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2026:CGHC:18175-DB
ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA
Digitally
signed by
ROHIT KUMAR
CHANDRA
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 313 of 2026
1 - Hasdeo Aranya Bachao Sangharsh Samiti Through Its Convener,
Umeshwar Singh Armo, S/o Siyambar Singh, Aged About 35 Years, R/o
Village Jampani, Post Madanpur, Tahsil Podi, Distt. Korba,
Chhattisgarh.
2 - Seema Porte W/o Thakur Singh Aged About 34 Years R/o Village
Ghatbarra, Tehsil Udaypur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh. (Member And
Authorized Representative of Hasdeo Aranya Bachao Sangharsh
Samiti)
3 - Bagar Sai Porte S/o Salik Ram Aged About 71 Years R/o Village
Ghatbarra, Tehsil Udaypur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh. (Member And
Authorized Representative of Hasdeo Aranya Bachao Sangharsh
Samiti)
4 - Akhlesh Kumar Porte S/o Chandrabhan Singh Aged About 21 Years
R/o Village Ghatbarra, Tehsil Udaypur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh.
(Member And Authorized Representative of Hasdeo Aranya Bachao
Sangharsh Samiti)
5 - Chhoturam Porte S/o Ghursai Porte Aged About 22 Years R/o Village
Ghatbarra, Tehsil Udaypur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh. (Member And
Authorized Representative of Hasdeo Aranya Bachao Sangharsh
Samiti)
6 - Hirday Singh Markam S/o Dilbandhu Ram Aged About 23 Years R/o
Village Ghatbarra, Tehsil Udaypur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh.
(Member And Authorized Representative of Hasdeo Aranya Bachao
Sangharsh Samiti)
7 - Sudhar Bai W/o Manjhi Ram Aged About 50 Years R/o Village
Ghatbarra, Tehsil Udaypur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh. (Member And
Authorized Representative of Hasdeo Aranya Bachao Sangharsh
Samiti)
... Appellants
versus
1 - Union of India Through Secretary, Ministry of Environment And
Forest, Government of India, Paryawaran Bhawan, C.G.O. Complex
Lodhi, Road, New Delhi, 11003, Delhi.
2 - Union of India Through Secretary, Ministry of Tribal Affairs,
Government of India, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi 110001, Delhi.
3 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Forest,
Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, Chhattisgarh, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - District Level Forest Rights Committee D.L.C. Sarguja Through O/o
Collector Tribal Welfare, Ambikapur, Distt. Sarguja, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. Vidyut Bhawan, Jyoti
Nagar Janpath, Jaipur Rajasthan, Distt. Jaipur, Rajasthan.
... Respondents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------For Appellants
: Ms. Shalini Gera along with Mr. Akash Kundu
and Mr. Amit Kumar Verma, Advocates
For Respondent
Nos. 1 & 2 / UOI
: Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Dy. Solicitor General
along with Mr. Rishabh Singh Dev, CGC
For Respondent
Nos. 3 & 4 / State
:
Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General
For Respondent No.5 :
Dr. Nirmal Shukla and Mr. Naman Nagrath,
Senior Advocates assisted by Mr. Shailendra
Shukla and Mr. Dinesh Bole, Advocates
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
21.04.2026
1.
Heard Ms. Shalini Gera along with Mr. Akash Kundu and Mr. Amit
Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr.
Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General assisted by
Mr. Rishabh Singh Dev, learned Central Government Counsel,
appearing for UOI / respondent Nos. 1 & 2, Mr. Prasun Bhaduri,
learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State /
respondent Nos. 3 & 4 and Dr. Nirmal Shukla and Mr. Naman
Nagrath, learned Senior Advocates assisted by Mr. Shailendra
Shukla and Mr. Dinesh Bole, learned counsel, appearing for
respondent No. 5 on I.A. No. 01 of 2026, which is an application
for condonation of delay of 20 days in filing the instant appeal.
2.
On due consideration and for the reasons mentioned in the
application, the same is allowed. Delay of 20 days in filing the
instant appeal is hereby condoned.
3.
With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is
heard finally.
4.
This writ appeal is presented against the impugned order dated
08.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No. 1346
of 2016 (Hasdeo Arand Bachao Sangharsh Samiti Ghatbarra
& Others vs. Union of India & others), whereby the writ petition
filed by writ petitioners / appellants herein has been dismissed by
the learned Single Judge.
5.
The brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are as
follows :
(A)
Initially, the Forest Rights Committee, Ghatbarra,
through its President, Hasdeo Arand Bachao Sangharsh
Samiti, and one Jainandan Singh Porte filed a writ petition
before this Court being WPC No. 1346 of 2016. Petitioner
No.1 moved an application for withdrawal of the writ petition
on its behalf, and the same was allowed vide order dated
03.10.2024.
Another
application
was
moved
for
impleadment of six persons as members of Hasdeo Arand
Bachao Sangharsh Samiti to pursue the matter, and the
said application was allowed vide order dated 29.07.2025.
Thus, the said petition was being contested by Petitioner
No. 2 and Petitioner No. 3, Jainandan Singh Porte.
(B)
Village Ghatbarra comprises mostly of the tribal
population, and it was granted community forest rights
under the provisions of the Scheduled Tribes and Other
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights)
Act, 2006, [hereinafter to be referred to as “FR Act, 2006”].
