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NIRMALA
RAO
2026:CGHC:3814
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 254 of 2019
1 - Hemendra Singh Thakur S/ol Pratap Singh Aged About 49 Years Presently
Working At Assistant Grade -Iii, Municipal Corporation Raigarh, District Raigarh
Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Urban
Administration, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh.,
District
:
Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Director Department Of Urban, Administration, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar,
Raipur,
District
Raipur
Chhattisgarh.,
District
:
Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
3 - Municipal Corporation Raigarh Through The Commissioner, Municipal
Corporation
Raigarh
Chhattisgarh.,
District
:
Raigarh,
Chhattisgarh
4 - Municipal Corporation Ambikapur Through The Commissioner, Municipal
Corporation Ambikapur Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh
5 - Mayank Singh Aged About 42 Years R/o C.P. Singh, Working As Assistant Grade
- Ii, At Municipal Corporation Raigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh., District :
Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Petitioner
For Respondents No.1 & 2
For Respondent No.3
For Respondent No.4
For Respondent No.5
:
:
:
:
:
Ms. Hamida Siddiqui, Advocate.
Ms. Pallavi Das, Advocate.
Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, Advocate.
Shri Anurag Singh, Advocate.
Shri Prateek Sharma, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
22.01.2026
1.
The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following reliefs:
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to setaside/quash the impugned order dated 13-08-2018 (Annexure
P-1), and impugned promotion order dated 05-03-2015
(Annexure P-2).
10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct
the respondent No.3 for considering the promotion of
petitioner.
10.3 That the Hon'ble Court further pleased to grant such
other relief(s) as may be deemed fit and proper in the interest
of justice and fair play.”
2.
The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was appointed as a Peon in
the Municipal Corporation, Raigarh. He was promoted to the post of
Assistant Grade-III sometimes in the year 2012. Respondent No.5 was
initially appointed as Assistant Grade-III in the Municipal Corporation,
Ambikapur and later on, his services were transferred from Ambikapur
to Municipal Corporation, Raigarh on 3.12.1999.
The services of
respondent No.5 were regularized vide order dated 17.12.2002 with
effect from 1.7.2001. Respondent No.5 was promoted to the post of
Assistant Grade-II vide order dated 5.3.2015 and the said order is
under challenge in the present writ petition. The petitioner preferred
WP(S) No. 4555 of 2018 which was disposed of vide order dated
12.7.2018 with a direction to respondent No.3 to decide the pending
representation of the petitioner. The said representation was rejected
vide order dated 13.8.2018, which is also under challenge in this
petition.
She would submit that no seniority list was published by
respondent No.3 while considering the name of respondent No.5 for
promotion to the post of Assistant Grade-II. She would submit that the
petitioner moved an application under the Right to Information Act to
obtain seniority list, but no document was provided by the Municipal
Corporation, Raigarh. She would contend that name of respondent
No.5 reflects in the seniority list of Assistant Grade-III in the Municipal
Corporation, Ambikapur and therefore, the order of promotion granted
to respondent No.5 is illegal.
3.
It is argued that the services of respondent No.5 were never absorbed
by the Municipal Corporation, Raigarh, therefore, consideration of his
name for promotion is per se illegal.
She would also submit that
respondent No.5 is entitled to get all service benefits from Municipal
Corporation, Ambikapur and not from the Municipal Corporation,
Raigarh. It is argued that as the seniority list was not published by the
Municipal Corporation, Raigarh, the question of delay does not arise.
She would submit that in their return, the respondents have failed to
demonstrate that the name of respondent No.5 was considered for
promotion in the absence of a seniority list. She would also submit that
according to Circular dated 11.5.2005 on transfer from one Municipal
Corporation to another, the names of transferred employees/ officers
shall be placed at the bottom of the seniority list. She would pray to
allow this petition.
4.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would oppose.
They would submit that the services of respondent No.5 were
transferred to the Municipal Corporation, Raigarh on 30.12.1999 and
the said order was never challenged by the petitioner. It is argued that
the services of respondent No.5 were regularized vide order dated
17.12.2002 with effect from 1.7.2001 and neither of the said orders was
ever questioned by the petitioner before any forum.
