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[2026:RJ-JP:3666]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.9574/2022
1.
Harshita Garg Daughter Of Shri Nirmal Kumar Garg, Aged
About 27 Years, Resident Of Makaan No. D-93, Ladli Path,
Chomu House, C-Scheme, Police Station Vidhyakpuri,
Jaipur (Raj).
2.
Rajat Morya Son Of Shri Mangilal, Aged About 31 Years,
Resident Of 817, UB Aura Tower Apartment, Shahkar
Marg, Jyoti Nagar, Infront Of Imli Phatak, Jaipur (Raj).
----Petitioners
Versus
1.
Babloo @ Pawan Son Of Late Shri Balram @ Bal Bahadur,
Resident Of Gram Pulga, Post Office Barshaini, Police
Station Barshaini, Tehsil Bhuntar, District Kullu, Himachal
Pradesh.
2.
Central Bureau Of Investigation, Through Special P.P.
3.
State Of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor.
----Respondents
Connected With
S.B. Criminal Bail Cancellation Application No.139/2023
Harshita Garg Daughter Of Shri Nirmal Kumar Garg, Aged About
27 Years, Resident Of Makaan No.D 93, Ladli Path, Chomu
House, C-Scheme, Police Station Vidhayakpuri, Jaipur (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
State Of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor
2.
Babloo @ Pawan Son Of Late Shri Balram @ Bal Bahadur,
Resident Of Gram Pulga, Post Office Barshaini, Police
Station Barshaini, Tehsil Bhuntar, District Kullu, Himachal
Pradesh.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Manish Gupta, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Shyam Singh Yadav, Adv.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAVEER BHATNAGAR
Order
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(2 of 6)
1. Date of conclusion of arguments
2. Date on which the judgment was reserved
3. Whether the full judgment or only the operative
part is pronounced
4. Date of pronouncement
1.
[CRLMP-9574/2022]
22/01/2026
22/01/2026
Full Judgment
28/01/2026
The petitioners- Harshita Garg and Rajat Morya have
preferred the instant petition under Sections 482 and bail
cancellation application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., challenging
the order dated 17.03.2021 passed by the Special Court (N.D.P.S.
Cases), Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur in FIR No.350/2016 registered
at Police Station Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur for the offences under
Sections 8/20 of the N.D.P.S. Act which was later on transferred to
CBI, New Delhi with Case No. RC3(S)/2019/CBI/SC/III/New Delhi,
by which the application for grant of pardon filed by Respondent
No.2 was allowed and bail was granted to Respondent No.2 Babloo
@ Pawan.
2.
It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that vide
impugned order dated 17.03.2021, the accused respondentBabloo @ Pawan was granted pardon against provision of Section
306 of Cr.P.C. It is contended that the said order suffers from
patent illegality as the same was passed violating the essential
term of Section 306 of Cr.P.C. It is further claimed that as per
Section 306(4) of Cr.P.C., enlarging the accused-respondent
-Babloo @ Pawan on bail is per se illegal as Section 306(4)
provides explicitly that after the grant of pardon, the accused shall
be detained till the conclusion of the trial. It is also contended that
the trial Court has no right to enlarge the petitioner on bail in
terms of Section 439 of Cr.P.C., as the provision of Section 439 of
Cr.P.C. is not applicable, and only under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
(3 of 6)
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[CRLMP-9574/2022]
could the respondent have applied for bail. In support of his
argument, learned counsel relies on the judgment of Noor Taki
Alias Mammu vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1987 Raj 52,
passed by this Court and Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes vs.
The State of Maharashtra & Others, 1968 AIR 594, passed by
the Hon'ble Apex Court.
3.
Contrarily, it is argued by learned counsel for the C.B.I. that
the case was transferred to the C.B.I. and thereafter, as per the
provision of Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act, the application was
filed, and the same was allowed by the trial Court. It is contended
that there is no violation of any provision enshrined under Section
306 of Cr.P.C., as the same is not applicable in the present case,
and the entire proceeding is governed by Section 64 of the
N.D.P.S. Act. It is further contended that it is not necessary to
apply before the trial Court/ or Magistrate for pardoning an
offender under Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act, as the Central
Government or the State Government itself are competent to
grant a pardon to the offender. Similarly, there is no provision
under Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act corresponding to Section
306(4) of Cr.P.C.; therefore, there is no embargo on the trial Court
from granting bail to the accused until the conclusion of the trial.