In the year 2006-07, the Ministry of Coal, Government of
India, allotted the Parsa East and Kete Basen captive coal
block to Respondent No.5, a State of Rajasthan entity. The
respondent No.5 applied for the diversion of forest land
measuring 2388.525 hectares before the Ministry of
Environment and Forest, Government of India (MoEF) on
12.01.2009. The respondent No.5 submitted a revised
proposal on 02.03.2011, whereby the forest area was
reduced and mining was to be done in two phases.
(C)
The aforesaid proposal was placed before the Forest
Advisory
Committee
on
10.03.2011.
The
committee
constituted a Sub-Committee to inquire and inspect, and
then submit a report to the Committee. The Sub-Committee
visited the proposed area on 14-15/05.2011 and submitted
its report raising various issues such as the density of forest
and the habitat of the wild animals, etc. The Sub-Committee
also pointed out that provisions of the FR Act, 2006, are not
within the knowledge of the villagers, and the provisions of
the FR Act, 2006 have not been completed. The Forest
Advisory Committee (FAC) rejected the proposal on
20/21.06.2011. The concerned Minister granted in principle
approval for diversion of forest land for mining on
06.07.2011. The permission for diversion of forest land for
Phase-I and Phase-II mining was granted in favor of the
respondent No.5 on 15.03.2012. However, direction was
issued to complete the forest rights procedure.
(D)
The MoEF vide its letter dated 30.07.2009 had
addressed Chief Secretaries of all States that the proposals
for diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes shall be
considered after recognition of the forest rights and the
consent of the concerned Gram Sabha. The Villagers of
Village – Ghatbarra, in exercise of their traditional
community forest rights, were performing their duty of
protecting the wildlife, forest, and biodiversity, and have
been protesting against the cutting down of trees. On
02.10.2011, Gram Sabha – Ghatbarra passed a resolution
observing a protest against coal mining in their village area.
(E)
On 06.02.2012, the villagers and Van Samiti submitted
an application to the Forest Department, making a request
to stop the coal inspection. On 05.03.2012, again the
villagers submitted representations before the respondent
authorities, making a request to stop the coal inspection. On
10.11.2012, the villagers submitted representations before
respondents No. 1 to 4 wherein they stated that the Gram
Sabha conducted in the year 2009 was a farce one as the
procedure contemplated under the FR Act, 2006, has not
been complied with; thus, a prayer was made to cancel the
land acquisition process.
(F)
In
June,
2013,
the
Forest
Rights
Committee,
Ghatbarra, submitted claim application forms for recognition
of the Community Forest Rights (CFR), and the claims of
villagers were recommended for recognition by the District
Level Committee on 03.09.2013 wherein three forest rights
were conferred. On 19.02.2014 and 20.02.2014, the Gram
Sabhas of Village Salhi, Hariharpur, and Fatehpur convened
a Special Gram Sabha and passed two resolutions – firstly,
under the provisions of Section 5 of the FR Act, 2006 for
conservation of forest, and secondly, for the grant of pattas
for community forest resources. The District Collector,
Surguja, vide letter dated 03.09.2014, stated that the lease
for community forest resources has not been provided as
guidance has been sought from the Government, and the
said compartment has already been allotted for coal mining.
(G)
One Sudiep Shrivastava challenged the order dated
23.06.2011 issued by the Union of India, MoEF, and the
subsequent diversion order passed by the State of
Chhattisgarh dated 28.03.2012 before the Learned National
Green Tribunal, New Delhi on various grounds. The learned
Tribunal vide its order dated 24.03.2014, set aside the
orders dated 23.06.2011 passed by MoEF and order dated
28.03.2012 passed by the State of Chhattisgarh, for
diversion of forest land. Further, the work commenced by
respondent No.5 pursuant to the above orders was
suspended. The matter was remitted back to MoEF with a
direction to seek fresh advice from the Forest Advisory
Committee (FAC) within a reasonable time. The
order
passed by the learned NGT was challenged by respondent
No.5 by filing Civil Appeal No. 4395 of 2014 before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court
vide its order dated 28.04.2014 stayed the direction issued
by the learned NGT whereby work commenced by
respondent No.5 pursuant to the order dated 28.03.2012
was suspended.
(H)
Meanwhile, vide letter dated 08.01.2016 issued by the
District Level Committee, Community Forest Rights (CFRs)
granted earlier to the villagers of Village–Ghatbarra were
canceled on the ground that such permission interrupts
mining work and forest rights were granted due to a
mistake, ignoring the orders issued by MoEF dated
23.06.2011 and 28.03.2012.
(I)
The petitioners have not challenged the order dated
15.03.2012 issued by the Central Government whereby
permission for mining over 1898.328 hectares was granted.
Respondent No.5 proceeded to carry out mining over 762
hectares in Phase-I. The petitioners have also not
challenged the order of diversion dated 28.03.2012 passed
by the State Government, whereby order of diversion was
passed and Respondent No.5 was permitted to carry out
coal mining in the PEKB Coal block. Initially the petitioners
had challenged the order dated 08.01.2016, whereby the
Forest Rights District Level Committee, Surguja revoked
three community forest rights, which were earlier granted to
the villagers. They challenged the said order on the ground
that no opportunity of hearing was provided before passing
such an order and the said Committee had no right to
alter/modify/revoke its earlier order whereby CFRs were
granted to the villagers. The petitioners have further
amended their petition to challenge the order dated
02.02.2022 issued by MoEF, whereby permission was
granted for non-forest use of the remaining 1136 hectares of
forest land falling in PEKB Coal Block in favor of
Respondent No.5 and order dated 25.03.2022 passed by
the State Government regarding diversion for Phase-II
mining. The order dated 05.05.2022 issued by Principal
Chief Conservator of Forests (Production), Chhattisgarh,
with regard to deforestation was also challenged but the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioners does not want
to press it.
