2 of Learned
Additional
Sessions
2025, titled as “Het Ram Vs. Judge, Kullu, District Kullu.
2026:HHC:6095
Sh. Amboj Sood”
2.
Criminal Appeal No.3 of Learned
Additional
Sessions
2025, titled as “Het Ram Vs. Judge, Kullu, District Kullu.
Sh. Amboj Sood”
3.
Petitioner, who is currently 45 years old, at whose behest the
present petition is lodged, has already undergone substantive sentence
of more than one year and in case his remaining sentence is to be
counted, he has to undergo imprisonment for further two years in each
case.
4.
Respondent/State
has
filed
communication
dated
16.12.2025, issued under the signatures of Superintendent of Police,
Kullu, enclosing therewith certificate of the period of detention (available
at page No.85 of the paper-book), perusal whereof clearly reveals that
the petitioner has undergone the total sentence period of 1 year and 18
days, as on 12.12.2025 in Cr. Appeal No.2 of 2025. Further, as per the
certificate of the period of detention, the petitioner is also convicted in
another case i.e. Cr. Appeal No.3 of 2025, which sentence shall run after
the expiry of previous sentence i.e. Cr. Appeal No.2 of 2025.
5.
Prayer made on behalf of the petitioner has been opposed by
respondents-State on the ground that convict Het Ram is undergoing
substantive sentence in Cr. Appeal No.2 of 2025, however, sentence in
default of fine/compensation of the second case i.e. Cr. Appeal No.3 of
2026:HHC:6095
2025 would only commence after the completion of sentence in Cr.
Appeal No.2 of 2025. It has been submitted that since fine imposed by
the learned Court below has not been deposited, petitioner is also
required to undergo sentence in default.
6.
Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and
perused material available on record, this Court finds that despite
having undergone conviction of more than one year (out of two years of
sentence) in Cr. Appeal No.2 of 2025, petitioner shall have to undergo
another sentence of 2 years in Cr. Appeal No.3 of 2025, if prayer made
on his behalf through instant petition is not accepted.
7.
With a view to substantiate the prayer of the petitioner,
learned counsel representing petitioner invited attention of this Court to
judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab Versus
Madan Lal, (2009) 5 Supreme Court Cases 238, V.K. Bansal versus
State of Haryana & Another, (2013) 7 Supreme Court Cases 211, Anil
Kumar Versus State of Punjab (2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 53,
Nagaraja Rao Versus Central Bureau of Investigation, (2015) 4
Supreme Court Cases 302, Benson Versus State of Kerala, (2016) 10
Supreme Court Cases 307.
8.
Reliance is also placed upon the Judgment of Hon’ble the
Supreme Court in the case titled as Iqram Versus The State of Uttar
2026:HHC:6095
Pradesh & Ors. in Criminal Appeal No.2319 of 2022. Relevant
paragraphs of the case are reproduced, as under:
“7. The Division Bench of the High Court has come to the conclusion that
in view of the provisions of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
19732, each subsequent term of conviction has to commence at the
expiration of the imprisonment currently being undergone by the
appellant.
8. The net consequence of the position, as it emerges, is that the appellant
would have to undergo a total term of imprisonment of 18 years in respect
of the nine convictions for offences under Section 136 of the Electricity Act
and cognate provisions.
9. The plea bargain was with reference to the provisions of Chapter XXI-A
of the Cr.PC. Section 265-G stipulates that the judgment delivered by the
Court shall be final and no appeal (except a Special Leave Petition under
Article 136 and a Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution) shall lie in any court against such a judgment.
10. Section 427 provides that when a person already undergoing a
sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or
imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the
imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the
court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with
such previous sentence. In other words, sub-section (1) of Section 427
confers a discretion on the court to direct that the subsequent sentence
following a conviction shall run concurrently with the previous sentence.
11. In Mohd. Zahid Vs State through NCB3, this Court interpreted the
provisions of Section 427 of CrPC after duly considering the precedents in
the following terms :
“33. Thus from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the principles
of law that emerge are as under:
(i) if a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is
sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment, such
subsequent term of imprisonment would normally commence at the
expiration of the imprisonment to which he was previously
sentenced;
(ii) ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the
expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the court directs
the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous
sentence;
(iii) the general rule is that where there are different transactions,
different crime numbers and cases have been decided by the
different judgments, concurrent sentence cannot be awarded under
Section 427 Cr.P.C.; (iv) under Section 427(1) of Cr.PC the court has
the power and discretion to issue a direction that all the subsequent
sentences run concurrently with the previous sentence, however
discretion has to be exercised judiciously depending upon the
nature of the offence or the offences committed and the facts in
2026:HHC:6095
situation. However, there must be a specific direction or order by the
court that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the
previous sentence.”
12. The Trial judge, in the present case, granted a set off within the ambit
of Section 428/Section 31 Cr.PC. No specific direction was issued by the
trial court within the ambit of Section 427(1) so as to allow the
subsequent sentences to run concurrently. All the convictions took place
on the same day.
13. Once the petitioner espoused the remedy of moving a Writ Petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court ought to have noticed
the serious miscarriage of justice which would occur consequent upon the
trial court not having exercised specifically its discretion within the ambit
of Section 427(1). When the appellant moved the High Court, he was
aggrieved by the conduct of the jail authorities in construing the direction
of the trial court to mean that each of the sentences would run
consecutively at the end of the term of previous sentence and conviction.