It is also
contended that the petitioner entered service in the department in the
year 1999 on the post of Peon and was promoted to the post of
Assistant Grade-III on 23.6.2012.
According to the provisions of
Chattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Appointment and Conditions of
Service of Officers and Servants) Rules, 2007, the required experience
for the promotion to the post of Assistant Grade-II is seven years of
service on the post of Assistant Grade-III. They would submit that
Rules of 2007 were repealed in the year 2018 and according to the
provisions of Rules, 2018, the minimum required experience for
promotion to the post of Assistant Grade-II was decreased to five years
of service on the post of Assistant Grade-III.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents
5.
present on the record with utmost circumspection.
6.
Respondent No.5 was promoted to the post of Assistant Grade-II by
respondent No.3 vide order dated 5.3.2015. At the relevant time, the
Rules of 2007 were in existence. The relevant provisions prescribing
the requisite qualification and experience for promotion to the post of
Assistant Grade-II are reproduced herein-below:
छቈኍ सगढ़ नगर पा लि क निनगम (अलि क रिरोሱ तथा सवक क निनोሱनि
तथा सव क शत½ निनोሱम 2007*
अनसची त न
¼ fu;e 10 (1) nsf[k;s ½
l-dz- in dk uke ftl ij Ikn dk uke ftlls inksUufr dh
tk;sxh
inksUufr dh tk;sxh
(1)
(2)
(3)
dkWye ¼ 2 esa n’kk;s x;s in ij
inksUufr ds fy;s ] dkWye ¼3½ esa
n’kk;s x;s in ij visf{kr lsok
ds U;wure o”kZ
(4)
1. --- --6.
7.
lgk;d xzsM &2 /
lgk;ld xszM &3 dsf’k;j / MkVk
07 o”kZ dk vuqHko rFkk dEI;wVj
ys[kkiky
,UVªh vkWjsVj
,Iyhds’ku esa fMxzh mRrh.kZ A
A bare reading of the above-quoted provision would make it clear that
the required experience for promotion from the post of Assistant GradeIII to the post of Assistant Grade-II was seven years. The petitioner
was promoted to the post of Assistant Grade-III on 23.6.2012 thus, as
on 5.3.2015, the petitioner was not eligible for promotion to the post of
Assistant Grade-II. It is also argued by counsel for the petitioner that
the order of transfer as well as absorption of services of respondent
No.5 are bad in law.
The petitioner never challenged the order of
transfer or order of absorption, or regularization of respondent No.5
before any forum. Even in the present petition, those orders have not
been challenged and only order of promotion dated 5.3.2015 has been
challenged after a lapse of four years. Therefore, the contention made
by counsel for the petitioner appears to be misconceived. The circular
referred by counsel for the petitioner dated 11.5.2005 and AnnexureP/7 dated 9.6.1999 deals with transfer of employees of Municipalities
and Nagar Panchayats and are not applicable to the facts of the
present case. Learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently
argued that the petition filed by the petitioner suffers from delay and
laches.
8. In the matter of Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of Orissa and
others reported in 2023 Livelaw (SC) 883, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held in para 21 as under:“21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain
decisions of this Court:
(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is
sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is
sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of
the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing
wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing
wrong, relief can be grantevuqlwph & pkj
9.
¼ fu;e 11 nsf[k;s ½d even if there is a long delay in seeking
remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing
wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a
continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the
exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or
administrative decision which related to or affected several
others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the
settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or
refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of
delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the
claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc.,
affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and
doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the
consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is
concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive
wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will
restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a
period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ
petition.”
(emphasis supplied)
(B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:
"Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence
are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions.
However, they have their distinct characters and distinct
elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches
and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be
called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However,
there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not
laches. These principles are common law principles, and
perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in
various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and
create non consideration of condonation in certain
circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of
practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict
application of law. The underlying principle governing these
concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice
is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.
Laches
21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language
meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves
unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving
an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It
is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires
while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of
the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay
and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it
would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party
approaching the court apart from the change in position in the
interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of
Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors
when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his
conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and
therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge
before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on
equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.