(J)
Respondent No.5 did not press Civil Appeal No. 4395
of 2014, which was pending consideration before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court after grant of approval for phase-II
mining by the Central Government, MoEF; consequently,
Civil Appeal was disposed of.
(K)
The petitioners pressed the application for the grant of
interim relief against the order issued by the Central
Government, MoEF dated 02.02.2022 and the diversion
order issued by the State of Chhattisgarh dated 25.03.2022
in the said writ petition, and the said application was
rejected vide order dated 02.05.2024. The petitioner No.2
i.e. Hasdeo Arand Bachao Sangharsh Samiti, challenged
the order dated 02.05.2024 by filing Civil Appeal No.
10604/2024 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and vide
order dated 17.09.2024, the matter was remitted to the High
Court to reconsider the interim applications. However, liberty
was granted to the High Court to take up the matter for final
disposal, if possible.
(L)
One more fact which required consideration by the
learned Single Judge is the judgment passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matter of Manohar Lal Sharma Vs.
Principal Secretary and others1, wherein it was held that
allocation
of
coal
blocks
through
the
Government
Dispensation Route suffers from the vice of arbitrariness
and legal flaws; consequently, the allocation of all coal
blocks was canceled including PEKB coal block, which was
allotted
to
promulgated
respondent
No.5.
Thereafter,
Parliament
the
Mines
(Special
Provisions)
Coal
Ordinance, 2014, and the Rules of 2014 for the purposes of
framing the rules for auction and allotment of coal blocks,
which were the subject matter before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court. In exercise of the power conferred under Section 6 of
the Ordinance of 2014, read with Coal Mines (Special
Provisions) Second Ordinance of 2014 and the Rules of
2014, the Central Government appointed the Nominated
Authority for allocation of coal blocks. The Central
Government also issued the order under Rule 8(2) of the
Rules of 2014 pursuant to Section 5 of the Ordinance of
2014. The Nominated Authority, vide notification dated
18.02.2015, issued the allotment document and invited
applications from government companies for allotment of
coal mines. In order to meet the coal requirement of
respondent No.5 for various thermal power plants in the
State of Rajasthan and finding that the PEKB coal block is
most suitable, respondent No.5 submitted an online
application on 26.2.2015, and the order of allotment was
(2014) 9 SCC 516
issued by the Nominated Authority on 08.09.2015.
(M)
The learned Single Judge after hearing learned
counsel for the parties and quoting the provisions of law,
which are relevant for efficacious disposal of said writ
petition and further going through the various judicial
precedents cited by either of the parties, dismissed the said
writ petition vide impugned order dated 08.10.2025 on the
following grounds :
“(i)
respondent No.5 has completed Phase I mining
in the year 2022 and permission was granted for
Phase II mining by the Central Government vide
order dated 2.2.2022 and three years have passed
since then and claims of the residents of village
Ghatbarra with regard to individual or community
forest rights, if any, can be compensated in terms of
money.
(ii) initially resolution was passed by Forest Right
Committee and decision was taken vide resolution
dated 24.4.2016 to challenge the order dated
8.1.2016
issued
by
respondent
no.
but
subsequently Forest Right Committee withdrew its
petition and there is no authorization in favor of the
petitioners no. 2(1) to 2(6) to continue this petition.
These petitioners failed to establish their locus also.
(iii) there is suppression of material facts as the
petitioners failed to disclose the fact with regard to
the dismissal of WPC No. 1247 of 2022;
(iv) the petitioners failed to challenge the orders
dated 23.6.2011, 15.3.2012, and 28.3.2012 in the
present petition, whereas the petition was filed on
10.5.2016;
(v)
locus standi of Petitioners No. 2(1) to 2(6) has
not been established, and documents have not been
placed to prove the fact that they are aggrieved with
any of the decisions taken by authorities;
(vi)
the petitioners failed to lead evidence to
establish the fact that individual or community forest
rights were conferred upon them at any point in time;
(vii) the petitioners also failed to challenge the
allocation of coal blocks in favor of respondent No. 5
pursuant to the Act of 2015, whereas the petition was
filed in the year 2016;
(viii) the petitioners also failed to substantiate the
fact that prior to the issuance of the order dated
2.2.2022 and 25.3.2022, the provisions of the FR Act,
2006 were not complied with;
(ix) as held in the matter of Mangal Sai Armo and
Others Versus Union of India Through Secretary
and Others and other connected matters , the FR
Act, 2006 neither expressly nor impliedly, has taken
away or interfered with the rights of the State over
mines or minerals lying underneath the forest land.”
6.
Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 08.10.2025 passed
by the learned Single Judge in WPC No. 1346 of 2016, the instant
appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioners/appellants.
7.