The High Court ought to have intervened in the exercise of its jurisdiction
by setting right the miscarriage of justice which would occur in the above
manner, leaving the appellant to remain incarcerated for a period of 18
years in respect of his conviction and sentence in the nine sessions trials
for offences essentially under the Electricity Act.
14. In view of the above discussion, we allow the appeal and set aside
the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 24 March 2022. We order
and direct that the sentences which have been imposed on the appellant
in the nine sessions trials noticed in the earlier part of this judgment shall
run concurrently.”
9.
Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by Hon’ble
Apex Court in V.K. Bansal versus State of Haryana & Another,
(2013) 7 Supreme Court Cases 211, wherein, it has been held that the
powers under Section 427(1) Cr.PC, should be exercised judiciously and
not mechanically. Relevant paragraph no. 16 is reproduced, as under:“16. In conclusion, we may say that the legal position favours exercise of
discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in cases where the prosecution is
based on a single transaction no matter different complaints in relation
thereto may have been filed as is the position in cases involving
dishonour of cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of a
loan to the creditor.”
10.
Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anil Kumar versus
State of Punjab, (2017) 5 Supreme Court Case 53, has elaborately
2026:HHC:6095
discussed the provisions of Section 427 Cr.PC. Relevant paragraphs 4 to
7 are reproduced, as under:“4. The power conferred on the Court under Section 427 Cr.P.C. to order
concurrent sentence is discretionary. Section 427 Cr.P.C. reads as
under:“S.427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence.(1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is
sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment
for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the
expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously
sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall
run concurrently with such previous sentence:
Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to
imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing
security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment
for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter
sentence shall commence immediately.
(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life
is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or
imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently
with such previous sentence.”
5. In terms of sub-section (1) of Section 427, if a person already
undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment, such subsequent term of imprisonment would
normally commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he
was previously sentenced. Only in appropriate cases, considering the
facts of the case, the court can make the sentence run concurrently with
an earlier sentence imposed. The investiture of such discretion,
presupposes that such discretion be exercised by the Court on sound
judicial principles and not in a mechanical manner. Whether or not the
discretion is to be exercised in directing sentences to run concurrently
would depend upon the nature of the offence/offences and the facts and
circumstances of each case.
6. In V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana and Anr. (2013) 7 SCC 211, it was
held by this Court as under:
“It is manifest from Section 427 (1) that the Court has the power and the
discretion to issue a direction but in the very nature of the power so
conferred upon the Court the discretionary power shall have to be
exercised along the judicial lines and not in a mechanical, wooden or
pedantic manner. It is difficult to lay down any straitjacket approach in
the matter of exercise of such discretion by the courts. There is no cut
and dried formula for the Court to follow in the matter of issue or refusal
of a direction within the contemplation of Section 427(1). Whether or not a
direction ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the
nature of the offence or offences committed, and the fact situation in
which the question of concurrent running of the sentences arises.”
2026:HHC:6095
This Court then went on to club various crimes in respect of which
sentences were imposed upon the appellant therein in three groups.
7. After referring to V.K. Bansal’s case, in Benson v. State of Kerala
(2016) 10 SCC 307: 2016 (9) SCALE 670, this Court directed the
substantive sentences imposed on the appellant Benson to run
concurrently. The appellant therein was convicted for the offences
punishable under Section 379 and Section 414 read with Section 34 IPC
in at least eleven cases. By a separate judgment, the appellant was
convicted and sentenced in each of the aforesaid cases and total length
of sentences in aggregate was around nineteen years.”
11.
In this case, two cheques were issued by the accused
towards a single continuous transaction, which pertains to purchase of
seeds from the complainant to the tune of ₹19,58,750/- and therefore,
concurrent running of sentences in both the complaint cases is merited,
therefore, this Court is inclined to accept the prayer made on behalf of
the accused for ordering that the sentences awarded in both the cases
shall run concurrently, however, so far default sentences, if any,
imposed in both the cases are concerned, they shall run separately.
12.
Keeping in view the fact that petitioner is undergoing
sentence in two cases, this Court is of the view that ends of justice
would be met, if the substantive sentence, in both the cases, as detailed
hereinabove, are ordered to be run concurrently.
13.
Having taken note of the aforesaid law laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court, coupled with the fact that the petitioner, aged 45
years, is the sole breadwinner of the family and that the sentence
awarded to him for committing an offence punishable under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act is required to be waived off, this Court
2026:HHC:6095
is of the view that the ends of justice would be met if the substantive
sentences in the cases detailed hereinabove are ordered to run
concurrently. Ordered accordingly
14.
However, it is clarified that in view of the decision of Hon’ble
Apex Court in Vicky @ Vikas versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
2020 (3) Scale 40, the benefit of the ‘concurrent running of sentences’ is
granted to the petitioner, with regard to the substantive sentence and
not the sentence, which has been inflicted, upon him, in default of
payment of fine, meaning thereby, substantive sentence ordered by
learned Court below in all the present cases shall run concurrently but
after completion of the same, petitioner herein shall have to undergo the
sentence inflicted upon him in default of payment of fine, if fine has not
been deposited.
15.
With the aforesaid observation, present petition allowed,
pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
March 06, 2026
Rajeev Raturi
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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