23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no
statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear
case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one
of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not
have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded
and proved by the other side. To determine the difference
between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a
case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would
apply to all the defences that are available to a party.
Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds
raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would
be amenable to acquiescence.
Acquiescence
24. We have already discussed the relationship between
acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the
other.
25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It
is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such
an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when
acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a
particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance,
therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged
refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate
knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue
by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further,
acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it
reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties.
Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that
acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original
terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties.
We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere
acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may
become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the
concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case
basis.”
(emphasis supplied)
(C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2
SCC 301:
"36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a
straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of
days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a
long time is nonexistent. Doctrine of delay and laches as
well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants
who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly
without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after
unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the
order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was
after four years and five months, which is certainly highly
belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory
explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that
the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time.
Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground
that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by
a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that
even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has
happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not
be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a
legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also
noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to
show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the
delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the
question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the
context of the present case.
X
x
x
38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union
of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar
[State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court
observed that if the statutory authority has not performed
its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the
same by taking the plea that the person who has been
deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate
forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any
orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory
mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not
be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at
all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action,
which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v.
Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8
SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing
cause of action.The State being a virtuous litigant should
meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of
action on their part. However, this general principle would
not apply when, on consideration of the facts, the court
concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights,
which may be either express or implied from his conduct.
Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as
has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills
Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills
Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC
(Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the
precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam
v.Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006)
11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to
several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation
in Halsbury's Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case
[U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 :
(2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 1213)
“12. The statement of law has also been summarised in
Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911,p. 395 as follows:
‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to
amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part;and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the
defendant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by
while the violation of a right is in progress,but assent after
the violation has been completed and the claimant has
become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a
remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or
where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time
and delay are most material. Upon these considerations
rests the doctrine of laches.’
13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above,
the respondents are guilty since the respondents have
acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not
challenge the same in time. If they would have been
vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as
others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears
that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not
rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions,
then in such cases, the court should be very slow in
granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also
to be taken into consideration the question of
acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent
whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the
relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents
would have challenged their retirement being violative of
the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have
taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the
liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents
have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of
years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit
for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to
raise funds which is going to have serious financial
repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam.
Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons
when they themselves are guilty of waiver and
acquiescence?”
39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify
distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and
laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine
which applies when a party having a right stands by and
sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that
right, while the act is in progress and after violation is
completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord.
He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v.
Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S)
149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram
Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal
1107] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means
silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance,
[See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine
Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] which denotes conduct
that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an
equitable right and also to denote conduct from which
another party will be justified in inferring such an
intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC
OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34] Acquiescence can be
either direct with full knowledge and express approbation,
or indirect where a person having the right to set aside
the action stands by and sees another dealing in a
manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the
infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See
“Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures — Law of
Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.]
However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of
no importance or consequence.
40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both
limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right.
Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable
considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports
even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence
implies active assent and is based upon the rule of
estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party
afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right.
Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active
consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or
inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this
manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually
destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor
Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR
584] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive
acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be
inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period
post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence
being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from
claiming violation of the right of fair representation.”
10.
The fallout of the above-discussed facts and law can be
summarized as under:
“(I) The petitioner never challenged the order of transfer or the
order of confirmation of respondent No.5 and therefore, those
orders have attained finality.
(II) The petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Grade-III
sometimes in the year 2012 whereas, respondent No.5 was
appointed to the post of Assistant Grade-III in the year 1999.
Respondent No.5 was transferred from Municipal Corporation,
Ambikapur to Raigarh as Assistant Grade-III.
(III)
Respondent No.5 was promoted to the post of Assistant
Grade-II vide order dated 5.3.2015 and on the said date, the
petitioner was not eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant
Grade-II as he did not have completed seven years of service on
the post of Assistant Grade-III.”
11. The petitioner challenged the order of promotion dated 5.3.2015 by
filing the writ petition in the year 2019 without explaining the delay part
properly. The petitioner has pleaded in para 7 of the writ petition that it
is declared that there is no delay in filing the writ petition.
12.
Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts, I do not find any
good ground to interfere into the matter. Accordingly, this petition fails
and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
Nimmi
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