Ms. Shalini Gera, learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the impugned order dated 08.10.2025 passed by the learned
Single Judge fails to properly address the crucial issues of
community forest rights, which are the foundation of the
appellants' case. The learned Single Judge’s dismissal of the writ
petition, while leaving the question of community forest rights
open with the use of the disclaimer "if any", results in a complete
failure to adjudicate the fundamental claim of the appellants that
they have legitimate forest rights under the FR Act, 2006, which
have been unlawfully abridged by the respondents. She further
submitted that the appellants, who represent the Gram Sabha of
Ghatbarra, assert that the revocation of their community forest
rights has had a direct and detrimental impact on their statutory
entitlements under the FR Act, 2006. As members of the Gram
Sabha, every adult in the village, including the petitioners, is a
beneficiary of the recognized community forest rights, which were
originally granted on 03.09.2013. The appellants' locus standi is
therefore indisputable, as the revocation of these rights directly
affects their livelihoods, environment, and cultural heritage. The
learned Single Judge has overlooked this fact by dismissing the
petition without addressing the specific and individual harm
caused to each member of the Gram Sabha by the unlawful
revocation of their rights. Ms. Gera also submitted that the learned
Single Judge’s reliance on the dismissal of WPC No. 1247/2022
as relevant to the present dispute is misplaced. The issues in
WPC 1247/2022 are entirely distinct, involving land acquisition
and different coal blocks, namely the "Parsa Coal Block," while
the present writ petition concerns the community forest rights of
the appellants in the "PEKB Coal Block." The two issues are not
interconnected, and there is no obligation on the appellants to
bring the dismissal of WPC No.1247/2022 into the current
proceedings. The petitioners are not challenging the allocation of
coal blocks themselves, but rather the permissions and
clearances obtained by the mining company without adherence to
the mandatory provisions of the Forest Rights Act and Forest
Conservation Act.
8.
Ms. Gera further contended that the orders dated 23.06.2011,
15.03.2012, and 28.03.2012, which the learned Single Judge
referred to, have already been set aside by the National Green
Tribunal (NGT) in its order dated 24.03.2014. This order attained
finality on 16.10.2023 when the Civil Appeal No. 4395/2014 was
withdrawn. Therefore, any reliance on these orders by the
respondents in the present case is misplaced, as they have been
rendered void and of no effect by the competent authority. She
also contended that the appellants' challenge is not based on a
claim to the mines or minerals beneath the forest land, which are
rightfully owned by the State. Rather, they seek to assert their
rights to the forest land itself, which is vital for their subsistence,
culture, and the ecological balance of the region. The access to
these minerals is conditioned on compliance with the statutory
processes outlined in the FR Act, 2006, and the Forest
Conservation Act, which require the completion of the forest rights
recognition process, including obtaining Gram Sabha consent for
the diversion of forest land for non-forest use. The petitioners
have provided multiple Gram Sabha resolutions opposing the coal
mining operations, but the respondents have failed to produce a
single Gram Sabha resolution in favor of the mining or certifying
the completion of the FR Act process prior to the diversion orders
issued on 02.02.2022 and 25.03.2022.
9.
Finally, Ms. Gera learned counsel for the appellants submitted that
the learned Single Judge’s findings that monetary compensation
could suffice for the loss of an ancient, old-growth forest,
designated as the "lungs of Chhattisgarh," is legally and morally
unsustainable. No amount of money can restore the ecological,
cultural, and environmental value of such a forest. The appellants
are not merely seeking compensation but are demanding the
protection of their fundamental rights to preserve the forest and its
biodiversity, which are essential to their community’s survival and
well-being, as such, she submitted that the impugned order dated
08.10.2025 is flawed in both law and fact, and therefore, it ought
to be set aside. The matter should be remitted to the learned
Single Judge for a proper and thorough adjudication of the
appellants' claims under the FR Act, 2006, with due consideration
to their community forest rights and the failure of the respondents
to comply with the legal requirements for the diversion of forest
land.
10.
Mr. Naman Nagrath, learned Senior Advocate, appearing on
behalf of Respondent No.5 submitted that the impugned judgment
dated 08.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge is wellreasoned, legally sound, and does not warrant any interference. It
is contended that all statutory requirements for diversion of forest
land and grant of mining approvals have been duly complied with
in accordance with applicable laws, including the FR Act, 2006.
The approvals dated 15.03.2012 and 02.02.2022 were granted by
the competent authority after due consideration, and the mining
operations in Phase-I have already been completed. He further
submitted that the Appellants have failed to place any cogent
material to demonstrate non-compliance with statutory provisions,
and in any event, any alleged deficiencies stand cured over time.
It is further submitted that the rights, if any, claimed by the
villagers are capable of being adequately compensated in
accordance with law, and therefore no prejudice is caused. It is
further submitted that the writ petition was rightly dismissed on the
ground of lack of locus standi, as the Appellants failed to establish
that they are directly aggrieved persons or that they possess any
subsisting legal rights. The original petitioner itself withdrew from
the proceedings, and there was no valid authorization in favor of
the present Appellants to continue the litigation. The petition also
suffers from suppression of material facts, particularly the nondisclosure of earlier proceedings, which disentitles the Appellants
from seeking equitable relief. Moreover, the challenge to the
impugned actions is highly belated, as the Appellants did not
assail the foundational orders dated 23.06.2011, 15.03.2012, and
28.03.2012 at the appropriate time, and such delay is fatal to the
maintainability of the petition. Lastly, it is submitted that the
allocation of the coal block in favor of Respondent No.5 stands on
a firm legal footing pursuant to the subsequent statutory
framework introduced after cancellation of earlier allocations, and
the Appellants have not challenged such re-allocation. The
reliance placed on earlier proceedings, including those before the
National Green Tribunal, is misplaced in view of subsequent
developments and fresh approvals granted by the competent
authorities. It is well-settled that the State retains control over
minerals and mining activities, and the provisions of the Forest
Rights Act, 2006 do not divest such authority. The impugned
judgment correctly appreciates the factual and legal position, and
therefore, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed.