As a result, the trial Court is competent to grant bail to the
accused-respondent
under
Section
of
Cr.P.C.,
and
the
impugned order suffers from no patent illegality and was passed
after due application of law.
4.
Heard and perused the material available on record.
[2026:RJ-JP:3666]
5.
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[CRLMP-9574/2022]
The Apex Court in the case of Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar
Jaggi, (2001) 8 SCC 289, while dealing with Section 64 of the
N.D.P.S. Act and Sections 306 & 307 of the Cr.P.C., held as under:"28. Under Section 64(1) of the Act, the Central
Government or the State Government may tender
immunity from prosecution for any offence under the
Act or under the Penal Code or under any Central or
State Act with a view to obtaining the evidence of any
person appearing to have been directly or indirectly
concerned in or privy to the contravention of any of the
provisions of the Act. The limitations on the exercise of
the power are twofold. First, the Central Government or
the State Government, as the case may be, must form
an opinion that it is necessary or expedient to grant
immunity to such a person. The reasons for such an
opinion are required to be recorded in writing. The
second limitation on the exercise of the power under
Section 64(1) is that it can be granted only
conditionally — the condition being that the person
granted the immunity must make a full and true
disclosure of the whole circumstances relating to the
contravention. The immunity is limited only to the
offence in respect of which a tender of evidence is
made [Section 64(2)]. If the condition subject to which
the immunity is granted is not fulfilled by the person to
whom the immunity has been tendered, after recording
a finding to that effect by the Central Government or
the State Government, the immunity shall be taken to
have been withdrawn and such person may be tried for
the offence in respect of which the tender of immunity
was made or for any other offence of which he appears
to have been guilty in connection with the same matter.
The underlying rationale of Section 64 is that the
Government/NCB which is vitally interested in getting
hold of the culprits, must be allowed to assess the
strength of the evidence available to it and if necessary,
bolster its case with evidence of an accomplice.
Therefore, the section serves the same purpose as the
grant of pardon to approvers under Section 307 CrPC.
"39. Assuming there is a conflict between the powers of
the court under Section 307 CrPC and the power of the
Central Government under Section 64 of the Act, then it
must be held that Section 64 would prevail both on the
ground that the Act being a special Act overrides CrPC
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[CRLMP-9574/2022]
which is a general Act and also because the later
enactment must prevail over the earlier one."
(Emphasis Supplied)
6.
Thus, it is obvious that the provisions of section 64 of the
N.D.P.S. Act & Section 306 Cr.P.C are entirely distinguishable and
the safeguards provided under section 306 of the Cr.P.C. are not
applicable for pardoning immunity under section 64 of the N.D.P.S.
Act. Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act and Sections 306 of the Cr.P.C.,
both provide mechanisms for tendering pardon to an accomplice
to obtain evidence. Still, they differ significantly in their authority,
application, and scope. Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act grants the
Central or State Government the power to grant immunity to an
accomplice before or during a trial. Conversely, Sections 306 &
307 Cr.P.C. are judicial powers exercised by Magistrates at the
stage of pre-trial or by the Courts of Session at the stage of postcommittal.
7.
In the instant case, though there was no need for the
prosecution to apply for pardoning the accomplice under the
provisions 306 & 307 of the Cr.P.C, as the powers are exclusively
vested with the Government, however, even it is assumed that
Section 306 of Cr.P.C are applicable then also the procedural
safeguards such as the statement of the accomplice before the
magistrate under section 164 of the Cr.P.C has been taken care. As
far as the contention that the respondent has wrongly been
enlarged on bail on transgression of the provision of section
306(4), is also misconceived as the provision reads as under:"(4) Every person accepting a tender of pardon made
under sub-section (1) -
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[CRLMP-9574/2022]
(a) shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the
Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the
subsequent trial, if any;
(b) shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in
custody until the termination of the trial."
8.
There is no provision in Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act pari
materia with the provision prescribed under Section 306(4) of
Cr.P.C., which imposes an embargo of detention on a person
granted pardon until the culmination of the trial. Therefore, the
contention that the respondent has been wrongly granted bail vide
the impugned order is incorrect.
9.
Upshot to the above discussion, the instant petition and bail
cancellation application is accordingly, dismissed.
(PRAVEER BHATNAGAR),J
Ashwani Kr Srivastava /-39-40
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