11.
Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General,
appearing on behalf of the Respondent/State while countering the
submissions made at the Bar on behalf of the appellant/petitioner
has supported the reasons and findings recorded by the learned
Single Judge and has prayed for dismissal of the Writ Appeal.
While advancing his submissions Mr. Bhaduri, has referred
copiously to paragraph 27 of the judgment to point out that the
subject matter involved in the writ petition had undergone litigation
in the past in this High Court in WPC 1247 of 2022 (villagers of
village Ghatbarra), WPC 302 of 2022 (Gram Panchayat Tara),
WPC 560 of 2022 (Gram Panchayat Salhi), WPC 698 of 2022
(Gram Panchayat Charpara), all these writ petitions put to
challenge the land acquisition proceedings. These writ petitions
came to be dismissed by way of order dated 11.05.2022. It has
been further argued by Mr. Bhaduri that, the petitioners in this
case are residents of village Ghatbarra as is evident from the
cause-title of the writ petition as also this writ appeal. Mr. Bhaduri
has argued that the challenge pertaining to land acquisitions have
been dismissed; the present writ petition in original is an attempt
to circumvent the order delivered in those bunch of cases, which
is with respect to the same area, same land in question and same
land acquisition proceedings. He submitted that the very genesis
of an identical challenge relating to the same proceedings is
impermissible in view of the doctrine of res judicata as also
doctrine of finality, apart from the attraction of the principle of
merger.
12.
Mr. Bhaduri has argued that this court having decided group of
writ petitions in 2022 [WPC 302 of 2022, WPC 560 of 2022, WPC
698 of 2022 and WPC 1247 of 2022] the issue involved in the
case has attained finality, therefore, the said finality cannot be
disturbed through a collateral challenge as was made by way of
the writ petition which rightly stood dismissed. In support of this
submission Mr. Bhaduri has placed reliance on the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. S.P. Sharma
(Major) [(2014) 6 SCC 351]. It has been also submitted by Mr.
Bhaduri referring to paragraphs 37 and 38 of the judgment of the
learned Single Judge elucidating the approach of the learned
Single Judge regarding interpretation of the FR Act, 2006 and the
Coal Bearing Areas Act. He further submitted that, the learned
Single Judge has rightly relied upon a binding judgment of this
Court delivered in a Division Bench in the case of Mangal Sai
Armo & others v. Union of India & others. It has been
submitted and argued by Mr. Bhaduri that whereas, initially, the
Forest Right Committee challenged the order dated 08.01.2016,
whereby conferment of forest rights was withdrawn. There is no
challenge to the order dated 23.06.2011 issued by MoEF and
forest clearance orders dated 06.07.2011 and 15.03.2012, and
the diversion order issued by the State of Chhattisgarh dated
28.03.2012. In this regard Mr. Bhaduri has referred to the relevant
pleadings made in the Return of the State/respondent before the
writ petition in original which were duly considered by the learned
Single Judge in paragraph 36 of the judgment.
13.
In rebuttal, Ms. Gera learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent No.5 and
the State proceed on an erroneous assumption that the present
challenge is a disguised attempt to reopen concluded land
acquisition proceedings. This premise is fundamentally incorrect.
The appellants are not assailing the acquisition per se, but are
specifically challenging the legality of diversion permissions and
consequential actions which are vitiated due to non-compliance
with the mandatory safeguards under the Forest Rights Act, 2006
and allied environmental statutes. The cause of action in the
present writ petition is distinct, independent, and continues to
subsist, as the illegality complained of goes to the root of postacquisition statutory compliance and Gram Sabha consent, which
are continuing obligations under law. It is further submitted that
the plea of res judicata and finality raised by the respondents is
wholly misconceived. The earlier writ petitions referred to by the
State were primarily concerned with land acquisition proceedings,
whereas the present lis pertains to violation of statutory forest
rights and procedural safeguards under the FR Act, 2006, which
were not directly or substantially adjudicated in the earlier round
of litigation. Therefore, neither res judicata nor constructive res
judicata can be invoked to non-suit the appellants in respect of
independent statutory violations which continue to have legal
consequences. The reliance placed on S.P. Sharma (Major),
(supra) is misplaced inasmuch as the said judgment does not bar
examination of continuing illegality arising from non-compliance
with mandatory statutory requirements.
14.
It is also submitted by Ms. Gera that the contention that
foundational
orders
dated
23.06.2011,
15.03.2012
and
28.03.2012 were never challenged cannot be used to defeat the
present claim, since the appellants’ challenge is not to the mere
grant of mining allocation, but to the failure to comply with
subsequent statutory conditions precedent, particularly under the
FR Act, 2006 and Gram Sabha consent requirements, which are
independent and continuing legal obligations. The illegality,
therefore, is not exhausted by passage of time or by the mere
issuance of earlier clearances. She contended that the reliance
placed by the respondents on alleged lack of locus and
withdrawal of earlier proceedings is also misconceived. The
appellants, being members of the Gram Sabha and beneficiaries
of community forest rights granted on 03.09.2013, continue to be
directly affected by the cancellation of CFR rights and diversion of
forest land. The right under the FR Act, 2006 is a collective
statutory right, and its deprivation affects every member of the
Gram Sabha. Hence, individual authorisation in a narrow
procedural sense cannot defeat substantive statutory standing.
Finally, it is submitted by Ms. Gera that reliance on Mangal Sai
Armo (supra) and similar precedents is misplaced in the facts of
the present case, as the appellants are not asserting any right
over minerals or challenging State ownership thereof, but are
asserting procedural and substantive compliance with forest rights
legislation as a condition precedent to lawful diversion and use of
forest land. The State’s authority over minerals is not in dispute;
however, such authority is subject to mandatory statutory
compliance, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Orissa
Mining Corporation Ltd. v. MoEF (2013) 6 SCC 476 , which
underscores the centrality of Gram Sabha consent and forest
rights recognition prior to diversion, as such, the objections raised
by the respondents are legally untenable and do not displace the
core illegality demonstrated in the impugned proceedings. The
appeal therefore merits consideration on its own independent
statutory and constitutional footing, uninfluenced by misplaced
reliance on principles of finality or res judicata.
15.
We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings, the
material placed on record, and the impugned judgment dated
08.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge.
16.
At the outset, it is evident that the dispute has a long and
chequered history involving successive rounds of statutory
clearances, forest diversion approvals, mining operations, and
multiple rounds of litigation, including earlier writ petitions decided
by this Court in 2022. The learned Single Judge has undertaken a
detailed examination of the entire factual matrix and has recorded
findings on locus, delay, suppression of material facts, nonchallenge to foundational orders, and the legal effect of statutory
approvals already acted upon.
17.
The principal contention of the appellants is that the alleged
violation of the FR Act, 2006 renders all subsequent clearances
illegal. However, the record indicates that the diversion process
commenced as far back as 2011–2012, and statutory approvals
were granted by competent authorities after due consideration,
including phased clearances. It is also an admitted position that
Phase-I mining has already been completed, and Phase-II
approvals have been granted. The learned Single Judge has
specifically noted that the appellants failed to establish, on record,
subsisting and enforceable community forest rights that were in
force at the relevant point of time so as to vitiate the statutory
clearances. The finding that, at this advanced stage of project
implementation, even assuming some residual claims exist, the
same are capable of being addressed by monetary compensation,
cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to law, particularly in
light of the settled principle that relief in writ jurisdiction must be
moulded in a practical and equitable manner when irreversible
stages of project execution have already been reached.
18.
The learned Single Judge has given a clear finding that the
petitioners failed to establish valid authorisation to continue the
litigation after withdrawal by the original petitioner, and that
Petitioners No. 2(1) to 2(6) did not demonstrate independent
enforceable rights sufficient to maintain the writ petition. This
Court finds no infirmity in the said conclusion. The record reflects
that authorisation was limited in scope and did not automatically
vest continuing authority in all individuals claiming membership of
Gram Sabha. In absence of clear legal injury and enforceable
standing, the challenge was rightly found to be not maintainable.
19.
The learned Single Judge has also recorded categorical findings
regarding
suppression
of
material
facts,
particularly
non-
disclosure of earlier litigation including WPC No. 1247 of 2022
and other connected matters. The appellants’ attempt to
distinguish those proceedings is not persuasive, as the subject
matter pertains to the same acquisition and mining framework in
the same geographical area. More significantly, the appellants
admittedly did not challenge the foundational orders dated
23.06.2011, 15.03.2012, and 28.03.2012 at the appropriate time.
These orders formed the basis of subsequent statutory actions
and clearances. The law is well settled that when foundational
orders
remain
unchallenged,
subsequent
challenges
to
consequential actions are not maintainable.
20.
It is undisputed that a batch of writ petitions arising out of the
same acquisition process, including WPC Nos. 302 of 2022, 560
of 2022, 698 of 2022 and 1247 of 2022, were already adjudicated
by this Court. The learned Single Judge has rightly relied upon the
principle of finality of litigation.
21.
In Union of India v. S.P. Sharma (Major), reported in (2014) 6
SCC 351, where in an espionage racket several officers of the
Army were subject to court martial and terminated, thereafter,
several writ petitions were filed in the Delhi High Court which
came to be dismissed in bunch of cases. However, some petitions
were left out and some preferred to litigate separately. Although all
the cases were duly contested by the Government of India, the
implications of the previously decided cases by the High Court of
Delhi on future cases which were constituted by circumventing the
previous orders as a collateral and indirect method to upset the
earlier findings of the Delhi High Court were considered in great
detail by the Supreme Court.
22.
In paragraphs 73 to 87 the Supreme Court has aptly summed up
the applicability of doctrine of merger, doctrine of res judicata and
principle of finality to judicial proceedings as under –
“73. From the above, it is clear that the Union of India has been
consistently contesting these petitions and this Court has found
substance in the argument of the appellants that the High Court
while delivering the judgment dated 21-12-2000 [ N.R.
Ajwani v. Union of India, (2002) 95 DLT 770] overlooked this
important legal aspect of finality coupled with the doctrine of res
judicata. In our considered opinion, this aspect cannot be ignored
and the issue of fact cannot be reopened in the instant case as
well as has been done under the impugned judgment [N.R.
Ajwani v. Union of India, (2002) 95 DLT 770] by relying on certain
material which the High Court described to have been
fraudulently withheld from the courts. In our opinion, fraud is not
a term or ornament nor can it be presumed to exist on the basis
of a mere inference on some alleged material that is stated to
have been discovered later on. The discovery of a reinvestigated
fact could have been a ground of review in the same
proceedings, but the same cannot be in our opinion made the
basis for reopening the issue through a fresh round of litigation. A
fresh writ petition or letters patent appeal which is in continuation
of a writ petition cannot be filed collaterally to set aside the
judgment of the same High Court rendered in an earlier round of
litigation upholding the termination order. In our view, the High
Court has committed a manifest error by not lawfully defining the
scope of the fresh round of litigation on the principles of res
judicata and doctrine of finality. To establish fraud, it is the
material available which may lead to the conclusion that the
failure to produce the material was deliberate or suppressed or
even otherwise occasioned a failure of justice. This also, can be
attempted if legally permissible only in the said proceedings and
not in a collateral challenge raised after the matter has been
finally decided in the first round of litigation. It is to be noticed that
the judgment which had become final in 1980 also included Writ
Petition No. 418 of 1980 [S.P. Sharma v. Union of India, CWP
No. 418 of 1980, decided on 21-4-1980 (Del)] filed by the
respondent S.P. Sharma. Once this Court had put a seal to the
said litigation vide judgment dated 1-9-1980 then a second round
of litigation by the same respondents including S.P. Sharma in
Writ Petition No. 1643 of 1982 was misplaced.
74. The very genesis of an identical challenge relating to the
same proceedings of termination on the pretext of a 5% cut in
terminal benefits was impermissible apart from the attraction of
the principle of merger. This aspect of finality, therefore, cannot
be disturbed through a collateral challenge.
75. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [AIR
1967 SC 1] this Court by a majority decision laid down the law
that : (AIR p. 11, para 38)
“38. … When a Judge deals with the matters brought before
him for his adjudication, he first decides the questions of fact
on which the parties are at issue, and then applies the
relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings of fact
recorded by the Judge are right or wrong, and whether the
conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity,
can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the
decision of the Judge takes up the matter before the
appellate court.”
76. A decision rendered by a competent court cannot be
challenged in collateral proceedings for the reason that if it is
permitted to do so there would be “confusion and chaos and the
finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning”.
77. In Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India [(1996) 2 SCC 749] a writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed seeking
reconsideration of the judgment rendered by this Court on the
ground that the said judgment is incorrect. Rejecting the prayer,
this Court held that Article 32 of the Constitution is not available
to assail the correctness of the decision on merit or to claim its
reconsideration.
78. In Babu Singh Bains v. Union of India [(1996) 6 SCC 565 :
AIR 1997 SC 116] this Court reiterated the settled principle of law
that once an order passed on merits by this Court exercising the
power under Article 136 of the Constitution has become final no
writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution on the self-same
issue is maintainable. The principle of constructive res judicata
stands fast in his way to raise the same contention once over.
79. In Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Supreme Court of India [(1996) 3
SCC 114] , this Court reiterated the view as under : (SCC p. 117,
para 7)
“7. … In a case like the present, where in substance the
challenge is to the correctness of a decision on merits after
it has become final, there can be no question of invoking
Article 32 of the Constitution to claim reconsideration of the
decision on the basis of its effect in accordance with law.
Frequent resort to the decision in Antulay [A.R.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri)
372] in such situations is wholly misconceived and impels
us to emphasise this fact.”
80. In M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka [(2011) 3 SCC 408
: (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 733 : AIR 2011 SC 1113] this Court held that
the doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a
fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring
finality in litigation. The main object of the doctrine is to promote a
fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse of process of
the court on the issues which have become final between the
parties. The doctrine is based on two age-old principles,
namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that it is
in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation
and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae
quod sit pro una et eadem causa meaning thereby that no one
ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the court that
it is for one and the same cause.
81. Thus, the principle of finality of litigation is based on a sound
firm principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle
great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of
law inasmuch as there will be no end to litigation. The doctrine of
res judicata has been evolved to prevent such anarchy.
82. In a country governed by the rule of law, the finality of a
judgment is absolutely imperative and great sanctity is attached to
the finality of the judgment and it is not permissible for the parties
to reopen the concluded judgments of the court as it would not
only tantamount to merely an abuse of the process of the court
but would have far-reaching adverse effect on the administration
of justice. It would also nullify the doctrine of stare decisis, a wellestablished valuable principle of precedent which cannot be
departed from unless there are compelling circumstances to do
so. The judgments of the court and particularly of the Apex Court
of a country cannot and should not be unsettled lightly.
83. Precedent keeps the law predictable and the law declared by
this Court, being the law of the land, is binding on all
courts/tribunals and authorities in India in view of Article 141 of the
Constitution. The judicial system “only works if someone is allowed
to have the last word” and the last word so spoken is accepted and
religiously followed. The doctrine of stare decisis promotes a
certainty and consistency in judicial decisions and this helps in the
development of the law. Besides providing guidelines for
individuals as to what would be the consequences if he chooses
the legal action, the doctrine promotes confidence of the people in
the system of the judicial administration. Even otherwise it is an
imperative necessity to avoid uncertainty and confusion. Judicial
propriety and decorum demand that the law laid down by the
highest court of the land must be given effect to.
84. In Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra [(2002) 4 SCC 388 : AIR
2002 SC 1771] this Court dealt with the issue and held that
reconsideration of a judgment of this Court which has attained
finality is not normally permissible. A decision upon a question of
law rendered by this Court was conclusive and would bind the
court in subsequent cases. The court cannot sit in appeal against
its own judgment.
85. In Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater
Bombay [(1974) 2 SCC 402] this Court held as under : (SCC p.
425, para 22)
“22. … At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that
certainty and continuity are essential ingredients of the rule of
law. Certainty in law would be considerably eroded and suffer a
serious set back if the highest court of the land readily overrules
the view expressed by it in earlier cases, even though that view
has held the field for a number of years. In quite a number of
cases which come up before this Court, two views are possible,
and simply because the Court considers that the view not taken
by the Court in the earlier case was a better view of the matter
would not justify the overruling of the view. The law laid down
by this Court is binding upon all courts in the country under
Article 141 of the Constitution, and numerous cases all over the
country are decided in accordance with the view taken by this
Court. Many people arrange their affairs and large number of
transactions also take place on the faith of the correctness of
the view taken by this Court. It would create uncertainty,
instability and confusion if the law propounded by this Court on
the basis of which numerous cases have been decided and
many transactions have taken place is held to be not the correct
law.”
Thus, in view of the above, it can be held that the doctrine of
finality has to be applied in a strict legal sense.
86. While dealing with the issue this Court in Ambika Prasad
Mishra v. State of U.P. [(1980) 3 SCC 719 : AIR 1980 SC 1762]
held as under : (SCC p. 723, para 6)
“6. It is wise to remember that fatal flaws silenced by earlier
rulings cannot survive after death because a decision does
not lose its authority ‘merely because it was badly argued,
inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned’.”
87. The view has been expressed by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in these very proceedings while dismissing the special leave
petitions of Subhash Juneja and Harish Lal Singh vide order dated
23-4-2003 [Subhash Juneja v. Union of India, (2006) 14 SCC 384]
. This Court applied the doctrine of finality of judgment and res
judicata and refused to reopen these very proceedings.”
23.
In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly
held that repeated or indirect attempts to reopen concluded issues
through collateral proceedings are impermissible and barred by
the principles of res judicata and finality. Applying the said
principle, the present writ petition was correctly found to be an
attempt to indirectly re-agitate issues already adjudicated, which
is not permissible in law.
24.
When we examine the findings recorded by the learned Single
Judge in paragraph 27 of the judgment and its legal implication,
we find ourselves in respectful agreement with the view as
reproduced by us above in the case of S.P. Sharma (Major)
(supra).
25.
The reliance placed by the appellants on the FR Act, 2006 does
not advance their case in the manner suggested. The learned
Single Judge has rightly relied upon the binding precedent of this
Court in Mangal Sai Armo (supra), wherein it has been clearly
held that the FR Act, 2006 does not take away or override the
State’s sovereign rights over minerals beneath forest land. The
Act operates in a regulatory domain ensuring procedural
safeguards but does not confer
an absolute veto over
development projects or mining operations duly cleared under law.
26.
While affirming the reasons recorded by the learned Single Judge
in paragraph 39 of the judgment while dismissing the writ petition,
we hold that, apart from the reasons recorded in paragraph 39 of
the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the writ petition in
original is actually a collateral assault on the concluded
proceedings by this court in a bunch of writ petitions [WPC 302 of
2022, WPC 560 of 2022, WPC 698 of 2022 and WPC 1247 of
2022] and as such a collateral attack is not permissible in view of
the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of S.P.
Sharma (Major) (supra).
27.
We hold that the writ petition has been rightly dismissed by the
learned Single Judge. We also hold that; the reliance placed on
the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Mangal
Sai Armo (supra) by the learned Single Judge (in paragraphs 37
and 38 of his judgment) is in conformity with the sound principles
of binding precedent, judicial discipline and propriety. We have no
hesitation in affirming the findings of the learned Single Judge to
this affect in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the judgment.
28.
Further we find that in the writ petition in original the petitioners
actually failed to put to challenge the order dated 23.06.2011
issued by MoEF and forest clearance orders dated 06.07.2011
and 15.03.2012, and the diversion order issued by the State of
Chhattisgarh dated 28.03.2012. Therefore, we find no good
ground to disturb the order of the learned Single Judge.
29.
The argument that no monetary compensation can substitute
ecological loss, though conceptually appealing, cannot override
the legal framework governing land acquisition and forest
diversion once due statutory clearances have been granted and
acted upon over a substantial period of time. Courts, while
sensitive to environmental concerns, are also required to balance
competing public interests, particularly where projects have
attained substantial completion and involve larger public utility
considerations.
30.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated
the factual and legal position; the appellants have failed to
establish enforceable rights or locus to maintain the writ petition;
the challenge suffers from delay, suppression of material facts,
and non-challenge to foundational orders; the issues sought to be
raised stand concluded by earlier binding judgments and
principles of finality; the statutory framework under the FR Act,
2006 does not support the appellants’ claim to invalidate duly
granted mining and forest diversion approvals at this stage.
31.
As
a
result,
considered
in
light
of
the
authoritative
pronouncements of the Supreme Court this Court is of the firm
opinion that it would not be justified on our part in setting
aside/quashing the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated
08.10.2025 in WPC 1346 of 2016.
32.
Thus, we hold that the writ appeal lacks merit. We dismiss the
writ appeal.
33.
In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order
as to costs.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Chandra
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
Head-Note
Repeated or indirect attempts to reopen concluded issues through
collateral proceedings are impermissible and barred by the principles of
res judicata and finality.
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